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PREFACE. 
In this thesis I argue that an explanation of Themistokles' 
absence from the strategic of 479/8 can beat be found in his desire 
to be in a position to creates situation in nellas'in which the 
Athenians themselves would choose to follow what would otherwise have 
been the unpopular policy of abandoning interest in Ionia. This 
policy was the necessary corollary of Themistokles' aim of striving 
for Athenian hegemony in Hellas. The devious methods he'felt obliged 
to use illustrate the demos' independence-of its leaders' opinions. 
This background explains the sources for the transfer of hegemony. 
It is held that Themistokles was influential in Athens until his 
ostracism in 470. 
The success of leading politicians depended primarily on the 
intrinsic persuasiveness of their arguments, the reputation they could 
win from personal achievement, and on an attractive personality, ' and 
less on reputation deriving from family prestige and°pbiloi"connections. 
The influence of Themietokles can perhaps be seen in the record 
of military activity in the 470e. Until 470/69 when the anti-Persian 
drive which culminated at Eurymedon (465) 'began, actions were 
undertaken only against Eion, Skyros and Karystos. 
Conflict over foreign policy forms the background to, and immediate 
cause of the Ephialtic reforms, which were a practical attempt to 
secure the demos' sovereignty in the face of Kimon'a unconstitutional 
behaviour and of his manipulation of existing controls on magistrates. 
The decision to embark on a war on two fronts in 460 was a , 'serious 
blunder. The failure of Athenian leaders to prevent this course of 
action requires the assumption either that they were unable to diseuade 
the demos from adopting a popular course of action, or, more probably, 
that they dared not oppose the demos' Wishes. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS. 
1) Ancient sources. 
a) The following abbreviations used in the text and notes warrant 
explanation. 
AP: Aristotle, Athenaion Politeis; 
Diodes refers to Book Eleven of Diodoroa Sikeliotea, unless 
otherwise epeoifiedt 
U. S Aerodotoa; 
Pl. 1 Plutarch; works abbreviated are Ar. v Life of Aristeidee; 
K. q Life of Kimonj Th., Life of Themistoklee; Thes. 9 
Life of Theseus; Per., Life of Perikles; Mor., Koralia. 
Referenoes to the 'Lives' are aocording to the system used 
in the Loeb series; 
Thuo. i refers to Book One of Thuoydidea, unless otherwise epeoified. 
b) The following ancient writers will be cited. Each author's number 
within F. Jacoby's collection (Die Fragmente der griechisohen 
Historiker, Berlin and Leyden, 1923 -. ) is listed only here. In the 
text and notes I cite the author's name and the number of the relevant 
fragment (fr. ) of his works 
Diodoroa Perießetea, 372 
Ephoros, 70 
viii 
Ion, 392 
Kallisthenes, 124 
Krateros, 342 
Ktesias, 688 
The Marmor Parium, 239 
Philoohoros, 328 
Stesimbrotos, 107 
Theopompos, 115 
o) Only for those sources which might not be readily available do 
I cite a particular edition. (Most are, in fact, available in 
extract in Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes). Here are the details of 
editions to which reference will be made by editor's names 
Dials: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 
ed. by H. Dials,, 9the ed* by W. Kranz, Berlin, 1960. 
Dindorf: Aelius Aristides, ed* by G. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1829. 
Scholia Graeca in Aesobinem at Isooratem, ed* by G. 
Dindorf, Oxford, 1852 (Nachdruck, Hildesheim, 1970). 
Edmonds: Elegy and Iambus, eds by J. M. Edmonds, London, 1954. 
Lyra Graeca, ad* and translated by J. M. Edmonds, London 
and Cambridge, Lass., 1964. 
Hill, ueiggs and Andrewea: Sources for Greek History, ode by G. F. 
Hill, new edition by R. Meigge and A. Andrewes, Oxford, 
1951. 
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IIudes Scholia in Thuoydidem, edo by Co Rude, Leipzig, 1927. 
Kocka Comicorum Attioorum Fragmenta, ed. by T. Kock, Leipzig, 
1880.. 84. 
Konters Ccholia in Aristophanem, edo by W. J. W.. Koster, Groningen, 
1975-89 
Killer and Kiessling: Theodorus ! eteoohites, itisoellanea, ed* by 
M. C. G. Müller and M. T. Kiessling, Leipzig, 1821. 
d) Other abbreviations relating to ancient sources are$ 
IG: Inacriptiones Graeoae, Berlin, 1873 -. 
MLi See Bibliography under R. lieigga and D. 11. Lewis. 
POzyt The Oxyrhynohuc Papyri, ed. by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. 
hunt, London, 1898-. 
SFQt Supplementum Epigraphicum Graeoum. 
2) Miscellaneous. 
6 
ATL: see the appropriate alphabetical position in the Bibliography. 
LZJz A Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by R. G. Liddell and 
R. Scott, revised by R. 9. Jones, Oxford, 1968. 
R. E. Pauly, Wissowa, Kroll, Real-EncyolopMdie der olassisohen 
Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1894 -- 
- All dates are B. C. (except those in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries). 
x 
- 478/7 designates the official Athenian year. 47917 refers to 
the part before, 478/L the part after January ist. 478-7 refers 
to some point in the two Julian years 478 and 477. 
- words which should have been italicized are underlined with a 
broken line, thus. 
- when no page reference to the work of a modern author is given 
in the notes it means the whole work is relevant. 
- In the notes the expressions "see text above" and "see text below" 
should be understood from the point at which the number of the 
note is placed in the text. "Above" and "below" refer the reader 
only to points within the chapter in which the directions occur. 
- Further abbreviations and explanations are given under "Bibliography". 
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INTRODUCTION. 
In this thesis I seek to reconstruct and explain the course of 
Athenian politics in the period between the victory of Salamis (480) 
and the dispatch of aid to Inaros (460) and on this basis to. 
characterize the relationship between the demos and its leaders. 
In 508 Kleiathenes bad won popular support for measures which 
made it easier for the 'average' Athenian citizen to dissent from the 
political opinions of men higher up the social scale whom he might 
otherwise have felt obliged to support. For the period 508 to 480 
the sources are such that I despair of trying to analyse the effects 
this freedom may have had on the nature of politics. But after 480 
we have sufficient information about the, effects of Athenian policy 
and about the opinions and relationships of leading men to allow us 
to draw fairly reliable conclusions on the relationship between the 
demos and its leaders. 
One of the remarkable features of fifth century Athenian society 
was the practical development of a system of government in which a 
large proportion of the population (relative to known earlier and 
later societies) took an active part in the decision-making process. 
The kernel of this system wan the Assembly of adult males. The 
probouleutic functions of the Council of 500 (the Boule) rendered the 
system of mass Assembly practioablej selection by lot and other 
limitations on the powers and composition of the Boule make it certain 
that despite a higher proportion of wealthier citizens serving on its 
the Boule's interests were those of the Assembly. Yet in the fifth 
century the Athenians continued to choose their leaders (almost) 
exclusively from the traditional rulingq aristocratic families. It iss 
xii 
therefore, not impertinent to attempt to assess the extent to which 
these aristocratic leaders, apart from the restrictions imposed by 
rivalries among them, could still hope to influence the demos, and to 
assess how much advantage the 'average' Athenian had taken of the 
opportunities Kleisthenes had offered. 
Our period forme a unity in two ways,, It is*with the strategic 
situation created by the Salamis victory that the possibility of 
aggressive actions against Persian interests in Asia emerged, and it 
was this possibility which posed the greatest problem for Themistokles' 
hopes of expanding Athenian influence in mainland Hellaa. The tension 
created by these two-directions in foreign policy was to provide the 
principal source of*political conflict in Athens until, with the 
conclusion of the alliance with Megara, and the dispatch of aid to - 
Inaros in 460, both directions were simultaneously and uncompromisingly 
followed, with disastrous consequences. 
Our- interpretation of the events of 460 attests an obsequiousness 
to popular opinion in Athenian leaders which seems to have been 
recognized by the demos as undesirable, and Perikles, at least, avoided 
this weakness in the years to come. The tendency in first discernible 
in Themistokles' attempts to execute his policies, in 479. Our period 
thus marks an identifiable stage in the development of the relation- 
ship between the demos and its leaders. 
The sources are such that our conclusions on this relationship 
can only be based°on a reconstruction of the course of Athenian, politics. 
Scholarly disagreement on the broader questions of the nature of 
Athenian politics results from disagreement on very specific questions; 
if our understanding of the broader issues is to be advanced, then, it 
is necessary to concentrate our enquiries on-those specific problems. 
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Before we can hope to explain how Athenian politics worked, and 
before we seek to explain the course of events, we must attempt to 
establish as firmly as possible what happened, and, in order to 
avoid circularity, it is methodologically important to keep this 
last aspect independent of the other two, as'far as is possible. 
Thus the bulk of this study will be concerned with the prosaic tacks 
of trying to establish the policies of men, their relationships, the 
events, and the chronology of our period. It is to be hoped that, - 
even if the overall structure which is built from these elements is 
rejected, some of the building blocks, so to speak, may'bo accepted 
and useable in other structures, or that-the analyses of problems 
may serve to focus attention on more precise areas of disagreement. 
I have certainly often used the work of modern scholars in this way. 
For the parts of the reconstruction which are hypothetical I make no 
apologies, until it can be shown that a hypothesis is either'superfluous 
or inýconfliot with evidence which has not been shown to be worthless. 
For the sake of clarity I give here an outline of my approach and 
of the main arguments and conclusions. 
Any interpretation of Athenian polities in the 470a is to a 
large extent dependent'on how we-enviaage Themintoklee' position. 
After his presence at the Amphiktyonio council in (moat probably) 478 
the-only securely attested mention of him before his ostracism (almost 
certainly) in 470, is his choregia for Phrynichos in 477/, b Perhaps 
more surprising is his absence from the record of military activity 
in 479. Zoholars have tended to assume (few rely on Diodoros' 
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evidence) that Themistokles' influence declined very soon after 
Salamis, and various reasons are advanced to explain the assumed 
decline. I try to show (in chapter four) that none of these 
explanations are convincing and that, in fact, there'is nothing beyond 
his absence from the strategia of 479/8 to suggest that Themistokles 
suffered a decline in influence. One of the explanations offered is 
that Themistokles disapproved of the strategy adopted for the 479 
campaign. That Themistokles advocated facing the Barbarian on land 
is, however, shown by his speech to the Athenians at Andros, recorded 
by Aerodotos. In chapter one I argue that we may take this speech 
as a true statement of his opinion, in particular, by showing that the 
earlier speech to the council of strategoi, also recorded by Herodotos, 
in which'Themistokles-advooates a quite different course of action, 
deserves no credence. But Themistokles' views on foreign policy do, 
indeed, provide the explanation of his absence from the 479/8 strategic. 
The attempt to locate Themistokles' post-war policy occupies 
chapters two and three. It is suggested that his treatment in 480 of 
the islanders who were subjected to visits from the Greek fleet may 
be a foreshadowing of a purely imperialistic position which be 
envisaged for Athens in the Aegean in the near future (chapter two). 
In an outline of Themistoklest post-war policy (chapter three) I argue 
against the existence of a Themistoklean "Ionian policy" prior to 480, 
and aooept-the'deduction, that Themistokles cannot have wanted to pursue 
the war against Persian interests in Asia because this would be 
incompatible with his well-attested anti-Spartan stance-in the 470s. 
However, in view of the silence of a hostile tradition as to any 
Themistoklean statement-to the effect that the Athenians should 
abandon interest in their Ionian kinsmen in Asia, I consider it 
xv 
impossible that he ever admitted publicly his views on this question. 
The evidence is sufficient to allow us to assert-that Themistokles 
envisaged Athenian domination of the Aegean, and, through diplomacy 
and protection, friendship with powers in mainland and western Greece 
which were not friendly towards Sparta, with the aim, of, seouring, 
ultimately, the hegemony of Hellas. 
The intensity of Athenian feelings towards their Ionian kinsmen 
should not be doubted; but by. a close analysis of the 479 naval 
campaign (chapter six) it can be shown that the Athenians had not 
given their generals with the fleet any guidelines on Athenian attitudes 
to a possible commitment to protection of any Asiatic Greeks. Thus it 
is fair to assume that the question had not been debated in, winter 
480/79, and., it is argued that. the question might be expeoted. to arise 
after the end of the 479 campaign. Now, the failure of modern scholars 
to provide any. oonvinoing reason why Themistokiee should have been 
barred from occupying the strategia in. 479/8 invites the assumption 
that, he chose not to stand for election. Since it was: not out of 
protest at the strategy for. 479, I suggest (still in chapter six) that 
such, a choice becomes perfectly credible when explained as, a desire to be 
present in Athens at the time of the Persian defeat, primarily in order 
to engineer ,a 
situation in Greece. in which the Athenians themselves 
would. oonsider it necessary to postpone any plans to make war in-Asia. 
At any rate, this suggestion would. help to explain Themistokies' 
alarmist reaction to the . 
Spartan, proposal concerning walled cities - 
outside, the. Peloponnese, and his reaction to the presence of 
Peloponnesian ships at Pagasai. His behaviour might be hoped to have 
other effects which would contribute to-the realization of his plans, 
and we can see a measure of success in some of the actions of the 
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Athenians in 479-8f in particular he seems to have achieved his 
primary aim by these devious and dangerous methods, in spring 478 
no orders were given to the generals with the fleet concerning involve- 
ment in the Asiatic mainland. 
If this interpretation is accepted than an important illustration 
of the nature of Athenian politics is won. Despite remarkable achieve- 
ments and popularity, and despite the fact that his rivals for 
influence were cautious about criticizing him, Themistokles was not 
sufficiently confident of his away with the demos to advocate a course 
of action - the abandonment of interest in mainland Asia - which be 
knew would be unpopular. The implication that the decisions of the 
demos were to a degree independent of the wishes of "influential" 
leaders, and that popular views influenced the policies of politicians, 
can be confirmed in different ways throughout our period. 
Our interpretation also'ob viates the need to assume that 
Themistokles had lost any prestige by 478. In general the sources 
which can be seen to be referring to the mid-470s mention the names 
only of strategoi. The proper conclusion to be drawn from their silence 
about Themistokles is that be probably did not occupy the atrategia. 
It would be-a mistake'to confuse tenure of office with influence. 
Themistokles''aohievements had already won him a position of respect 
in the city. He bad no need to absent himself for long periods from 
Athens, the place where decisions could be influenced. 
It iss I submit in chapter seven, much easier to accept the best 
evidenoe'for the transfer of hegemony against the background of 
Themistokles' attempts to execute his policy. Thucydides is 
unequivocal in stating that the Spartans were happy to transfer the 
hegemony, and other good sources support him. There is evidence that 
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Aristeides and Kimon made contact with officials at Sparta during 
the 478 campaign concerning Pausanias. By postulating that this 
contact also resulted in a private agreement between the two 
Athenians and influential men at Sparta, aimed at thwarting 
Themistokles' sucoess, Spartan reaction to the transfer becomes 
intelligible. The positive and friendly attitude of the Spartans 
undermined the excuse Themistoklea had created for not pursuing the 
war against the Persians. Yet the formation of the anti-Persian 
Athenian alliance did not represent a public defeat for him, since 
be had not opposed the idea publicly. He continues, I believe, to 
exercise a discernible influence on the direction of Athenian energies 
throughout the rest of the 470x. 
(Chapter five justifies rejection of three points from the 
tradition dealing with the battle of Plataia, two of which, had they 
been accepted, would have required a different interpretation of events 
and policies, while the third (the "Temples clause" of the Oath of 
Plataia) would have deprived us of a subsidiary reason which-helps 
explain the military inactivity of the Athenians in the 470x). 
An interpretation of Themistokles' position in-Athens, and of 
Athenian foreign policy, is substantially affected by the chronology 
we-accept for the period 478/7 to 465/4" For example, were it possible 
to believe, as most scholars do, that the flight of Themistokles, which 
coincided with the siege of Naxos, was in 470, it would be possible to 
date Themistokles' ostracism in the mid-470s. The closeness in time 
to the formation in the early 470s of a "grand alliance" of the three 
most aristocratic families, and all enemies of Themiatokles, would 
make it attractive to explain his ostracism primarily as a result of 
the concerted efforts of that alliance. Such success in removing a 
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highly successful man would testify to the immense strength and 
extensiveness of the political influence of aristocratic families 
with the broad mass of the demos. We should be forced to explain 
Themistokles' success in the 480s as the result of a series of " 
changing alliances with aristocratic leaders, enabling him to divide 
them and have them ostracized one by one. Joining forces again'in 
the early 470s these aristocratic leaders with their factions could 
then have had Themistokles removed by all directing their 'olientelae' 
to turn up on ostracism day and inscribe 'Themistokles' on the sherd. 
The picture of political life emerging from such a reconstruction would 
bear more resemblance to Attika in the first half of the sixth century, 
or to the later Roman Republic, than to the politicalethos which 
emerges from the reconstruction we shall in fact be proposing. As-it 
is, the fact that Themistokles fled past the besieged island of Naxos 
not earlier than 466 makes it virtually certain that he was not 
ostracized until 470. It is this fact which ultimately justifies'the 
method and conclusions of the chapter (nine) on success in Athenian 
politics, to which I shall return in a moment. - 
That the siege of Naxos was still in progress in 466 also has 
important consequences for the history of the Athenian alliance. It 
means that in the period of about a decade between the capture of Zion 
and the siege of Naxos the only securely attested military operations 
were the capture of Skyros and the war against Karyatos. Thus to 
assume, as most scholars do, that the alliance simply got on with the 
job it had set itself requires. us to postulate disturbingly much = 
eotivity of which we have no evidence. 
I have set out the case for accepting this date for Themistoklea' 
Plight past Naxos, central to my thesis, in an article, and have not 
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repeated the arguments here. In chapter eight, though, I conclude 
that we may place greater confidence than is usually done in a fairly 
conventional chronology of the early years of the alliance.. I accept 
Diodoros' 470/69 date for the beginning of preparations for an-anti-. 
Persian drive (and at the beginning of chapter twelve argue that we 
should accept it), relating to this other evidence of preparations and 
training, and reasons are cited against adding substantially to the 
record of military activity in the 470s. _ 
In chapter nine it is shown that the first three main exploits 
of the Athenian alliance, against Eion, Skyros and Karystos, conform 
sufficiently closely to what we discerned of Themistokles' policies 
for it-to be permissible to believe that they represent the results 
of his attempts to: guide the, decisions of the demos{ I deny that they 
can be cited as evidence of a decline in his influence. In order to 
assess the relative importance of certain recognizable categories 
which-contributed. to. political success I try to estimate the standing 
of Themietokles, Aristeides, Kimon and Xanthippos. in terms of these 
categories, namely, 1) the intrinsic persuasiveness of a men's 
argumentel- 2) his good"repute, deriving from a) his family, b) his 
own achievements, a) an attractive personality; and 3) support from 
philoi. As we cannot determine. precisely the degree of political 
success or failure experienced by these leaders in the period 478/7- 
475-4, and as some of the categories remain unknown quantities, the 
limitations of the approach are frankly admitted. The most important 
conclusion, though, that philoi connections cannot have been decisive 
in the success of leading politicians is assured by the remarkable 
of fact that despite. the formationXthe. "grand alliance" Themistokles 
managed to escape ostracism until 470. This limited conclusion is 
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filled out (at the end of chapter eleven) after an interpretation 
of the period 475-4 - 470 to provide a characterization of Athenian 
politics in which success is dependent primarily on the intrinsic 
persuasiveness of a man's arguments, reputation deriving from personal 
achievement, and an attractive personality. 
Having demonstrated in chapter ten the necessity of dating a 
high-handed security drive by Sparta within the Peloponnese to the 
late 470s (as well as considering the chronology and interpretation 
of events in the Peloponnese generally in the period 4787-4654), it 
is suggested in chapter eleven that Themistokles' reactions to Spartan 
behaviour helps to explain the military inactivity of the Athenians 
between Karyatos and the beginning of preparations for the anti-Persian 
drive. It is argued that Themistokles' probable interpretation of 
Spartan ambitions caused a degree of suspicion of the Spartans, and 
that Themistokles would have advocated supporting the anti-Spartan 
movement in the Peloponnese. His proposals were ultimately rejected 
but were not without appeal. Some indirect evidence can be found to 
support the view that aid to the anti-Spartan movement in the 
Peloponnese was'an issue'at this time. Inference, and the evidence 
of Aisohylos' Persai is used to account for the Athenian rejection of 
Themistokles' proposals, and the increasing popularity of those of 
bis enemies. ' 
The rejection of Themistokles' policies is not in itself an 
adequate-, explanation of his'ostraoism. The sources permit us to 
explain it-as a response to his arrogance, and as a reaction to his 
refusal-to drop his pressure once the considered opinion of the 
majority, of the demos had been reached and (probably repeatedly) 
demonstrated. This reaction was prompted not only by the practical 
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desire to remove the focus of dissension for security reasons, but 
also by a sense of impropriety at the implied refusal to recognize 
the rule of the demos. 
The period of Kimon's supremacy is not very interesting (chapter 
twelve). The evidence suggests the city was totally, committed to the 
new anti-Persian offensive and that Ktmon's supremaoy was unchallenged. 
His exploitation of his position and of the nervous atmosphere in 
Athens reveals Kimon in an unpleasant light. 
In chapter thirteen it is maintained that the debate in the 
Assembly in 464 in which Ephialtes spoke against, and Kimon in favour 
of sending aid to,. the. Spartans sparked off a public debate on the 
precise spheres. of influence which Sparta and Athens should enjoy. 
We have evidence, that by 462 the Athenians had concluded that parts 
of }akedonia should be fair game. for Athenian aggression without 
impinging on good relations with Sparta. Kimon disagreed. 
, 
That the 
Athenians wished; to, maintain good relations with Sparta is proved by 
the dispatch of aid a second time, after the decision to invade 
Makedonia. 
Kimon's refusal to obey the demos' orders to invade Makedonia 
was a revolutionary act challenging the sovereignty of the demos. 
The acquittal of Kimon by the Areopagos demonstrated the partiality 
of that council, and enabled Ephialtes to muster sufficient popular 
support to divest it of the powers which it had been using to promote 
politicians with a pro-Spartan policy who were friends of Kimono and 
to penalize . those, who were his enemies and who were less concerned 
with preserving good relations with Sparta. Thus, confliot over foreign 
policy explains the background to, and the immediate cause of the 
. 
reforms in constitutional practice. The reforms of Ephialtes were a 
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practical attempt to ensure that the sovereignty of the demon was 
respected by magistrates, and the least partial judge of that was 
the demos, or'a microcosm of it. There is no reason, therefore, to 
postulate, at this stage, a theoretical belief in the wisdom of 
expanding areas of popular participation in government. 
The fact that'tbe demos sent Kimon with aid`to Sparta shortly 
after be bad disgraced himself over Makedonia and the subsequent trial 
may be taken an evidence of'the'political maturity of the demos, in' 
so far as it was disoerning'enough to accept an element in a man's 
policy even though the man himself was discredited. The evidence 
shows that Kimon was-ostracized not only as a scapegoat for Athenian' 
anger at the Spartan insult to the Athenians in 462, but also because 
he refused to accept the decisions of the demos. ' 
In chapter fourteen I note the' evidence which suggests that after 
the Spartan insult, the Athenians were envisaging going to war with 
Sparta and perhaps her allies, too. - Although alternative chronologies 
are not impossible, an objeotive4ssesement of the evidence does 
suggest that the Athenians chose to support Inaros in 460, at a time 
when the alliance with Wegara had made war with Korinth, and probably 
other Peloponnesian League members, virtually certain. There is every 
reason to see the acceptance of a war on two fronts as a serious 
blunder. 
In order to explain the failure of Athenian leaders to prevent 
this course of action I argue that it in necessary to assume 'either 
that despite the prestige they had won as a result of the events of 462v 
those who advocated expansion in mainland Greece were incapable of 
deterring the demos from its desire to prosecute the war against Persian 
interests; or, that they sbyed away from opposing a course of action 
xxiii 
that was obviously popular. For reasons given in the text I believe 
that the second alternative is nearer the truth. Two explanations 
of their timidity suggest themselves. Remembering the various 
assertions of the demos' dislike of men who refused to accept the 
judgement of the majority of citizens, they remained reticent. The 
implication of this, that the policies of leaders were to a degree 
determined by popular views, is also contained in the second explanation. 
Having learned from Themistokles' fate there is some reason to believe 
that a man who advocated expansion in mainland Greece had felt obliged 
to adopt an anti-Persian stance. Such men now lacked the courage to 
shift their positions as circumstances required. While Kimon's clumsy 
attempts tö steer the state in the direction he considered best 
to 
amountedAa rejection of the traditional sovereignty of the Assembly 
and was, therefore, unacceptable, the lack of leadership in 460, and 
perhaps throughout the next six years, led to disaster. It was probably 
this experience which created a climate in which Perikles' peculiar 
relationship with the demos could flourish. 
i. 
CHAPTER ONE. THE HALT AT ANDROS 
Herodotos (8.109) preserves a speech made by Themistokles 
to the Athenian fleet at Andros. But before we can make use of it 
we must deal with the historical and historiographical difficulties 
presented by the section (8.108-111) in which it is included. 
The problem is that while we are in no position to doubt the 
historicity of Themistokles' speeoh to the Athenian sailors (see 
below), discouraging sailing to the Hellespont, Herodotos, by 
having Themistokles propose the opposite course in what must have 
been a closed council of strategoi1, casts doubt on whether 
Themistokles' public speech represented what he in reality considered 
the beat course open to the Greeks at this stage. We would have been 
bound to accept Herodotos', presentation of Themistokles' shift of 
opinion were it not for three interrelated elements which arouse 
suspicion. The most damaging to the integrity of his account is his 
comment on Themistokles'. public speech, dissuading the Athenians 
from destroying the 
. 
bridges, that 
----ýý-ý. _GIOQ 
i4 va. üv, (___xa9O 
v'TO (11.8.109). 
This at least establishes the probability that the tradition IIerodotos 
is following at this point has been adulterated by a knowledge of 
subsequent events- and warns uaato be on our guard. This is obvious 
and requires no further discussion.;. Themistokles then sends Sikinnos, 
the man who. had delivered the first message which had brought about 
Salamis, with a second message-to the King. The presence of Sikinnos, 
in particular, has led scholars to doubt the historicity of this 
2. 
second message. By analysing the tradition of a second message 
we shall be able to show 1erodotos' version to be so thoroughly 
manipulated with, the intention of compromising Themistokles' role 
as to encourage us to-interpret the third suspicious element, 
Themistokles' extensive plagiarism of Eurybiades' arguments, in 
a-way which will allow us to locate with confidence Themistokles' 
real views on strategy, and perhaps on policy,. _in 
the wake of the - 
victory. of-Salamis . 
It might have been possible to rejeot Eorodotos' seoond message 
..., outright, , had it not been for Thuoydidee' aooount of part of., 
Themistokles! --letter to Artaxerxes 
(137.4). The passage has caused 
some difficulty4 and the interpretation, I offer is not the only one 
possible. Themiatoklea. admits that he, did. Xerzes great harm so long 
as he, -Themistokles, was forced to defend himself from Xerxes' attack. 
He claims, however, that while Xerxes was retreating, in danger, he 
did, him-an even greater , servic e. But before be relates this new 
ä-yQRöv 
Themistokles adroitly prepares the ground psyohologioally by reminding 
Artaxerxes: of the. two: Themistoklean. servioee already known at court, 
i 
: 11-oc for whioh, independent of the new. olaim, _ 
he deserves favour 
I'vo -opFAurcv- 
(, ýpdya, 5 T7 '(- --rc_ 
"e 
-2 aAa/j-- 
IV, 
FWJ2i5-. ', rPoo-g,, -o, 7 a'a. zo, T, öC'_ $i? aü röv. o ü... ä 
He thus wrote,. Ivbelieve, of the, warning he cent before Salamis 
that-the-, Greeks intended, -to; retreat, -and also of,. the--second warning 
he sent,, conoerning the-bridges. . Themistokles reminded Artaxerxes 
of these two'aete of friendship: partly for the favour he might expect 
from them,:,, but, also. to: make more plausible his new claims The third 
service which Themistokles claims "he rendered Xerxes while he , Aas. ,., 
3" 
actually in retreat was that the failure of the Greeks to destroy 
the bridges Was due to Tbemiatoklee' own'efforts; Thuoydides 
6" 
rejects the truth of hia claim 
Some aoholars have denied that the Greek should be taken ae 
indicating that=a message conoerning£the bridges was sent by 
Themistokles7: =lt is, however, safer to"interpret Thuoydides as 
indeed referring`-to some kind of second `message . And it ist . in my 
view, -beyond-doubt'that Thuoydides believed this message, like the 
one TES 'c va, x'ciPja"E&Jg , was also sent from 3alamis9 
There is no good reason'to doubt the reliability of this section 
of Thuoydides. It'is difficult to imagine that,, if Themistokles 
really did send'euoh a letter to'Artaxerzee, he could hope to get 
ý11 away with referring to anon-existent message . Hignett said that 
Thucydidea' reference to salamis as the geographical origin of the 
12 
second message "looks like a more slip". Before we consider thin 
judgement let'ue look`at"the other important sources for the second 
message. 
Plutarch (Th. 16.1) has Themistokles, still at Salamis, propose 
sailing to the Hellespont and breaking the bridges to Ariateidea, 
but not, however, in earnest. Aristeides uses the arguments of 
Herodotos' Eurybiades concerning the effect this would have on the 
King to counter - the' proposal: -' Themistokies then sends as messenger 
the captured eunuch Arnakes to-tell the King that the Greeks had 
decided to sail to the Hellespont-and break the bridges, and that 
he should depart in all haste but that Themistokles ý4fý(Pý ýqüö 
OLf [. ý.. LYUýj_ Q. L Q, TPS ß0. p öU lty ()(, 5 __/CG%ý_. 
ýlý111Výýitf 
(Pl. The 16.4). The effect of this ? PoVk fl, 5 of Aristeides and 
Themietokles'was't6 reduoe enemy, numbers at'Plataia and its motives 
4" 
were patriotic (Th. 16.5). In the Life of Aristeides (9.3 - 10.1) 
Plutarch gives substantially the same account, though the content 
of the message has become _YU _XXEZV 
Eýtt T&5 YiqupaS S5V EAjYLt5 
O4F-6ecu.. f ad, -J£a_ 
ßo vAö jj-V-'v' (Pl. Ar-o 9-4)- 
It would be difficult and unwarranted to propose two distinctly 
different sources for the two Plutarch accounts. The 'Themistokles' 
should take precedence. Plutarch was most probably influenced 
unconsciously in the 'Aristeides' by the Herodotean message (H. 8.110)9 
though meaning to follow here the obviously non-Herodotean source 
he used in the 'Themistoklea'. 
If Diodoros (19.5-6) preserves Ephoros accurately, the latter 
also interpreted Themistokles' second message as patriotically 
motivated-(_cf. 59.2). -, The context suggests that the message 
originated from Salamis.: There are verbal similarities between 
Diodoros' and PlutarohSs-('Themistoklea') accounts. In Plutarch 
(Th. 16.4) the'message to, the King was that. -t65 t`EV 
¢Eý ýcý dýdorctac 
Yw v0. UýýiCw_Ký ; dras CLVa7[ LY el$ Tov Ey tOvToV kt T-6 a kam 
ooav [2], 
6F ý, c, L-oýozk7 bE Kry6öf. t. Evo 
ßao, ý£tw5 
ý7QPacvvi 'rKrul£zV 
c r%vautä, äl attay_ýaý__ýýPaýoüa-9Qý ,.. rQV 9ö ý(34PßaP S 
ýýQS ,ý_ý. 
AT 
ý E32 S Yöuc &+1 i 
In Diodoroa (19.5-6) it 
. is 
that Aov6L, 
__ 
C. Cn 
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£ t1- rb 'ýr£Üý'Atn_ A is ty `ºVý QY J3 Jo 
_Sto7Ccp 
Ö 
ao-c! £Ü 
7tcert£v'aS Töc ýö oc ýc, ýt,. - . Z'q_t 
Xi Bavo'rkJ rc. tý 
- S- ö Sý- I ý.. 
., 
f-yc 
`, r3J 1 T9S F-LS. _T Ao-`av EýovoSoU a--cF- Twv `HA ývwv 
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Despite the olose"correspondence., Diodoros' account - let us assume 
5" 
it is also Ephoros' --does differ from Plutarch's in two points 
of substance. In. Ephoro s, Themistokles is-alone in perceiving 
the advantages tobe. had from encouraging Xerxes'esoape; and in 
Ephoros it is Töv (i. e. Slkinnosi 
ii. 8.75) whom, Themistokles-sends-, as messengerl3. Nonetheless, 
Bauer rather surprisingly found Plutarch's use of Aristeides $looks 
most like Ephoros'14. Now Ktesias says, U y£L_ ., 
p 
Kat.. cOfpKýf-OV, (fr. 13) 
and in the=epitome, of,. Phýotios: there, appears a few lines further a 
royal eunuch whose name ; 
in the. manuscripte is corrupt 
(MOLTaKCLsj 
McuccLxo-S (N2taixa, 5)). and suspioiously similar to 'Arnakea' . The 
complete, text , of 
Ktesias_is likely, to have mentioned, or meant, 
the-eunuch Arnakes referred to, by Plutarchl5. Uxkull pointed to 
Plutaroh'e. uae. of_Aristeides,,. to draw the conclusion that he. must 
have been drawing: on Ktesias, and this is more logical than, Bauer's 
deduotion16.: Recently,, Podleoki has found "the similarity of wording 
between Plutarch, Themistooles 16.6.,.... and Ctesiaa" grounds-for 
suggesting, Plutarch was drawing on, Ktesiasl7. The suggestion is. 
acceptableq. and. with it, the, corollary that, Ktesias most probably 
located the geographical , origin; of the message, like Plutarch,, at 
Salamis., ý. Y, ... 4 
There is good. reason to, deny that Plutarch was drawing on 
Ephoros18. And, there seems equally. good reason to deny that, Ephoros 
was drawing, on, Ktesias here. The. one. has Themistokles working alone 
and sending, Sikinnos,,.. the; other involves. Aristeides and hast. 
Themistoklee send Arnakes. And yet the correspondences in setting, 
content, motive, ; 
in 
_the =effeot , of , 
tbe message, ; and of 
language 
between Plutarch and. Diodoros are striking and_do. require explanation. 
6. 
The use of a common source by Ktesias and Ephoros would help to 
explain both the similarities and differences in their accounts, 
as preserved by Plutarch and Diodoros. 
The putative source would have the geographical origin of the 
message as Salamis, its content directing the King to head for the 
Hellespont and warning him of the intention of the Greeks to 
destroy the bridges. The motive and effect would be to reduce the 
danger to the Hellenio'forces on land. It needn't have mentioned 
the name of the'meseenger, `but may have. It probably mentioned, 
like Plutarch, Themistokles' expression of goodwill to the King. 
The source could have been fellanikosl9. But whoever our postulated 
source mightbave been, the evidence argues against a more tinkering 
with the Herodotean version. Take, for example, the introduction 
of Aristeides into the tradition, as we know it from Plutarch. This 
is usually excused as a 'substitution' of Eurybiades, and indeed it 
is clear that Aristeides'sarguments are modelled on those of 
Eurybiades at Andros, recorded by Herodotos20., But the fundamental 
differences between the'two traditions are made all the more clear 
by the application of this episode to both. In the anti-Themistoklean, 
Herodoteanýacoount-the implioationýis clear that Themistokles'is not 
expressing his. own opinion which-has been previously set out in the 
council of strategoi, but is adopting the arguments of Eurybiades 
to win a (therefore undeserved)-reputation for £3 o, k, 
'1 (se" 
below). This device, however, when' transplanted to the tradition 
favourable to Themistokies, loses its raison d'etre, and the rather 
mechanical surgeon who is guiltyýof the operation is forced to 
provide"the'clumsy expedient of, -explaining that sinne-Themistokles, 
as his main source made clear, was himself well aware of the 
7" 
advantages of-encouraging. the, King's retreat, Themistokles must 
have been 'just testing' Aristeides when he suggested breaking the 
bridges. Ephoros has'most-probably reproduosd our putative -v 
original'souroe`more`accurately than'Ktesias by having Themistokles 
alone perceive the advantagesof the King's swift retreat. 
The existence of `two -fundamentally different, traditions' con- 
corning the°seoond message is also'deteatable in the different 
geographical `origins, : Salamis'"and'Andros, , and this is connected 
with the oöntent`of«the messages: From Salamis the Greek`ýfleet 
sailed off north-east'in the"direation"of the Hellespont (and'-Andros). 
Had this aotion followed a'message, -to-the King 'concerning the 
bridges'ffit`is veryddiffioult to`imagine that==it should have claimed 
that Themistokles' C- A, Fýý1ýyaý -ýa. S &t9 _ýouýof1AvoU5 
ÖCwKKIY_ 
14 Z Eve 
C 
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v 
(H. 8.110)'ýw: ýHad be? s° It_can*t. have-looked: like, itl _-No, 
the content -- 
of. the, message aa. eent`from Salamis was-consistent with the actions 
of-the Greekssý. -, they"intteended'to; break. -the`., bridgee. l.. Conaistent-with 
both-the, geographical, -origin-and. with, the content is, of course, the 
motive-behind the message s,. -From'Salamis,: and shortly before the 
Greek': flaet-, began the pursuit, whatever else Themistokles may have 
been alleged to: have hoped'to gain; by informing the King of the: 
danger he pas-in, the effect can only: _have'been 
to encourage: bis- 
departure, `and, so to"reduoe°-the sizeiof bis-land forces. -t 
So-it is reasonable to°ýsee behind Diodoros and Plutarch, -e 
ultimately, '-an"internally consistent source which had'Themistokles 
alone inaperoeiving the advantages tobe. had of making the King, 
believe his lineýoffconmunioations-and*of, retreat were in danger, ° 
8. 
that he sent a message shortly after Salamis, before the Greek 
fleet began the pursuit, and that the. main-motive and effect were 
patriotio21. ,: 
Onto this core aocreted, elements based on passages 
of Herodotoe (the:, introduction of Aristeides, and perhaps Sikinnos) 
or simply invented, (Arnaken, as messenger )22, 
In view of, the evidenoefor a , tradition locating the geogr- 
aphioal origin of the message e t, Salamis, it would seem best to 
accept Thuoydides' apparent location of, it. there, too, rejecting, 
instead, Hignett! s judgementthatThuoydides has made a slip 
? 30_, 
Tbucydides, thus arguably supports the tradition of a patriotic 
message, for, as we, saw, the Salamis origin was an integral element 
of that tradition24.,. 
_We 
must, bring historical considerations to 
bear to deoide, which of the two4traditions. appears the more- authentic. 
Essentially, in deciding.; between, the two traditions we are 
deciding whether the meesage, was patriotically-motivated, or whether 
Themistokles wasp as -, Herodotos_says, ooming to some private arrange- 
ment with,, the ging, for some purpose to his own advantage. It is 
not necessary to argue that if we accept-the historicity of a second 
message we should accept a patriotic, motive behind it25. But 
acceptance of this assumption. oarries with it a; ohain of further 
requirements. >' If the motivation was. patriotio it. is difficult to 
imagine what, else it can. have , 
hoped ., to achieve other than a with- 
drawal of . 
Xerxes',. forces. ", The warning that, the Greeks intended to 
r break the bridges, along with apromise. of attempted delays might 
have been hoped to achieve this aim. ;, Conversely, a narrator, who 
wished to exclude from the message any, element which could-be 
interpreted as having served the Greek cause had to exclude this 
element. -Thus we find in_the, unpatriotioally. motivated ßerodotean 
9" 
message the news that the Greeks had decided not to break the 
26 
bridges, thereby giving Xerxes no reason to hurry. whether the 
Greeks "had decided not to destroy the bridges" or whether they 
"intended to" depended, to all appearances, on the geographical 
origin of the message, as we have seen. 
Now, Herodotoa (8.107) was well aware that the possibility-. 
of the Greeks breaking the bridges was haunting the ging's mind. 
He'was also aware that, despite the Persian fleet's withdrawal, it 
appeared that the King and his land foroes might be preparing to 
remain (8.108). The emphasis which he gives to the immediacy- ith 
L 
which the Greeks decided on pursuit - 
? 
X£C. 
u_rvz'c- 
(8.108) - is striking. But it has long been recognized that between 
the awareness of the Persian fleet's withdrawal and the decision to 
, pursue, Herodotos "has assuredly omitted to report a 
debate at 
Salamis"27. Herodotos' very emphasis may, then, suggest that he 
or his sources were at pains to pass over this period, which would 
have been the time a patriotic message should have been sent, and, 
of course, in the other tradition was sent. The divergences between 
Herodotos' account of'the second message and that discernible in 
the other tradition represented by Thucydides, Ktesias, Ephoros 
and Plutarch are not, then, incidental, but are determined by the 
motive which each tradition attributes to Themistokles. If we 
reject a selfish motivation we must reject the accompanying details 
of content and geographical origin which are determined by it. I 
suggest that Herodotos' account is based on the refusal of his 
sources to entertain the possibility of a message which could have 
had an effect (and so motive) beneficial to the Greek cause, and 
10. 
that the other modifications' consequent upon that shift of 
emphasis have been made. 
But if this is so, what could the circumstances - and in 
view of Thuoydides' evidence-let us call them the historical 
circumstances 
28 
- of the patriotic message have been? An answer 
to this will also enable us to explain how,, if our criticisms of 
Herodotos' account are valid, he-wsa able°to present euch a false 
account to-an Athenian audience composed im part of sailors who 
had served in the fleet in 480. - 
If, as suggested, a debate - presumably a council of etrategoi 
- was held before the decision'to'pursue, and if a patriotic' 
message was sent informing'the Xing of the'intention to break the 
bridges, we may deduce that-the council, perhaps'on Thenistokles"' 
proposals, decided on`the message, and further, that it was under- 
stood by the strategoi that they should, of course; not`in faot'sail 
to the Hellespont29. , Burn comments that "if auch a new deception' 
was praotised, it would be'desirable to support it by'letting the 
Greek fleet ... disappear°from. Xerxes' sight-in an easterly 
direction; and if some''of, the-men, in the elation'of viotory, 
indulged in loose talk on the theme'on to the Hellespont' - and 
Berodotos says the Athenians did do so ... - there was no reason 
for the generals to 'play down' the idea until'it had served its"' 
turn"30. The sailors'will have been'led to believe that they, were, 
eventually going to the. Hellespont. I think we"must accept 
Plutarch's notice (Th. 16.4) that the message contained a promise 
to the King that Themistokles would attempt to cause the'Greek fleet 
delays in its pursuit, probably by carrying out operations in the 
Aegean in the form of descending upon-the islands, for otherwise 
11. 
the King would have no ohanoe, anyway, of reaching the Hellespont 
before the Greek fleet3l. The Persian land foroes were on the 
move within 8A 
(a5 4/40a_5 
of the battle (11. "8.113). Halting 
at Andros, theýnews of Xerxes' movements must have made the 
generals believe that the ruse had worked32. The halt at Andros 
will have corresponded to the promise of delays made by 
Themistokles in the message, as}will his public speech dissuading 
the Athenians from sailing one and as such needn't have given the 
King the impression that his line of retreat was finally out of 
danger. 
During the 470'a Themiatoklee laid claim to the credit due 
to him both for the first message and, to a lesser extent, this 
second one33. He had reduced the numbers at Platsia and sentýXerxee 
scuttling off with all the panic described by Aisohylos (Pere. 
480-514)34. Their delight in this may have made the sailors choose 
to ignore as unimportant the fact that in so doing Tbemistokles had 
bad to trick them into believing for a few days, in the flush of 
victory, that they were in fact off to the Hellespont. But the 
charges of Medism brought against Themistokles in the 460e 
encouraged his enemies to put into a suspicious light whatever ';. 
actions of bis would sustain it. ' Salamis, of course, protected 
the first message from aspersion. But-if. the content of-the second 
message, keeping the central 'Themistokles bids you leave', could 
be' changed from "I'll try to atop the Greeks" to "I have stopped 
them" the message would be-completely robbed of its patriotic 
motive, and only that of winning the King's favour remained. For 
a message bidding the King depart quickly to be patriotic, it 
presupposed that a decision not to-break--the bridges had been taken 
r 
12. 
before its dispatch35., `Now, asýfar as the sailors were concerned, 
and as far as they-could remember, the decision not to sail on 
was in fact taken at 'Andros. ` It gras thus particularly easy for' 
Flerodotos' sources to blur the distinction - vital'to'a correct 
understanding of the message - between theseoret'Salamis`decision 
of the council of strategoi and-the public "decision" at-Andros. 
The seoret-deoision-and the duping of the sailors it implied will 
not have been'dwelt upon by Thenistokles or the sailors, and may 
have been quickly forgotten. So Themistokles'"detractors sought, -* 
to locate the message"still 'after Salamis' but also after the' 
speech`to the Athenian sailors at Andros; 'a'matter of-days later. 
The shift was easy to make, and the inaccuracy it involved was in 
a matter which was veiled in the secrecy of the generals' council, 
but nonetheless one sufficient to putTTbemistokles' message-in a 
completely different, -discreditable, if not quite traitorous, light36. 
So-it is easy to understand how Herodotosl-version could be 
a corruption of a, patriotic version-which was plausible, 
internally consistent and whose essential framework is confirmed by" 
Thucydides, Ktesias, Ephoros, and-Plutarch. "But'all these writers 
are post-Uerodotos. ý Should we not=assume that they represent a 
more "Umformung-einer--originale Vorlage? "31 That would be'the 
proper conclusion if we were able to dismiss Ucrodotos' version 
as an invention., But-Thuoydides' evidence makes it unsafe to deny 
the existence of-a second, meseage. Eerodotos'-version of-it is 
certainly not a historically correct account, ' not so much-because 
13. 
of its-obviously prejudiced assumptions and its, pointlessness . 
but more-because it could not have become known in the form he,, 
represents it. -There is nothing in it which would make Themistokles 
or his aides boast of it38. And so it is preferable to accept the 
version of-the message found in the other tradition as, being nearer 
historical reality, and as being the original form of the tradition, 
seeing Herodotos' version as a-stage in-a process of modification 
designed to discredit Themistokles39. 
. The results we have obtained on the question of the, tradition 
of a second message affect our approach to Herodotos' account of 
Themistokles' opinions as expressed at Andros. Most obviously we 
must deny that in the council of strategoi there was any discussion 
of , 'breaking 
the bridges. But this does not explain why Herodotos' 
sources-portrayed Themistokles in this putative debate as proposing 
breaking the bridges, when his public position as expressed in the 
speech to the Athenian. sailors must have, been widely known to have 
been to take the opposite course. Our answer may-seem less}bold, -- 
if Herodotos' sources treatment of the second message, and. of 
p'nesiphilos' role. in the strategy of Salamis are borne in mind. 
The former shows how consistently they were prepared to follow 
through their manipulation of. the. tradition, and., the latter provides 
a direct, though less subtle,, precedent of_a device which can be 
shown to be used here, -namely 
implied plagiarism. 
The arguments which Themistokles brought forward in dissuading 
the Athenians were considered to have proved him ß'vß oAoý 
(H. 8.110)40. Like the credit for the strategic insight which won 
the Greeks Salamis, Themistokles could be robbed of the credit for 
this £V Po uk4j by portraying him as having, in reality, been 
14" 
opposed to this wise course of action, and as having adopted it 
under'the necessity of airoumstances. But not only was the wise 
course of action he proposed to the"Atheniens not an expression 
of his real opinion on what should be done, but the persuasive 
arguments be used to'advooate this course were taken from someone 
e1se41. So, in conolusionwe may reject Themistokles' alleged 
proposals in the council of etrategoi at Andros as an unhistorical, 
tendentious device, accepting though Themietoklea' public speech an 
not only historioal but in faot representing his true position. 
Let us examine the two speeches, bearing in mind that 
"Furybiades "' speech is a fabrication and that in it may be 
elements which were in fact part of Themistokles' historical, public 
speech. Generally here Rerodotos (or his source(s)) seem to put 
into Themistokles' mouth only the bare conclusions of arguments not 
out more fully by "Eurybiades", and into 11%rybiades'" speeoh'the 
conclusions of arguments to be stated fully by'Themistokles. This 
may be because elements which Themistokles was allowed to elaborate 
were well known and prominent features of-Themistokles' character 
and policy, or which would simply be inappropriate in a speech by 
Eurybiades. The two speeches fall into three parts which may be 
described as dealing with considerations of 'strategy', 'religion' 
and of 'foreign polioy': I set out the essentials in sohematio" 
form for ease of reference. 
... rM 
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Reference A: FURYBIADES.,. Ref.., 
[B, 
T1M. -1, I3T0KLFS-, -., 
I STRATEGY:. DO NOT BREAK THE-BRIDGES BECAUSE ... . - 
108 ... If Xerxes is forced 109... -. 
Beaten men will rally., 
to remain he will 
rally because other- 
wise 
1) he-will never get 
home, ) 
2) his army will 
starve. 
a When he rallies 3) many will go over 
to him - < 4) he will live on 
the , fruits of Hellas. 
II RELIGION: LET XFRRES FLEE BECAUSE ... 
see under III 109... 1) we have been lucky to beat 
so many men. 
2) The Gods and heroes won the 
victory because 
a) Asia and Europe are not 
for one mane 
b) Xerxes was impious and 
-hubristic-by burning 
homes and temples and 
by , fettering, the seas 
III FOREIGN POLICY _:. 
109 E1 ý(ýQ 
£x£ý Tö 7CaP£öv 
ýýiv 
Since 
let us stay in Hellas in order 
;.. to; 
1) take thought for ourselves 
and, our families, 
2) reshape a dwelling, 
3). take care of the sowing,. 
_ 
108 ... the Persians will. once-we have, driven-the enemy 
not remain after completely awayo 
the sea defeat. -, 
Let us fights Xerxes, 
- . ,. " 
hus let -us sail, to. Ionia-and for his own land, the Hellespont next . springo 
not ours. 
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It is obvious that most of these two speeches, could come 
from one delivery with a logical internal development, thus 
immediate and compelling strategical grounds against hindering 
the Barbarians' departure (I A and B), the general principle that 
fleeing men should not be pursued (II), followed by the religious 
grounds for allowing them to retreat unharmed (IIB). The statement 
of proposed alternative action (III) forms an exception to the 
correspondence of argument and conclusion in the "Eurybiadea" - 
Themistokles speeches for they offer differing assessments of the 
situation. 
Let us look at the possible epecifio propagandist aims this 
division may have had, at the same time considering points for 
and against the authenticity of the various elements. Iobviously 
establishes the implication that Themistokles bad not himself 
perceived the dangers involved in cutting off the retreat, force- 
fully underlined by his earlier (8.108) proposal to out the bridges. 
The arguments put forward against blocking the Barbarians' retreat 
seem, to me wholly applicable to the strategic situation in late 
480 and, - as such, authentio. I am not sure why Macan thinks they 
ignore the naval superiority of the Greeks42. Indeed they seem to 
be based on the assumption that Xerxes' lines of communications and 
supply will be broken,, which was surely the most important result 
of the Greek naval victory43. A further sign of the authenticity 
of "Eurybiades"' strategic arguments is the fact that they do not 
seem to have been influenced by later, probably Themistoklean claims 
concerning the effect that Xerxes' unmolested retreat bad on numbers 
at Plataia. 
It is probable that Themistokles went into the speoifio effects 
17. 
of what a rally by Xerxes would mean, in much the same way as 
"Eurybiades"" does. The- fact that Herodotos' sources do not have 
Themistokles repeat, these arguments, as they did in the case of 
Unesiphilos, is probably due-to-the fact that in. the, latter case 
it was necessary because most people in Athens would not have been 
familiar with the details of Themistokles' arguments in, the council 
of strategoi at Salamis, whereas in our-case it was, unneoessary, 
since most of the audience will have known the strategic arguments 
Themistoklea had put before the Athenian fleet at Andros. - 
The authentioity of IIB has been unwisely doubted. Bauer 
thought"it-evinced a "sonst nicht charakterisierenden Bescheidenheit" 
and that it looked Herodotean rather than Themiatoklean'. Schulte 
followed a similar approaoh45 Themistoklea' attention, at least 
publicly, to the role of the Gods in-the war is, of"course, well- 
attested46. And no, while Ilerodotos may be expressing not the exact 
words of, Themletokles47, the only-grounds for rejeoting'this-element 
in Theinistokles' speech would be to demonstrate that the 
"Denkformen"48 are anaohronietio, which passages in Aisohyloe' 
Pereai prove to be not the oaae49. 
If Themistokles, oan-beAtaken as minimizing his personal aohieve- 
went in favour of thankful piety it-is not difficult to understand 
this as both an attempt to minimize the gOoVOS which might develop 
in response to the extraordinary-¬üSo 
iM the victory will have 
earned him, as well as an expression of sympathy for the outrage 
most Athenians were probably soon to feel on seeing the destruction 
to religious (an3 secular) constructions that awaited them in Attika. 
One of. the religious arguments put forward by-Themistokles in 
that the Gods and heroes-thought-Asia and Europe too great for 
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one man. As we shall see, the suggestion'that Europe'and Asia 
should remain separate is a feeling whiob-fits well with what we 
can glean of Themistokles' attitudes in the 470x. 
Themiatokles may have been expressing a genuine piety. 
The religious arguments put into Theuiistokles' mouth' by 
Herodotos were perhaps too firmly attributable to his own world 
view for Aerodotoo' sources to be able to deny his authorship of 
them on this oooasion. 
Nevertheless, the' implication made in I 'Le mildly reinforced, 
that Themistokles has drawn on elements of the plan he proposes 
from "Eurybiades"I this time, though, he does not merely repeat 
the conclusion of a series of arguments propounled by "Furybiades" 
but takes the traditionally Spartan principle of hon-pursuit 
(P1. Lyk. 22.5) ani adduoes his own religious arguments in ite 
favour. 
In III Thenistokles sets out the pressing basks of reoonstruotion 
which lie"ahead of the Athenians - those of reoon$truotinC their city 
and of securing next year's crop. The actions of Thenistokles"in"°479 
testify to, and prohibit any doubt over the authentioity of these 
exhortations50. This aspeot, of oourae, `-oould find no parallel in 
"Furybiades l" speech. But-Themistoklee, the strategic genius; having 
disoouraged pursuit of those Barbarians who are fleeing, ie well aware 
that there is a good chance of some land forces reoainingt""and he 
implicitly warns the Athenians of this by exhorting them to re- 
construction 7C0. VT£M, 0.3XiX(c T01 ýä4ßapov _ "when we have 
driven the foreigner wholly away"51. 
"Furybiades", however, clearly doos not take this possibility 
into account and believes that after Salamis ©u hcty&Iv ?V Tr 
üPwýCn 'fob nFPcrvýv. This difference between the two assessments 
is perhaps best explained as an attempt to add verisimilitude to 
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this fictional speech by putting. into "Eurybiadee! " mouth-what 
must have seemed to be-the assumption upon which Spartan reluctance 
to engage Lardonios was based. Furybiades' plea: to, fight the 
Persian when-his land is at stake-is also. an attempt to add.., 
verisimilitude, reminiscent as it is of Iierodotos' description of 
Pausanias' 478-campaign 
Jý7n 
(II. 8.3* £. ºý£iv0u £7CoiýuvtD. _ .. 
af} 
x,. 
8.108 : 
_ý¬p aT9S . 
£KJVOU.. 7Co t ££. 5.8' __! 'ýýº1. 
ToV aýCOVa. ) 52 
., 
Themistokles suggests to the Athenians . that 
Xfc. a,.. JT 
ACtPý. 
ý£Wýc4Y EXc. E»irXovrot 
jKai . 
1wvi j5, While. bis proposals 
were certainly in part designed to encourage acceptance of his 
present non-aggressive policy, -by promising 
this campaign for next 
season, there is no reason to . 
doubt that he was, in foot, hoping .., 
for the realization of these proposals53. It can be shown that there 
Is-no evidenoe that Thenistokles had ever been interested in., Athena 
assuming theresponsibility of liberating and proteoting Ionian 
mainland. etates54. Furthermoret bis-policies in the 470a exclude. 
the possibility. of a simultaneous, involvement in, mainland Ionia, of 
which the sources, ,. 
in any. oase, have. no . 
indioation. On . the other 
hand, the. idea«that Themiatoklea'. post-war policy-included. the, aim 
of Athenian. control over the". ßellespont, Thrace and the Aegean makes 
good sense and conflicts with no evidence. In view, of this we .:, 
should understand Themistokles! promise,, to proceed, toIonia in the 
following spring as referring to operations in the Aegean, aiming 
at securing Greek control over . 
the. islands, but not over the. main- 
landjtoo.,: Our analysis. of operations-. inr479 will shoe thatthe_ 
question of. dominating mainland Ionia was not seriously. entertained. 
This is not, to say,; however, that at. Andros many of the sailors did 
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not understand Themistokles to mean mainland Ionia, as well, nor 
that he did not deliberately use an ambiguous term. 
This important statement by Themistokles must have been 
remembered at Athens. ` But one point, however, virtually assures 
its authenticity. As Stein pointed outs, it is clear that in 
the speech Themistokles is envisaging the land battle which will 
finally drive the Persians away as being fought-before the 'season 
is out, and that the Athenians will, having laid the foundations of 
their reconstruction, sail to the Hellespont and Ionia in spring 
479" That the land battle was delayed is strong evidence that the 
speech was not-composed with a knowledge of events subsequent to 480- 
, As a result of our analysis of the two speeches at Andros, 
especially against the background of Herodotos' tendentious account= 
ofýthe'second message, we may not only accept Themistokles' public 
speech as authentic, which, we should have had to do in any case, 
but also reject an fictional the debate in'thi council of strategoi 
at Andrea, including. Themistokles'proposals to sail to the Hellespont, 
and 'ho-take Themistokles' speech as reflecting his real views on the 
strategic situation. This is particularly valuable in that it 
enables us to acoept-with, confidence the implication of the speech 
that Themistokles was preparing already for the necessity of a land 
battle. This conclusion will-'besome significance in reconstructing 
Athenian politics in'the forthcoming chapters. - , Furthermore, while 
Themietokles was no doubt forming his opinions in, the face of the 
immediate problems facing the Athenians in'late 480; --his position 
may be taken as conforming to what will emerge as his post-war policy, 
namely an emphasis on Atbenian-security within ßellas-and the'aim ' 
of controlling the Aigean for, in part defensive reasons as well-as 
securing control of certain vital routes. 
21. 
CHAPTER TWO TITFUISTOKLES AND THE ISLANDS 
Aerodotos continues his narrative of events (8.111-12) 
by telling us that "the Greeks" besieged Andros because the 
islanders i1 5 
ý£µC6torcýto5 XPVLO270- oux F-doca. v. 
There follows the famous speech in which Themistokles holds out 
Ral &va <avcvvto which the islanders retort with 
7C£Viýyoý. kQý cýýtcºý)(avj1V. In chapter 112 IIerodotoa says that for thus 
answering they were besieged, and he comments that Themietoklee 
. _oü 
yap b o4cro 7Cý£OV£Kr£. WV_? _, going on 
to accuse him of sending 
"the same messengers as he used with the King" to other islands, 
threatening that he would bring the Greek fleet upon them if they 
failed to co-operate. Learning that the Andriana bad been besieged 
for taking the Persian side and that Themistokles was 
?v cttV4 
erisr7 the Xa7rCys'tisn-z and Parians sent money, and Aerodoto" 
believes other islands also paid, though he is unable to say with 
certainty. Nonetheless the UT t$a, nhe aaya, were still besieged. 
Themistokles visited the other islands and took money unknown to 
the other generals. 
It is clear enough that Herodotos is using sources here which 
were unfavourable to Themistokles: Accepting this, we must be 
careful not to reject more of flerodotoc' account than the bias it 
reveals warrants. For example, it would be crude to reject the 
prominent role given to Themietokles in the extractions made by 
the Greek fleet1. There is`no contradiction in Herodotos' account. 
He "Makes it clear both that the use of force against Andros and 
'K'arydtbs was backed `by the Greek fleet and that the threat' of 'force 
used against Paros was also from the Greek fleet. There ie, in 
2 
0 
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fact, reason to believe that the Athenians were the moving spirit be- 
hind these exactions. The Athenians will still have been eager 
for revenge (, cf. ß. 8.109). They had supplied the. most ships at 
Salamis, many of which had been destroyed, and they alone of the 
allies had suffered the destruction of their territory. While 
feeling among the Peloponnesians may have been to return, to the 
Peloponnese, later events show that they were willing to help the 
Athenians in the financial burden the war had imposed (H. 8.142), 
and so the exactions of 480 may, well have been received rby; 
the 
Athenians alone. So there are insufficient grounds for rejecting 
Herodotos' broad outline that Themistokles, as the most, influential 
general of the Athenians, was the prime moverw, bebind the exactions 
and that theHellenio fleet supported him in, this3,. 
Rather, it is, the details and interpretation of these operations 
in HerodotoB which arouse suspicion. Most immediate in awakening 
our suspicion as to the, impartiality of chapter 112 is the reference 
to Themistokles' XXEovCILI. Chapters 111 and 112 would seem to 
work on two levels., On the one, which we have already seen,, it is 
tacitly recognized that the demands were officially-made by, or 
at least supported by the Hellenic fleet, motivated primarily by 
the Athenians. On the other level there is an attempt to interpret 
these actions in conformity with traits of Themistokles' character 
which have already been drawn by the malignant tradition4, and, thus 
the actions are attributed expressly to Themistokles' avarioe5. 
W bat of facts? 1 arygtd's and Paros. are said to have sent 
money. The fact that Herodotos isprepared to mention the names 
of these two oommunitiea enoouragea the belief that their olaims 
rested on a well attested. (which does not. mean reliable) tradition, 
23 9 
unlike the rumours of "other islanders" who were supposed-to"have 
been visited. Furthermore, earlier events at both places show 
that they were considered strategically important_(H. 6.99,133-5)- 
The public facts were well-known. Kan$ston had been besieged, 
Paros hadn't. It would not be audacious to guess that Paros paid 
up and Kanfatos refused. The simple fact that Themistokles was 
never condemned for cupidity in connection with the events of-480 
ensures that there was no aase against him6. 
If we are prepared, to reject the truth-of the accusations we 
should at least postulate a context in which they might have been 
levelled. They have often been associated with the charges of 
bribery made by Timokreon of Rhodes (fro l. ) and sinne both refer 
to an alleged misuse of influence for personal gain it is logical 
to attempt to see both sets of accusations as the products of-one 
period. 
Timokreon's fragment 1 was most probably produoed in, the mid- 
4700, as we shall see below. 
The accusations in Herodotos might. bave been made in. late 480 
but they will have fallen on, deaf ears, for we shall, see , that the 
evidence, on. balance, is in favour of, believing that Themietokles 
was at the peak of his popularity: in: Athens and, Hellas in 480/79. 
This, however, is not to. deny that the accusations may have been 
made in 480 to be revived again later. when ciroumetanoes. were more 
favourable to the slanderers. 
Of the early undertakings of the . Athenian Allianoe dorm , to. -, 
the dated Drabeakos diaaater, the. date of the war against XsxSxtos 
recorded by. Thucydides (98.3) and fterodotos (9.105) is the least 
secure. But it is defensible to proceed in the belief that it 
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occurred around 475-47" The coincidence in time of Timokreon's 
fragment 1 and the war against rsrystos. encourages-locating the 
origin of the rfaitfa (and other) charges in `the same context. 
The Karrystians could have levelled their charges against Themistokles 
towards the and of their war with Athens, in the hope of securing 
a milder settlement by claiming that they had already paid an 
indemnity for their Medism as well as suffered an injustice at 
Athenian bands. But it is more likely that the allegations were 
made as the Athenians began to turn their attention again to a job 
which bad been left unfinished. In 480 they had only ravaged 
Irarjatianr territory, and, as we saw, the implication is that 
Zsrifs ax failed, unlike Paros, to bow to allied demands, financial 
certainly, and perhaps politioal, too. We shall argue later that in 
the 470s Themistokles was exercising considerable influence on the 
direction of Athenian military notions. The yatfart accusations 
may have been intended to cast suspicion on and to discredit the 
man thought most responsible for the violent action against 
Klm tos. Ifs as we shall suggest, the war against Karyistos divided 
Athenian leaders and marked a turning point in Athenian policy, we 
would be entitled to wonder whether there was not collusion between 
the Zarfatians and Themistokles' enemies at Athens. 
Whether other islanders who received 'invitations' to join 
the Athenian Alliance in the 4700 made similar accusations remains 
doubtful. It is difficult to imagine that-they should construct 
messengers from Themistokles when otherwise no contact between the 
allied fleet and the various islands was known to have existed in 
480. I suspect that Herodotos' account has crystalized a fairly 
. ... . ': i ce _. i. . 
advanced stage of a growing tradition. It would be easy for the 
tradition to add 'other islands' once the important step had been 
25. 
made of creating "secret' messengers, the! same he`üsed with"the 
King". This'element derives from a stage in'the träditiön'e 
development at least as advanced as the attempt to shift the 
geographical source'of the second message`from Salamis to Andros. 
The original 'fiXaf iian charges, on the Other hand, probably derived 
from the historical reception of Themistokles at Ean$stos to 
negotiate payments etc., before talks broke down. 
It will be appropriate here to analyse Timokreon's fragment 1 
beoauoe it has been held to provide evidence for"events in the 
Aegean in 480. In a familiar format8 Timokreon mentions that while 
some might praise Leotyahides, he would praise Aristeides, the one 
best man to come from Athens since (ebtcL Lato "formed a hatred 
for" (+ýý'00. PC ) Themistokles9. The antistrophe then accuses 
Themistokles of being a liar, of being unjust, and of being a 
traitor who, despite having a senor relationship with Timokreon 
was persuaded by filthy lucre not to bring Timokreon back ( o-d' 
KO-tä r2 v) to his native Ialysos, instead, taking 3T. and sailing 
off to Hell! 
10 
Themistokles is further accused of having restored 
and exiled men unjustly, while others he killed, and Timokreon 
reminds us how, at the Isthmos he acted as "ridiculous host"11 by 
presenting "cold meats, which the guests ate, and prayed that no 
good should come of them to Themistokles"12. 
The most important lines in fragment 1 are the accusations 
concerning Themistokles' acceptance of bribes and the influential 
position that presupposes, and his further activities concerning 
the exile, reinstatement and execution of men. Since Timokreon 
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aas a contemporary of Themietoklee, we must believe that his 
accusations were at least plausible, though we are not obliged 
to accept they as true13. we would like to know to which stage 
of Themistoklest career Timokreon referred these alleged 
activities. Let us examine the elements of the poem to see if they 
shed any light on this problem. 
We cannot be sure what event Timokreon is referring to in the 
last lines. The only account we have of Themistokles at the 
Isthmos is that given'by FIerodotos (8.123-4) of the celebrations 
at which Themistokles was awarded only the second prize. The story 
of the voting sounds absurd, but the fact that no agreement could 
be reached on allocating the first prize should be accepted, and 
with it the fact that there probably were speeches in favour of 
the various candidates. If Themistokles behaved as though he would 
surely be awarded the first prize, i. e. that the celebrations were 
in his honour, we would have an explanation of the "ridiculous 
host". The curious phrase Yu/Pä KP£CL might then be explained by 
taking tYv#CL in the sense of "ineffectual. vain" 
(LSJ s. ve c1UlXpOS II. l ) or "silly" (LSJ s. v. Yu/P'S 11.5 ) and 
KP F, a in the sense of "body, person" (LSJ e. v. K pFaS , 2) so 
as to give the phrase the double meaning of the host presenting 
poor food and of Themistokles as arranging for or presenting persons 
to argue his candidacy but who had only foolish arguments and who 
were ineffectual. 
Most commentators in fact accept that Timokreon is referring 
to the 480 Isthmos oelebrationa14. But even if he iss the con- 
olusion is not of much assistance in solving the problem of locating 
Themiatoklea' alleged deeds, for the temporal oonneotion between them 
27. 
and the Istbmos occasion is not clear; they could be after it 
as easily as beforel5. 
The candidates for praise have been used as a means of 
determining a terminus ante quem for the poem's composition 
16 
Scholars have, wanted to date the poem before : Pausaniaa'final 
disgracel7. This is not very useful because recent research has 
shown that Pausanias did not finally lose all credit until his 
murder, which was most probably in the 460818. 
A little more helpful is the possibility of praising 
Leotychides. He fled to Togea, as, a result of bribery charges most 
probably in 476/519. The observation that either of these men 
could be praised after their, disgraoe does weaken the usefulness 
of this approach20 and the point has perhaps greater weight in the 
case of Leotyohides. But 
,I 
still feel it is slightly safer to 
assume that the poem was composed before news of Leotyohides' exile 
became widespread, let us say pre-474, for there are no reasons 
to date the poem later 
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Timokreon's accusations are themselves more helpful in dating 
the events which they allege, and the most. informative word is 
KCL. -Cay£V - bring backk. At the time Timokreon made this appeal 
to Themistokles be aas already in exile from Rhodes. No one has 
tried to maintain that he was exiled before_Salamis, as an anti- 
Persian activist, for he himself admitted his Kedism (fr. 
3 )22. 
It is necessary, therefore, to assume that he was exiled and made 
his request to Themistokles after Persian power had been toppled 
in Ialysos. 
Before Timokreon wrote his verses, that, is, probably, before 
474,, he bad made his request to Themistokles and had witnessed the 
28. 
latter's involvement-in the banishment,: -reinstatement"and`eieoution 
of men in cities, resulting, we may*, presume, from the part they 
had played in the Persian war. The precise relationship between 
Timokreon's'request and Themistokles' involvement in the=fate of 
the leaders of Greek cities is not clear, but logically it would 
appear to be'close* some scholars have"associated Timokreon's 
request and Themistokles involvement in the internal politics of 
cities mentioned by'Timokreon with Tbemistokles', activities in-the' 
Aegean recorded by Herodotos (8.112. )23 Some have even gone so - 
far an to postulate a"naval expedition'under Themistokles' command 
operating in Rhodian-waters. Timokreon provides no evidence for 
such a'Themistokleen expedition at any time24. Beloob25 argued 
against any association between the events recorded byýHerodotos 
and"the allegations of Timokreon, -though not convincingly. The 
fact that Herodotos, unlike`Timokreon, 'does not mention exiling- 
and reinstatement'activities is not enoughýto disprove that, for 
. _ example, 'at Paros in--480 some political-control was practised26 
Yet it is true, as'Fornara says,. that the sole contact between 
the two-passages is"the theme of Themistokles'-cupidity27. 'It'is, 
indeed, virtually impossible"to-, Ioeate Timokreon's request to 
Themistokles, and so also' the logically and'-it"would appear, 
temporally connected exile and reinstatement-` activities of 
Themistokles, before the victory of'Mykale'. Herodotoe' description 
of the situation between Salamis and L! ykale'in the Aegean creates 
the clear-impression that the Greek fleet dominated only the I- 
Kyklades and that they expected an offensive by the Persian fleet' 
in 479 and the impression beýconveys of feelings in the Aegean is 
confirmed by the public faotsýbe records28. It therefore conflicts 
29" 
with a probability based-on-ßerodotoa' evidenoe to'euggeat that 
the, anti-Pereian, revolution, whioh must have preoeded Timokreonle 
exile, ocourred- before Rykale29. = The, most plausible 'oooasion for 
an anti-Persian revolution at Rhodes, in'partioular at Ialyeoe, 
Is in oonneation with the showýof strength in the eastern 
Mediterranean made by the Greek fleet under Pausanias', oommand in- 
47830" 
Timokreon! a request to, Themistoklea, -then, should be after-478, 
perhaps autumn-winter 478/7, and so probably made-at Athens, where 
he or his messengers will have observed Themistokles' struggle for. 
influence withaAristeides. Plutarch (Th. -21.4., 
) says that there 
was a. -tradition-that had"Themistokles concur in a vote to"exile"" 
Timokreontfor M"edism. Its, reliability has-beenrquestioned, -and it 
is easy to imagine_bow. such a tradition oould grow"up31. The 
failure of Themistokles toxact"upon his guest-friend's request may 
only have become apparent after some years. "2Intervention on 
Timokreon's behalf required positive action. Tbemistokles'may even 
have told. Timokreon. or'his messengers'. that he would do what he 
could32. At any. rate, by the time the poet, bad given up hope and 
composed: his: versesshe: had had time to. observe a-pattern in 
Tbemistoklea': sympathies. towards-ex-Medizers whiab'appeared not to-. 
be dictated purely, by. justioe. It-is not-impossible that 
Timokreon, is merely referring. to a: series of interventions made by 
perhaps a contingent-of., the Greek, or Athenian fleet, possibly led 
by Themistokles.. and occupying only one season, and perhaps parallel 
to. other. major-operations.. This,: is how most scholars envisage the 
factual basiswof, Timokreon! s charges., But in this case we would. 
have to, assume ., either -that <there were no grounds whatsoever 
for 
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Timokreon's charges, or that. Themistokles was in, faot inconsistent 
in his dealings with-the Medizing-leaders in the-Aegean. Neither 
is impossible, but-there should be some basis. to, Timokreon's 
accusations, -and it is difficult to. imagine why Themistokles, should 
have chosen to forgive such men, given that after 478 the patriotic 
causeýenjoyed"tbe greatest potential,, strength in. the Aegean,, and so 
there was no. reason to, compromise. But Timokreonte. observation of 
inconsistency may admit of amore satisfactory explanation4if we, 
refer it to, his comparison-of the treatment leading Medizers like 
himself appeared to be-receiving and the-overt defence Themistokles 
bad already made of certain-powerful Medizing. states at the 
Amphiktyonio-counoil, most probably, in spring 478,. and. perbaps of 
other states, ýtoo, on otber. oooesions33. Timokreon, of course, will 
have taken this defence of Vedizing states as a defence of their, 
leading citizens, which, was, in effect, accurate., Themistokles' 
activities inzinfluencing decisions on-ex-Medizera will have been 
conducted in whatever framework was available, as instances arose. 
The Amphiityonic council was one, _Themistoklea' channels of 
influence on Athenian decisiona, were applicable to states falling 
under Athenian. orbit or, control, and., there<may have, been other,,, 
procedures, within,. the Hellenic League of which-we have no knowledge, 
as well as ad boo appeals to settle, atasis. withjd iddl-Viddal 
communities.. Thus Timokreon's observation of partiality waa, of 
one aspect of Themistoklea', post-war policy, namely-that of gaining 
influence and friends in areas which were threatened by-Sparta and 
which Athens had little hope of dominating herself. -, Y 
So if. Timokreon did not receive a- categorical rejection from 
Themiatokles be will have done well to wait patiently for a response. 
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As we said, it may have taken-some time for a pattern of strict 
treatment of Aegean Medizers, in contrast to mainland and other, 
states, to emerge sufficiently clearly, or simply for enough time 
to pass, before Timokreon finally gave up hope of Tbemistokles 
interceding on his behalf. His decision to"level. bis metrical,,, 
accusations should, in tbat"case, baveýfallen nearer 474 than 478, 
which means about-the same as we concluded was the most plausible 
date for the Martsn charges of corruption against Tbemistokles, 
that is, around 475.4. The public allegations of . the Msr. 3at au 
community referred to a specific event in latee480 and must have 
carried more weight than the. allegatione of an individual. The 
latter offered an explanation of"tbe`continuing failure of 
Themistokles to act upon his guest-friend's request, and by. '-: -, 
implication generalized the specific charge to explain Themistokles' 
inconsistent attitude to Medizers. Timokreon may have had the-, 
audacity to make his charges only against tbe. -baokground of-the 
officialK'arym complaints. 
In-order to establish-the events of autumn 480 we have bad to 
extend-our enquiries into the mid-470s-,, Lot us return to 480 and 
sum up our findings concerning Themistokles' ideas on the islands 
in the immediate aftermath of Salamis. An with his views on sailing 
to the IIellespont, Themistokles' position was first and foremost a 
reaction to the strategic position in late 480. The reaction of 
Andros and I1Cv/1 tba testifies to a feeling in the Aegean that 
Salamis had not decided the issue. Some show of strength was 
essential to create a favourable psychological situation for next 
year's naval campaign, and so they followed up their victory as far 
as possible. All the Greek commanders are likely to have recognized 
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the wisdom of this, as-is shown by Herodotos''etatement that the 
Greeks decided to besiege Andros and Karystos. However, it was 
one thing to show who was-master but another to make reparation 
demands. The purely strategic position would have been better 
served by offering more congenial terms. It is'here, I suspect, 
tbat'Themistokles' influenoe'oan be detected in the Hellenic fleet's 
operations, as Herodotos-suggests. The common explanation given is 
that these actions were in response to'the finanoial"burden"imposed 
by the war. *' It is adequate, and so we are not justified 
insisting ' that- the actions reflect a longer-term-Themistoklean"- - 
policy . That said, it is fair to note that domination of the 
Aegean was to be the basis of Themistokles' defence against Persia 
(Thuc. 93.7 ). and the' actions of autumn 480 also' had the effect of 
demonstrating to the Athenians the material advantages` which could 
accrue from-such domination. The-reasons whioh-'had led Themistokles 
to encourage the-Athenians to relinquish-their claims to naval 
hegemony at the beginning of the war would, if all went well; <not 
obtain much longer. So, like his position over the Hellespont, 
Themistokles' attitude to-the-islands can; -be understood in terms' 
of his later policy, and may represent an early foreshadowing of it. 
I; I r. .. 
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CHAPTER THREE AN OUTLINE OF THFIJISTOKLES' POST-WAR POLICY 
ý-.. 
Salamis had demonstrated Athenian. naval power and had kindled 
great energy in the Athenians, as they had shown at Andros. The - 
war was still in the balanoeq but Themistokles was already looking 
beyond the final expulsion of the Barbarians to. the. new situation 
which would be formed, as his Andros speeoh shows. 
It is necessary to try to deduce Themistokies' post-war policy 
at this stage in our enquiry because it will enable us to understand 
more easily the events of the months between Ootober 480 and spring 
477" 
Podleoki believes that the Athenian commitment to 'freeing'. 
mainland Ionia implicit in-the charter of the Athenian Alliance 
1 
can 
be traced tos. a Themietoklean policy dating from, the late 4908 " 
His theory of-a Themiatoklean "Ionian. polioy" is-based on two faota. 
The first is that Phryniohos wrote a play called 
M, Xj'tou "AkoQt. S 
which brought the audience to tears and which brought Phryniohoe a 
fine of a thousand draohmas_605-äc! cZ/Ltyý6-Qvý-tQ_ýºýrCý., _IGUK6L-. -- 
and a ban on.. further productions of the play (H. 6921).. The date 
of the produotion is not known.. Miletos fell to the Persians in 
49330 Herodotoa makes it clear. enough that the Athenian reaction 
to the play was an expression of- fairly recent - grief in that be, 
compares it with the Milesian head-shaving demonstration at the 
grief they felt at. the Sybarites' fate. It is, therefore, not safe 
to date the production over a decade and a halt-after the catastrophe, 
4 
. But it is far from certain as some. soholare have wanted to-do. 
that the production was in 493/2. ; 4It could just as well be in 494/3. 
or in one of the years. following, 493/2. It is, therefore, not 
5 
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certain that Themistokles was the archon who granted Phryniohos3z 
a choros6. The foot that Themistokles acted as ohoregoa'for 
Phrynichos in477/6 (Pl. Th. 5.4 ) does not, 'in itself, make it 
"highly probable""that he "inspired and encouraged the dramatist" 
on this earlier 
occasion, tool. So there is nothing in the evidence 
which makes an association of the play's production with 
Themistokles a necessary inference. But let us assume, for 
argument's sake "thatThemistocies was in sympathy with its 
theme". Who knows how it dealt with its theme? ' The fact that 
8 
Herodotos'records the Athenians' aotion of fining Phryniohos as an 
expression of their sympathy for the Mile'sians suggests'thst his 
handling of their fate was uneympathetio. At anyy rate, it is hard 
to imagine Themistokles was behind a rather futile finger-wagging 
exercise which them p1ayý becomes if we take it as a criticism of the 
by 493/2 abandoned the Milesians, for 2 there 
could' be''no serious question-of'-further aid to the defeated 
insurgents9. It could as well be guessed that the play criticized 
the Athenians for ever having encouraged Aristagoras, in the hope 
that they"should'keep their-hands-off mainland Ionia1in future 
10 
Podleoki'`quotes 'approvingly the" opinion of How and Wells that the 
play mays"have been intended to awaken the national spirit and 
inspire resistance to Persia, perhaps by seaThis is another 
possible interpretation, and it'does-not imply any interest in the 
12 
protection of Ionia. 
Poilecki's assumption that the play represented an appeal to 
Athenian loyälty`to their Ionian-kinsmen'by an"implioit criticism 
of their withdrawal`may`be influenced by'his belief in Themiatokles' 
association with it -for'he believes for another"reason in an 
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"Ionian policy" of Tbemistoklea. in the 4908 and 480x" , 
This brings 
us to the second fact upon which Podleoki bases his theory. 
8erodotos (8.22 ), records how Themietokles had an appeal. to--. 
the Ionians engraved. on the rocks near drinking-water as the 
Greeks: prepared their withdrawal from Artemieion. He appealed; to 
them on the basis of their kinship, reminding them, (and-the, Karians) 
that Persian enmity towards,; the Athenians was ultimately their 
responsibility. Podleoki-has, both retrojeoted and projeoted_thie 
"attempt to play on the. larger loyalties of the, Ionians"13. He 
retrojects it by seeking to set Tbemistokles! appeal againsta -- 
background in which Themistokles. "seems to-have-been. -the 
leading 
proponent of Athenian assistance to. the. Ionians even after this 
policy had become. unpopular" but. the-only, justification. for this 
claim is Podlecki's belief in. the_association-between Themiatokles. 
and the, production of Phryniohos' 'Capture of Uiiletos', which, as 
we have seen, , even-if-acceptedt provides no secure 
basis upon which 
to reconatruot Themistokles' views on the subject of Athenian 
protection of, mainland Ionia 
14. 
y., 
We, ehall examine exactly how far 
this appeal to, kinahip should colour our=view of Themistokles' 
policy once we: have analysed its projection by Podleoki. 1 
He thinks Themiatokiea' "Ionian policy" paid. off_fully only 
at rykale with the Ionian defections whioh-took plaoetherel5. 
Though the terminology is too, grandiose the identity of the tactics 
at Artemision and.? Jykale. is correctly, recognized., Rowever, there is 
no evidence for Podleoki'stfurther-statement . that atbtbe Samos 
conference Xanthippos "is seen. -to, be, supporting-Themistoolosl con- 
tention at Artemisium. that; Athens. had a right to. count on the 
loyalty, of the Ionian . 
Greeks,. and : 
(by 
. 
implication, at least) also 
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a corresponding obligation to look after their interests"jin which 
he sees a foreshadowing of the charter of the Athenian Alliance" * 
we shall analyse in detail the evidence for the 479 naval campaign 
in chapter six, and conclude that not only did the Athenian 
generals at Samoa give no assurance of protection to any mainland 
Ionians, but also that they had no brief concerning Ionian main- 
landers when they left Piraeus. 
The analogy between Themistokles' appeal at Artemision and 
Leotychides' before Mykale, drawn already by Aerodotos (9.98 )' is 
very instructive. If Themistokles' appeal is evidence of a, polioy 
of protection of mainland Ionians than Leotyohides' appeal should 
also saddle the Spartan king with such a policy. That he as one of 
the Peloponnecians ezpresaly'rejeoted such an idea (II. 9.106 ) 
excludes using Themistokies' appeal to prove he supported protection. 
Leotychides and Themistokles were facing battle against superior 
numbers. Both seiked the possibility of softening their opponents' 
resolve by their appeals. It-is wrong to generalize this into an 
"Ionian policy". Both were pragmatic taotiöal ploys and as the 
example of Leotyohides'warns, cannot be taken as reflecting either 
earlier or later policies17. So there is no evidence to support' 
the theory that Themistokles, in the period before 479 was interested 
in Athenian protection of mainland Ionian independence. 
No scholar'-bas denied that-one of the'major tenets of 
Themistokles' post-war-policy was its anti-Spartanism, and there 
in sufficient evidence to establish it-as beyond justifiable doubt 
18 
policy We shall examine the reasons for this side of ThemistoklesZlater. 
But ifs an the evidence strongly suggests, he was prepared to run 
the risk of a war with Sparta, we are forced to make a corollary 
31. 
deduction. Themistokles cannot have envisaged Athens taking on 
a continuation of an aggressive war against Persia, for, -as as 
Ste. Croix puts it, to attribute to him such an idea "makes 
Themistooles into an utter fool"19. The, advantages to Athens of 
continuing bostilities'can't have been clear, and the prospects 
discouraging 
20. It is impossible to-say with certainty bow' 
detailed Themistokles'ýideas were at this stage but to judge from 
his words at Andros be would appear to have had his sights already 
fixed on re-establishing'Athenian control of the Hellespontine 
route. The events which were to follow, however, and Themistokles' 
role in-them, indicate a complete lack of interest in Athenian 
involvement in mainland Ionia. 
Beyond this negative side of Themistokles' policy there is 
good evidence that he continued to believe in the need for a very 
powerful Athenian fleet (Thuo. '93.3. -7, especially 93.71 Diod. 
43.3; Pl. Th. 4.31 19.1--3 ). while the city's defence against 
the Persians and; -indeed, as Themistokles claimed, against 'all 
enemies' could be-ensured by a well-fortified Piraeus and a strong 
fleet we are entitled to look for more than a purely defensive - 
intention in this aspect of Themistokles' policy. ` As well an the 
indications in the sources that Themistokles was aiming at using 
Athenian sea-power to exercise Athenian oýý. Qýºý 
21 
we would anyway 
be forced to assume that-the cost-of the fleet , which would keep 
the Persians out of. the Aegean would not willingly be borne by 
the Athenians alone 
2The Athenians would take what they could 
get from those they could ' dominate. -' After the Persians had been 
driven from Hellas the use of Xet 0 C%) and ävc-XKj could be given 
full rein . 
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Before we consider the geographical extent of the, ap) ý 
envisaged by Themistokles we must note the problem of status. 
The attempt made by the Athenians at gaining hegemony of the 
Hellenic League (H. 8.2-3; cf. Pl. The 7.3. ) was not significant. 
Her claim was one among others24. She was, 'of course, bound to fall 
in line because of the immediate threat to her existence. However, 
once this threat was removed the Hellenic League itself, and, 
naturally, hegemony of it, would become irrelevant (H. 8.3"). ' She 
would be able to'ignore the existence of the IIellenio League in 
establishing her 
J 
ýCj+-ov-a- of, or : 
ä. 
p P over, other groups of 
Tellenes. The reaction of various Peloponnesian League states was 
perhaps predictable, and it"would depend-"on Athens' areas of 
domination. With her fleet Athens would have no great difficulty 
in dominating the Aegean25. This would oertainly'draw envious 
objection and probably confrontation from Aigina and perhaps Korinth, 
too, but the danger posed by these two states, independent'of the 
Peloponnesian League, would not"'be formidable (see H. 8.42' on 
relative strength). - Later events'would lead us to believe that 
such a naval by Athens would be insufficient to stir Sparta 
to action since it needn't be a threat to her security. Yet in 480 
this may have been'less clear than it is with the-benefit of 
hindsight. Attitudes inSparta Were volatile26 and so her 
acquiescence could not be taken'forrgranted. The solution to this 
problem was also a step töyarde achieving"the second stage of 
Themistoklea' plans for Athens' greatness, and brings rua to rythe 
the 
question of1geographical extent `of ! Athenian äp (º __ envisaged by 
Themi stokle s. 'ý. 
f1 
The sources 'for' Themistokles' post-war ambitions for-Athens 
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have usually been correctly interpreted, as evidence that be 
envisaged Athenian influence as eventually not remaining restricted 
to the Aegean27. But that this must have been . a. 
long-term 
objective can be deduced by the fact that. firat Athens would have 
to secure her maritime as well as the -factthat we have 
Thucydides' evidence (93.7-8) testifying, to Themistokles' envisag- 
ing the possibility of having to face land powers by retiring to 
Piraeus and fighting only by, sea. - Athenian leadership of areas of 
mainland Hellas would be-less simple to achieve than Aegean 
There were, after-Plataia,,, large, important and powerful areas 
of Greece not under direct Spartan influence. They included the 
whole of northern and central Greece (Thebes was perhaps-the least, - 
independent),, Argos and.. the western.. powers.. Themistokles' visit to 
Sparta in 480 may-have acquainted him with Spartan plans to punish 
the tedizers of northern_Greeoe_whioh was soon tobe attempted by 
Leotyohides., A.. suooessful outcome of. such en, expedition would 
result in northern leaders owing allegiance, to, Sparta. The. same 
aim of extending, Spartan-influenoe was behind. her: Amphiktyonio. 
proposals in. springy478. Themistokles sought, to, thwart these aims. 
The most urgent and-obvious motive behind his opposition-was, of 
course, torleave the, -field open for. 
Athenian influence by preventing 
Spartan expansion.,. But beyond this Themistokles' stance had, a 
double-edged effect, and-so,, presumably intention., On the one 
hand, by defending-those-Medizing, states which Sparta, had turned 
against,. Themistokles laid. a. basis of-trust and gratitude between 
them and Athens,; as well as encouraging their resistance to Spartan 
pressure,, and in., some ,, cases 
(Argos); encouraged an already existing 
hostility. He thereby established Athens as the natural protector 
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of states threatened by Sparta. But, on the other hand, it was 
perhaps the effect Themistoklest stance was expected to have at 
Sparta that was to be of more immediate usefulness in furthering 
his aims for Athens. In the counoils of war which he had been- 
attending with Spartans since 481 Themistokles must have at least 
sensed the deep underlying fear which pervaded Spartan thinking at 
this period. To Spartan opinion generally the fact that expansion 
of influence outside the Peloponnese would prove more difficult 
than some had claimed, and so should be dropped, may not have been 
of such great. significance in determining Spartan decisions. But 
the fact that Themistokles' stance had given encouragement, to the 
hostility of Argos will have been a deep psychological blow to those 
signs of budding confidence that the Spartans had shown. Not that 
Argos herself at this stage would present a serious threat to 
Spartan security, but, as events were to show, she had her ear close 
to the ground, -and was not slow to exploit those sounds of dis- 
affection with Sparta within the Peloponnese which were potentially 
fatal to the Spartan system. By rekindling this deep-rooted Spartan 
fear, I suspect that Themistokies was hoping to encourage the 
tendency to isolationism. which Sparta had shown and was to show. His 
most immediate concern in so doing was to discourage Spartan com- 
plianoe in the demands which certain of her Peloponnesian League 
allies-would be making to-forcibly prevent the extension of Athenian 
00 in the Aegean which Themistokles was planning. Thus, as we 
said, the solution to the problem of facing opposition from the 
Peloponnesian League to Athenian naval Co. also laid the 
foundations'for Athenian influence on, the mainland by establishing 
good relations with those states not recognizing Spartan hegemony. 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE ATHENIANS FROM SALAMIS TO LATE 479 
An examination of Themistokles' position between Salamis and 
Plataia will enable us to take stook of the wider political con- 
stellation among the Athenians. Our results will provide a useful 
basis from which, after glancing at a_few points from the battle 
of Plataia, we can go on to see how Themistokles attempted to put 
his policies into effect in the months after Plataia. 
From }Sarystos the fleet returned to Salamis and divided the 
spoils (H. 8.121 )l. Then there was the meeting at the Istbmos to 
award the prizes (II. 8.123 ). Immediately afterwards Themistokles 
went to Sparta where he was honoured greatly (H. 8.124. _)2. 
Reliable 
and direct statements on the relationship between. leadingmen or 
between the demos and its leaders in these months are scanty in the 
sources. We shall note what there is in the course of examining 
the one fact which has assumed prominence in modern scholarly 
reconatruotions, ' namely that Themistokles is not mentioned in any 
account of the two battlea, of 479, plataia and-lykale.. This "in a 
real crux3 and: requires explanation. Before we try to, explain 
his absence we-should make clear that there-are. no grounds for 
believing that he was. on the-., board of, generals for 479/84. Firstly, 
his activity concerning the walls, does not require his being 
strategoe,. ainoe, he could have been, _appointed as 
head of a special 
commission, and there is evidence, later, at. leaat, of a separate 
office of -TEi1o7 O(O5 . .: at= 
Athens5.,, Secondly, Diodoros (27.3 ) 
claims that the Athenians stripped Themistokles of his-generalship 
and gave it to, Xaathippos. This has, been widely reoognized-as 
nothing, more than. an Ephoran explanation of the information found 
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in Herodotoa6. The report must be wrong because of the different 
tribal affiliations of the two men. But Diodoros' evidence is 
useful in showing that Ephoros found it necessary to offer an 
explanation of Themistokles' disappearance after 480, and this 
strongly suggests that be was unable to find any evidence at all 
of his tenure of a atrategia in 479/8. 
I take it as a principle of method that we should add to our 
sources only when, the information they offer-is so apparently 
incomplete as to make no sense. . 
Let us examine the attempts made 
at explaining Themistokles' absence from the strategic. The most 
obvious deduction to be drawn from the failure of a man to be re- 
elected to, the strategia is that be suffered a decline in. .,, 
popularity7. A variety of causes for, this putative decline in, 
popularity-have been suggested, though none is persuasive. The 
most justifiable explanation is that the Athenians were angered by 
elements of Themistokles' character, for it has the backing of. 
Herodotosº, _story"of Timodemos' attack on Themistokles on, his return 
from Sparta in , late 480 , 
(8.125' ).,. We have already noted that the 
elaboration of this notice and IIerodotoa'. eilence, by Ephoroa 
(Diode 
27.3 ) deserves no credit. Furthermore, -ßerodotoa' account would 
appear to discourage any attempt to generalize thin individual's 
anger at Themistokles. , -He strongly 
implies that, Timodemos' attitude 
was not representative of the communia opinio of leading men when he 
8 
says Timodemos was ..,, -_OL)_ 
TWA tý. l. ýalY. £Cc1ýl, _ 
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Nor does,. the story in Herodotos give any grounds for believing that 
suoh, a sentiment was widespread among the demoa9. As a result of 
theme diffioultiea, thieexplsnation has found little support in 
modern soholarship19. 
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More popular has been an explanation of Themistokles' absence 
from the sources whichhas absolutely no ancient testimony to' 
support it, and relies on only a superficial plausibility. That 
the Athenians were angry with Themistokles for having abandoned 
Attika cannot be accepted since the decision was taken by the whole 
demos, and the price that would have tobe paid'for the sea victory 
was olear from the beginningil. 
Another approach has been to see his disappearance as the 
result of political and/or strategio disagreements. There in 
evidenoe of a difference of opinion between Sparta and Athens during 
the winger and spring of 480/7912, though the belief that there was a 
fundamental division in Athens over strategy is nowhere suggested 
in the sources and in based partly on'an erroneous interpretation 
of Thenistokles''views as expressed at Andros. As we saw, he 
envisaged the necessity of a land battle13, and so there is no- 
reason to doubt that he in fact fully supported the'strategy which 
was eventually adopted for the 479ýcampaign. This impression, of 
unity is confirmed if we"examine: theaotions of otherr"leading men 
in 480/79-whom we expect to be. Themistoklee''rivals. = 
There in-no doubt 'that Kimon ': emerged' during the V 47Oa as a 
leading politioal=and personal opponent off-Themistoklea, though it 
is not-clear how influential-he-may have been in'"the first half of 
the decade (Pl. 'Th. -5.31- 20.4; ; Stesimbrotoa*fr. 3 , ap. "Pl. 
The 24.4 1 
P1. K. 5.4; 10-71 '*1692; ' Ar: 25.7). `Ido"not believe that in 
480/79 Kimon was`suff iciently'influential to pose any threat to 
Themistokles. In 489 he-was rt£LpaKLOV ° Xcvtc&curW'(Pl. -K: 4.3) 
which should mean under 21 (. cP. Pl: Brutus 27.2) so in-480 79 he 
should have been' 29 at mostl4. That be was under .., 
3o in 480/79 
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is perhaps confirmed by the fact that there is no tradition 
linking him with any military command in the Persian war proper15, 
though Plutarch (K. 6.1; Ar. 23.1) clearly believed him to be 
strategoa in 479/816. 
Plutarch (Ar. 10.8) mentions a tradition which claimed to know 
of a decree in which Kimon, Xanthippos and Myronides are to be sent 
to Sparta as envoys, on the motion of Atisteides, and he refers to 
it as an alternative version of a story told by Idomeneus in which 
Aristeides himself went to Sparta as envoy with bitter reproaches 
against the Spartans for allowing Attika to be invaded a second 
time. Plutarch does not mention his source17. The confirmation of 
the existence of a Xanthippos other than the son of Ariphron18 has 
relieved the most glaring chronological objection to seeing this 
as a genuine decree from the year 480/7919 but the fact that not 
only Kimon but also Myronides would be extremely young to be serving 
as 7CPE 6(3£L5 casts serious doubt on either the authenticity or 
the application to 480/79 of the decree20. So it would seem beat 
to omit the alleged decree in assessing Kimon's position. If it 
could have been used it, too might have pointed to internal harmony 
21 
The Kerameikos-ostraka perhaps indicate that Kimon was a 
candidate for ostracism at the same time as Regakles22. The obvious 
deduction to be drawn would be that these ostraka derive from the 
ostrako. phoria of 486 in which Megakles was removed (AP "22.5). The 
presence of Kimon in his'early twenties as a candidate for ostracism 
is not the only difficulty this reconstruction encounters. D. M. - 
Lewis' recent article appeals only for a suspension of'judgement, 
but in my view he presents a-good case for viewing "the deposit as 
a unit" and believing "that it-contains the bulk of the votes cast 
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at an ostracism in the 470's"23. Substantially the same conclusion 
was reached independently by ßicknell24. I take this view despite 
the defence of "current opinion" made by G. I5. E. Williams. 
Mattingly was prepared, to see, the deposit as deriving from more 
than one ostrakn, pboria25, and he has-been kind enough to'aet out°`" 
hits present . views for me by letter 
26.. He still believes in` ! 'the 
487/6 date for the Vegakles oatraka". : He believes only "that some 
Kimon ostrakaroan plausibly belong to the 487/6 context . `.. the '' 
great bulk .., from the 'Kerameikoe, however, " he would "put to 
461"2?. 
_ 
So-the new Kerameikoe oatraka, ° in' the present state: of 
our knowledge ofxthem, do not prove that"Kimon wäs influential in 
the 480e, though their full, lpublication may 
force a revision of=ý 
this judgement. 
Plutaroh(K. 5.: 2-3), telle, a story of how Kimon symbolically 1 1, 
dedioated, his horse'sbridleg, lending support to°Tbemistokles! 
arguments in favour. of, asea defence against the Persian invasion. 
If the, story could be taken seriously it-would presenta picture 
of the young, -Kimon, about4to: enter politioal-life, ' giving public 
28 
support to Themiatokles . 
Conoerning-Aristeides ve. have: a direct- statement on-hiss'"' - 
relationship with Themistokles. Herodotoa -(8.79) 'aaya be was, in 
480, ou -9 
(Ao 
: ý[B(ýov 
Sý- but' that uxo: _ý __ 
__Wdvwv. aco«ü(. voswe ýa 
Mira 
to Themiatokles, in, order to deliver, him. some-atrategio news., --`Even 
if we , aooept., Hignett! s: attaok , on,. the-, historicity ofthis -seotion , 
of Herodotos29. the-tradition would-, eeem. to'reat°on the faot-,. that, 
ex isU n3 
far from friotionlbetweenýThemistoklea and Aristeides, they co- 
operated during the Persian invasion. 
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'Many scholars have doubted 
46. 
that the speeches in response to Mardonios' message in the 
presenoe of Spartan envoys (H. 8.143-4) were, as Plutarch 
(Ar. 10.4) asserts pta-cýýýoý (ýlvýýccrµa. ýPacýu-v zos _ 
31. 
Podleoki, who also doubts Plutaroh's testimony, has, however, 
rightly noted that "the similarity of motif between these speeches 
and Themistooles' address on Andros ... suggest that the sentiments, 
if not dictated by Themistooles, were at least thoroughly consonant 
with-his policy"32. Now I do not wish to try to defend Plutarch's. 
claim as to Aristeidesl authorship of these sentiments, but again 
we are forced to the conclusion that for Plutarch there was no 
tradition of strategic or political differences between the two 
men during the Persian war to make the attribution of Aristeides' 
name to such Themistoklean sentiments obviously suspect. None of 
the remaining incidents between Salamis and Plataia with which 
Aristeides' name was associated provide grounds for suspecting 
friction with Themistokles. 
So muoh for evidenoe33, what of probability? we should work 
on the assumption that Aristeides, Xanthippos and Kimon, and 
certainly others too, would have been very pleased to see a decline 
in Themistokles' influence. But it would be difficult to imagine 
Kimon, probably still too young to stand for the strategia, with 
the burden of his father's disgrace yet to be absolved by his own 
military exploits, enticing or minimizing the successful strategy 
of Themistokies. Aristeides and Xantbippos had been ostracized by 
the demos and their recall was an act of clemenoy, at least in part 
in the interests of unity34. For either of them to have adopted 
an aggressively critical stance towards the so far successful 
strategy and polioy favoured by Themistokles would have been out 
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of line with the intention of the recall and would have aroused 
suspicion and fear of that debilitating factionalism which had, 
perhaps, made a resort to ostracism necessary. Since-we were 
able to find no evidence or probability of a broad-based dis- 
satisfaction with Themistokles, auch an attack would have been 
politically inept and probably counter-productive. Indeed, a priori, 
we should expect to find Themistokles' rivals behaving in-precisely 
the way the skeletal facts we have about them-in 480-79 suggest they 
were behaving: eagerly and conscientiously contributing to the war 
effort and actively cultivating an impression of'co-operation35. 
. tSq, to sum ups the evidence militates strongly against 
explaining Themistokies' disappearance from the. strategia as the 
consequence of a lose of influence and popularity. Belooh, of' 
courses was silly to go so far as to say. "es kann also nicht der-. ` 
geringste Zweifel sein" that Themistokles aas-strategos in°"4798 on 
the basis of the purely a priori arguments he brought to"bearg and 
he has-been rightly criticized36. Yet, the apriori case for 
Themistokles' popularity remains. we should seek an explanation 
of-Themistokles' disappearance which does not'conflict with-the 
probability of his high popularityand which adds as little-as 
possible to the recorded facts. Therefore we; should examine'the 
possibility that Themiatokles chose not to'stand for election to 
the strategic of 479/8, (and perhaps throughout the-decade). If 
viewed in the context of his attempts to-. execute bis post-war 
policy, such a choioe, I feel, becomes not only plausible but 
virtually inevitable. -Firstly,; bowever, we must-glance at three 
points from the Plataia campaign37" 
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CHAPTER FIVE THREE POINTS FROM PLATAIA 
The three points we are to note in this chapter are the 
putative "temples clause" of the Oath of Plataia, the so-called 
"Covenant of Plataia" and the alleged subversive plot by Athenians 
before the battle. 
The sources for the Oath of Plataia date from the fourth 
century (Diode 29.2-4 (Ephoroa); Lykourgos Look. 80-81, and the 
inscription from AoharnaiI). Its authenticity has been widely 
rejected2. The thorough stylistic and historical study of the 
inscription and its relationship to the literary versions by Siewert 
has, in my view, justified believing in the historicity of an oath 
sworn by the Greeks3 at Plataia before the battle4 which included 
the intention to punish all Mediaera5. Only in Diodoros and Lykourgos 
is there a clause swearing to leave the temples in ruins as a 
reminder to later generations of the Barbarians' impiety. The 
omission of this clause by the inscription (and by Isokrates 
(4.155-6) where we might expect mention of it) does not, in itself, 
rule out that such a clause was included in the historical oath6. 
But there are positive objections to its inclusion 
7* The most 
important objection `'is the increasing evidence of the fact that the 
Atheniane, between 479 and mid-century, did undertake religious 
building activity to an extent which cannot be excused as merely 
exceptional to the rule8. This conclusion forces us to seek another 
explanation to account for the relative sparsity in religious 
building activity in the seventies. The most obvious is to see it 
as a reflection of more pressing needs in making Attika viable 
again. The pressures of reconstruction will contribute to an 
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explanation of certain tendenoiea"discernible, in, the 470a9. 
From Thucydides it is clear that after the battle of Plataia 
some kind of oath was sworn relating to the future position of 
Plataia (2.71.2,,. 72.1,74.2_3) though its-exact-nature is not 
certain 
10. 
However, -. by Plutaroh! e, time 
(Ar.. 21.1) the tradition 
had flowered into-an elaborate "Covenant of, Plataia" which .r 
established Fleutherian Games 
11 
and-the sending of probouloi and 
theoroi, pronounced Plataia -o a-0,0(4 k --a .- 
iFPoUS 
and, most significantly, announced the intention-to levy a Hellenic 
army to prosecute the war against the Persians,. consisting of, - 
10,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse eni 100 ehipa. The reasons against 
accepting Plutarchta "Covenant of Plataia" as set out by many 
different scholars are, in my view, convincing12. . 
Another of Plutarch's stories surrounding the-battle, -of.; 
Plataia which cannot be"accepted as it stands is his account 
(Ar. 13.1-3) of a plot by certain men from prominent familien, 
who, having been impoverished by the war, had experienced a decline 
and 
ýl in their influence, Xnow, met secretly intending ,. 
Ka-raýlvcrýv -töv ý7P. 0 
or failing that, to betray the Greek cause. Then,. follows Aristeides' 
solution to the crisis. Like, so many passages in Plutarch, we 
really. have no. wny, of knowing his source. Beyond noting any 
similarities in the tendency of a notice to fit,. in, with other 
elements of the tradition whose reliability we-are in a position to 
judge,. all we can use, are historical arguments. 
On both these counts the notice has nothing going for it. 
Plutarch claims that-the conspirators' primary aim woo: 
Tov It L eq and that only if this, failed Si... 
n"IT ?oc oj__: _) would they-betray the Greek cause. It. is - difficult 
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to-imagine how, given that=the battle was imminent (".. cf. 'Ar: 14.1), 
these men intended to bring about revolution"in"Athens without 
betraying. the Greek cause. Burn, who surprisingly accepts', tbe-°"- 
historicity of'the tale, thinks that the plot was in part'the"` 
result of the fact that the atoning of Lykides (H. 9.5), whose 
suggestion "the conspirators,.. * had"no doubt" supported, " made 
rational discussion impossible. Presumably, ' then, the conspirators 
intended to enter into negotiations with 7Zardoniosl3. So since the 
intention to betray the 'Greek cause seems to be inevitable- it 
follows that a political revolution at'Athens cannot have been the 
primary aim (though it may have been"the intended result of 
ledizing). ", rThe political revolution looks-, like an accretion, based 
probably on-the parallel which occurred some 23 years later at 
Tanagra (Thun. 107.4), to a story of the final escape of some 
attempted deserters or troublemakers. The fact that there was no 
open investigation (Pi. Ar. 13.3) discourages accepting the imputed-` 
motives. 
-Were the story acceptable it would have , provided useful evidence 
of an otherwise unattested sooio-politioal conflict at Athens at this 
time. Burn considers this element an argument in favour of' the 
story's historicityl4. He thinks the question of negotiations could 
be raised at Plataia now because, unlike at Salamis some months" ' 
earlier, the thetes were out of the way. '''The idea that the thetes 
were leas horrified at seeing Attika and Athens destroyed"has'little 
to recommend it. Firstly the thetio class will, not, ` like some of = "' 
the zeugitai', have had long-term. investment in agriculture destroyed 
by'Persian pillage, yet what material possessions they did own will 
have been destroyed., The loss of 4 agricultural produce which the ` 
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destruction will have caused presented the population with'the 
immediate problem of securing sufficient nutrition. It would be 
the poorer elements who would suffer most from this, both because 
they lacked any of their own produce and because of the high'priaes 
imported food would'fetoh. Despite Peloponnesian charity (H. '8.142) 
further devastation would certainly aggravate the shortages. 'And 
beyond the economic level, the destruction of Attika aroused deep 
indignation on an emotional and'religious'level (see Aisoh" Pers. 
809-12) and this was not confined to the three upper census classes. 
So the socio-politioal differences within the Athenian community °" 
which this anecdote implies do not represent an argument in favour 
of its authenticityl and since such conflict is not discernible in 
better evidence for`the period, it may, rather, be taken as 
militating against the story's historicity in the form Plutarch has 
preserved it15. 
Historiographically the tale has nothing to recommend it either. 
While it does not fit into the pattern of anecdotes illustrating 
Aristeides' justness, it does demonstrate his sagacity and diplomatic 
skill ( Cf. Pl. Ar. 3.21 16.1-31 20.1-31 23.1-5)" Busolt and 
Hignett thought the unreliable Idomeneus was probably Plutarch's 
source16. But later in the same Life Theophrastos is adduced as 
the source for the opinion that in public matters Aristeides did not 
always act according to his own standards of justice (Ar. 25.2). 
Our tale of the Plataian conspiracy would have been an appropriate 
example to illustrate Theophrastos' point, in so far as his solution 
to the crisis was based on expediency rather than justice 
(P1. Ar. 13.2). The example repeated by Plutarch as illustrating 
this trait, concerning Aristeides' association with the transfer of 
52. 
the treasury from Delos, if this event occurred in 454 as is 
usually believed, does not inspire the hope that Theophrastos 
required historical accuracy from the examples he chose to illus- 
trate, his pointl7. Burn thinks Herodotos failed to, hear of the 
plot because nothing came of it18. Yet Herodotos claims to be- 
sufficiently well-informed about Aristeides to be able to form his 
own judgement (8.79), and according to Plutarch the alleged plot 
was extensive (Ar. 13.2). Berodotos' silence confirms the internal 
historical difficulties of Plutarch's account and casts serious 
doubt on it. There might be a core of historical fact in the report 
of the two named men who went over to, the Persians, obviously 
expecting a different outcome to the battle, but it is of noý 
19 
significance for our inquiry. 
w- 
ý. 
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CHAPTER SIX- 'THEMISTOKLES'. ATTEMPTS TO EXECUTE HIS POLICY;, "; 
-.. Let us take up the point we made at the and of chapter four 
that-a decision by Themistokles not to stand for election to the, 
strategic of 479/8 is not surprising if viewed in. the context of 
his attempts to set the direction of. -post-war Athenian foreign policy. 
Itwas not-obvious in early spring 479 that by the end of the 
campaign-season-the Persians would be decisively beaten in mainland 
Hellas and that the. Aegean would be in the hands of a Greek fleetp 
not obvious, but by no means unimaginable. To suggest that 
Themistokles had this situation in mind in spring 479 does not 
require an improbable degree of prescience. At any rate, -whenever 
such a situation should arise, the question of the status of the 
Asiatic cities would re-emerge. 
As we noted in chapter three, extensive expansionýof influence 
in mainland Hellas and in the"Aegean would be incompatible with an 
aggressive war against Persian interests on the Asiatic mainland. 
The possibility of the Athenians wanting to embark on such a war 
after the defeat of the Persians was real indeed. Firstly, it must 
have been-widely known that the Spartans and their Peloponnesian 
allies would never take part. in: a sustained prosecution of-the war 
at such a distance. The idea of involvement in Asia had been 
decisively rejected by Sparta in 498 ($. 5.50) and recent experience 
can have done nothing to diminish the,, belief in Spartan timorousness 
concerning extra-Peloponnesian military activities. Now there can 
be no doubt that the Athenians felt. a genuine and deep emotional, 
tie with their Ionian kinsmen, -as the twenty ships sent in 498 most 
clearly illustrate (II. 5.97)1. The performance of the Ionians at 
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Artemision (H. 8.11) and Salamis (H. 8.85)2, however, must have 
caused disappointment and bitterness (cf. Thuc. 6.82.3-4)3. But 
there was another sea battle to be fought (or so Themistokles will 
have thought) and widespread defection on. the part, of the Ionians, 
made more likely now by the outcome of Salamis,, might. dispel that 
bitterness. And even-if no such defection, occurred, there. is , no 
reason to believe that the desire for vengeance expressed. so,, 
vigorously. by the Athenians at, Andros (ß. 8.109) would be dampened. 
If-the Greeks were victorious in 479 the question of pursuing the 
war would arise in, 479/8. Since, at first eight, we might have 
expected the Athenians-, in. winter 480/79 to have debated on the 
attitude. they should adopt, towards the Asiatic Greeks, in the event 
of,. viotory we. must, in; order. to show that this was not the asset 
analyse the events in the Aegean in 479, with special reference to 
the position, the Asiatic Greeks occupied in the thinking of the Greek 
leaders of . the Hellenic , fleet4. . 
,,... 
The Greek fleet-mustered.. early in spring; 479 atAigina 
(H. 8.131). - As IIignett emphasizes, sinne Herodotos implies that.. -. 
I5ardonioa was still in his winter-quarters in Thessaly when, the 
Sleet . advanced to, "Delos 
ON 8.133), 
. the move must 
have taken place 
in early springs. It follows that Aigina was only a mustering point, 
anyway, , and the,. advanoe to, Delos needn't. be dependent on the six,. 
Chian. exiles. They, arrived-just. after the: last_`Gr©ek contingents 
arrived. They.. aeked the, Greeks , 
Kqx ta. X'a- 
, 
9S T4v 
and, pre suQably, ___? 
xEU (3 4Ö'Y ?yýWv! ý ý/ so. they 
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had at Sparta (H: 8.132). The Greek leaders were obviously" 
unimpressed with the pleas of these then, and' their actions can and 
should be-understood independently. It is true that Herodotos' 
account suggests that the move to Delos was made reluctantly, and 
was as far asýthe Chian exiles could persuade the admirals to goy 
but this may be merely to contribute to the humorous exaggeration 
of Greek fears at sea* We are not told exactly what the fleet was 
expected to"aohieve in 479, 'but'Herodoton provides us with 
sufficient information for us to piece together both what Greek 
leaders of the fleet saw as their minimum task, as well as the most 
optimistic, objectives whiob they had'been aaeigned. In 480 the 
Greeks had been able to man a large fleet, but now that they were 
foroed'to fight on land, lack of manpower kept the fleet down to 110 
ships (H. 8.131)6. The most obvious and essential task which the 
fleet had wis to defend the "coasts of Hellas occupied by loyal Greeks. 
Furthermore, the move to Delos shows'-that it was expeoted to maintain 
the Greek naval superiority ivon at' Salamis in the Kyklades. leere can 
be no"doubt that the Greeks"expected the Persian fleet to return and 
attack theGreek'fleet in the western Aegean. The stand taken by 
Andros' and Ma "yriftma in '480 -after "Salamis testifies that it was a 
widespread feeling. " Herodotos'(8.130) felt it necessary to explain 
at some length why the Persian fleet failed to'take the ötfen'sive 
against Bellas. ' `He also 'sayä nthat the Greeks did not advance boldly 
to Delon ff? Q ý qo, Y .. = oYAs_. -. I` 
PL oýýý (A. a. i32)) 
no doubt beoauae-they expected to meet the Persian fleet. Having 
had no sign of it, ' and being sure they would meet it in the open 
waters beyond Delos if they proceeded (PýTpcu 0, 
JCxýd, '£&4KEe etvo (Ii. 8.132. )_'. _}' wer watted! there, as it turned out, 
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the whole summer. It follows that the Greeks did not expect the 
situation in Ionia to require the Persian fleet to guard it. 
The Greek fleet's move aoross. tbe Aegean. late in, the season, 
was strategically irrational. Speaking of Plataia and Zlykale, 
Herodotos says (9.101) cýTý 'riý5 avTýs! 
ý pas qýuVC gaIVE 
IN .7 r% 
. e/c/ 6Ba, L ý7VO'$ ... 7ý. 
zo3. 
_aA 
CO Jx 
_a_-gi_.. cI6tfPo/v _ýý, 
Qva. 
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He also says (9.100) that:, before the soldiers at Lykale engaged, 
a. -herald's wand was seen on 
the shore, enda4rumour spread that the 
Greeks VyKwCV 
?V 
ýrjOIWTOLCTL 
ýCQj(ö/i VOC , 
Unless we aaoept the_. miraole, with Rerodotos, we have two alternatives$ 
we can reject the synchronism, or offer, come rationalization of the 
rumour. _ 
The oommon_solution, bee been the first, and it has been 
linked with an attempted. explanation of; the Greek fleet'e. advanoe. 
beyond Delos. Belooh,, for_. example, 
7 
argues that it is. obvious that 
an offensive against Ionia could only,, have point if an uprising could 
be hoped for there, and there was no chance of this, he thinks, until 
i'ardonios had been defeated, 
, 
for 
_the, 
Ionians knew that until this was 
achieved they could. expeotno effective support. from helles. Thin 
view does not explain the advancefrom, Delos. If knowledge. of 
L+ardonioe& defeat were. so important it would have been better for 
the Greek fleet, to. havewaited until next seaeon., when, word, would 
have spread. throughout the Greek. areas_, of the, Asiatio. mainland and 
the ialanis of the eastern, Aegean.,.. But in, my,. opinion the deoisive 
reason against believing that . 
Plataiafoocurred. before 
, 
the Greek fleet 
left Delos is that Plataia would . 
have put as many, as,, neoessary of 
the, allie3 land forces in, a, position to man thetavailable triremes, 
as they had in 480, and, to. augment, -the fleet to a considerable 
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extent. So for these two reasons Plataia not only fails to explain 
the advance but in fact would have given the Greeks ýgrounda to- 
postpone"it until next"season8. 'So I prefer to accept our second 
choices some rationalization of the rumour recorded by Herodotos 
must be'accepted. Indeed, Herodotos' quite specific assurances 
about research into the synchronism should command respect9. The 
report of the rumour is far-more vague, -and, unlike the synchronism, 
admits of several explanations. " Fiignett says that the "modern 
attempts to explain the'supernatural element in the narrative are 
not-much better than that'of. 'Ephoros", °"and be is prepared to reject 
outright the whole aooountofýthe rumourlp, I confess to finding 
most of the explanations; inoluding'-Ephoros', quite plausible. 'So': 
the fact that Plataia and"Mykale were fought on'the same day forbids 
any "attempt to explain -the. -move from Delos as a 'result of ýPlataia, 
which, as we"-saw, would'not in any case explain the advance. 
An explanation should ratherkbe sought in the effect that 
some five months of waiting-at'Delos`"had on-the thinking'of the Greek 
leaders. Apart" from, theýeagern®s® for"battle'that such frustrating 
inactivity will have produoed-among"the men with the fleet; the" 
fact that the Persian fleet was obviously"not planning on-contesting 
the western Aegean 'in the eeäson of"479 was a"significant"barometer' 
of the confidence theenemyyoould put in his fleet. xerodotos 
(8.132)+does not say whether--the Chian"exilea"had encouraged belief 
in support'for-tbe Aelleni&Ufleet by Ionian'oontingents of'the` 
Persian fleet. They would. surely"have used'suoh an argument"if they 
could have hoped it would oonvinoe anyone. Perhaps the memory of 
Artemision and Salamis was too -fresh, or- perhaps Hierodotos has' 
simply failed'to mention what the Chians said about the attitude 
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of the Ionians. If the latter is true, the promise of a revolt was 
not convincing enough to stimulate the Greek-leaders to action. 
At-any rate, the Saurian-messengers who came to Delos several months 
later certainly did hold out-the prospect of'widespread defection 
in Ionia-(1I. -9.90). The-cautious stance taken by the Persian fleet 
perhaps lent some credence to this claim. But the information 
supplied by the Samians'about-the condition of the Persian fleet 
may have been at-least-as important a factor in determining the 
decision 11, . But whatever it was that swung-the balance of opinion 
in favour of advancing, two points remain clear. - The advance was- 
strategically irrational since it would have been better to await a 
decision on land, for the reasons we have noted 
12. 
Secondly, if the 
prospect of Ionian desertions was, over taken seriously, it was only 
after the Persian fleet's defensive stance gave substance to the 
Samian (and possible Chian)-claims, and so it is likely that in the 
discussions on strategy and polioy-"which the Greek leaders in winter 
480/79 must have bad-it will-have been assumed that the Asiatic 
Greeks would -remain 'loyal, as, at -Artenvision and Salamis. 'Thing of 
course, -is not to say that defection was not hoped for, but there 
was no reason to rely on it or even to expect it, and so any 
discussion of-the status of, the Asiatic Greeks after a naval victory 
would'have-seemed premature. 
:. This conclusion is confirmed by Herodotos' statement (9.101) 
of. what was almost certainly, the ultimate objectives set to the 
Greek fleet for the campaign of 479. "- If the fleet should defeat the 
enemy fleet in the Aegean they would secure control of the islands 
and the fiellespont. If this interpretation of Herodotos' comment 
that IC' o_ý ýýºýCXoV-zas 
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is correct, then it is clear that the Greeks neither expected a 
widespread revolt on, the mainland (before, during or after the 
battle) nor .__. , , 
intended, in the event of victory, to make 
any attempt at dominating the, mainland cities13. 
When the Greeks learned that the Persian fleet had. esoaped to 
the mainland (H., 9.98).. they considered two courses of actions 
either to return (to. Samos, presumably, but perhaps to Hellas) or 
to proceed to the Hellespont. There is nothing in Herodotos to 
indicate which course the Athenians favoured at this point, but to 
judge from their-attitude. at-Androa. (H. 8.109) and the tenacity of 
their generals-at Sestos later (H. 9.114,1171 Thuc. 89.2), we 
should, if anything,. asaume. them to be, the prime movers if not the 
actual proposers of. the' plan. . 
In. faot Herodotos (9.117) ,, has , been 
persuasively interpretedýasýindioating, that the Athenian generals 
had been speoificallyi ordered, by ., Tö 
A ýv acýwý Ko/vov 
to capture Seaton, the key to oontrol: of the Chersonese and vital 
to control of-the Hellespont1q. SThat the Athenian objective of 
dominating the-Hellespont may have been adopted-by, -the, oounoil of 
strategoi of, the Hellenic,.. Leaeue, maybe suggested by its-intention 
to destroy the bridges. (H. `9.114). If we could be sure that the 
Athenians advocated aailing; on;. to; the Hellespont it would not only 
confirm our impressionthat,: the, position of. the-mainland was 
secondary in Athenian thinking in winter 480/79, but also it would 
imply that the Athenian generals had, no brief concerning the 
mainland, and-so that its position had probably not even been 
discussedl5. 
Denied their-prey, their-confidence heightened . 
by, their enemy! s 
reluctance to fight,. the_Greeks made,, another strategically irrational 
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decision - to fight on land with-the fleet's crews. That it was a 
snap decision, made in the excitement of the moment, is indicated 
by Herodotos' omission of this course of action as one of those 
seriously discussed, along'with 'returning' and proceeding to the 
Hellespont. It would be. wrong to`interpret Leotychides' appeal to 
the-Greeks in the enemy lines (H. 9.98) as anything more than an 
attempt to reduce the number'and spirit of the opponents his men 
were about to confrontl60 
The viotory at L'ykale"waa'over part of the Persian army, as well 
as the crews of °the *fleet. The , Greeks, however, treated' it purely 
as the naval-victory for which'-they°'had been hoping the whole 
summer. It in probably . significant that they chose not to-set up 
a trophy (Ii. 9.106). That they chose to hold their council on 
Samos, not on the mainland; is perhaps also an indication of the 
scope of the victory an they viewed-it. They-had not been 
commissioned with-the task=of delivering a-blow at Persian power 
on-the mainland. They had done, so only in-wpursuit of the objective 
of destroying the Persian fleet, `and`-they made it clear that they 
had no intention of following'up : the potential. ' implications of-the 
17 defeat of the Persian army. 
Let'us examine Herodotoa''acoount (9.106) of the Samos 
conference18. 'The Greeks'sailed back', to' Samos and 'ýA ovAC 
üoVTO__ 
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It is olear from, thisstatement that, the~oonferenoe was based on 
the assumption that there was'no`question of a'-military=involvement 
in mainland Ionia, and the impression given'! is- thatdiscussion was 
intended to concentrate'on the'execution of'the plan. We have 
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seen that the possibility of, some. Asiatic Greeks joining the 
Greek cause seems only, to. have been entertained seriously at a 
fairly-advanced stage. in the season, perhaps shortly after the 
Samianemessengers arrived at. Deloa. This possibility, remote 
though it nonetheless may-have appeared, must have provoked' 
discussion on what.. their-fate. would,. be. The idea of linking it 
with the fate of the ltedizera of, -Old' 
Greece may have had its 
genesis at Delos., But at. -that uncertain stage the leaders would 
hardly have entered: into serious,,. detailed"discussion. At any rate, 
üerodotos', acoount-does not. permit the assumption that the 
Athenian leaders -,. whose attitude,,; as. events were to show, was 
decisive - had expressed. seriousýreservations about the plan before 
the conference.;., 
The resettlement, plan has not gone down well with modern. 
scholars. ; Some, rejeot. it. as aompletely'unhiatorioal20 and others 
think, 
-It 
impracticable,; and so. probablyFnot a genuine proposal21. 
But most scholars. rightlyýreapeat: Herodotos'-olear. implioation that 
the proposal was, madein. all. seriousness. It is notioable that 
there is, no hint in; the: a000unt that: the Athenian objections were- 
based-on practical grounds. 'The'very`readiness to take the proposal 
seriously-in Herodotos'f-aooount. may": lead: ue- to. euspeot one element 
of. his-narrative. : It is, true that:. the -, Greek -intention 
SEK_a-zF_4JetJ 
the, Medizers of: north and¢central-Gresae:. would;, have made available 
suffioient-land for, the, wbole. Ionian-population22. But Herodotos 
23 
says -the plan. proposed' settling-tbe1. Ionians in . 'V0. - 
C. L7 OrLCt 
and there oertainlywere-"not enough of-theserin-the Medizing areas 
to accommodate-the--bulk of-. the.. Greek, ypopulation"of-the whole of 
Ionia. Obviously-. theiGreeks were,, planning. to-settle only those 
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who chose to leave. If this represented not the majority of 
mainland Ionia,, the apparent-acceptance by the Greeks at, -the 
conf erenoe-of the plan as a'meaningful suggestion, and, not-a 
"fantastic impossibility"? 
4 
would be explicable. 
But thia"ezplanation: oonfliots with Herodotoa! oomment'that 
the. Greeks took counsel on the question _ä-va. ýýci a'. ýo_S 
The implication of this is that they 
envisaged, removing the greater part of the Ionian population, yet 
we have a right, I suggest,.. to, "suspeot Herodotos, or perhaps his 
sources25 of attempting-to over-emphasize the extent of the. so- 
called "Second Ionian Revolt".. The description of the mood in. ->. 
Ionia given by the Samian messengers at Delos (H. 9.90) cannot be 
taken as reliable, r, for obvious reasons. The fact that Xerxes left 
a fleet of 300 (including: Ionian) ships (H. 8.130) and an army 
(H"-9.96) to, guard Ionia. may have-been determined more by a 
reluctance to risk: the`demoralized fleet in western waters again, 
and by what was*conaidered; the. necessity of'protecting Persian 
interests in Asia against the: poeeibility of a Greek offensive, than 
by'any serious danger of unilateral-revolt by the Ionians, (or other 
Asiatic Greeks), But: it is ilerodotos! narrative ofýthe battle and 
hie oommentary whioh,. give us$the. olearest. grounds for suspecting 
his assessment of the "Second Ionian Revolt". He. has specific 
information about the actions°otý only two groups of. -Ionians-in 
Persian. servioe at Yykale. , }TbeSamians, 
hs-says (9.99,103), -were 
disarmed because of-Persian suspicions that they would assist the 
Greeks, and he, explains the, grounds for their suspicions (9.99)9 
We should accept thin., -,, The Milesians, -, on the other, hand, were. 
posted on the tracks leading up to the heights of- Mykale - 
(H. 9.99)v 
a position of trust and responsibility, as events were to show. 
The reason given by the Persians for their posting - that they knew 
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the ins and outs of the area - is quite adequate, and the 
alternative offered by Herodotos - that they feared Uileaian 
loyalty - does not aooord with the position entrusted to them, 'and 
is a transparent attempt to baokdate"Milesian'oollusion with the 
Greeks26. Now-even IIerodotos (9.99) tacitly admits that the other 
Greeks in the Persian forces were under no°suspioion of disloyalty. 
The account of the Ionian role in-the battle also casts doubt on 
the extent of their 'loyalty ., to,, the - Greek' o ause. - Herodotos (9-'103) 
says that it was the Samians who set the example to the other 
Ionians. Even though they were unarmed, they "did what they could" 
which couldn't have amounted-to much more than cheering or at best 
stone-throwing. 'Even Herodotoe eeems'to"admit that'the Ionians 
attacked the Barbarians only when the scales had turned. They, 
27 
like-the Mileeians (A., 9.104) were, in`reality, ° probably doing no 
28 
more" than saving-their akina`, at-the` hands of'the Greeks 0' This 
impression is confirmed by the faut-, that Aerodotoe does not`eeem 
to', have been able : tornarrate" epeoifio`inoidente in-the oouree of 
the battle in which the`Ioniana,, turnedagainst the Barbarians, but 
tacks on the claim at the end of his account of the battle29. Eox 
many contingents besides the Milesians actually attaoked Barbarians 
in any meaningful way remains, open to doubt, and although we have 
no secure way of knowing, the speoifio information which 8erodotoe 
Is-able to adduoe in favour: ofvhia'interpretation of the role of 
the Asiatio Greeks militates"atrongly against 'assuming it to be a{ 
large number30. -Herodotoa' oommentttbat-the-aotion of the-Asiatio 
Greeks at kykale`repreaented `Tö_°'. °_Ü2£ýOVý- 
ýJcývirl_- 
q 
Ci7CE6. t'- , ie likely° to' be an exaggeration, 
and-the exaggeration is maintained when ha cornea to describe the 
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plan to resettle the Milesiana and some other cities as an 
(9.106)31. so the 
confliot between the apparent seriousness with whioh the resettle- 
went plan was taken and the implications of Herodotos' statement 
that it involved the 
__aYCc, 
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be. resolved by recognizing Herodotos' statement as an exaggeration. 
That we should reject what is almost a direct statement of the 
extensiveness of the planned operation in favour of an inference 
on the attitude of the Greek leaders based on Herodotos' account 
but, not explicitly attested by him, has been justified by our 
demonstration of the. tendentiousness, of his direct statement on the 
intimately related question of the-. extent of the "Second Ionian 
Revolt"32. 
The rest of Herodotos' account of the Samos conference is 
relatively free of difficulties., The information he provides is 
capable of a satisfactory. explanation without resorting to the 
supplementary deductions which some historians have considered 
necessary.. According -, to. Herodotos it was o 
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There is no indication -here --that , the, Athenians present differed in 
their assessment of-the aituätion33.8erodotos then gives notice 
of the divided response to the agreed assessment. The Peloponnesians 
wanted to solve the problem by, adopting. the original suggestion which 
had been accepted as a basis-for, discussion by all, and which had 
by-now been refined-. to. tbe point of-, specifying Medizing cities as 
--which should 
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accommodate the Ionians: The Athenian representatives, on the 
other hand, wade two points*" They did not at all 'like (ý. oüK 
the resettlement plan. Before we Co 
ön' to their second point, - let' üs analyse the" situation thus arising, 
and note modern response to'it. If, as they must have, the 
Atheniane accepted the fact that thoee'Ioniane whohad acted 
treasonably at ifykale would, be punished by, Persia, and if they also 
objected to the resettlementY'plän, "the question naturally arises, 
and no doubt arose at Samoa, what"sölution, then, did they have to 
offer to the Ionians"predicament? " Aerodoto's does not say340 
Soholars have found it easy to fill" *the gap: the. Athenians must 
have pleaded for the, inclusion`, of the Asiatin" Greeks in the Iiellenio 
Alliance, thus oo=ittinj the Greeksýto their protection. This 
assumption is'unacaeptable on tNöýcounte. "Firstly it adds to an 
aoaount which (as we shall»eee)-makes sense an it stands. 'Secondly 
it conflicts with both the°generäl'o'ontextin Herodotoa as well as 
with his speoifio' aöcount'. ` 
To take' our rveakeet argument first, i' it'vrill` be{ remembered that 
our-analysis of thenaval'campaign of 479 demonatrat'ed'that there 
Xe no ev, idenäe or likelihööd of any Of the Greek'äontingente having 
orders oonoerning, *or, interest in; engagements on the'Asiatio main- 
lind: Thus'the'suggeätion'thät the Athenians were pursuing the 
cause- of, admitting mainland Greeks to 'the' League confliots with the 
general context: ` 
The suggestion conflicts with F'erodotos' specific account 
beoause; as' we noted, , 'his aoöount does not*°'admit* the `assumption 
that the 'Athenian s"dispüt~ed. *the flellenio- League's assessment of 
the strategic situation' in loni which war that the mainland was 
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indefensible. WHammond reoognizes that the structure-which ,_ 
Aerodotos bas given the:. debate presupposes that-, no onehad seriously 
considered accepting-Asiatio Greeks into the alliance when he says 
"the-primary matter for discussion by the Greeks at Samos.... was 
not whether to remove the Ionian, mainlanders, as Herodotos suggests, 
but whether or not. to, admit. the-Ionian mainlanders into the- 
alliance35..; In other words, once we-assume that>there was-a 
division over-the question of-admission of Asiatio, Greeks from the 
beginninguof the", oonference weclash with Herodotoe. . 
Diodoros. 
(37.1-3 ), and following him IhD. Meyer sought -to avoid this clash 
by shiftinga, putative: Athenian advocaoy of the idea of-. providing 
defenoe for. the Asiatio, Greeks. and the assurance that . 
the Athenians 
would. provide, it, alone, from the beginning of-the oonference, where 
it- should-. logically,; be if, ý it existed,, to a later stage in. the course 
of, theaoonferenoe36, no doubt. based-on the two stages in the 
Herodotean. version>ofµAthenian, responae. to the question of, Ionia. 
The aolution, deserves-scrutiny. 
, _-Atsleast, 
part. of Diodoros' aooount is. -basel on Ephoroa37.. 
Ephoros had. read Hellanikos38.;.: But ith is far from. oertain that he 
drewihis=accountýof;; the Samos,, conference from Hellanikos, either 
at, all,:,. or,, unoontaminated-*by other, souroes, or"his own tendentious 
inventions..; Furthermore, we doänot--, know whether Diodoros. has 
reflected-Ephoros',. account accurately (see below). Historio- 
graphically, -then, Diodoros'ycredentials_on this, episode are not 
beyond, auapioion. k ý_.. 
_: 
Soholara have learned tobe wary of_passages. in, Diodoroe whioh 
lay emphasis on: the, heroio, role played by the Asiatic Greeks 
(sepeoially, Aioliann) as probably deriving from. Ephoros', tendenoy 
"j 
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to give prominence to"the Greeks dwelling on the eastern shores', 
of'the Aegean. It is possible that Diodoros'ýolaim that 
0 ..... 
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'made allies of the Ionians and'Aiolians' (37.1) should be seen 
in this light, for it may"have'been designed to, remove-any doubt- 
about the wholeheartedness 'and decisiveness ( cf. 36.2_6) of the 
Asiatic Greeks' contribution to"the. Hellenio cause in the battle"` 
which might have arisen if, as in Herodotos, the Greeks had failed 
to include the mainlanders'astallies at Samos. The notice is in 
conflict'with Herodotos and-must be. rejected39. This error casts 
doubt'on the reliability of! the, whole of`Diodoros' account. -, But 
there are further grounds againWaooepting the' Diodoran solution 
to, the conflict between the alleged Athenian support for Asiatic 
Greek' membership and Herodotos' 'aocount. One: of the'differenoes'-1 
between"tbe'aoooünta of=Diodoros, and 8erodotos'isýthat Diodoros 
suggests Xanthippos was point proposer of the motion to4resettle"> 
the', A6iatio Greeks, ýwhile Aerodotoa-Buggeste thetrythe'Atheniane 
simply did not`objeot°to`the discussion topic. ` The'negative reaction 
of the Athenians to'the proposal-An the'oourae of the debate'in 
Herodotoa'thus presents-, no', problem. -'"But'Fin-Diodoroa<it represents 
a etartling'volte-face. Tbe, contradiction--is so crass that the 
account * does' not ý make w sense'without.: an explanation49. i ""It is possible 
that: -`Diodoroo has -omittsd, an! explanation given by Ephoros. ' In his 
account of the `Pentekontaetia 'it 4is -usually: safe to assume that r=' -L 
Diodoroe -io 'drawing -exclusively xfrom Ephoros or Thuoydides. ' This 
Is not true of eventa`whioh-have been described-by Herodotos. 
Before chapter 37-is finished Diodoroa has referred'to IIerodotos' 
aocount of the battle'of'Yykale and the'Sestou siege=(37.6). 
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The contradiction in Diodoroa is probably beet explained by 
postulating an attempt by our none too skilful author to combine 
the differing accounts of Ephoros and Eerodotos41. From Ephoros 
be has kept the admission of the Aiolians and Ionians immediately 
after 1ykale. It may be that in Ephoros the suggestion to trans- 
plant the Asiatic Greeks was opposed by the Athenians from the 
start of the conference, where the promises of unilateral protection 
by Athens would, therefore, also be located. Such an account would 
at. least make sense. But turning to Aerodotos' aooount, he found 
good evidence which unmistakably suggested that there was no 
opposition between the Athenians and Peloponnesians at the outset 
of, the conference over the proposal - or. discu ssion topic, - to 
resettle the Ionians. Diodoros has, accepted this and indeed inter- 
preted it as Zanthippos and Leotyohides, making the proposal jointly. 
In the course of Eerodotos! _conferenoe 
the Athenians do, 
_express 
their reluctance to vote in favour of the proposals. Diodoron may 
have-hit upon this atage, of the debate wben, differenoea emerge as 
the 'correct' point at which to locate Ephoros' descriptions of 
Athenian advocacy of defence of and promisesof support for the 
Asiatin Greeks. By conflating bis two sources in this way he leads 
his Athenians into the Inexplicably, inconsistent position of 
proposing the resettlement initially only.: to vehemently oppose lt _ 
later. Diodoros gives a reason for their opposition to the plan 
which would have been as apparent at the beginning of the conference, 
where Ephoros probabiy. fhad 
the Athenians perceive it. There is 
no. oonvinoing reason in Diodoros why the Athenians should have 
"changed their minds",, (37.3)42. VowDiodoros' looation of the 
Athenian support for protection of the Asiatic Greeks should not 
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a 
bevaooepted, and-the, objeotion we'raised`to"the notion of 
Athenian support for inolusion of-the Asiatin Greeks into 'the 
Hellenic League, based on -the -struoture-'ofthe debate at Samoa 
aa`presented by, Herodotos, remains'-valid. 
i`. The: argument from Herodotoa' silence must'"aleo be mentioned. 
Eerodotos, who so often follows pro-Athenian' traditione7, would 
surely have made much ofthe alleged Athenian`championship, =in the 
face-, -of Spartan -opposition; °of proteotion"of Asiatic Greeks bad he 
known of euoh a' significant, `and' (in terms` of later fifth century 
43 
propaganda, at, least)-'praiseworthy stand., 
""' Herodotos; then, prohibits accepting the''answer suggested by 
Diodoros and modern-soholars, to the questiön°öfwbat'to°dö with' 
tbose Aaiatio Greeks"who'Would suffer punishment by the`-Persians, 
a: question"arising from--tbe first, Athenian'point=made in response 
töl, the'resettlementýsolution: 'Part of, the Athenian answer to this 
question-is öontained''in-the second point theymade'as recorded by 
Herodotoa, "ands the -rest : is`implied. -, They- said 
-(H. 9.106)__? JOK£. 
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In other worde,, they`suggested, 'thät`-evenýthough4it"was obvious that 
if=it, came; to-a vote the Peloponnesiens would be -able=to carry the 
Athenian day-with their: advooaoy of`the"proposäls, '=the representatives 
would not be prepared`to"see ept'this ae'binding enc would, therefore, 
not commit-themselves to äöntributing"to*the 'ezeoution of=`the-Boheme. 
They,. perhäps- even'+refused' to* vote. So much is clear enough from 
Herodotoa. -But if. the-Peloponneeians -in-0the frameworksof the 
Hellenic League, ' were not Dompatent -to 'deoide on a solution to the 
problem, ' who, "was? Surely'not 'the ýAthenian°aenera! as Athenian 
generals could `take, a atanoe=on'ä`matter of'such "high policy""44 
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only as representatives of the Athenian people. The same board 
of generals later. in,. the year seems to have been particularly 
sensitive=to not aoting independently of orders from Tö 
AýI vu-Lwv 
Ko1voV '(ß. 9.117). When the fleet left Piraeus in spring 
479, we argued Athenian feeling towards the Ionians was ambivalent. 
The Greeks appear not=to have expected any substantial revolt in 
Ionia and had planned their strategy'aocordingly. The Athenian 
generals bad not expected to find themselves at Samos with not 
only the Persian fleet defeated but also the Persian land forces. 
Their orders had covered what action to take if the Persian fleet 
were to be defeated: they should attempt to gain control of the 
Hellespont. So it is best to accept Iierodotos' implications that 
the Athenians at-. Samos: did"no, more than express their personal 
opinion concerning the resettlement plan, refusing to be drawn into 
allowing-the discussion topic to be turned into a formal resolution 
of the council oftigenerals ofathe Hellenic League, and responding, 
in 
. answer, toKthe"demands. for. an alternative solution that it was a 
question.. whioh would have to be decided by the Athenian people. 
They had been. willing to confer about the proposals to resettle the 
mainlanders perhaps in order-to aoquire'a, detailed knowledge of the 
Peloponnesian position(s)-tobe able to report back to Athens with. 
There is, of course, no contradiction between such a stance and 
their failure'to, dispute the assessment by "the Greeks" of the 
impossibility-of-defending Ionia. 
--Since the A, theniane. objeotei to-the proposals in this way the 
Peloponnesians-gladly gave way45. -. Thia auggeata. tbat the 
Peloponneaiana had-supported=the. plan, which would have been 
diffioult, end expensive.. to;: exeoute: howeter. few the cities involved, 
71. 
in'part in deference to the known emotional ties between the" 
Athenians and Ionians. The Athenian response will have appeared 
puzzling and perhaps contrary46. And so (ic& ov-rwc 
this matter being droppedg, "at least for the time being47, the 
Greeks went on to the next point on the agenda, whioh required no 
discussion as all were agreed, which was that they should aocept 
into the allianoe'the Samians, Chiane and other islanders who 
48 
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they did, forthwith., 
I 
I have deliberately postponed, any"disouseion of Thuoydides 
89.2"-beoause`it"and Herodotoe`9.106 should-be oonsidered-independ- 
ently-first, and'then, compared. ' Modern eoholare'have tended, 
influenced no doubt by the events of the next eighteen months, to 
look-for evidence"that the"Athenian representatives at Samoa 
championed the Dause "of the- Asiatio'Greeks. Unsatisfied with 
iierodotoa' 'silence on such a 'stance they have been quick to seize 
upon'Thuoydidea' remarks to supplement Eerodotos, before, however, 
giving adequate consideration to the question of'`whether Ilerodotos' 
account could; 'in fallt, ', `sustain"suoh an addition; ' and, as, we'have 
seen, it can notes- 
Thuoydides begins hia`Pentekontaetia'ezcursus by promising to 
describe bow the Athenians 
____ 
u... AL-5 JÜ. It has long been reöögnized 
that his account- takels up where 'IIerodotos left off'49. well, 'almost s 
he chooses to correct Herodotos' account of the Boston campaign by 
72. , 
mentioning. that not only: the, Athenians (as Herodotoa 9.114 implies) 
C> ? JWV" LCL but also 
Ü aýoL,,: qäT£cr-ýýºcö_zýs __äßo 
remained and besieged 3eetoe. 4: -, Thiaoorrection strongly Buggeste 
that Thuoydides, found, nothing. in-Herodotoe' aooount. of the Samos 
conferenoe whioh, he felt, neededmodifioation. Had he known of any 
Athenian-ohampionahip of Asiatic Greeks-it would certainly have been 
auffioiently, relevantyto hiefnthemeato have warranted, indeed to have 
required, _mention50. 
. 
Thuaydidea!: atatement_oontaina two ambiguitieas. what does he 
mean by; and what does he 
mean by,. 
Ü Il, ý. ,)O?,. I. don't, tbink anyone bas denied that for 
Thuoydides the, primary. geographi6al area, underatood by 'Ionia' was 
the coastal, areaof Asial! inor (acf. _ e. ß. 1.12.4,., 2.9.4-5, 
8.56.4)., <Aocepting, the implications of,, thisa minority of scholars 
have gone on, to take Ut_LfL (ý in its ý technical . sense and 
concluded: that, according to, Thuoydides,, mainland, Ioniana had. at 
5l. 
some stage) , 
between Samos, and. Sestos joined the Hellenic League 
gli11accepting the, referenceae being,, to mainland Ionians, and 
taking 
ýjý Vý /ýL 
_, 
formally, a few scholars have postulated the 
relationshhip. as existing. between the "allies from; Ionia and the 
ilellespont"«ýand. 
-. the Athenians only52. f The majority view, however, 
is to accept .! from Ionia",. as including, mainland Ionians and to take 
Ujj_r G___. informally5' *_That this interpretation of U((ýlAýp L 
4_0 4 
is possible is, made most, olear, by Thucydides' use, of the verbal,, 
form at 4.44.1 where UaQ yo_L describes the. relationship 
between Athenian cavalry and Athenian hoplite forces. Others have 
insisted. that ®ý OLWO 
ýCVYLGt, 
ý 
--could 
be a 
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designation of those Ionian islands whioh had joined the League 
at Samos54. No matter what Thucydides' normal usage, 7.57.4 and 
8.40.1 are decisive in showing that it is not impossible that 
Thuoydides, understood only Ionian islanders when he wrote 899255* 
We oritioized scholars for interpreting Herodotos (9.106) too 
rashly in the light of what they drew from Thuoydides 89.2. The 
strioture,, however, does not. hold, so well the other way round, as 
we shall see. As we-have just seen Thuoydides can be interpreted 
as meaning that at Benton there remained with the Athenians Ionian 
islanders (of whom eome,, st least, but not neoessarily all, may 
have been admitted-to, -the League at Samos) and another group of men 
from, the Hellespont who-had , not-been admitted 
to the League, but 
helped the Athenians nonetheless56. This interpretation of 
Thuoydides does: not contradict any ancient evidence, and, in my 
view, does not require an improbable course of events. Sinne 
Thuoydides' account is so flexible, it should be bent towards 
oomplianoe; with, Herodotos' inflexible account, rather than away from 
it. Let us, then, attempt. to_give a, narrative of events from Samos 
to. Sestos which harmonizes the evidence of Serodotos and Thuoydidea 
as far as possible57., 
The Greek. fleet, including the., new island contingents, not out 
from Samoa : to break-the-bridges. , They can not have known how much 
opposition-awaited"them, for they"had no knowledge of the situation 
inE, the north-east as theirignoranoe of the destruction of the 
bridges shows (H. 9.106). -Their readinese. to sail there and face 
the possibility,.. of,; furtber: military actions confirms our earlier 
conolu sionrthat-. the Hellenio. League, had probably adopted as an 
objective for. the campaign season the 'freeing' of the Hellespont. 
74" 
Herodotoa picke up his narrative at 9.1149 telling us that 
the Greek fleet was forced to take shelter from bad weather by 
Lektos, F-VO-EU- -- 
A ý_u_ 
-Q_V_"------ 
Newa of the fleet's arrival in the bay of Adramytteion must have 
spread swiftly through the Helleapontine region, and, _c 
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the Persians assembled at the fortifiable town of Sestos 
(H. 9.115). 
The Greek arrival had been a surprise and the retreat to Sestos 
hasty (H. 9.116). Now, on arrival at Abydos the Greeks saw that 
the bridges had been destroyed (H. 9.114). The Hellespont was then, 
arguably, in the bands of the Greek fleet, and Leotyohides and the 
Peloponnesians decided to leave. We do not know how many days 
intervened between the anchoring of the Greek fleet off Lektos and 
the Peloponnesian departure; at least enough for the Persians from 
the surrounding cities to assemble at Sestos. The fact that the -- 
Persians abandoned a city made it clear to its inhabitants that the 
Greeks were probably planning a determined action in the Hellespont. 
Before leaving the Persians will have no doubt boasted of reinforce- 
ments from the king. Some cities might have doubted whether the 
Greeks would be able to secure permanent control of the Hellespont 
region, and have decided not to commit themselves to the Greek cause, 
which meant simply doing nothing for the moment. Others probably 
anticipated Greek control and were anxious to express loyalty. It 
will have been easy for a city to provide provisions for the Greeks 
and to offer the services of their forces to contribute to the 
tedious task, and it will have been a prudent insurance. 
8erodotos implies Hellespontine fraternization with the Greeks. 
Abydos seems to have offered no resistanoe58. Having fled, ' 
75" 
Artayktes was caught by the Athenians and brought back to Sestos 
(H. 9.119). The Athenians considered some of the people. of the 
Chereonese loyal enough to be entrusted with guarding this important 
prisoner (ß. 9.120). It is also clear from IIerodotos (9.120) that 
the Athenians had Elaians with them at the Sestos siege. 
These notices in Herodotoa are quite incidental and make, it clear 
that he knew the Athenians had ü7Cö ... 
CEýýJcrWcVtotf Üf-LO-XOr- 
(Thuo. 89.2). It is possible that Aerodoton chose to omit direct 
referenoe to them in order that "Athens alone" might have "the glory 
of, this victory"59. It iss however. more in accord with his account 
to suggest-that-he is simply reflecting a contrast whiohýlater 
Athenians probably drew between Athenian energy on this oocasion, 
with its consequent spotlighting of the purely Athenian role, and 
Peloponnesian lack of it60, for, -the notices we have just mentioned 
show IIerodotos is not deliberately trying to disguise the presence 4 
of Ilellespontine assistance to the-Athenians. This explanation gains 
weight when we remember that IIerodotos is obviously not thinking 
carefully about exactly who was present at the seiger for, as Meiggs 
remarks, "in his account" the islanders. "neither stay nor return 
home"61. "5o the oomposition of the besieging forces with the 
Athenians at Sestos does not represent an incompatible discrepancy 
between Herodotos and Thuoydides, and soholare have usually assumed 
that these Hellespontine allies joined'forces with the Greeks when 
tbe'latter arrived in the area62. L'eiggs objects to-this by claiming 
that "Tbuoydides : in saying that" the Ionians and. Iiellespontine-allies 
"remained with the Athenians clearly implies that they were with the 
fleet that sailed to break... * the bridges"63. His objection seems 
to be based-on Thuoydides'-. failure-to mention the Samos conferenos 
76. 
and the act of sailing to the Hellespont., We have seen's possible 
reason why-he omits the Samos conference, -and it was fair of 
Thuoydides to assume that his'readers would assume that the Greek 
fleet sailed from Mykale/Samos to-the-Hellespont when he moves the 
scene of action from Mykale to Sestos. What does emerge'as, ' ' 
ambiguous in his aocount is at what point in the movement from`- 
Mykale to Sestos the Peloponnesians sailed home. -lie only says that 
it was 
c KSLö vý the Persians had retreated from Europe and 
they had been defeated at Mykale. This does not contradict Aerodotos' 
more detailed information on-the exact point°at whiob "after°Lykale" 
the Peloponnesians left for. home any more than his omission of 
the Samoa conference contradicts Aerodotos' account of it. Rather, 
it assumes a , knowledge of and implicitly accepts xerodotos' 
information. -keiggs, though, seems to=take Thucydides as meaning 
that the, Peloponnesiana sailed home from-Mykale, 'for he implies that 
UCKO fLE 1'AavtCS means the-Ionians and Hellespontines remained with 
the Athenians at Mykale/Samos and sailed north while the -} 
Peloponnesians sailed home. This is not justified by, Thucydides. 
UX0 fj-E(V0. V''Cs should be taken as referring to the notion of 
the Athenians, Ionians and Hellespontines`in remaining at'the'task 
of flushing the Persians from the Hellespont. This is in contrast 
to the Peloponnesians who returned v37c., oY WO U. - so it is 
not necessary-to take. Thucydides as indicating that the Ionian and 
Hellespontine allies "remained with the Athenians" when they set 
out from Mykale/Samos. What Meiggs actually-says is that we cannot: 
take Thucydides as=indicating that the Ionians and IIellespontines 
joined "after the-Athenians had settled down to the siege", "and in 
this he is right because in Thuoydides the contrast made between 
77" 
the Athenians and others remaining and the Peloponnesians- leaving 
implies that the others had joined the Greeks"before'"the 
Peloponnesians left. Since the Peloponnesians left from Abydos 
(H. 9.114) the Hellespontinea could have joined°'the Greek fleet 
at"Lektos (though only those witbout"Persian garrisons)-or at its 
arrival at Abydos, which is more"likely"since it is possible that, 
the Persians quitted-the cities only-when the Greek fleet appeared 
in-the Hellespont itself (H. 9.115). Since Herodotos, for whatever 
reasons, seems to have-paid little-attention to-tbe presence of . 
Hellespontine (and other non-Athenian men) at the siege ofýSestos it 
is. also possible that he has also omitted mentioning acceptance- " 
into the= Hellenic League of such -üellespontines (and possibly further 
island states who had not been at Samos) as may have sent 
representatives to the Hellenic-fleet at Abydos,, before they, 
Pelopennesian"departure. Such acceptance would be in keeping with- 
what we concluded about-the most optimistic objectives-for the 
naval arm of the Hellenic League for'the oampaign'of 479, as well 
an with-the-actions of the Hellenio League in 478. In the present 
state of the evidenoe it is impossible to-deoide whether some 
Helleepontine cities were, - in fact, ', acoepte4 into the League -in 
<. , late. 479, - 
As we have seen, ' Herodotos does-not record the return-home'of- 
the island contingents which were with the Greek fleet as, members - 
of the League -sinoe their admission at Samos. -Everything (especially 
Thuoydides' 0E ax 0 - 
'IWVLCL5 
points to their presence 
at the Seaton siege. What of. mainland, Ioniane? ý- 
Ifs on the basis-of Herodotoe' disinterest and Thuoydidea' '- 
assertion of their presence at the 8estos siege"we? are--prepared to,: -- 
78. 
admit the possibility that cities from the Hellespont were admitted 
to the Hellenic League; why should we not do the same for mainland 
Ionians, enabling us to understand Rý ö cýv(0J3 in the way 
Thücydides commonly used it? Clearly because Herodotos' evidence, 
not challenged by Thucydides, indicates that all members had agreed 
that it would be impossible to guard mainland Ionia forever. They 
bad not mentioned the'Helleapont because the question had not yet 
arisen, and besides, it was understood to be an objective of the 
Hellenic League's actions against the Persians for 479. The coast 
of'mainland Ionia was not, and there"is no, reason to assume that 
the League's plan; had-changed when they reached Abydos. Mainland 
Ionians cannot have been admitted to the Hellenic League between 
Samos and Seaton 
64. ' 
This is'not to deny, however, that some mainland states, for 
ke` 
example, Liletos, had deoided, following the action of their forces 
at iiykale, that the beat way of avoiding punishment"wee to do as 
as rossWe 
much harm to the Persian cause/ by encouraging other mainland states 
to revolt and perhaps make possible a re-formation of the Ionian 
League, enabling the cities to defend themselves against Persia 
65* 
Such action would, in view of the clear statement by the Hellenic 
League at Samos of its assessment of the strategic situation in 
Ionia, seem foolhardy, and most cities will have tried to play down 
any'anti-Persian behaviour at L'ykale. The Athenian generals, on the 
other hand, need have had no compunction about accepting the help 
of such divisions in relieving their impatient'men. The presence 
of such mainland Ionian contingents would also have impressed 
Eellespontine cities who were waiting upon events before committing 
themselves to the Greek cause. The Athenian generals had undertaken 
79" 
no future, oommitments and so assistance by mainland, Ionians would - 
have been their own,.. business. The evidence does not permit us to 
decide categorically one way or the other, but probability indicates 
that there will have been fewq if any, mainland,,, Ionians at Sestos. 
Our analysis of Thucydides' evidence of events from Mykale to 
Sestos (89.2) has shown that his evidencel. though open to different 
interpretations can, without strain, be understood to supplement and 
clarify some elements of Herodotos' account. Conversely, . Herodotos' 
account does the same for some elements of Thucydides'. Neither 
stands-in contradiction of the other.. In partioular,. Thuoydidee 
supplies no grounds for claiming that the. Athenians5at any stage 
between Mykale and-Sestos, expressed any championship of the cause 
of liberating or, protecting mainland Ionia against-Persia. Had this 
been the case, his evidence would , 
have. stood in direct conflict with 
that of Herodotos. The explanation which we drew from IIerodotos' 
implications, that the. Athenian generals had no-ordere or guidelines 
on, the question, and felt obliged to refer the issue, to 1. Ae1vawv 
Kowöv -,, remains acceptable. 
To must. pick up-the threads of our main argument. Themistokles 
in winter 48,0/79 enjoyed great popularity and influence at. Athens, 
and faded virtually no opposition. - There is no evidence of internal 
disagreement over-the strategy to be, adopted fortthe 479, oampaign. 
The plans which he had for _7, 
C er jý ý ä7c S 
? 'ö1l 
. __. 
gP 
, ýý(ý,..,,.. 
(n. 8.109) e=clude3 the,, possibility of 
extensive Athenian engagement in a war on the coast, of, Asla. 1Sinor. 
The possibility existed that once the Persian fleet had been cleared 
80. 
from the Aegean (and army from lellas, of course) Athenian emotions 
would persuade the demos to embark on such an Asiatic war. The 
emotions could be stimulated by a desire for the liberty of their 
kinsmen if they proved worthy, or, conversely, a desire to punish 
them if their loyalty to the King at Artemision and Salamis proved 
to be typical of their actions in the war as a whole. And vengeance 
against the King would naturally play an important, perhaps primary 
role. The war could be prosecuted in the framework of the Hellenic 
League, or otherwise. 
Themistokles had to prevent this. It has been suggested that 
Themistokles, at some stage, openly opposed further conflict with 
the King 
66. 
In view of later developments on the coast of Asia Minor, 
and of the fairly extensive and hostile tradition concerning 
Themistoklea it would indeed be quite remarkable that if Themistokles 
had ever o. penly declared himself in favour of such a programme no 
trace of it should have survived. In view of this I find it 
impossible to accept the idea. We should look for another explanation 
of how Themistokles attempted to put his policy into effect* 
we have evidence of two incidents from the year 479 which 
arguably provide'an answer to our problem. Both admit similar 
explanations. The historicity of one - Themiatokles' activity over 
the rebuilding of the walls - is in no serious doubt; the other - 
Themistoklea' reactions to the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet at 
Ps gasai - is usually dismissed as unhistorical. Both these events 
created a war alarm at Athens. I suggest Themistokles decided he 
wanted to be in Athens when the Persian threat had been removed 
above all because he wanted to engineer a situation in which the 
Athenians would themselves feel it impossible to embark on an 
81. 
aggressive war on the Asiatio mainland. The, suggestion provides 
an adequate explanation of why Themistoklem took no, part in the 
campaigns of 479. While there were generals as experienced as 
Aristeides who, oould, be best allooated. to_the part of 
_the, 
board 
serving with the land oampaignq it will have appeared most natural 
and beat to send_Themistokles with that part `of 
the, board. of generals 
serving with the naval, arm. For Themistokles to have insisted on 
being detailed to take part in the land defenoe would have been 
dangerous. It may have appeared to be an expression of excessive 
Tj jo-C, . LL1C, in wishing also to have a , part 
in what promised to be 
another. battle which would, deoide Athens' fate, at, the expense of 
the common good, something which would soon be exploited by hie 
competitors for influence. On the other hand, by declining to 
stand. for election at all, he will have been able to represent his 
reluotanoe &a .a desire to allow others to take the fore in, leader-, 
ship - a. gesture of, reconciliation in the spirit of. the reoall of 
the ostracises and. a refutation of any suspioions., being oonoeived,. _ 
that Themiatokleazwaa. aeekingµto gäin 
enable him 
{ 
to aspire to, tyranny6T .. - -1.11 4 
a reputation sufficient to 
. 
It is no longer neoe®sarygto defend the historicity of the 
public, events recorded in Thuoydides' account of the, walls incident 
(89.3,. 
- 92) 
68 
" The Athenians, set to work on reoonstruotion, on their 
returnrto. Attika (89.3)69. 
_ 
Thucydides says that the Spartans asked 
the. Athenians not to rewall their city partly because they would 
have preferred every city without walls, and partly because they had 
been influenoed by their allies who were afraid of the Athenians' 
boldness and their, new fleet (90.1-2). This seems to have been 
Thucydides' opinion,, and it is safest to assume it was well-founded. 
82. 
1. ,n 
Thuoydides (90.2) makes it clear that he believes Sparta'in fact 
shared the 'suspicions of her allies by saying Tö tAl-V (3ouX01FVoV 
Kai ff o* rov 1 /$ . 
'w/u-rýS o0 ýýiiovvtt5 ES Th i497vci ou5 
The Official reason given by the Spartan ambassadors tallies in 
part with Thucydides' opinions they wanted no one outside the 
Peloponnese to have awall, their reason being the'fear that the 
Persians would in future make use of such strongholds. They professed 
. 0V E\ _Kcu%ul q'. 
LW 
.7S 'Tctýoa Lve'cr cee. _ 
re,, j EXL 
_tO, V4) 
Ea-A e- va'avzo 
(92) 
Themistokles assessed the embassy'-differently. From the start 
he created the impression that Athens was in immediate danger of 
military intervention ( Co' TC2)O5 
JGV V LI0C 5L GýC VE .. 
ci äzoýccä 
Lr? K TOO 'a-y , otci Lou uyouS _- 
90.3, cf. 91.3 ). 
He-went on (at Sparta) to give reasons why be disliked'the Spartan 
suggestion. Essentially, he argued that having her own walla would 
enable Athens to avoid dependence on others for protection 
1( 91-09 
a situation which would ensure for her the influence in common debate 
which her recent astute judgements had proved that she deserved 
(91.4. 
-7). Thus be took'the"Spartan' suggestion as an attempt to 
minimize the influence of'Athens, and, as we saw, Thuoydides seems 
to have agreed with him that this was at least part of the Spartan 
motivation. Thucydides does not, however, give any indication that 
he accepts Themistokles' suggestion that Athens was in danger of 
military intervention. If anything, he suggests that it was unlikely 
that'"this was the case (92: 7Cpoa-j'i. LE25' 
övvE vTip tkc'' `. _. 
". 
Ti 2S -Coy M9 X-ov xpo ev j. 
ä. v Tc_ f k, 
L 
(_la-Ca aü coZ5 
ru' ) oO. voV this seems tobe Thucydides' own comment). 
Historical reasons'also argue-against believing that the Spartans 
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considered invasion. It is true that because of recent history it 
will have been easy to , convince, the Athenians that Spartan 
troops might well invade Attika70. Nonetheless, the behaviour of 
the Spartans in late 479 makes it difficult to accept that they 
were determined to atop the building. Onoe reports began to arrive 
at Sparta that the walls were going up fast7l, despite Themiatokles' 
presence there to discuss the question (91.1)lthey could easily have 
found out for themselves without waiting for Themistokles' suggestion 
that they send trustworthy men on an official embassy, and thereupon 
have acted accordingly. And if the Spartans bad been prepared to 
take such desperate action to hinder the growth of Athenian power 
they would have done better to prevent the fortification of the 
Piraeu872. So if we leave aside Athenian suspicions over the 
Spartan request we must conclude that it was a purely diplomatic 
attempt to reduce the influence Athena appeared likely to be able 
to wield in the forthcoming years, stimulated not inoonsiderably by 
Sparta's allies73. The fear of an immediate invasion, then, was, 
alarmist74. The fear that she bad an aggressive and envious group 
of enemies in the Peloponnesian League will not have been irrelevant 
to the question of whether to pursue the war against Persian interests 
on the Asiatic coast. 
Plutarch (Th. 20.1-2; cf. Ar. 22.2) reoords.. the Paiasai 
incident. Having narrated Themistokles' plans to fortify the Piraeus 
he says he had yet greater plans for securing Athena' naval power. 
At the same-time ( 7ý&ý )-as the Greek fleet was wintering at Pagasai, 
Themistoklea made a speech to the Athenians in which he claimed to, 
have a plan whose execution would be 
W(p&ý. tt. -4-od and: cfwTvýPLov 
for, -the Athenians, but could not be stated publicly 
(&7CÖ P('1'Co'/' 
_. 
Jý, OýÄoV Se The 20.1). The Athenians 
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decided he should elaborate his plan to Aristeides, and-if-, the 
latter agreed to it, - it should be carried out. Themistokles 
explained to him thatrbe proposed burning the Hellenic fleet"which 
was wintering at Pagasai in`Thessaly. Aristeides reported back to 
the°Aesembly, tbat the plan was extremely advantageous and'extremely 
unjust, and Themistokles was ordered to drop-it (Tb. 20.2). 
Plutarch does not quote'bis source., 'The story has, --"not'surprisingly, 
been widely rejeoted75. Nonetheless, many of the scholars who reject 
it recognize that it is located in a surprisingly accurate context. 
The circumstances described in Plutarch+s story conform to those = 
obtaining in winter 4798. The'Peloponnesian contingent, led by 
Leotyohides had left the Athenians and others at Sestos in late'479" 
It was thus a'"Hellenic fleet". ' The Peloponnesians at Samos had 
spoken of the expulsion of Medizers in Hellas and their proposals 
to settle the Ionians in their place shows that they intended to 
carry out the expulsions. The question bad been left open. Either 
way the Medizers should be punished. Herodotos (6.72) records an 
expedition led. by'Leotyohidesagainst Thessaly. Plutarch's Pagasai 
story is probably based on the historical presence of the Hellenic 
fleet at Pagasai, led by'Leotyahides, which sought to topple the 
prime Medizers'in Thessaly, the Aleuadai, in winter 479/876. So 
Plutarch's source, seemsq at least, to have been familiar with some 
lees than commonly-known details of fifth-century history77. 
Scholars have failed 'to pay ýsuffioient 'attention to Busolt's 
important observation that`the secret prooeedings"reoorded`by'Plutaroh 
have a close connection with-those recorded by, Diodoros'(41.2) con- 
oerning the Piraeus fortification. " He notes that ""bei `-Diod. und 
Pluto ist die Einleitung zu der Geschichte der Hauptsache naoh_, vdllig 
85. 
identisch"78. -In'Diodoroal account the secrecy surrounding 
Themiatokles' proposals has no point79 and would appear to'have 
been grafted on to the original story. It is probable that Eph oros 
bad read an account substantially the same as Plutarch's Pagasai 
story and that the secret proceedings essential to it appealed to 
him as illustrating a (to an extent historical) feature of 
Themistokles' post-war career, in particular his relationship with 
the demos: 
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Z`I (Diod. 42.4)" For this to be accurately reflected 
by the story of secret proposals, especially the element of 
admiration, -the outcome had to be. a success for Themistokles, which, 
besides, was desirable as contributing to the greater glory of ' 
Themistokles. But there was a further reason for transferring the 
subject of the secret consultation from the unsuccessful fleet'' 
burning plan to the Piraeus fortification plan, and this was the" 
unscrupulous light"in which the Pagasai story portrayed Themistokles. 
Nonetheless, Ephoros perhaps preserves an echo of Themistokles' 
failure as recorded in the original source, for he bas'the Assembly, 
despite the approval of the men assigned to hear and judge the 
80 
proposal 'still refuse to adopt his plans unconditionally (Diod. 
42.4). So Plutarch's story most probably derives, perhaps only 
indireotly, from a souroe earlier than Ephoroe. 
sl 
There is not muoh point in trying to show who the original 
source might have been. Bauer suggested Stesimbrotoa, which ia'as 
good a guess as any 
2. All we can say with-oonfidence is that the 
fact that the'original aouroe, was'euffioiently well-informed to 
place a Hellenic fleet, shortly after Xerxes' withdrawallat'Pagaeai. 
ft 
86. 
and that it assumed the knowledge, or perhaps stated, that the., 
Athenian contingent was absent. from it,, suggests. an intimacy with 
details of fifth century non-events which we would expect . 
to find 
only, in a fifth. century writer., In view of this it is, justifiable, 
to pay greater attention than is usually done to the other elements 
in the. story. _, 
Plutarch'a account, is not impossible as it, stands* It would, 
however, require Aristeides' divulging the plan. This could, have 
been politically advantageous to him, but Plutarch suggests be did 
not specify the proposal in rejecting it. Aristeidee' response, 
however, may, at some stage of the tradition, have been transformed 
from a, simple, rejeotion which, mentioned the nature of the plan into 
a more sophistioated_play. on the dilemma created by the statesman's 
desire for justice as well as his city's advantage ( cf. Pl. Ar. 25-, 3)- 
On the other band, if, we take., Plutarob's statement that the plan,.,, 
was. to be expounded 
APc, crt£tc -, -- hd vc. , as merely an. example 
of 
the 
. 
tendency.. to contrast the two great ment. and assume, tbat" 
Themistokles. was ordered to consult. secretly with. the Boule, perhaps 
in the presence of, the strategoi,. then, there would be less difficulty 
in accounting fora knowledge of the plan83. 
But perhaps there are good historical reasons for. rejecting the 
bistorioity. of, Plutarch's account. In. Plutarch they are clearly 
intended to. be genuine proposals to burn the Hellenic fleet8a. That 
thesAthenians, bad just been engaged in the refortifioation of Athens 
suggests that Themistokles can hardly have envisaged 'retiring to 
the, Piraeus', (Thuo. 93.7) at this early stage, and conducting 
'a, 
naval war in the immediate future. One may doubt also whether she 
could get involved in a Peloponnesian war. while she was probably 
87. 
still to some'extent dependent on Peloponnesian charity., Yet it 
is difficult to believe the story has been invented out of the'x-' 
blue. One explanation may be that the original source for the 
seoret, prooeedinga had knowledge of a public speech by Themiatokles 
in which the threat of 'turning the Hellenic fleet wintered at 
Pagasai was mentioned. - If the *secret proceedings' source believed 
or wanted his readers to believe that Themistokles'object was in 
fact to destroy the fleet, then he-did well to clothe the proposals 
in the secret proceedings. They may be pure invention, or modelled 
on the historical secret meeting between Themistokles and the Boule 
concerning the walls and embassy to Sparta85. 
What then would"the point have been of a public epeeoh in which 
Themistokles spoke of burning "the fleet but did not in fact 
intend that such an act of war be carried out? Themistokles was 
soon to defend the position of the Medizing states, including Thessaly, 
in the Amphiktyonio, oounoil against the threat of expulsion posed by 
Spartan proposals (P1. The 20. '3_4s see below). ` A threat of 
attacking the Beilehicýleet, if Leotyohides' expedition against 
Mediaeze in Theesaly were not withdrawnnjmay have contributed to the 
decision to abandon the expedition, As well as the obvious advantage 
of contributing to the failure of'Spartan designs on Thessaly, of 
intimidating Spartan expansionism and of winning friends-among those 
threatened, by Sparta, especially , the Aleuadai86, an ' important- effect 
of°'suoh a speeoh will have been the heightening of the already d' 
existing sense of crisis and imminent war at Athens. Sparta will 
have been portrayed as aggressively expansionist within Hellas. 
The opposition of Aristeides reflected in Plutarch's story 
may be historical. - At-any rate within a few years, by the time 
88. 
Timokreon wrote his fragment l, Aristeidea and Themistoklea"seem 
to have been seen as unfriendly rivale8?. There is also evidence 
that about now a"'grand coalition" was being formed, aimed, 'it' 
would appearýat the political extinction of Themistoklee, and of 
which Aristeides was a member88. His opposition to Themistokles 
now probably marked the end of that interlude of co-operation in 
an otherwise consistently hostile relationship which had character- 
ized their dealings with each other since the recall of the 
ostraoiads89. 
We have sought to explain Themistokles' absence from any 
military command in 479/8 in terms of his desire tobe in a position 
to"engineer a situation in which the Athenians themselves would form 
an opinion on questions of the direction of future military 
commitments which conformed with his own opinion. His alarmist"' 
reaction to the Spartan request overthe wills is evidence enough 
that be was deliberately trying to create a sense of urgent danger 
among the Athenians. The explanation we offered of the tradition of 
Themistokles' talk of burning the Hellenic fleet as Pagasai would 
also fit such a policy. 
If our analysis of Themistokies' actions in 479 is accepted' 
an important conclusion emerges concerning the nature of Athenian 
politics at this time. Despite the fact that when Themistokles 
made his decision not to stand for election his erstwhile enemies 
seem to have been more concerned with regaining the respect of the 
demos by quiet service rather than by criticizing and opposing 
Themistokles or his policies, and despite the fact that everything 
we know of events between 483 'and 479 suggests Themistoklee' influence 
with the demos will have risen, he nonetheless did not feel confident 
89. 
enough'of his influence with the demon-to seize the opportunity 
by attempting to persuade the Athenians to aooept a neoeasary 
element of-bis polioy whioh, he knew would have proved unpopular - 
namely, the abandonment of interest in aotive"involvement in 
mainland Ionia. -Instead, he felt obliged to resort-to, the devious 
and dangerous methods we have suggested. - This ia'a testimony to 
the independence of'the demos in forming their own decisions in 
the face of the advice of their leaders. They would appear to-. have 
been "led" to a leaser, oztent than me usually'imagine90s 
_ 
QUTCVOS. 
_ýý4VlýOtýKýlÜIýYýaL _W 
LoS__O_Uý_. ý ýJX14P ooL, _.. _. ... 
wrote one of the-men who bad a place in-. tbe. Assembly of 479'(Aiaoh. 
Pere. 242)" 
chapters 
91. 
This conclusion will be reinforcel in the forthcoming 
.. _3 
Sow effeotive, then, was Themistokles' attempt to oreate. f ear 
among the Athenians? 
92, 
Diodoros (43.3) says Themistokles persuaded 
the Athenians to build twenty new triremes a year, apparently in 
connection with the-Piraeus-fortification. The notice looks - 
authentic, not so much because it fits so well with Themistokles' 
policy, nor that-It makes -sense, but because of the way it is. taoked 
onto the end of Diodoros' account of the Piraeus fortification93. 
Part of the motive'in maintaining a large, well-equipped fleet will 
naturally-have been defence against Persiae e. ' Nonetheless, 
Thucydides (93.7) implies Themistokles had-enemies nearer home in- 
mind as well, since he advised the Athenians, to-use their- naval - 
arm __-0-5 --l_ cLV_.. 
ý a. výL cttaa Aas94. A. desire 
to'maintain a-defensive oapability-. at, home maybe part of the -. 
explanation of-the relatively small. Athenian oontingent whioh, sailed 
east with the Hellenic fleet in 47895. The fear of Spartan attack 
9o. 
which Themistokles had whipped up appears to have created a sense 
of sympathy for, and community with other states threatened by, 
Sparta, for we should assume that the stance made by Themistokles 
at the Amphiktyonio council had the support of a majority of, the 
demon 
96. 
' The story, recorded by Plutarch (Th. 20.3-4), teils how 
Themistokles successfully caused the defeat of a Lakedaimonian 
proposal which-aimed at excluding from the council those states 
which had not fought the Persians. ße-showed that the result of 
excluding; among others, the-Thesealians, Argivea and Thebans would 
be to have the council dominated by two or three cities. The 
scepticism of earlier scholars-as"to the historicity of this event 
was shown to be unwarranted by the analyses of Bengtson and,, 
Flaoeliere97. It'is now orthodox to accept Plutarch's account, 'and 
unnecessary to'defend it98. The meeting cannot have taken place 
long after Plataia. The autumn meeting of 479 in far less likely 
than that of spring 47899. We have already referred to the 
significance of Themistokles' stances like his probable reactions 
to the Thessalian expedition it, not only helped to thwart an 
extension of-Spartan influence outside the, Peloponneseg but also 
established Athens'as the defender of the autonomy of states 
threatened by Spartan domination. At home it bad the effect of 
demonstrating to the Athenians that within Hellas there was a large 
power-base which oould,, be tapped in challenging Sparta's traditional 
role as first city in Hellas. In particular, the states he chose 
to single out - Thessaly, Thebes, Argos -were important land 
powers and would provide the necessary complement to Athenian sea- 
power essential in. offering an overwhelming challenge to - 
Peloponnesian . power100* 
91. 
Finally, a usually unfairly rejected notice may provide 
evidence of an Athenian attempt about now to win a powerful friend 
against possible conflict with the Peloponnesians. The echolion 
to,. Thucydidee, 136.1 (Sude 99) says that Themistokles bad been , 
by granted the title £ 
üý p 6'E Tºý 5 the Kerkyrana because he bad 
prevented the, otber, loyal Greeks carrying out a plan to annihilate 
them for not having. taken part in the par. The pedigree of this 
notice is anonymous, -but, tbe information it provides plausible. 
We know that the Greek s, began proceedings against the Kerkyrans 
(E. 168e zcä. Y-. 
ý- 
-Iötc.. 
_, o. 
3-k- 
eoholiaet agreeswith Herodotos in taking Kerkyran 
pleas as speoious,. for he says 
Via"o ýo'QV-CO 
" He supplements 
Herodotoa' aocount by reoording, that the Greeks intended to destroy 
them and that Themistokles opposed the action. There are no grounds 
to object against the supplementary information. The opposition of 
Themistokles fits precisely into the pattern that emerges in his 
post-war. attempts to gain, the friendship of states threatened by 
Sparta and inaccessible to domination by Athens. Kerkyra was the 
second most powerful naval state after Athens (Thun. 14.21 U. 7.168). 
Athena could not hope at this stage to exercise control over, western 
powers. If the Athenians took part in the annihilation of her power 
they would be increasing the strength of Korinth, and other western, 
states, as well as destroying a. potential ally who could make a very 
significant contribution to any future conflict with the 
Peloponnese 
101. 
For is the other piece of supplementary. information 
cause to reject the scholiast. There is a tradition that Karyai in 
the Peloponnese was destroyed (VitruviusDo Arch. 1.1.5) for what can 
only have been neutrality, not active support for Persia, during the. 
92"" 
Persian invasion. Huxley has recently dedioated"an article to 
defending the historicity of the tradition102. So more neutrality 
may have been sufficient grounds'for destruction. If Themistokles 
was pursuing a policy of befriending states threatened by Sparta 
then we should expect to find him opposing this action against 
Kerkyra, and so it is unwise to suspect'-this incident as'being 
modelled onýthe Amphiktyonio stand103. There must have been several 
occasions on which Themistokles gave expression to this'polioy. In 
fact the only connection between the Amphiktyonio story and this 
one is Themistokles' opposition tomeasures-proposed against 
offenders. Sinoe the action proposed"was in connection with 480: we 
should keep it as close to that year as possible. The suggestion in 
unlikely to have been made after spring 478 when the attitude of 
the Athenians, over Thessaly and'the Amphiktyonio-incident, had been 
demonstrated, for it would beýdoomed to failure if Athens refused to 
take part. The attempted action should be dated around'winter 479/8" 
In the absence of better evidenoe to the contrary, 'the eoholiast's 
notice should be-accepted. 
The alternative explanation of'the grant of EÜ£faM*, 'ü. found 
in antiquity does not deserve more credence than'the soholiast, 's. 
Plutarch (Th. 24.1), most'probably drawing on 'heophra'stos (PO VII, 
nr. 1012, Cii 23-33), says Themiatokles had settled a dispute between 
Kerkyra and Korinth over Leukas in Kerkyra's favour. Usually without 
argument, this version is generally given preferenoelk. But the 
explanation is "very suspi0ious"105, not least because "parallels 
may be detected with events later in the fifth century" 
106 
For the moment, at least, Themistokles' further aim of dis- 
couraging active Athenian involvement in-mainland-Ionia seems to have 
93" 
aohievel success. Despite the tension he had created between 
Athens and Sparta it was accepted by all at Athens that it was 
necessary to contribute to the xellenio campaign of 478 under 
Pausanias' command which intended to secure the Aegean for the 
Greek cause. 
There can be no doubt that engaging in military activity on 
the mainland of Asia 1! inor was not an objective net for the Hellenic 
League's 478 campaign. The extensiveness of its achievements 
preclutesthe possibility that further tasks bad been set but 
unfulfilled. The main objectives seem to have been essentially 
the same as in 479, the olearing, of the Aegean from and including 
the IIellespont, but this year extending as far as Kypros also. More 
can hardly have been hoped for, but if there should happen to be 
time the objective next on the list was not attacks on Persian 
interests on the coast of mainland Asia L'inor, but making a start 
on scouring Thrace107. There is no hint in the evidence that the 
Athenians or any other of the contingents serving in 478 were 
unhappy about the limitations of the programme. The shift of 
allegiance which was taking place throughout 478 towards the 
Athenians is reported in the sources as motivated primarily by 
discontent with Pausaniast behaviour and never with the programme 
of the League (Thuo. 95.1-2,4,96.1,130.2; He 8.3; Plut. K. 
6.2-3; Ar. 23.1 . 3; Diode 44.5 -69 46.4 _5)108. It is true 
that with the charter of the Athenian alliance a new direction was 
struck which aimed at involvement in Asia liinor. But this was 
some twelve months later, in special circumstances which will have 
radically altered the Athenian assessment of the situation, and so 
affords no presumption that the Athenians in spring 478 considered 
-94" 
active involvement in Asia Minor practicable 
lo9. While we 
should assume, since we hear no more of the resettlement proposals, 
that the Athenian demos aereei with the personal-recommendations 
of the generals who bad been present at the Saraos. confercnoe, 
and that they may have been formally rejected by, delegates, -in 478, 
we do not bear of any alternative proposals. -Apparently. the 
Athenian demos, in the present crisis-in Hellas, was prepared, to 
postpone a decision on the question of the fate of mainland Ionia, 
at least until the situation nearer home stabilized, or, perhaps, 
until the threat to Ionia became more urgent. 
v 
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CEAPTER SEVEN THE TRANSFER OF üEGEMONY 
A detailed analysis of the evidence for Spartan attitudes in 
our period must remain outside the scope of this studyl. It iss 
though, not controversial to say that there existed at Sparta a 
shade of opinion which was less enthusiastic about active engage- 
ment in extra-Peloponnesian affairs, and it-is not naive to see 
in this tendency a reflection of fear for the security of Sparta 
within the Peloponnese2. Since Pausanias! campaign in Kypros and 
the Hellespont was an operation vital to Spartan, aeourity in that 
it secured the Aegean, it does not testify to a weakening of 
Spartan insularity so much as Leotyahides' Thessalian expedition. 
The demonstrations of Themistokles' policy which we have analysed 
and which amounted to the offer of support to states threatened by 
Sparta and not accessible to Athenian control, will, to may the least, 
not have gone unnoticed and will have affected adversely the 
barometer of fear. Conversely, the tension created by Themiatokles' 
actions was probably the primary reason for the dampening of 
Athenian interest in mainland Iönia which is discernible in 479 and 
4789 
But at Athens political competitors were beginning to look for 
opportunities to catch up with Themistokles. To judge by his later 
career ant by Plutarch's comment (g. 16.1) that -qV 
C4 CU p0 
. 
k4i. _, 1Cimon, probably elected general for the 
year 479/83, will not have found Tbemistoklea'. emergent post-war 
anti-Spartan policy attractive. we have noted that the tradition 
recording Aristeides' opposition to Tbemistoklss' stance over 
Pagasai may have a degree ot. trutb in it. We shall see in this 
96. 
chapter that by viewing the transfer of hegemony against this 
baokgrouni we can avoid the violence done to our best sources for 
the nexus of events which has commonly accompanied modern accounts 
of the transfer. 
Whether Aristeides bad developed his strategy for opposing 
Themistokles' new policy (which we shall elucidate in this chapter) 
by the-time be went off-with the fleet in spring 478, may be doubted. 
The course of events which enabled him to exploit the situation in 
the way be did occurred when -they 
did largely an a result of 
Pausanias' behaviour, which could not be fully predicted. The 
exploitation of the situation must have been conceived during the 
season. This is confirmed by Thuoydides (95.1). Ue says that 
those who were discontented ýOýtWVtEs,,.? CPös__T S-. 
ýA6-º1vo. J, vc 
making their proposals. We should accept the usual. meaning of the 
word, translated beat by Podleckie they "kept going to the 
Athenians"4. Thuoydidea says-(95.2) the Athenians aoknowledged the 
suggestion ant said they would consider it. There is no sign here 
of Aristeides or any of his colleagues grasping the offer. It must 
have been after the first of these approaches that Ariateides turned 
his mini to exploring the potential the situation offered5. 
Thuoydides also informs us (95.3) that before the Spartans recalled 
Pausaniss they had received reports about him. Nowt some kind of 
public display of loyalty to the Athenians occurred at the time 
KOL/5.. 7CaP7-01`'acco5 Pausanias was recalled (äµaß Kcü_ro'c_f VpAyjd 
. E. ý4I"ci 7 ltd c _t.: 
95.4). It follows that the, disaffeoted allies 
bad not openly -one over to the Athenians before the recall. This 
public display of loyalty-obviously represents the pointat which 
the Athenians Cave to the disaffectei allies some more positive 
97. 
response than their earlier promises to consider the matter. 
So in the period prior to this point the Athenians had been 
exploring ways of exploiting the proposals and the Spartans bad 
received reports about Pausanias. 
rbo sent the reports? Thuoydides (95.3) says the oomplaints 
£ Y-- were made 
0X0 T3V 
CF ývrly Tt V C? IKVoufc. v4 '__ 
Diodoroe (44.6) tells of some Peloponnesians who deserted and 
levelle3 accusations against Pausaniaa at Sparta6. Plutarch 
(ä. 6.3) says Yi©on and Ariateides -COGS cc10C5 
X£1ciZOviT5 e? PaPvI c; &o of c iýj TIt$__ [Tsfpr15 
kü rcz pa. t ro, c v7 S Tý S E). cr_öo S, 
ä va"A E1y 
TäY__t l aucrav&iV. All three source s, of c ourse, are compatible. 
The Plutarch passage represents a significant piece of information 
which not only tits in with other more reliable sources but indeed 
helps explain them. It is remarkable what little attention has 
been paid to this notice in connection with the transfer7. Plutarch's 
information is supported by the implications of Herodotos (8.3). Be 
says the Athenians 7 pc & (V . _T-q% Y__ 
fa_u6LLVlicýI__Uý? LYpoiffýid/LEv_ot. 
_cL7[-F ikov-Co 
T1v 7a'I/-40%ä/v To us A alc c4LovLauc_ 
This suggests that the Athenians made some approach to theLakedaim- 
onions in connection with Pausanias' behaviour and used it is an 
excuse, an Esrodotos saw it, 
hegemony8. 
to trick the Spartans out of the 
-11 
No source says that an agreement was made between Athenian 
leaders with the fleet and influential men at Sparta in 478 over 
the question of naval hegemony. But let us examine whether an 
agreement is likely in the circumstances and whether it helps to 
explain subsequent events. Aristeides had probäbly lost some credit 
98. E 
at Sparta because of his participation in the walls affair, 
though if he opposed Themistoklos' stance over Pagasai he may 
have regained it. Nonethelessya political friendship, with Kimon 
will have proved useful in any attempt to come to an agreement 
with Sparta. It is surely now that he began to promote Kimon as 
vtL'Xaý.. koV... ös., TýV.. ýC t toKUcvS, _c IVo. Tijra Kcs. 
LtoX cw 
(P1. K. 5.4). The tradition also records that it was in 4789 that 
the Spartans F'o jYoV -M. 25 TIýý S ýVT(ic&). aV 
FV 
r_c?. 
ýýRI K_KrL-J". LL 1.0- rc /T£5_ 
(Pl. Th. 20.4)10. If not only Aristeides and Kimon (and probably 
others) but also the Spartans were anxious to put a stop to the 
continuing success of Themistokles' anti-Spartan policy there is 
an a priori case for their exchanging ideas on how to achieve their 
common aim. We have evidence that they exchanged ideas in 478. It 
is very easy to imagine that if they did exchange ideas they will 
have reasoned that if the Athenian fears which Themistokles had 
stimulated could be allayed it might be possible to induce the 
Athenians to take the. leadership of an alliance of states which 
would proclaim and prosecute that war in Ionia which had been 
consistently rejected by Sparta and which the Peloponnesiane, 
probably Themistokles and, we may suspect, Aristeides and Kimon 
believed would last .7V 
7cc VZGL /PÖVOV (R. 9.106)11. 
Such a development would have obvious benefits for Sparta since, 
as Themistokles had recognized,. it would inhibit Athens' freedom 
of action in expanding her influence. to a point which would have 
to stop short of going to. war with Sparta. It will have had the 
attraction to Aristeides and Kimon of leaving Themistokles - unless 
be proved particularly subtle - on a political sandbank, stuck with 
99" 
his'anti-Spartan reputation in a political and military situation 
which could not afford conflict with Sparta or even the danger of 
it. Conversely, Aristeidee and Kimon will have appeared in the 
fortunate role of those maintaining the vital good relations with 
Sparta ( cf. Pl. K. 16.2 -3)12. So there is every reason to 
describe the idea of an arrangement between some Athenian leaders 
of the fleet and some influential Spartans in 478 as not in the 
least improbable. 
Let us examine whether our putative arrangement enables us 
to understand the events surrounding the transfer more easily. If 
the 'Greeks who came' to Sparta before Pausanias' recall mentioned 
by Thucydides included the messenger who carried the exchange of 
ideas between Aristeides and Kimon and the Spartans recorded by 
Plutarch, then the striking fact that the disaffected allies went 
over to the Athenians precisely at the time when orders came from 
Sparta for Pausanias to return may offer some grounds for 
speculation on the course of-the negotiations. If the response 
of the Spartans had been positive then the Athenians could feel 
free to give the' disaffected allies a more positive' response, 
conditional, of course, on ratification-by the Atbenian'demosq 
but nonetheless probably a promise to recommend, and a significant 
step forward. Having received it the allies made some overt 
demonstration of loyalty to the Athenians1.3. There had presumably 
been detailed discussions before this point between the disaffected 
allies"and Kimon and Aristeides, in which the Athenians must have 
been able to elicit an assurance that they would be prepared to 
join-in cam anti-Persian war14. 
Thucydides says that 'the Greeks' were alienated by, Pausanias' 
10001 
behaviour but that the 'most disaffected were 
ä., ZÖ AadtlC"' s v£Wa-ýc.. 
ýýi£u8£PwVTo__(95.1). This 
reminds us of'®C 
OLzö 143VZ, 45, K2ý _'E, 
U16_X1Vrodd 
äßö ýa urt. cc£Gt)5 (89.2) though C 7101 
äýýýr7Ko `5 
it helps little in establishing their more precise-identity. It 
presumably includes some 8ellespontine-allies, members since 479, or 
only 478. It also included those islands which had been admitted 
at Samos. The-prospect of the coast of Asia Minor and its hinter- 
land being-in friendly, handa. bad obvious benefits especially for 
those living nearer the;, Asiatic coast. Subsequent events show that 
they were willing to join an aggressively anti-Persian war. If 
there were any forces from mainland Ionian cities unofficially 
accompanying the Hellenic fleet they will have been both few in 
number and the most enthusiastic for the war15. 
It is impossible to"know'to what extent leaders of Peloponnesian 
allies were involved inf'any -arrangement. No doubt they could, be 
convinced of the wisdom of'tbe'plan. But at what stage they-were 
drawn into discussions is not known. ' The evidence is not clear, 
but it seems likely that their' contingents, at-least, were 
withdrawn along with-Pausanias. * which might-suggest they`wore 
aware of, and-consented-to the: -plan-at its inception, or shortly 
afterwards16.. 
, %"Aristeidea will have had, a-good case to-present to the 
Athenians. A large number`of. island: states ready and enthusiastic 
to accept Athens as 'hegemon of an alliance and pay contributions 
to a war of revenge against the Kings land, for. whioh'he had - 
positive Spartan, and. perhaps-Peloponnesian, blessingl7. vre-have 
good, if indirect evidenoe, tbat during! 478/7, after'Pausanias' 
=101. 
recall, Aristeides left Kimon and any other generals alone with 
the fleet in the IIellespont, 'and the conjecture that he had returned 
to Athens with his-proposals seems inescapable. 
The story recorded by Plutarch (Ke 9) of Kimon's distribution 
of,. booty. and prisoners captured from Sestos and, -Byzantion is of 
great value since it is taken from Ion's eye-witness account 
(fr. 13) of Kimon's narration of the story. Attempts to set 
Kimon's story in its context have not been lacking. Because it was 
believed that the story. ýpreeupposed both Kimon's command and the 
capture of Sestos and Byzantion'in one season'scholars chose to 
make-the very substantial: addition to"-the historical record of 
a second capture-of "Seetos18.. '' But "tbere are very weighty objections 
toý. suoh-an idea19. ATL. proposed a. slight modifioation{ Seeley said 
that it-"faoea difficulties-that are not insuperable but serious"20. 
Woodhead made a. careful. review of the problem and concluded that - 
the-most likely. reconstruction, wae that Kimon bad been left by 
Xantbippos at Sestos. guarding, the prisoners who bad just been 
captured, which be dates. in. spring 478.: On the arrival of the-: 
Hellenio fleet at"Sestos-in mid-summer. 478, with Aristeides°one of 
the.. Athenian generals,, Kimon joined it. and sailed on to Byzantion. 
After, the recall of.. Pausanias: but-before mid-winter, Kimon made 
the distribution.. Seeley bas-a very similar solution, 
21 
emphasizing that=all that is'neeied to make sense of the available 
data is the hypothesis that the. oaptives of Sestos were kept under 
guard for some months 
2. 
... i 
The reoent objeotions to theroontext offered. by'Woodhead and 
Sealey-raised by L; eigge are not compelling. - 
He says "it is most 
improbable that the: Persian prisoners. would have been left in- 
102. s 
Seaton when the Athenian fleet sailed home"23. - we know that the 
Athenians were very impatient. to get bome. (n. 9.117) and 
Xanthippos will certainly have been willing to-postpone, the main 
part of. the distribution until next season in view of this. For 
his purposes he was able to make a spectacular enough return to 
Athenas 
__äKE£OS/S 
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ý£ vý£!, ý_V ýA"v9. l21). Evidently IHerodotoa does 
not include the oaptives"in"this. Me silence here is confirmed 
by the implications at 9.120. Having narrated how some Persians who 
had made their . escape from Sestos: just before ita fall were 
captured (9.118-19) he says,, they, were bound up and brought back to 
the town to be guarded there. -,. Artayktoa was treated exceptionally 
and crucified (9.120). _So, tbe. -bulk of those who escaped were kept 
under guard, and in viewýof,, -9.121, we should assume 
that they. remained 
under guard. In delaying. -the, distribution of captives Xanthippos, 
on top of the negative reason, , may, 
have been hoping for word to. 
spread among their relatives, and to cash in on the high ransoms 
which were in fact fetched. In order to encourage this development 
it was better if the captiven. were known to beat Seatos, not - 
Athens. "Had the Persian prisoners from, both towns been available 
when Byzantium was captured, would, Pauoanias-have waited-so long 
before dividing the spoils? ý4.. It may have been in the awareness 
that-at Sparta there was-a.. tendency towards isolationism that- 
Pausanias did his best,:, to create a spectacular record of achieve- 
ments during his season.. °IIe had-no time to distribute booty. 
Lazenby's recent suggestion-that Gongylos made off with some 
Persians. while Pausaniac was on a-march in Thrace (i. e. late in the 
103. 
season) is attractive25 and it suggests that Pausanias had not yet 
got around to the job of distribution, for otherwise the captives 
would have been under Athenian supervision, not GongyloW, appointed 
by Pausanias (Thus. 128.6). It is also possible that Pausanias 
was deliberately holding the men to be used as abargaining point 
in-any future negotiations with the King, "if`they really were so 
closely connected with him as was claimed after their escape (Thuo. 
128.5)26. "If the distribution was delayed beyond Pausanias'-recall 
the responsibility should have passed to Aristeides who commanded" 
the Athenian contingent" 
27 
and Uoiggs thinks "we-should ... need a 
better reason for Cimon rather than Aristeides becoming responsible 
for the distribution" than Sealey's admittedly unconvincing one that 
Aristeides was afraid of damaging his reputation28. The-point-is 
valid not because Aristeides was the commander of the Athenian 
contingent, though he was surely the most prestigious, but because 
be must have been considered equitable tobe chosen to make the 
first quota assessment. This objection has been the most important 
stumbling block to acceptance Of tbe'478/7 context--for the 
distribution29. 
Our answer brings us back-into the narrative of the transfer 
process. Straight after Pausanias' recall and the demonstration 
of loyalty to Athens by the disaffected allies, Aristeides returned 
to Athens with the draft proposals. 'Leaving Kimon behind as 
perhaps the next-most prestigious general, he perhaps emphasized 
that the 'new allies' should; not'-be alienated. Kimon obeyed to 
the point of making a fool of himself (Pl. K. 9.3). As it turned 
out, though, he had the last laugh, and was ables four months after 
the distribution, to return home boasting of his booty (Ion fr. 13' 
X04. 
ap. Pl. K. 9.4)30" 
Meanwhile at Athens Aristeides apparently received a positive 
response. During the winter of 478/7 there will presumably have 
been further negotiations on points of detail. By the and of 478/7 
the most-, important arrangements bad been made, the first assessment 
submitted and accepted and the oath administered (AP- 23.5). But 
before the Athenian alliance could come into existence, certain 
formalities had to be. completed. At the beginning of the campaign 
season, Sparta was still begemon: ot the Hellenic League, many members 
of which were about to. meet at Delos to formalize-the arrangements 
agreed upon concerning the Athenian alliance. It is in this final 
stage of the transfer process that our suggestion of an under- 
standing between Spartan leaders and the Athenians is most helpful 
in understanding the sources. I suggest that all the best sources 
can be-understood by believing. that at-a, meeting of the Hellenic 
League in early, 477, perhaps at Delos, the Spartans sent Dorkis 
and some otber men with°a, token force. - Tbere may have been some 
Peloponnesian representatives, -but needn't have been. A programme 
Was laid out for. the continuation of the war, 'and discussed. The 
Athenian representatives at Sparta on the eve oP the Peloponnesian 
c "ý 
war address the Spartans thuet . Of ýt£ýv__oüK__ 
äv_tcýV 
ä. ý.. Ü7ßäk®ýý. a.. _.:. _ýoý. ý,. 
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In other words, they announced that they would be unwilling to 
lead this continuation_of^the war. The allies then-approached the 
75.2). The Athenians 
related positivelysto the, otter:.:: ýscPýýJT, ".. vt. cýpllý£výtý £C5E40. /týQeL 
Athenians and offered-the hegemony to., thems, -j v-S 
7CPooý'ýhQöY3ZJv 
105. 
Their acceptance was-partly-because they, like the Spartan 
representatives considered themselves- worthy: -C t, oG. 
x0vL. v. t£5 r-iVoJ tit c, V/ iv joi o vtg 5 . -.. 
76.2) . In 
other words, the-Spartans-seconded, or joined in supporting the 
proposals for Athenian, begemony ( cf. 75.4). The speech from which 
these passages are"drawnýlooks back over the whole development of 
the. Athenien"allianoe.: But; in applying the remarks to specific 
stages of-the., transfer process we are supported by other Thucydidean 
passages3l. At, 95.6 we are. told that the allies did not award the 
Spartans the hegemony --not, surprisingly since the; Spartans 
F- OV -C. F_5 a. c,.; _. 
Zcý v. 
- 
N1ºý 
_ýý ýc o- 
ýý-otj -r ai, zoüS ým vcý, ýoo5 '. _voý. ýý vr£5 
i#cavO'$ 
95.7 cf. 75.2). Zö-CE. 
ql:: 
ý... 0.. O_V Zc Eý7CLt1 O0U 5 
It is even possible, though not necessary, to believe that the 
Spartan delegation made; anýapologetio-speeoh-ooncerning their 
commanders, which they-. advanced as. their reason for withdrawing fron 
the-hegemony; and oxpreased`friendship for the Athenians (95.7)32. 
At some point the Spartans must have announoed their withdrawal from 
the. war altogether.;, A. vote was'teken-andýthe Athenians received 
( wo_ro_S-aßövtE5) . : the begemony: (96.1)33. flaying observed 
(aýcrýöµ£vot,. ý. ' -s-95.7): this, the Spartans left ( cf. Thuc. 
3.1092)34.. 
-, - Thuoydides is : explioit 'enough on : the Spartan attitude to the 
transfer, -and our suggestion. of. an: arrangeaent between Aricteides 
and Kimon (and perhaps others)tand influential men at Sparta, 
designed probably primarily to thwart"the`so far successful execution 
of Theßistokles'-policy, is-helpful in'explaining their attitude35. 
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: That'suoh a major. deoision=oould be takw at ý Sparta. without any 
-dissenting voices. is_impossible to, believe. But Thucydides in- 
: not-compatible with tbe: idea,. thatýthere, was substantial opposition 
which-was-, overcome by a narrow margin. Some scholars have tried to 
use.. this approaoh in; suggesting that-although Thuoydides says the 
. Spartans were pleaeed. with the transfer, they were, in reality, 
ýdeoply divided, -or°that. they`put-on`a good: face to a fait accompli36. 
w' Such-a{compromiae will not do, especially when we recall Thucydidea' 
remarks over Spartan reaction. to=the walle` incident. To record that 
behind a facade of friendliness the Spartans. üd. ýýWs 
q, Xeovro(92) 
did not take up much. epace,. and-to have done the same over"'the 
transfer woulC not'have taken'just as much space as the prelude to the 
'yPeloponnesian-war'Fas: von4Fritz, ezaggerateily claims37,,, and--euggests 
ithe°opposition-in'478/7"was quite, inoonsequentia138.:. Our solution 
`also=p rovides'the`necessary explanation of. -thetSpartans' dispatch 
oP: Dorkis, _whioh: has. beenýwrongly'taken: ao reason to believe that 
the Spartans did'=indeed, wish, to aszumeýthe hegemony again39. It 
ýaleo accounta. for the fact that, Dorkis and, his colleagues had only 
e. ý. Tpa; L täv..;. oü is 
'inexplicable-if1they%were"laent to,, resume"active Spartan hegemony40. 
Let=us. examine'. the other.. sourcea. -: Perhaps the most important 
>after. Thucydides is Xenophon'ssaccount of the-Spartan speech at 
Athengin 370. Xenopbonis, 'of'oourse, 'a reliable witness for 
-what . the°. messengers` said. '=All the I: SS except one have -the Lakodaim- 
oniansclaim, that they had- taken: an active and-positive-part 
. t(a'uft. pou). £u o(a-tivfu V ): in: the 'discu$sions on the choice of 'Athena 
"as hegemonand4 ^ 
_7n 
4- (Hell. 
% 6.5.34) " ,., " Thi, e' official ° Spartan l aooount' of' the-transfer confirms ýý -ý 
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that written by Thucydides (76.2) of active Spartan support for the 
allies' proposals 
41. It adds the information that as part of the 
proposals which the Spartans supported was the provision of 
Hellenotßmiai, or 1 iV Ko, v 3v ý(Pvýýca. tci TUAo ic£S. 
Thuoydides (96. 2) only eaya that after the vote the Athenians in 
fact went ahead and created the office42 . Xenophon's evidence 
represents substantial support for the historicity of Thuoydides' 
account43. 
Iierodotos' evidence is more cryptic. Re says the Athenians 
JVOCp0. d"ýY. 
___.. 
T''ýV. 
___ _0. 
UITQVLý£! "J. . 
URPiV_,. /TPQ_ 
Öý-£VO4__ ZaEA01Tc). 
a'ip-ovt ijV 't0v$ nCL1Gj: ýou. ovýov5 _ 
(8-3)- If Pauaanise' 
hybris was only an excuse, we should like to know what IIerodotos 
thought was really behind the transfer44. As, however, the excuse seems 
to be offered to the Spartans, we would be unwise to try to argue that 
Herodotos had in mind as the real reason for the transfer the arrange- 
ment arrived at between Kimon and Aristeides and influential Spartans 
which we have postulated. Taken in context we should assume Herodotos 
thought the real reason for the Athenians taking the hegemony was the 
honour, and, perhaps, with a view to later events, advantage, accruing 
from it. - Since the Athenians, in his view, were able to offer an 
excuse for their aotion, the implication is that the excuse was 
accepted, for, as we know, the Athenians were able to take the hegemony. 
It follows that the negative implications of &z viiRov co need not 
reflect what Herodotos considered to be the Spartan view of the 
transfer in 4787. It Is Herodotos who, in retrospect, interprets 
the Athenian assumption of hegemony as a 'theft', and he no doubt 
reflects a deliberate and light-hearted popular Athenian attempt to 
misrepresent the transfer as a clever Athenian ruse. Herodotos, then, 
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does not provide evidence that the Spartans were reluctant to see 
the Athenians assume hejemony45. 
Plutarch (especially Ar. 23.6) fully supports Thucydidee46. 
AP 23.2 has proved controversial. Gomme understood the last 
three words of Tt v T15 OoJ arz1s ý , covcav . opav 
äýCövtc, 
s, /. r_. v 
Ao, e-f. ro-q., ovI&3q to mean "Sparta being unwilling to keep the leadership" 
and he'has not been without support47. Others find this difficult 
to accept because "the genitive absolute depends on %Q ßI v "48 
and sinne "it was a matter of retaining, not taking the hegemony" 
they feel it cannot be correct49. But these objections lose their 
force if AP' comment is applied to our interpretation of Thuoydideä. 
In an announcement by the Spartan delegates after the general 
objectives for 477 and future years were set out, and before a vote 
on hegemony was taken, the allies were advised that "the Spartans" 
would be "unwilling to receive the hegemony" were it to be offered 
them ( Cf. Thuc. 75.2)50. Since the Spartans were unwilling to take 
this new award of hegemony, the Athenians did. 
Diodoros' account of the transfer itself is not clear as to the 
the 
attitude o XSpartans. He merely says (46.4 -5) that because of 
Pausanias' behaviour the allies went over to the Athenians, and 
03K£-CL 
_ 
WPOýT 1/0\/ to the men sent from Sparta. But that 
he means this in a defiant way becomes clear later (50.1) when the 
Greeks 'are described as 'having revolted' from Sparta (&q EcrT1i d'cr, v). 
Furthermore, he certainly knew nothing about any agreement between 
Athens and Sparta, since he says (50.8)'/ vOüoL 
Ec 'WW- Iý, ý ýýtvýCöýF Y_ ly__ _Soi _ _ýczýcýa,. ficeviouS 
ý£Qý- S. K0. Zä 
gäý0. zYav -1*(tfIOV V3 We noted earlier that their must have been some 
discussion at Sparta over resigning the hegemony. Some scholars have 
1o9. 
maintained that Diodoros' evidence of Spartan reactions to the 
transfer is not at'odds with Thucydides'. The validity of this 
claim is not immediately obvious, but it is made' superficially"" 
plausible by the-redating of the 'Hetoimaridas'debate' (50.2-8) 
from Diodoros' 475/4 date back to 478/7. The same reasons which 
show such a redating°-to be impossible also demonstrate that'Diodoros' 
account of the transfer"is°in direct contradiction to Thucydides'. 
It is held that Thuoydides reports the final result of the 
decision-making process described by Diodoros5l. - Now Thuoydides 
(95.7) certainly creates the indubitable impression that he is - 
describing Spartan reactions in 478/7, and not in the years following. 
Diodoros, by contrast, as we have-seen, envisaged the action of the 
allies as a, revolt, (50.1) and the implication=-, that the Spartans 
resented the"action` gat the time - is confirmed unequivocally by 
his comments on-the Athenian fear of war'with7Sparta at the time of 
the transfer (50.8). Clearly, - unless Thuoydides' and Diodoros' 
interpretations are'to clash head-on, the mood of the Spartans as 
described by Diodoros must cover a very'short period, and their- 
change of heart, oooasioned`by the persuasive Hetoimaridas, must come 
before that point in time to which Tbuoydides' refers when he ' 
describes their attitude as one of wanting to be rid of the Persian 
war and the Spartans as considering the Athenians to be 
(95.7)52" Since such a putative period of shifting opinion at Sparta 
is unrecorded by Tbuoydides ( cf. 69.1,75.4,76.2) it could have 
been of months, at moat,. oertainly not of yearn. Buts oloser-look 
" at Diodoros' account makes it quite clear that he thought'of`the 
period between the transfer and the conclusion of' the Betoimaridas 
debate as covering a period of at least many monthag and probably a 
110. 
few years. 
The use of the imperfect in 
I)ce; 10Uv (50.1) could 
suggest that. the action refers to more, than the one communication 
required by those who would deny, a"oontradiotion with Thuoydides. 
Secondly, the motion of the Hetoimaridas debate does not seem to, 
fit the 4787 context required for it if the length of the period 
of animosity prior to it is not to conflict with Thuoydides. The 
hegemony which the Athenians ac, quired. in 478/7 was of a group of 
TöV states which intended . to prosecute an aggressive _war 7cp05 
P ärc3a-Pov (Thus. 96.1). In Diodoros there in no mention, ors 
it would appear, thought of the Barbarian; -the. important point 
is. 
only to regain the hegemony of the naval states, which, in 478/7 
would have meant. in a war against the Barbarian. We shall argue 
later that Diodoros', debate as it stands does make sense in the 
contest of the mid-470s when Athens was hegemon of the Aegean and 
showing little energy in attacking King's land. Thirdly, in speaking 
about. Athenian fears about the consequences for Atheno-Spartan 
relations of the transfer, -the very fact that Diodoros 
(50.8) says 
7Vp3rov suggests he is looking bank. over 
_a 
period of more. than a, 
couple of months. Furthermore, , in. the period between the transfer 
( 7C pc3 -r ov) and the Hetoimaridas debate the Athenians have time 
to re-equip, their fleet ( --rl"L - ýoýýs_ý__KQ.. 
Cac, Q'Ký6a -o 7("ýFýou$ _) 
art zcoV-_, -7Cý! 
ý-ýýS 
and to accumulate a large sum of money ( (? I 
ZýQ Ply Yza ý 
)" The use of the imperfect would render tendentious 
an attempt to see-in those-aotions,, the single phoros colleotion and 
the single year's building-programme for 477 (cf. Diode 43-3)- 
There was. even time 
, 
for a disoernible, pattern , 
of behaviour by Athens 
towards her allies to emerge - (. os5____C: Url. fA. 
0.. XO-L5, 
-? 7CLEA KcJ. 
5 
ills 
crorpEpovro). And finally, Diodoros does, after all, date the, 
Hetoimoridas debate to 475/4. So'it is evident'that'Diodoros, who 
probably-accurately reflects Ephoros in this, has left sufficient 
internal: evidence to confirm as deliberate his date of 475/4 for 
the Hetoimaridas debate. The conclusion of this debate, then, cannot 
be related to the evidence of Thuoydides for the Spartan support of 
Athenian assumption of hegemony, which is too firmly rooted in 478/7. 
Further, Diodoros' evidence is clear in-portraying Spartan animosity 
towards Athens and her new allies at the time'of the transfer and 
at the time of the beginning of the Hetoimaridas debate; "and there °LL 
is some indication'tbat be believed theaminosity was uninterrupted 
in the intervening period. 'Diodoros'thus stands in irreconcilable' 
conflict with Thucydides over'the Spartan attitude to the'transfer. - 
Recent-scholarship"has demonstrated thatDiodoros' Hetoimaridas 
debate contains elements which provide sufficient grounds for accept- 
ing at least something like it as historioal53. ' There are, however, 
no-similar grounds for retrojeoting the animosity expressed in'the 
first part of'the debate back to 478/7, 'ae we, saW Diodoros', account 
does. -Those, soholars who, accepting the'implicatibns of'the debate, 
redateAt to', 478/7 are falling intoýthe same 'rational' trap'as 1ý 
Ephoroe probably did when-"he'retrojeoted its animosity'to'`478/754. 
To judge from'Diodoros' language, Ephoros had not disguised the 
fact that hie--source for-the debate placed it'some 'Years' , after the 
tranafer. °But especially in-view of the evidence it'-prövided'for 
Spartan'-resentment (probably)'in mid-decade, he, like one recent 
aobolar, felt that'"the anodyne mildness of Thuoydides' Spartans 
at ' 1.95: 7. oan-hardly" be the' whole story55, an d, prooeeded `to 
retrojeot the animosity-to 478 /7- If we are prepared to aooept'thie 
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suggestion it makes°Diodoros' misrepresentation-of. the situation 
in 478/7 easier tounderstand. ---If it is-not accepted it does not 
alter the fact that Diodoros must be`rejeoted if he, conflicts with 
Thucydides... 
Lotus examine the possible reception of the proposals in Athens, 
and the general situation-arising. There is-virtually no'evidenoe 
and we must-rely on3inference.. The Ion fragment, is indireot, evidenoe 
of'Aristeides' presence in Athens.. in 478/7attempting. 'almost oertainly 
to secure Athenian" support-` for . the new' alliance. -s°°We oannot, -however, 
traoe'other stages in the' prooess which led to. nthe final, -ratification 
by the-demos56. But some general"observations'may be appropriate at 
this stage. .. _. t 
In response" to-Themistokles' alarmist-behaviour, in 479-8 the 
Spartans had proved themselves acquiescent - over the walls and, the- 
Amphiktyoniorstand, "and'perhapa'over, Thessaly, Kerkyra"end possibly 
other similar issues. -This very'aoquieseenoet, while itýwill in part 
have' been attributed to Themistokies' 'skilful and tr1asolute stance, 
robbed Themistokles of the"most effective tool'he had=in putting his 
policy` into effect, namely, ' fear of Sparta57. ' "' 
It was probably between about six-and nine months after the- 
Ampbiktyonio`affair that Aristeides returned home=with'his proposals 
whioh'would give Athens hegemony of a'not inconsiderable seotion: of 
the'Greek world rand, --as. was so-often marvelled°at in, later literature, 
and no doubt appreciated at the time, without having to fight for her 
Position-( cf. ° e. g. " Xen. Poroi 5.5-6; Isok. -Pan. --4.72)'9- Indeed, -- 
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Sparta was to confirm her reoent deferential pose towards Athens 
by actively supporting her attempt to`oreate for'herself a' 
hegemonial position in the Aegean. She bad done everything in her' 
power to allay Athenian 'fears. It is not neoessary to argue'the' 
fact that Kimon supported the formation of the new alliance. It 
was most probably now that-Sparta awarded him proxenos status - an 
overt and reassuring gesture of approval for the new Athenian polioy58. 
We noted above that Athenian Feeling towards their-Ionian 
a'vYýEvEcS ' waa. - intense' and, that after : Salamis and Artenvision 
certainly, and probably Mykale, too, their feelings will have been 
ambivalent. We showed that in all probability few, if, any of the 
Asiatic Ionian states bed. transibrmed their mutinous-action at Mykale 
into ,a full-scale revolt from the Persian empire. The stated 
objectives of`the Athenian alliance reflect Athenian feeling not only 
towards the Barbarian, but also towards the Ionian and other Greek 
Asiatic states (Thun. 96.1)59. Those states which did not revolt 
from the King would be part of the "King's land" and'would, accordingly, 
60 
. The implication that those who did revolt and join the be ravaged, 
alliance would be protected by, it is sufficiently obvious to'require 
no speoifio mention by Tbuoydidea61. , The professed'intention of the 
alliance was as muoh a threat as"a promise to the Greeks of Asia 
62. 
As such, it had' a greater, chance of being acceptable to the Athenians. 
Aristeidea, it should be-recalled probably made his first appeal 
to the Athenians little more than a year'after-they had returned to 
devastated Attika. The destruction which-surrounded them-will. have -, 
been a not inconsiderable factor in persuading them to take on this 
63 
. war of-attrition 
We said=that--the complete silenoe of the sources about any overt 
114. 
opposition to pursuing the war against the King's land by Themistokles 
is probably sufficient to-assure us that he in fact never-did express 
opposition. He was too astute to commit himself on such an emotive 
issue 
64., 
we may, guesa that if he bad been called upon to express 
his opinion publicly he would have said that of course the aims of 
the alliance were highly commendable but that the Athenians must be 
ever vigilant against a Spartan $stab in the back j650 
There is one notice which describes Themistokles' reactions to 
Aristeidest assessment of the tribute. Plutarch (Ar. 14.4) said that 
Themistoklea ridiculed the praise he won for his assessment as fit not 
for a man but for a purse. The implication is that Themistokles would 
have extorted a more profitable contribution, perhaps as he had tried 
to do in 480. The anecdote may reflect a well-founded belief in the 
more imperialistic aims of Themistokles as opposed to the attempts of 
Aristeides and Kimon to enjoy a more civilized relationship with the 
allies ( cf. e. g. Pl. K. 11.266). But the story fits much too neatly 
into the conventional pattern of Themistokles-Aristeides anecdotes 
for it to inspire confidence. 
That Athens was now committed to continuing the war in the east 
was a blow to Themistokles' plane to establish Athenian influence not 
only in the Aegean but also in mainland Hellas and eventually to offer 
a challenge to Spartas traditional position as first city of Hellas. 
But it was not a public defeat because he had at no stage openly 
opposed the continuation of the war in the east67. The Athenians 
had supported Tbemistokles in his attempts to check Spartan expansion 
of influence outside the Peloponnese. Tension was now relaxed because 
of Sparta's behaviour between 479 and 477. But there was no reason 
why Tbemistokles should not continue to enjoy support if Spartan 
115. 
ambitions were again'to appear to exceed what most Athenianq could 
be persuaded was unacceptable. Whether they could back up their 
opposition with force would depend'upon the extent: of. their military 
involvement in Asia. ' 
__". r 
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CHAPTER EIGHT CHRONOLOGY, 478/2-- 465/1 
ý ._ 
I do. not propose to; diecusa the problems connected with the 
constitution of the Athenian alliance. For our-purposes it isx 
important only to note the non-controversial fact that Athens was -" 
able to guide. the direction of. the alliance's activities, however 
she may have managed to do sol. "For shall I go. into the two related 
problems presented by the first assessment figure of 460T. (Thuc. 96.2) 
and the precise extent of the alliance in. its first years.. None of 
. these issues is sufficiently relevant to our theme to warrant detailed 
treatment, though we shall; have occasion to touch upon the last two 
in 
, 
the course of our analysis of the 470a and 60s. 
P, s ý_ .. 
- -- w 
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It will be appropriate in this chapter, primarily concerned with 
establishing. a plausible chronological structure for the period 478/ 
465/4, to argue the point that there are insufficient grounds for 
assuming that the Athenian alliance undertook campaigns in Asia before 
the campaign which culminated at Eurymedon. 
After the foundation of the Athenian alliance in 478/7 (AP 23.5) 
we have the evidence of the "scholion to Aischines 2.34 (Dindorf 48) 
that in the archonship of Phaidon three Athenian generals,, Lysistratos, 
Lykourgos and Kratinos, were killed at the hands of the Thraciana after 
the capture of Sion. The scholiast could, however, be dating the 
capture to Phaidon. Despite attempts to associate Phaidon with the 
archon of 469/8 there remains very little doubt that Phaidon was, in 
fact, archon in 476/52. The possibility that 'Phaidon' could refer 
117. 
to the archon of 469/8 exists because Diodoros (48.1,63.1) has 
named the archon for 469/8, as well as for 476/5, Phaidon (some laSS 
give 'Phaion'). The other sources, despite some variants, all draw 
on a tradition which named the 469/8 archon Apsephion. These facts 
alone make it permissible, without treating the principles of source 
criticism unduly brutally, to reject Diodoros as mistaken as to the 
name of the 469/8 archon. That said, however, we must examine the 
positive reasons which scholars have advanced for believing that the 
scholiast's date for the death of the generals should be 469/8 and 
not 476/5" 
Several nineteenth century scholars felt certain that the 
Dionysia judgement, recorded and dated to the arohonship of Aphepsion 
by Plutarch (K. 8.7-88 correctly, Apsephion) should be causally and 
temporally linked with the immediately preceding events in Plutarch's 
narrative, namely, Kimon's capture of Skyros and the return of 
'Theseus" bones (8.3 -6)3. Most of these scholars went on from this 
to conclude that the oracle bidding the Athenians bring back the bones 
of Theseus had been mistakenly dated by Plutarch (Thee. 36.1) to the 
archonship of Phaidon, in place of the 'correct' arohonship of 
Apsephion4. Since most of these scholars felt there should not be 
a gap of some seven years between Thuoydides 98.1 (capture of Eion) 
and 98.2 (capture of Skyros) they were consistent and condemned the 
scholiäst's'Phaidon' for-the Eion episode as mistaken, replacing it with 
'Apaephion'S. The consensus of all this, was, in short, a chronology 
which placed the capture of Eion around 470--69, the oracle, fall of 
Skyros and Dionysia judgement in 469/8. 
r, ilemowitz' fully justified observation that the only connection 
in Plutarch between the return of 'Theseus '$ bones and the Dionysia 
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Judgement was that both events were remembered by the Athenians, 
and that there was neither a causal nor temporal connection between 
the two was widely accepted, and laid to rest the chronology which, 
bad been based on that erroneous belief6. In faot, the date of the 
judgement had better. be left out of the attempt to eeoure'the 
chronology of our period altogether7. We shall discuss the validity 
of some of`the assumptions made by those early soholars When"we 
discuss the date of Skyros. For the moment, though, it ie'sufficient 
to conclude that Wilamowitz' observation removes the original problem 
which had led to Eion being dated around 470-69" 
In 1967 Smart took up the problem again, and via a more refined 
route came to the same conclusions as the earlier scholars. His 
approach differed in that he postulated two divergent archon lists, ` 
one giving the archon of 469/8 as Apaephion, the other as Phai(d)on. 
The main reason, though, -for making this assumption is to-explain"'I 
Diodoroa' demonstrable error over the dates of Leotyohides' reign9. 
This is almost certainly too deferential to Diodo, ros, not a careful' 
historianl0. The existence of an alternative archon list is attested 
nowhere elsell. 
Smart tries to draw support for his belief that the soboliast 
used an archon list giving Phai(d)on for 469/8 from the following- 
arguments. `Noting that the soholiast mentions leaders other than 
Kimon for the first 
vt'i'ü/I', 
Lp_ , Smart maintains that `he cannot 
be referring to the first expedition against Pion since this was led 
by Kimon (Thun. 98.1; U. 7.107). -8e°ooncludee that Z? Ikj q 
Ötf-s 
ZovcL must-refer to a second capture of Eion, after the locals 
had rallied, by, a colonizing expedition. Kimon's capture would then 
be in the preceding year. We shall see later that this., interpretation 
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of the evidence is unnecessarily cumbersome, but the result. that=k-- 
Kimon captured Eion-in the archon year prior to that'of, -Phaidonýmay= 
nonetheless be correct12. Smart goes on to try to determine the date 
of Kimon's expedition to Mon using the familiar method of ascertaining 
which of a series of events listed by Diodoros, under one archon year 
is likely to be the one correctly dated. Under 470/69 Diodoros has 
listed Kimon's capture of Pion and Skyros, as well as the irymedon 
victory (60 . 61). Smart chooses Pion by a°prooess of elimination13. 
A closer look at Diodoros' account makes this result'most improbable. 
ý? Cc_aýý `ýQýýwY. 
_ 
9Tývacot ýrpa. zýýQJ___&4.. cvcc_ K1 ýýýýCaý_r iJ k>. - 
1l 
. 
ýou_ KQLýýI/YAý l1Y ds ýoýy_; CaPý$övýesý_£ ý av. ýYý. _ 
rapaLOV 715fia'las-POI troVtQ_... 'ýýV T0. 
C5. 
_ýuýµCss(m cLtSýC0_tYl_ 1 
60.1 . . 
ýJlý. u 8 ýw a-ovýq _ 
ý£' 
_ 
rah ýýIEý iss rcä. ýs- ýrý _ ýPo u Päc S Kaz. ýCo}. ý. EVas 
Diodoros has expressly dated the election of ICimon as general as well 
as-the\task set him by the Athenians, namely toýconduct operations on 
theooast of Asia. °Implicit in this is that Kimon, was sent-from 
Athens. There then follows (60.2) the brief account of Kimon's sailing 
from Byzantion ( cf. POzy XIII, 1610, fr. 6) and his capture of_Eion 
and Skyros. ' Neither, it-. will be noted` is on the coast of : Aals. We 
next' find Kimon at Piraeus, making preparations for-p-41OvwY X( -ýwv 
(60.3). These preparations complete, he sails off from Piraeus and 
collects ships from r&v 
"JwvwV/ 
XYKa% -nov 
ä Awv Omwrciv 
(60.3). Clearly, it is this expedition from Piraeus to Ionia-and 
than on to Karia (60.4)whioh the Athenians instructed Kimon-to under- 
take'(60. t). These instructions'can not be connected with Kimon'sý 
sailing from Byzantion=to', Kion and then to'Skyroa these. two ° 
expeditions have been slipped'in by Diodoros, between the dated 
election to the strategic and. accompanying instructions and the 
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preparations made by Kimon to enable him to execute the instruotionsla. 
Diodoros' notics., far from providing evidence for dating Kimon's Fion 
expedition to 470/69, in fact establishes nothing more than a 
terminus ante quern for it. As such it does not support the con- 
tention that the scholiast's archon year 'Phaidon', the year of the 
campaign of Lysistratos etc. and perhaps the year-after Kimon's, must 
be after--47069. 
So far we have only undermined Smarte supporting argumentel5. 
It remains impossible to disprove the existence of two divergent 
anahon lists.. The.. only way to prove that the scholiast was thinking 
of the archon of 476/5 when be wrote . 
*Phaidon' would be to cite, a 
passage where=he bad referred to the arohonship, of. 'Apsephion', and 
this he has not done., But,. Smart's only, valid positive argument is 
that his theory helps to explain an error of Diodoros16. It needn't 
be argued that for Diodoroe to have blundered here as elsewhere in 
not in fact improbable. And if, two lists did exist, and Diodoros 
drew on the one giving Phai(d)on as archon for 469/8, that list did 
not record the post-Kimonian expedition of-Lysistratos etc* under 
that year, because; Diodoros has recorded under 470/69. events which 
he clearly took to be subsequent to Kimon's Eion-oampaign. This 
deduction makes it neoessary_. to assume that if the scholiast, as 
Smart suggests, was 
. 
really referring to the archon of 469/8 when he 
named Phaidon, then he. must have been drawing one completely different 
chronographic source to Diodoros, one_which, supplied different 
information for the different archon years. This fact reduces the_ 
desirability of seeing. the scholiast's 'Phaidon' as referring to the 
same, arobon as Diodoros: has. for the year 469/8.. 
Finally, an old point, which has, been (I think) ignored this century 
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at 'least deserves mention. ' Blass noted that the obsoure line of 
Aisohylos'"Persai'8 68'(delivered in 473/2 (Hypothesis)) referring 
to A >(£ X4)0 presupposes among 'his audience a fairly intimate 
knowledge of this area of Thrace which could hardly be the result 
of'hearaay or leirning, and=ia best accounted for by a prior 
oämpaign'at-'Eion17. This`. ia`obvioualy not conclusive but it adds 
more weight'in the'soales of probability against Smart's 470/69 date 
forýKimon's capture of Eion We might add, too, r-that the-wbole 
section 864-908 of the-Persai suggests that-the'areas listed were 
no'longer under predominantly Persian control. Were-the important 
city' of Eion -still not "liberated"Isection 865-70 , would -have , had an 
inappropriatelyAronioal ring. - On balanoeg, itheng we should not 
believe that the`ecbolion to'Aisahines 2.34 (Din1orf 48)-was referring 
to the archon of 4698 but ° to that 'of 47 61518 . 
We said Smart's reconstruction of the-events connected-with the 
oapture`-of Eion was unnecesesarily cumbersome: ' The soholiast's note 
is`ambiguous, sinne--it could be understood as dating the capture of 
Eion'or the stioky-end which befell the three generals after the 
capture, or both. -In faot; -though, _, the ambiguity presents no serious 
problemse we-have unquestionably; a terminus ante quem for the 
capture'of Eion. The detailed', chronology of events" from, Pausanias' 
first reoall'until'the deaths of the three generals near Eion in 476/5 
will not=affect our interpretation of, events, and so we-shall=deal with 
it briefly l9. `. Since Pausaniae was most: probably, recalled in late 478, 
and, the foundation7of the'Athenian allianoe was completed by the-end 
ofr478/7, we may presume; that'the Athenians and their allies2Q 
proceeded to Eion before the end of the 477 season, for the 
negotiations loading'to the escorting of Pausanias from Byaantion°can 
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have taken no more than weeks. -It can be inferred from the first 
of the Hermai quoted by. Plutarch (K. 7.4: K fuE rc I T'£7Cäa! oV 
that the Athenians. spent a winter campaigning2l. __At 
any rate the IIermai certainly imply a long. and difficult siege, and 
this is confirmed by other sources. Rerodotos (7.107) says that 
Kimon offered Bogea safe passage back to Persia, which suggests the 
Athenians did not rate their chances of a quick siege highly. The 
offer being refused the. Persians bad to be starved out (-cf. Pl. K. 
7.2_4) which must-have taken a -long time, especially since provisions 
were, for a while: getting past the blockade (Pl. K. 7.2)22. The 
financial assistance afforded by'Menon of Pharealos (Demoeth. -23.199) 
is evidence that': the allies bad'. run out; of money, which further, 
suggests that the campaign proved longer than anticipated. 
The evidence is not offended,, then, if we au8gest that the 
Athenians and their allies arrived at. Fion in 477, defeated the -- 
Persians'in battle (Pl. K. 7.2)23, began the siege of the town and 
expelled the Thraoiana-who had. been, supplying". tbe Persians, Soon 
after the capture of the city an expedition was sent inland. We, know 
only, tbat three Athenian. generaln. were, killed24. For all we know 
Kimon, may«have. been_with, the-expedition, and-have escaped death25. ",. - 
That the., purpose of the expedition inland was to establish a settle- 
ment is not attested by.; the aoholiast. If we accept Plutarch (K. 7.3) 
that+as a result of the capture ofýEion the Athenians were-able to 
settle the eurroundingtcountry? we should conclude that despite the 
deaths-of the three generals domination of. the country around Eion 
was achieved 
26.: 
-Sion was captured before their deathsq, the'latter°.: - 
being either in or"after 476/5.., If, they died. after'476/5 then Eion 
fell in that year.: It-ia not impossible that the=oity- wae, captured 
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in 476/5, but I prefer some time in 476. 
Thuoydides (98.3) Bays ___%Spwzo' . 4vi i 
Ht. 6VCI,.. &(LAov.. 
Strat.. 21<0 cI... Pivýnxöýc6aV. Those nineteenth century soholars we 
listed above who were prepared to alter the 476/5 date given by the 
soholiast for the capture of Eion to 469/8 in line with what they 
mistakenly believed was a reliable date for the oapture of Skyros 
did so in the belief that Thuoydides' words could hardly separate 
a`gap of six or seven years 
279 Some would say Thuoydides suggests 
a very close temporal connection28. But whether Thuoydides' 
connectives can be pressed to yield chronological distinctions of a 
year or to, may well be-doubted 
29 
* The POxy fragment relating to 
these events (xIII, 1610, fr. 6), however, clearly suggests that 
there was no delay between the capture of Eion and that of Skyroa30. 
But the nature of the fragments perhaps makes it risky to base 
chronological deductions on these lines31. But these rather insecure 
implications are proved to be, in fact, trustworthy by our best 
evidence for the date of the capture of Skyron. 
Plutarch (Thee. 36.1) dates the oracle commanding the Athenians 
to bring back Theseus' bones to the arohonship of Phaidon, 476/5*'' 
Plutarch's account of the prooeedingei leading up to'the action against 
Skyros seems to fall into two parts. At 'Kimon' $. 3-4 we have an 
account of the action taken by Thessalian merchants against Skyrian 
pirates at the Amphiktyonio council. 'winning their suit against the 
whole island, they fail, however, to get satisfaction because the 
Skyrian authorities refuse to shoulder responsibility for the crimes 
of individual pirates. So far this sounds (to me, at least) credible 
enough, but then we have the suspicious sounding letters sent by the 
pirates to Kimon inviting him to bring hie fleet and take the island32. 
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Indeed this epistolographic'element, in providing us with an 
immediate occasion forland explanation of Athenian intervention5may 
have disrupted what would otherwise have been an internally logical 
account of the lead-up to the Athenian action. As it is now it 
leaves the`iecond part of Plutarch's account (K. 8.5-6) concerning 
the oracle-and 'Theseus ' bones at something of a loose end, and 
not, apparently, immediately connected with any Athenian excuse to 
intervene at Skyros. Yet*to judge by his reference to these events 
at 'Theseus"36.1 Plutarch's source ( cf. Paus. 3.3.7 - see below) 
almost certainly did relate the oracle and bones incident to the 
immediate 'reason' for intervention. The epistolographic element 
looks to me like an extraneous strand which Plutarch has allowed to 
wander into an otherwise convincing tradition. 
In Plutaroh's second part (K. 8.5-6) we are told that the 
Athenians had the oracle concerning Theseus' bones but that the 
Skyrions would not allow them to make a search of their island. In 
other words, Delphi had given the Athenians an excuse to enter the 
island. The Skyrians were, not unwisely, somewhat suspicious and 
refused admittance to the Athenians. It is, then, tempting to connect 
the Amphiktyonio dispute with the Delphic oracle and to see in the 
latter a legitimization of the use of Athenian force of arms to 
punish a recalcitrant member of the Amphiktyonic League. If the 
island oommunity-put up no resistance when the fleet of the Athenian 
allianoe33 filled its harbour, the story of the pirates' treason might 
easily have arisen34. 
If such a connection is accepted then it follows that the oracle 
must indeed bave"been executed at no great distance in time from when 
it was issued. There is an a priori case for assuming a close temporal 
n 
.ý 
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connection between the oracle and its execution, anyway, but without 
our proposed connection it can be maintained that the oracle was 
acted, upon only'eeveral years after its ieeue35. 
Our interpretation of Plutaroh is supported by Pausanias (3.3.7)" 
He-says that the oracle told the Athenians that if they did-not find 
the bones-they would be unable to take the island. This need not 
mean that the Greeks had already begun actual military operations 
against the island when they consulted the god. Indeed, this is made 
most unlikely by the rest of Pausanias' account, for be goes on to . 
say that after Kimon discovered the bones he cleverly took the island. 
From this we should assume that after the pressure of the Athenian 
alliance's fleet was brought to bear on the suspicious islanders, the 
Athenians were allowed-onto the island and a search for the bones was 
begun. In connection with their. presenoe it-was made-possible to 
take the-island from within., I, think we should follow the more 
simple-command of-the oracle aeriven by Plutarch, that the Athenians 
should see-to the-return of-Theseus' bones, in preference to the more 
explicit assistance to Athens' imperialistic designs represented by 
the oracle as found. in, Pausanias. But in-so far as Pausanias' source 
has made the assumption that, the oracle was given in intimate- 
connection with Athena'-designs, for-the oapture-of Skyros, it is 
probably correct36. _Everything, -tben, =points 
to-dating the action 
against Skyros in 4765. It was probably completed swiftly. It 
could be as early; as 47/5. but hardlylater than 47/4.1 
The. next event recorded-by Thuoydides, (98.3) is the war. whioh broke 
out against the Karyatiana. There is nothing other than Thuoydides to 
determine the. date.. If. -anything may<. be deduced from the-narrative it 
is that the war. followed closely upon the capture of. Skyros37. I 
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have avoided bringing interpretative argument s"to. bear in trying 
to establish the chronology, but in the absenoe of anything else, 
we mayýbe, permitted to note that the dominationýof 48rystoe can be 
understood as fitting, with Eion and Skyros, intoJa-pattern of 
operations designed to seoure Athenian control of the, routes between 
Piraeus-and the-northern_Aegean38. As such itwould seem logical to 
keep the war against. garystos in close, temporal connection with the 
preceding domination of Skyros, whioh was not after 475. TheiKarystoo 
war, then, will have begun in 475-4" We do not know bow long the war 
continued39. 
To shall discuss, the chronology of events between Karystos., snd 
Drabeakos now in the course of tackling the question of the com- 
pleteness of Thuoydides!. aooount, of military events-between Rion and 
Drabeakos. The,, widely held belief shat Thuoydides' account of - 
Athenian military-activity between Eion and, for our purposes, let 
us-say, Drabeskos,. in very,, selective -has been refined by ATL. by their 
suggestion that: the"military-actionaliated in ohapter, 98 represent 
only-. examples of-, types of campaigns404 Evidence of military actions 
not specifically recorded by Thucydides in the period Pion to 
Drabeskos forcesFus to accept the possibility that, this suggestion 
is-oorreotj.., I do not-believe it. is correct.,, My-opinion is. based on 
two `different approaches.; . The first will try to show that the 
operations not specifically recorded by, Thuoydides. may be-merely 
parts of, a campaign indeed referred to by him, so making it less 
acceptable to add considerably to his narrative by inventing 
unattested campaigns., The seoondýapproach will seek to showthat,, 
there are, in., faot,, not, insubstantial reasons"whioh militate against 
adding-to Thucydidesyin; -this way, ýover, end-above-the general 
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methodological principle which'recuirea us to aeek'td interpret our 
evidence as it stands. 
Since Diodoros' date for the election of'Ximon to the 
atrategia and the allocation of certain'taake conneoted with" 
prosecuting the war in Ionia does not conflict with any other 
evidence, but rather, fits well, we'ahould accept it as correct 
(60.1: 470/69). We decided that the date of Skyros was 475/41 
after Skyros, according to Diodoros (60.3) Kimon returned to Piraeus 
and before-setting-out for Ionia, Karla and'Lykia undertook an 
extensive preparatory programme. So Diodoros' source recognized 
as two distinct campaigns the Eion-Skyros campaigns and the eastern 
campaign41. -. 
Kimon is said to have arranged for the redesigning of the 
triremes built at Themistokles' aüggestion to enable the allianoe's`'° 
fleet to carry more hoplites. This redesigning is connected 
specifically with preparations made for the campaign which culminated 
at the Eurymedon ý(Pl. K. 12.2). - This notice is surely` to' be'`°` 
connected with Diodoros''(60.3) in which he says that Kimon added 
new-triremes and°ýv d"v. [o7ýV aL00ýoý1. _7CctCaxý'vcýýwos___.. 
before setting out for-Ionia, Varia and Lykia and the Eurymedon. 
Chronologioally, "Diodoros'ýevidenoe of preparations beginning in 
470/69 for an eastern *campaign which culminated at Eurymedon is 
confirmed by the date of the Eurymedon battle, whioh 'was-in 46542. 
Let us examine these preparations more closely'and, compare other 
sources. 
' Diodoros seems to reflect ,a two-stage programme which may have 
been-more olearly define d' in" Ephoroe. 'The' initial aotivity of 
preparing the Athenian fleet for large-scale undertakings on the 
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other side of the Aegean was followed by mustering ships (pCILrTT-Fp, ýLjý--. _. _ 
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Now, Plutarch (K. 11) gives an important account of the process by 
which many of Athens' allies were assessed in terms of cash in place 
of ships. He says that while financial contributions were paid 
some allies refused military contributions _a7ým, bý-op! CVay. -n£S_.. _*- jJq - 
2 po _TO 
preferring to sow their land and relax (Pl. K. 11.1). Kimon accepted 
their contributions in cash and had Athenian crews serve in rotation. 
Plutarch does not mention any actual fighting on the part of the 
Athenians, but seems to think they were training (cKovr ra-S -' 
K. 11.3). While scholars have recognized that the antithesis between 
the good Kimon and nasty 'other generals' should not be taken too 
seriously43, they nonetheless accept the notice's factual statements, 
and have proposed different contexts. The issues involved in 
determining the context are wide-ranging and I do not propose to go 
into them'4. But it. must be admitted that the most obviouatoontext 
for at least the beginning of the conversions process should be 
where Plutarch puts-it - immediately before the campaign which 
culminated in the Eurymedon. battle (Pl. Y. 12.2 - 13.7). It has 
been recognized that-Plutarch's account-is based on Thuoydides' 
chapter 99, though-probably supplemented by at least one other 
souroe45. Thucydidea' comments are made in the context of the Naxos 
revolt, immediately before the notice of the Eurymedon victory. It 
is clear that his remarks on the causes of revolt are not intended 
to be applied only to the case of Naxos46. But the fact that he 
locates them here shows that the factors he mentions as leading to 
revolt must, by the time of the Naxos revolt, have been already in 
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play47. Thuoydides supports Plutarch, thong-in placing a rigorous 
training campaign, resulting in certain states choosing to be -1 
assessed in cash to avoid being away from home, in the period leading 
up to the Furymedon victory. 
By combining our three sources a consistent and plausible 
picture emerges of the preparations made by Kimon for his eastern 
campaign, commissioned by the Athenians in 470/69, according to 
Diodoros (60.1). A bout of shipbuilding activity at Piraeus (Diode 
60.3) was supplemented by the modification of existing triremes to 
suit the new style. of fighting which-would be required if the Asian 
seaboard were to be kept'-out of enemy bands (P1. K. 12.2). In, thie 
context it is easy to believe Plutaroh's statement that Kimon accepted 
contributions from the allies not only of-cash but also of empty 
ships (Pl. K, -11.2)480 -Especially in view of the new style of naval 
warfare which would be entailed by carrying large numbers of hoplites, 
an-intensive training programme was needed (Pl. K. 11.3). -It was 'in 
this context that some states chose to convert to cash contributions- 
(Pl. K. 11.1 -31 Thuo . 99.1 -3)- As part of the training and the 
mustering-of-the fleet Kimon-went to Ionia (Diode 60.3). - Plutarch 
follows his-accounVof the-conversions with a narrative of the 
campaign which led to the Eurymedon battle, but he is very vague 
about what happened where on the Asian coast: CL PAI , 
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(K. 12.1). We can imagine the allied fleet demanding contributions 
from those already in the alliance as well as from those who had 
not yet joined. It is not necessary to-assume that cities in main- 
land Ionia offered any serious resistance to the 'invitations to 
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join the alliance and contribute to the protection against Persia. 
Ejection of any remaining Persian garrisons would probably be an 
internal matter. But it is not impossible that occasionally it 
proved necessary to besiege cities. Diodoros (60.4) suggests 
opposition was encountered only in Karia ( cf. Frontius $trat. 3.2.5), 
and perhaps Lykia. ° It is in this context that Plutarch's story 
(K. 12.3-4) of the forced inclusion of Phaselis in Pamphylia should 
be set. So this action in Pamphylia and perhaps others in Karia, 
Lykia and possibly even Ionia were merely part of the mustering of 
'allies' in preparation for the Eurymedon clash. They, like the 
training programme, could be implied by a reference to the crowning 
victory-to which they led. f.: Aa such . 
Thuoydides may have felt that 
his statement of the aarymedon victory was sufficient and that 
specific mention of such minor preparatory moves could be omitted. 
The existence of-such operations should not, therefore, encourage 
the assumption that-similar actions on the Asiatic coast were common- 
place-before"Kimon was-instruotedý, to undertake operations in Ionia in 
470/69: Y', 
It seems obvious, though, that the-revolt of Naxos was in some 
way'conneoted with the. large scale. mobilisation in the early 460s 
which we have described. The revolt bad not been. crushed by 46649 
and so it is likely that it had begun in! 467 or-earlier. It could, 
then, be maintained-that Thuoydides should also have viewed the revolt 
of Naxos in terms of the preparations for Furymedon and have omitted 
epeoifio, referenoe to it. But, `of course, Naxos-stood apart in that 
it was Ehe first revolt fron, Ehe alliance to be su ppresse d and not merely 
a refusal' to join it. -- Unlike others she probably refused to make 
even a financial contribution. ' Also, the -potential effect on 
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discipline must have required the, Athenians to make an. all-out' 
effort, in, suppressing the revolt as quiokly. as possible., It 
probably caused the Athenians-to break off their preparations50. 
For these reasons the. revolt of Naxos warranted special mention. 
These oonsiderations-provide us with-fairly preoise absolute 
dates. Since Naxos and 1urymedon belong virtually. together in so 
far as there would be no, time for other military activities between 
them5l, we must assume - that the - Furymedon preparations were-before 
466 and, -.. if Naxos ?, began, in-467, as is probably the-case, , 
then before 
467. Kimon was ordered-to-embark on<an -eastern, oampaign in 470/69. - 
and his preparations, began; with. a period of rearmament in-the 
Piraeus. His fleet -then may-have=put to sea. in 469. The training, 
mustering and, on oooasion, coeroion of 'allies' therefore took plane 
in. the period 469-7" 
We-oould see the, other: military-operations not-mentioned by 
Thuoydides2but attestedelsewhere, in the same way., rThe"fighting 
in the"Chersonese, recorded by Plutarch (K. 14.1) and some-of the 
oasualties"listedkby Iß-12 928 can be seen as; mopping°up left over 
from the Furymedon preparations or as beingin-aonnootion, with-the 
attempt, on Fa neahodoi (Thuo. 100.3)52. 
That, said. it must be admitted that the evidence of-operations 
unrecorded by Thuoydides renders the argument from silence inconclusive. 
But what arethe positive reasons. adduoed, by, modern scholars, -for 
adding-to the historical reoordt. by. postulating military actions other 
than those we-have already_noted?. - Firstly, the-stated aim of the 
Athenian'alliance was to ravage; the. Kingts territory. -Secondly, we 
argued , that few cities of mainland Ionia. revolted from the King, - 
shortly after Mykale, -yet by 472 we have. what, I em: prepared toýacoept 
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as evidence of the. memberahip of the allianoe of at least a fair 
proportion of mainland Ionian cities (Aisoh. Pers. 898-903)" 
Lastly, Meiggs thinks that the-reminisoenoes of the jurors in 
Aristophanes' wasps (1097-8) of the time when-they took many cities 
from the Uedes should be taken as a hint confirming "common sense" 
which requires us to assume that there were actions in-the 470s 
against the Persians besides Eion53. 
It is obvious that the words-of the-Choros in the Wasps needn't 
be applied to the 470eß an opposed to a later period54. The lines 
of the Persai oonfirm the implications of the task given to Kimon in 
47P/69 reoorded by Diodoroat ae, well ae expelling: any remaining 
Persian garrisons on, the Asian coast, he is to',,. _ o1.6, 
ß 
4V-ra ._ 
There 
were oities allied to Athens in the late 470s on the coast of Asia. 
This does not, of course, -mean that.. the Athenians 
had provided 
military assistance. in bringing about, the revolts from Persia. The 
revolts bad probably been ooourring from within throughout the 470e, 
as a; -result of the threat wielded. by the. profeseed aim; of the 
Athenian alliance. It. is this professed aim which bas provided the 
strongest argument in favour, of assuming the existence of. otherwise 
unattested, actions against-tbe`Persians. The fact that. by 472 some, 
perhaps many, cities in Asia had "Joined ., the alliance does not, 
however, presuppose that the alliance*a threat was acted upon. 
Threats can be as_effective as actions It is methodologically 
questionable to make such an, asaumption. We should, in general, 
attempt to make sense of the information available before adding to: 
it. It"will be argued later that an. absence of military operations 
in the east in the. 470s does admit ofa satisfactory explanation. 
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These are, furthermore, positive reasons in Thuoydides whioh 
should prohibit adding to his evidenoe of military aotivity: 
Thuoydidea (96.1) dubs the professed purpose of the alliance, 
namely, to ravage the King's territory, a more 'exouse'55. Those 
who would assume, on'the basis of Thuoydides' statement of the 
'professed aim' ( ýP 
6x'ý ý"10t- )56 of the 'alliance, that more 
extensive military activity occurred on the Asian coast than 
Thucydides bas recorded are, in effect, appealing to hie statement 
in order to justify the assumption of events which, if they existed, 
would contradict the sense of the very statement (n p 6x ß 
'excuse') which they think supports the alleged events. Thuoydides' 
comment on the professed aim of the alliance thus confirms the 
paucity of actions against the Persians in the 4705 which his 
narrative of events (98. '1 -3) implies. ATL'a 'examples hypothesis' 
is also unconvincing. Thuoydides has just claimed (97.2) that be is 
going to write an-account of the Pentekontaetia, partly, because it 
has not been properly covered by, previou s writers, and so we may 
deduce that to record the events was thus an end in itself57. 
Furthermore., he criticizes Hellanikos' account of the period for its 
brevity. It is difficult to believe that he goes on to omit 
extensive campaigning on the Asiatic coast because he considered 
the example of Eion sufficed. Thuoydides is guilty of omissions in 
the account of the Pentekontaetia, but that is no reason for us to 
dream up campaigns of which there is otherwise no sign. 
The fact that sources not based on Thuoydidea have no echo of 
campaigns on the Asiatic coast which we would have to locate before 
the Eurymedon preparations would be surprising if auch a oampaign 
had existed. We tend to moan about bow 'aourvily' we have been 
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treated by our sources for the Pentekontaetia, but it is worth 
noticing that all the campaigns recorded by Thuoydides in the 4708 
are in fact attested by other sources which are not dependent on 
Thuoydides58. It would, 'then, be surprising if no commemorative 
or comic verse, no incidental reference in IIerodotos or 
the orators and no anecdote set in this context should have survived 
of the putative` campaigns on the coast of Asia in the 470s. 
The conclusion that these campaigns did not exist is implied 
by other sources. We argued that the programme of trireme redesign- 
ing for the Eurymedon campaign (Pl. IC. 12.2) should be connected 
with-Diodoroa' notice of"preparations, the beginning of whioh'is 
dated to'470/69 (60.1). Scholars have noted that the new style of 
trireme reflects what*was expected to be a new style of warfare needed 
to engage the Persiane1on'the`ooast of Asia59. If the coast of Asia 
Minor were to be held' permanently, the Athenian alliance would have 
to be able to deploy'large numbers of hoplites on land. One thinks 
of the hasty-retreat after My'kale. ' The implication of these facts 
1S " that before'470/69'the Athenian alliance had not been engaged 
60 in operations against the Persians on"the'Asiatio mainland. 
ýýý x_: ý ý.. ý:. . ''-x ý ý' 
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CHAPTER NINE. SUCCESS`,, -IN ATHENIAN POLITICS FROM THE FORMATION OF 
THE AThIENIAN, ALLIANCE. UNTILTHE WAR WITH KARYSTOS. 
It is no longer, necessary. to,. argue the case that fifth-century 
Athenian politico did, not function within the highly artificial 
partysystem familiar in: modern; political. In the final analysis 
aypolitician was successful ontheastrength of, bis own abilities, 
proven or suspected,, although, his chances in public life were 
increased by support from other men within,, a variety of frameworks 
whioh, we shall have occasion tonote later.. Constitutionallytrof 
course, it, was the Assembly which accepted or rejected a man's 
proposals. Suche situation did . not, encourage 
the expounding of 
inter-related, long-term, policies, ttof a, manifesto, so. torspeak.. This 
in not to say that leaders did, not, have long-term objectives for the 
city nor, that they did not see individual issues within their. wider. 
context, but that. these oiroumatances-would make, it, impraatioable to 
relate each decision-facing Boule or Assembly to such policies, and 
less effective to justify proposals in terms of such policies, 
rather than in terms of immediate, short-term advantages2. But the 
repeated success of a man in having his proposals adopted may 
justifiably be deecribed äs the sücoessful implementation of his 
policy, in the broader' sense #öf the worl. In` this chapter we shall 
attempt to locate'the most important considerations which led to 
the adoption of a"mänIs'pröpösalo'by the'Aesembly. To do this two 
stages are necessary. -Firstly we mu'at try, by comparing known events 
with what we oensglean of tbe`long-term'p'oliäiec of Athenian leaders, 
to decide who proposed the actionsi we thus''have a rough measure 
ýs > 
of success. Secondly, byeetabliehing'categories"to cover"' qualities 
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which can be attested as contributing to political success, we 
shall be in e position to measure the relative importance of these 
categories by comparing'the success of individuals with what should 
be'the strength, of their endowment with the qualities covered by 
our categories. We shall recognize in due course the'obvious 
limitations of- such'a method' applied to our period as well as, 
however. -offer a defence of the results it affords. 
" -, Recent ostraka'finds have confirmed that our literary sources 
have over-simplified--the complexity of Athenian politics by omitting 
mention-of numerous-men who, though less important than the great 
names, were signifioant'enough"to poll aý'respeotable' number of 
votes'in, theýostrakophoriai3. ' And yet even though there may have 
been-groups of5men and'issues-which stood in no direct relationship 
to the great namearor°to the direction of foreign policy over'whiah 
the great men-clashed, our"pioture of political conflict, while over- 
simplified, -probably=reflects°correatly the predominant issues and" 
groupings of the period. " 
We have already outlined Themistokles' post-war policy. One 
element in it was secure control of the Aegean. Aristeides. and, in 
support of him, Kimon had persuaded the Athenians to pursue the war 
against Persia, partly in the hope of excluding Themistokles from 
influence, which they might hope to achieve since both hie provocative 
anti-Spartan stance was incompatible with 
'a 
concerted war in the east, 
and, perhaps, his standing with the islanders as a result of his 
behaviour in 480 would not recommend him as a leader of the Athenian 
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alliance4a 
Let us try to, relate the military actions of the, Athenians to. 
the policies of, Themistokles and those of Aristeides-Kimon. The 
first minor action against,. Pausanias is not very helpful. It is 
not difficult to imagine that Tbemistokles turned Pau sanias'-action 
into a etiok with which, to, beat, the Spartans. Pauzanias. returned to_ 
Byzant ion 
(Thuc. 128.3). Whatever Thucydidean usage may be in , designating, ware, 
this is. probably what, Pausanias. aotually, said. -What Pausaniaa meant 
is debatablo5. It oould: undoubtedly, be-interpreted as an expression 
of aggressive-intentions against Athenian interests on the part of 
the Spartans. The evidenoe ; is: such, that: it-lis unwise to, base, too, muoh 
on ; speculationsabout=-the- role,, 
Pausanias -played in the. politics of 
the 470s. and 460a, in-the Hellenio, world., But-itµis worth mentioning 
the, poesibility that, Themistokleo was the first to. level accusations 
of relations with-the Persians against Pausanias in his-oapaoity-as 
6a high-ranking, Spartan, offiaial. ; Yet. his expulsion was probably 
sanctioned by. Spartan officialdom,,, and sofwill not have conflicted 
with the wishes of., Aristeides-or; Kimon. 
Before we analyse, the. relationship; of Eion, Skyros and Karystos 
to the, polioies., of, our two groups, it is worth emphasizing that: we 
should, not automatically equate-the most prestigious general on a 
campaign with its initiator.; wCihile on questions of tactics. the 
board was, naturally, rygiven, a freerhand,,. matters of overall, strategy, 
objeotivea andý-polioy; were: determined, by Boule and Assembly,. end the 
generals were given . their., tasks- to> fulfil?..: 
It, will be remembered 
that we felt confident, that at no stage. in. hia, career can Themistoklea 
have openly discouraged actions directed against the Persians, and 
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that now, shortly after the. adoption. of the aggressively anti-Persian 
programme of the new alliance, -he will not have gone against the-tide 
of emotion. There is no evidence to suggest that, Kimon or Aristeides 
may. have preferred an objective other thanSion to launch the .. ) 
alliance's anti-Persian drive. On-, the. other hand, an exploration- 
of the possibility of seeing Tbemiatokles as an enthusiastic advocate 
of Mon as the alliance's firnt . target can-lead to the conclusion 
that on balance iVmakes more sense to-postulate Themistokles-rather 
than his enemies, as the prime mover.. of this campaign. 
Firstly, if Themistokles was-aiming at Athenian-domination-of 
the-Aegean a secure base at., Eion will have seemed invaluable. It 
also represented a remarkably strategic site in dominating the land 
routes. As well asits immediate strategic value the site may have 
been,. viewed as a stepping-stone, eventually, to greater ambitions,.. 
namely, the annexation of_part. of. Makedonia,, an action which would 
facilitate the supply of,, timber. The annexation of part of Uakedonia 
was, at any rate, a plan of Kimon's, enemies in, the-late 460s when it 
wam; oonsidered feasible. (Pl.. K. 14.2)8. " ;, The-potential threat of 
denying acoess tothis -attraotive, souroe, ot ships' timber , which was 
made, possible: 
-bythe secure 
hold Alexander: probably had over export 
may well have posed-an unacceptable 
aanger, 
q-in Themistokles' view. 
This fear will have been brougWhomeyall the more if, in con- 
struoting their, Persian. war: fleet,. tbe. Athenians had had to rely to 
a-large extent on timber-from.. the west,. as arresult of Alexander's 
commitment-to the Persian King: (see H. <5.219 8.136)9. So, while 
complying with the popular desire, -to=take vengeance on the Persiens, 
the choice of: Eion. will aleo have-furthered the realization of 
Themiatokleal plans for Athena. - 
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The " capture of Eion, in, as far n as it may have been thought of 
as a , potential base for further operations against Makedonia, also 
had the advantage for Themistokles: of'continuing to focus-Athenian 
attention on the potential power and influence they could wield in 
mainland Hellas. Thanks`. to Themistokies' action at the'Amphiktyonio 
council, and, if aocepted, 'bisýatanoe over the expedition of 
Leotyohides, at least-those areas of Thessaly`dominated'by the 
Alsuadai were'now friendly"tolthe=Athenians - especially Themistokles 
==and--oould be viewed-as potential`alliesl0. -'If Themistokles was 
the prime mover of-the deoiaion"to take on Eion as the first target 
it was not only a useful stage in his post-war policy buttalso-a 
brilliant move politically.; 
c _t eThemistokles may - have- known"Eion and the surrounding-area, 
perhaps from. his involvement in'the. analysis, of thestrategy'of" the y= 
defence of'Hellas before: Xerxes'°-invasion.. -, Also, however, the 
possible connections" between-_Themistokles`and Thascs in"the"490s and 
480a might well have=encouraged a-trip to<-the island, stimulating 
interest. inimportant featuresof the area; as a whole 
ll. He can't 
have 'been - ignorant of the `difficulty :. that . would * 
be. encountered ' in 
taking=this fortified city, , and'he. was: probably, aware of the dangers 
lurking! in the interior for anykwho-were'ordered to venture inland. 
He`mayneven have heard tales of', the typekof'man Bogee was. 
Sinne 4787°'tbe influential'Aristeides had been promoting Kimon. 
There is contemporary'svidenoe-whiohýeuggeeta, that"Themietoklee in 
the`470s sought to dismiss Kimonäas skilled in the gentle arts of 
singing and lyre°playing but not, in`the'more urgent ones of making 
the city wealthy: an$. great (Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.1), relevant to 
the 'situation, faoing Athens in-the 470x. In' 477/6 Kimon was tobe 
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among the leaders of the Eion campaign. The support of Aristeides, 
as well as the 'suotoritas' deriving from his family names put Kimon 
in an influential position on the campaign's board of generals. It 
was Kimon'e Häme which was to be associated with E'ion, and may have 
been from the start. Kimon must have been seeking to substantiate 
his claims to political leadership with tangible success. 
Themistokles was probably aware that if the Eion campaign did not 
put a premature end to Kimon it might well be expected to prove a 
12 
disastrous start to his career. To some extent it was 
We have already seen that the siege was long. Running out of 
money and improperly equipped to deal with the military situation, 
Menon of Pharsalos, probably no friend to Themistokles, helped Kimon 
out of the pickle he was in (Demoeth. 23.199)13. With this 
aseistanoe Kimon was able to maintain the siege long enough to starve 
out the inhabitants. Athenian disappointment at finding nothing of 
worth in the city must have been deep ( cf. Pl. K. 7.3). The 
Athenians had bad their first taste of the reality of 'ravaging the 
King's land'. They also learned that despite domination of the 
coast besieging a city with a determined population and a hostile 
hinterland was a difficult and dangerous business ( cf. Pl. K. 7.2; 
sohol. Aisoh. 2.34 (Dindorf 48)). The situation on the coast of 
Asia Minor was not the same, but it had similarities, and parallels 
may have been drawn by the men shivering in front of Eion. 
Our sources are particularly unhelpful about discussion of issues 
at Athens. The fact that there is no mention of Themistokles in 
connection with the deoision to go to Eion does not argue against 
his being the prime mover. Yet all we may insist upon is that to 
suggest Themistokles was an eager supporter makes good sense, and 
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that-the campaign should not be seen as a politioal'defeat for him. 
There is, on the other, hand no reason to suppose-that his enemies 
opposed 'the campaign. = 
The capture of Skyros strengthened the security of the sea 
route between Piraeus'and Eion and the Hellespont. . It was, though, 
hardly the most urgent objective in a war wbioh-professed to be* 
exacting revenge from the Barbarian. The apparent'ease with which 
the island was taken must have demonstrated to the Athenians the 
difference between ,a policy of naked imperialism in the Aegean, 
similarýto, that Themistokles was perhaps assooiatedýwith in 480, and 
theitiresome, -dangerous and sometimes profitless task of ravaging the 
King'. s land, be it on the Thracian or Asiatic coast. There is some 
circumstantial evidenceato connect Themistokles with-the decision to 
Proceed to Skyros. The excuse for attacking Skyros'was based on two 
elements, both associated with Themistoklea. 'The provocative judge- 
ment of the Amphiktyonio council in favour of the plaintive 
Thessaliana (were they friends of the Aleuadai? )l-against Skyros may 
represent an: example of the type of influence Themistokle s had in, 
mind-when: he won-the, friendship of-many of the'states'sending 
delegates to the council. This judgement, and the Skyrian refusal 
to-comply, provided moral grounds for an attack. Themistokles^seemn 
to have-had a special relationship with the Delphic oraole14. It. » 
would, perhaps, not have been difficult for him to elicit, in 476/5, 
an oracle demanding that the Athenians find-Theseue'cbones and 
return-them. to: Athens. -., The co-operation of. Delphi on this point 
provided=: the. -excuse for a. specifically-Athenian-interventioniin 
Skyros15.: The-fact that Kimonwas able to exploit this action 
brilliantly Ior, his ý own purposes (Pl. K. 8.6) should not . rule out the 
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possibility of seeing, it essentially as an expression of 
Themistokles' imperialistic Aegean policy. Podleoki has recently 
collected the possible hints in the evidence of attempts by 
Themistokles to claim some of the propaganda, value accruing from 
the 'Theseus' inoident16. Nepon (Th. 2.3) says Themietokles rid the 
seas of pirates. This might reflect a source which had Themistokles 
at least partly responsible for the expulsion of the piratical 
inhabitants of Skyros17. 
The aotion against Skyros fite better with what can be gleaned 
of Themistokles' plans than with those of his enemies. Yet Kimon's 
intimate and enthusiastic involvement in it suggests they were not 
openly opposed to it. But we may speculate that if the understanding 
reached between influential men at Sparta and Kimon and Ariateides 
which we postulated were not to be strained the Athenians should 
resume their anti-Persian drive, and preferably on the Asian coast. 
This was not to be the case. 
Modern scholars have recognized that whatever the reasons 
Athens may have advanced for the war against Karystoa it must have 
appeared high-handed. It was not a Persian stronghold, the., 
inhabitants, as far as we know, were not piratical and they had 
already been punishel in 480 for their Mediam. At any rate, it 
could hardly have been maintained that Karystos' independence from 
the allianoe represented a serious threat to security sufficient to 
take preo edenoe, over the real job of attacking King's land and Persian 
strongholds. Tbe, war was a; purely imperialistic venture and 
represented another step towards achieving a complete Athenian 
domination of the Aegean and which served Athens'. interests 
primarily18. The Aar may have oast doubt on the integrity of the 
143. 
motives behind the operations against Eion and Skyros. 
It will be remembered that Themistokles, backed by the Hellenic 
Leagues fleet, had visited Karystos in 480 making financial and 
perhaps political demands. The Karystians had evidently held out 
against some of or all the demands and so had had their land 
devastated. Personal animosity may have existed between Themistokles 
and the Karystians. We suggested that the accusation that the 
Karystians in 480 had in fact sent money to Themistokles which 
Herodotos (8.112) records, was made now, around 474, to discredit 
Themistokles. Timokreon seems to have been encouraged by these 
'official' accusations to level similar ones of his own. He also 
made the more justified complaint that Themistokles' actions were 
inconsistent. While some, notably the Aegean islands, were being 
treated harshly, allegedly, we may presume, because of their behaviour 
in 480, the Medism of others, notably Argos, Thebes, Aleuad Thessaly 
and, perhaps, Kerkyraywas made secondary to more pragmatic con- 
siderations 
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If such a context for, and interpretation of 
Timokreon's fragment are accepted, the mention of Aristeides as the 
man most deserving of praise would be evidence that he opposed 
aggression against Karystos. The context would also suggest that 
feeling in the Aegean was at least dubious20. 
One of the reasons why Sparta had been willing to withdraw from 
the hegemony of the offensive war against Persia and to support 
Athens' adoption of it was the hope of seeing Athens' forces 
entangled in a war on the coast of Asia which would last 'for ever'. 
Instead what had happened was that Athens was enjoying the advantages 
of the TO P05 and was exploiting her position as hegemon to expand 
her own power in the Aegean and seemed in no hurry to get involved in 
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Asia Minor. It-was in this situation that some Spartans may well 
have considered making war upon Athens to rob her of the dangerous 
power which she was amassing. If the Hetoimaridas debate really 
does reflect some kind of historical debate in 475/4 on the"possi-` 
bility of war with Athens, and if the Karystos war began in 475-4v 
then we are almost"oompelled to draw a causal link. Since I accept' 
both conditions I believe that the Karystos war acted as a direct 
stimulus to the debate 
1. 
Fear of a threat from Sparta wasp we 
argued, a ploy used by Themistokles in 479-8 to discourage Athenian 
involvement in Asia. An action which created another crisis 
situation might encourage us to see Themistokles as connected with 
proposing it. If the Spartan reaction which we have postulated is 
accepted then it is certainly evidence that Aristeidee and°Kimon were 
not responsible for proposing the Karystos operations and we should 
have expeoted them to have opposed the war. The interpretation we 
probailiy have offered is perhaps oonfirmed by the hig1i that Kimon did not 
22 
act as general in the war. 
A glance at the map is sufficient to testify to the fact that 
the domination of Karystos can be interpreted as serving the same 
aim as control of Eion and Skyros in securing the safety of essential 
supply routes for Athena, and as a potential means of wielding 
influence on other states by her command of this route ( cf. Ps. Xen. 
2.2 -3)23. This effort to ensure the import of essential goods is 
matched by other measures taken at Athens serving the same end. 
Themistokles' authorship of these may suggest associating him with 
the former, too24. 
So it is fair to say that on the basis of the first three 
campaigns of the Athenian alliance, Eion. Skyros and Karystos, the 
145" 
influence of Themistokles' policies and Themistoklean thinking is 
perhaps discernible. These military actions, though, certainly can 
not be cited as evidence of Themistoklest decline in influence. To 
do this is to confuse tenure of office with real power. The latter 
lay in the ability of a man to put bis plans into practice. The 
strategos in the field was not in a position to do that. He was the 
servant of the demos' orders. It was the an who could influence the 
resolutions of Boule and Assembly who wielded real power25. To do 
that it'was not wise to be away from Athens for almost'half the year 
campaigning. Let us examine, then, what evidence there in for us to 
determine what factors led tea man's opinions and plans being 
adopted by the demos. Admittedly, the categories which we shall not 
out are to some extent artificial, but nonetheless justifiable 
ultimately, I feel. 
We may distinguish three main, oategoriee which played a part in 
the acoeptance of a man's proposals by the demost 1. the intrinsic 
persuasiveness of his arguments, 2. the reputation, in the positive 
sense, 'which he enjoyed, and-3- philoi support. 
I, -the best example of, success based on persuasive argument is 
probably Themistokles' ability. to persuade the Athenians to dedicate 
the recent silver strikes, to building a new fleet to settle the 
Aiginetan 
-war, 
(H. 7.144) even though _,. _7CQ_? 
2ýtz5.1sF ýL .. 
7.143)., Thuoydides'. comments on Themiatoklea' 
insight and persuasiveness (138.3) also suggest-that thia. gift at 
least oontributed, to Tbemiatoklee', influenoe in the pre-Salamis. atage 
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of his career. 
2. Good repute would derive from three main source st 
a) from his family. A man would inherit the reputation his 
ancestors had built up. Thucydides (5.43.2) says, for example, of 
Alkibiades, that although young, _. 
CL 
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If the full publication of the ICerameikos 
ostraka does, in fact, prove that Kimon was a serious candidate for 
ostracism in the first half-of the 4808, the fact would also, provide 
good evidence that it must have been his family's reputation which 
gave a lad probably still suffering from adolescent acne the degree 
of political significance presupposed by his candidacy 
26 
0 
b) from his own achievements. The two best testimonies to this 
source are Herodotoa' explanation (8.110) of the Athenian sailors' 
acceptance of Themistokles' advice at Andros:. 
r 
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and the implications of his account (6.132) of the Athenians granting 
Miltiades seventy ships, an army and money to proceed against an 
unspecified target. immediately after his achievement at Marathon. 
Success breeds success. 
a) Lastly, an attractive personality would supplement a good 
reputation won by family and achievement. Kimon'a generosity con- 
tributed to his political success (Gorgias fr. B. 20 (Diols 82) 
ape Pl. K. 10.5; , 
Theopompos fr. 89; ý. cf. AP 27.3; Pl. Per. 9.2)27 
Aristeides' even-handedness no doubt"oontributed to his political 
success in Athena'(Timokreon fr. ýl ape P1. Ph. '20.2; - He 8.79). - 
Plutarch (Th. 22.1) attributes, at least in part, Themistoklos' 
ostracism to him self-laudatory speeches and'behaviour. The recently 
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discovered oatrakon-dedioated to 'Themiatokles' honour' perhaps 
confirms Plutarch28. 
3. Our final oategory, ie the influence a man derived from 
-1 
support from his 
CPI kOC, 
. This term covers both family and friends 
including hetairoi29. These philoi will in turn, as well as trying 
to secure the support of more influential men with whom they may 
have been close, have been able to secure some support for their 
friend or relative from a pyramid structure of dependants. But it 
is not clear how influential such connections remained at the lower, 
broader end of the structure. Nor is the working of such influence 
at local or 'national' level clearly attested30. There is evidence, 
furthermore, that Peisistratos and Kleisthenes sought to reduce the 
dependence of the 'average' Athenian on his local aristocrats31. - The 
economic developments of the sixth and fifth centuries, as well as 
the nature of decisions facing the Athenians in the thirty years 
following the expulsion of Hippias, should, a priori, have dis- 
couraged the importance of this type of-influence32. - A man could 
extend his access to this type of support by. alliance with powerful 
families, usually by marriage. 
Despite the defioienoies in our evidenoe, it is still worth 
relating these categories to the moderate political success of. 
Themistokles in the years down to Y. arystos, and to compare his 
endowments with those of his opponents. Which opponents? We have 
already stressed that by dividing Athenian politics into only two 
groups, 'Themistokles and his opponents&, we are. almost certainly, 
over-simplifying the pattern of politics at thisaperiod. ---Yet we can 
do no more than recognize this fact if we wish to attemptsto relate 
the recorded events to specific political confliots33. And it is 
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in fact probable that as well'as numerous other men of greater or' 
lesser importance beyond whose name we know little, a consistent 
attempt was made by a group of men to stem Themistokles' political 
success and that this attempt bad the ultimate aim of annihilating 
him politically. Aristeides' active co-operation with Themistokles 
in 480 represents a break in his otherwise consistent opposition 
(H. °8.79)" This was at 'least partly motivated by"a'desire to regain 
his credibility with the demos as a loyal Athenian. The same will 
have been true of Xanthippos, though it is far less certain that he 
should be viewed as an enemy of Themistokles in the 480a. We have 
no information about Xanthippos after his return from the capture 
of Sestos in 479/8. He should be dead by 473/2 when'his son served 
as choregos; he needn't have still been alive in the mid-470s when 
Timokreon mentioned him. But there is evidence which suggests that 
if be was alive until 475-4 he will have lent his support to the 
"grand coalition" (see below) in opposing Themistokles. It is 
possible that be also chose not to stand for election to the 
strategic in the 470s in order"to exert his influeno'e'ae fully as 
possible in Athens where decisions were made. Yew derbythat 
we should see Aristeides and Kimon as enemies of'Themistoklea during 
the 470s. Aristeides may have chosen to remain in Athens for the 
same reasons as Themistokles and perhaps Xanthippos. ' We must, then, 
concentrate our enquiry on the competition for influenoe between 
Themistokles and his unknown philoi and Aristeides, Kimon and 
Xanthippos and their philoi, for we have no'knowledge of other men 
which could be used to fill out our picture of Athenian politic s. 
1. Persuasive argument. Since we have no'"information on the 
arguments used in setting the direction of Athenian energies down to 
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475-4"-we cannot even-decide whether there was disagreement between 
Themistokles'andýhis enemies. - We: saw, -, for example, that Eion and 
Skyros, oouldfit with what we, know-of the aims of -both groups. If 
there was division it is most likely, to have-occurred over, whether 
to make war onKarystos. The importance of the role of6.. percuasive 
argument must, then, remain uncertain in determining these'early .. 
targets for. the alliance. It is-pertinent here toemphasize thatIt'', 
the term 'persuasive, argument'-should not°be allowed to obscure the 
fact that policy was not conceived in 'isolation: in 'tthe minds of °' 
Athenian leaders and then 'sold' to the demos. The-proooss was 
dynamiov popular feeling influenoing, the, detailed policy°of leaders, 
and leaders influencing'popular feeling. We, saw"this feature of 
Athenian politics in the-failure of"Themistokles to advocate a 
necessary aspect of his polioy-which be-knew would be deeply unpopular. 
We shall have occasion to-observe different' manifestations"of this 
interaotion in later obaptera. ;'° 
2. Reputations 
a) family34. - Later anoient, and some modern writers, have over- 
emphasized the modesty of-Themistokles' family. His=membershipýof - 
the Lykomidai Genoa iswell-attested enough for us. not"°to-doubt,, 
even-if=the senior=branoh to, whioh Themistokles did-notnbelong'were 
jealous (Simonidee ap. 'Pl. Th. 1.31 -Theodorus 1 etioohus ° t^. " °, -" --- 
(Willer and Kiessling 608))35. The'anoient -ritual 'duties of the <' - 
olan. testify to-, its nobility (Hippolytus'Refutatio omniumýhaeresium 
5.20.5... 6 6)..: Menon'of Pblya (AP 1; Pl. Solon 12.3) may have been 
among Themistoklee' anoestore37. chile Themistokles' broader family 
conneotions'were-thus impressive,, his immetiate family history 
Probably, contributed -less Ao'his'reputation, , -Plutarch 
(Th. 1.1) > 
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knew of no aohievement of his father Neokies. That Plutarohta 
impression of a less than prominent man was correct is perhaps 
objectively confirmed by the fact that he is nowhere-attested as 
Kcc, k0 5 38. If Themistokles' mother was foreign it needn't have 
been to his discredit39, and his father probably did not disown 
him40. The family's remoteness from Athena may have contributed to 
its probable political obscurity41. When Themistokles entered public 
life with his 3T. he was only moderately well-off (Kritias Zr. B. 45 
(Diele 88) ap. Ael. V. 1!. 10.17)42. Nor did Themietokles match up 
socially with some of hie political oompetitora, (Ion fr. 13 ap. 'Pl. 
K. 9.1)43. 'Beyond the more remote reputation accruing from his 
membership of the Lykomidai, his immediate family, wealth and social 
standing were not outstanding. Though his marriage to Arohippe 
daughter of Lysandros of Alopeke may have helped him up the social 
scale, essentially his, suooess would owe little to the reputation 
he won from his family44. There is no reason to believe that any 
of his children married well in the 47os450 
The case is strikingly different with his enemies. The traditions 
concerning Ariateidea! poverty are ezaggerated4b. The social statu® 
of his father, Lysimaohos, is testified by his marriage to a sister 
of Hipponikos Kalliou, and daughter of Kallias Phainippou47. So on 
his mother'a aide Aristeides was related to the Kerykes genoss one 
48 of the great gene of-the. fifth oentury, and -oertainly very wealthy . 
Ariateidea-might have had a oonneotion with the Alkmeonidai, but the 
evidenoe is not good490 
Kimon's family background was most illustrious. Despite the 
sticky end his father MMiltiades had come to (H. 6.136) it was 
)iltiades' association with the llarathon victory which remained upper- 
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most ( cf. H. 6.109-10,136)50, as well as his other military 
exploits (H. 6.136-40) and his regal and adventurous existence in 
the=Chersonese (H. 6.349 40-41)51" His family's glories, of course, 
extended back'far beyond his father, Miltiadea Kimonos. Among the 
reasons for its good repute may have been the memory of the faut 
that in the sixth century it was this family which was "most 
obviously at loggerheads with the regime"52. Membership of the 
Philaid genos, or perhaps we should say Kimonid53, automatically 
conferred on Kimon a belief in his ability to lead, because of the 
traditions and experience of his family, once, of course, he had 
demonstrated that he had not inherited his grandfather's block- 
headedness (Pl. K. 4.3) which he seems to have done early in his 
career (-cf. e. g. Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. 9.2" -4, generally K. 5.1)54. 
The reputation he enjoyed because of his family will have been 
beightened`by two important marriages. Kimon's sister, Elpinike553 
married Kallias Hipponikou. The precise date is not certain. It 
was after Miltiades' death, which was probably in 489-8. The stories 
of her sexual relations with Kimon during their co-habitation (Eupo1is 
fr. 208 (Kook) ap. Pl. K. 15.3 ; Pl. K. 4.5) suggest that they lived 
together for at least a few years. At the other end of the scale we 
have the fact that the child of this marriage, Hipponikos, 'himself 
sired a child around 45056. All that means is, that Hipponikos should 
have been born by about 475. Any date between about 485 and 475 for 
the marriage is acceptable57. There iss then, no reason to object' 
to Bicknellts c. 479 context for the marriage58. Whenever it was 
conoluded'this link between the Philaidai and Kerykes boosted the 
prestige of both, and was effective in the 470s. It established a 
link between Kimon'and Ariateidea, and possibly with the`Alkmeonidai59. 
152. 
Amore securely attested link, between the Alkmeonidai and Philaidai 
is the marriage of Kimon and Isodike, daughter of-Euryptolymos 
Uegakleous60. To determine the date of the marriage we must examine 
the evidence of Stesimbrotos and. Diodoros-Periegetes. Diodoros 
(fr. 37-ap" Pl. K. 16.1), stated. that Kimon's children,; Lakedaimonios, 
Eleios. (oorreotly Oulios) and, Thessaloswere. borne by. Isodike; 
Stesimbrotos (fr. 6 ap. Pl. K. 16.1) says. the first two were.,? K. - 
'uvow'059"" "'Elfopus, and -he -probably included Thessalos, 
too, (Pl. 
Per. 29.3)61. In view of, Stesimbrotost proximity-, in time-scholars, have 
been reluctant to reject his evidence62. Sinne Kimon's marriage-to 
Isodike is not in doubt (. Cf. Arobelaos (Fämonds, Elegy and Iambus 
446) ap. Pl" K. 4.9) scholars have suggested-two wives, the Kleitorian 
woman and then Isodike, which only partially resolves the conflict63. 
A better solution was offered-by ßaubitsobek and adopted by Davies, 
namely, that 'Kleitorias'. should be understood anatomically, not -,, °- , 
geographically 
64., 
Steaimbrotos, then, is referring, consciously or 
unconsciously to Isodike65. --In that case we have s terminus ante 
quem for, the marriage in the birth of Lakedaimonios. He should have 
been at least thirty when he. served, as hipparoh, probably-in 446 
(Z(; 12 400). While 0.470 would be the very latest date for his 
birth66,0.476 is more comfortable. If we accept the existence of 
three-, other children, Kimon, üiltiades and Peisianax (Sahel., Ael..... 
Arist. 
-(Dindorf 
515))# as . we should 
67,. 
we must also -fit Mliltiadea in 
as the first born, -as onomastic convention would require. The best 
date, then, for the marriage is in or near 47968 "-"xsr', ,-. 
. 
As with the Philaidai-Kerykes connection this Philaidai- 
Almeonidai connection served. to,. enhance-the splendour of both, houses. 
Alkmeonid involvement in, Athenian history was long and. intimateg if 
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not uncompromised69. The nurse which had been incurred over the 
Kylon affair was used as a atiok to beat them down into the fifth 
oentury70. By the 4808 they were also suspected of lyedism, 
presumably at Marathon (cf. H. 6.121,123-4). Yet it would be 
wrong to believe that the reputation they had built up over 
generations, as well as the memory of the real contribution the 
family had rendered to Athenian independence in the last decade of- 
the sixth century, was completely wiped out by the )Sedism charges 
1. 
The choice of the Alkmeonid Leobotes as the accuser of Themistokles 
(Krateros fr. 11; cf. Pl. Th. 23.1) by Themistokles' enemies in 
the early 460s is itself-testimony to the renown attaching to the 
family's name in this period. Association with the Alkmeonidai was 
an asset. 
Xanthippos had married-into the family, probably in the 490872, 
which did represent a political assooiation73. ' In view of Kimon's 
as the fa^mat accuser' of Then stokles 
association with the Alkmeonidai and of the choice of Leoboteeein 
the next deoade, we must believe the Alkmeonidai and their friends 
were enemies of Themistokles in the 470s. 
Themistokies' main competitors for influence after Salamis, 
Aristeidea, Kimon, and, for as long as he lived, XanthiPPOsq will 
almost certainly each have derived, greater renown individually from 
his family's reputation than Themistokies could. The imbalance was 
compounded by the fact that by the 470s they were seen to be linked 
by K% 1f-i- ties and so to. some extent their individual repute 
took on a collective weight. Themietokles was far outmatched in 
this souroe of reputation. 
Not no, however, in our second source of good repute, deriving 
from b) a man's own. aohievement. It is difficult to know how 4 
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complete our information in for the 4908 and 480s- Xanthippos had, 
at least, established something of a name for himself by his part 
in the successful prosecution of Miltiadea (H. 6.136). By the 
late 480s AP (22.6) states that Xanthippos was considered P- 13 to, / 
Etvl. As probably the most respected of the generals on the 
board leading the Athenian fleet in 479 ( cf. H. 9.120) he will have 
won high regard for the victory at )Sykale, and the determination to 
fulfil the tasks set by the demos (H. 9.117) may have irritated the 
sailors at the time, but in retrospect must have earned Xanthippos 
popular respeot. The dedication of the tackle of the bridges 
(H. 9.121) boosted recognition of Xanthippos' achievement. 
By the mid-4700 Kimon was only just beginning to build up a 
reputation for his own achievements. We have noted the evidence 
suggesting that his first strategic was in 478/71 nothing remarkable 
is reported from it. His role in the formation of the Athenian 
alliance, especially his useful Spartan connections, was ''however, 
significant, and will have won him some credit at Athens. `I doubt 
whether the distribution of captives was important. The expulsion 
of Pausanias was a minor affair, but may have been thought of as 
an Athenian victory. Eion, as we saw, was of dubious value for his 
reputation, though he made the best of it (Pl. K. 7.4, _5). '`His 
skill at'using what little aohievem®nts'he had to his name Iwas again 
demonstrated after Skyros. ' We argued that there'was probably'n6 
military resistance by the Skyrians: By his showmanship Kimon was 
'able to turn the event into a major aohievement74. Plutarch (K. 8.6) 
cites the return of 'Theseus' I -bones as the chief cause of the 
*popularity of Kimon. That Kimonta own aohievementä"were only 
beginning to win him a name by, the mid-470a in perhaps-confirmed by 
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the fact that he is not mentioned, as a possible candidate far'praise 
by Timokreon (fr. 1, ap. Pl. The 21.2). 
It was probably Aristeides whose personal achievements won him 
the greatest reputation among Themistokles' enemies. He may have 
served at Marathon-as general (Pl. Ar. 5.2). If he was-important 
enough to be. ostracized some seven years later-there is little reason 
to doubt that he was old and-. significant enough to be elected 
strategos for the year of Marathon. The problem is merely that 
neither Herodotos nor, apparently, Ephoros mentiono'him as, genera175. 
This is notdeoisive, and on balanoe it is probably best to go along 
with the tradition-in the absenoe. of even a priori reasons'asainet 
it76. It Ariateides Lysimaohou. wee the eponymous arobon of 4898 
( Cf. Pl. Ar. --5-7) he will' have . 
beon- an Areopagite77. - 
During the 480s it is'probable that Arieteides lost credit 
because of strained Atheno-Aiginetan relations. In faot,: it was 
probably some kind-, of-opposition to Themistokles& plans to turn 
Athens' new silver. resources; against Aigina (H. 7.1441 Thuo. 14.3) 
whioh led to his ostraoiem. But-Aiginetan valour-at Salamis 
78 
(H. 8.91-31 Pindar Isth. 5.48-51) will have vindicated Aristeides 
to some"extent.,. Aristeidest, leadership of the action on Payttaleia 
won him. praise: (4 cf. Aisoh., Pers. -1.435-71;. H. 8.95). Although his- 
part in. the leadershiplof.: the Athenians, at. Plataia was obviously 
to his credit the_viotory was nonetheless considered, in contrast 
to. Salamis, -a, 'Dorian _viotoryl: 
(Aisoh.: Pers. 816-17). His 
participation in Themiatokles' alarmist antics over the walls was, - 
merely. a demonstration. ofhis, ^loyalty79, and the main credit for 
the show will have gone to Themistokles., The high-point of 
Ariateideal-, personal achievement surely came with the-formation of 
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the Athenian alliance80. The accomplishment van-. always attributed 
mainly to him. : His reputation-was. booated not only, by bia, having 
secured Aegean. hegemony: for Athens,, but also because of the 
"international' recognition and acclaim which the formation of the 
alliance and the acaesoment of tribute won (Timokreon fr. 1 ap. Pl. 
The 21.2; Thuo. 5., 18.5). ., The : reputation 
Ariateides enjoyed: ae a 
result of his own achievement should have boon considerable during 
the 470x. 
And yet it still did not compare favourably with Themictokies 
in this regard. His personal achievement was-truly outstanding. As 
eponymous archon in 493/2 (Dion. Hal. R. A. 6.34.1) he may have begun 
the Piraeus fortifications (cf. Thuo. 93.3). The office will have 
earned him a soat on the Areopagon council. He must have fought at 
Marathon, but the implication of Plutarch (Ar. 5.3) that he was, 
like Aristeides, general of his tribe does not inspire much con- 
fidenoe, while there is no reason, apart from the silence of other 
sources, against believing it81. Themintokles may have boon a 
candidate for ostracism in or before 487682. Plutarch (Th. 31.1) 
mentions the office 
as having been filled at some unknown time by Themistokles. But it 
was most probably over the war with Aigina in the 480s that he made 
a name for himself. It in reasonable to assume that he hold one or 
more strategia before 483/2 and established his reputation for 
military skills in connection with that war. 
It is hardly necessary to demonstrate that Themiatokles' personal 
achievements from 483-0 were quite extraordinary. It was his 
suggestion over the use of the new silver finds which not only caved 
Hellas but also made the Athenians cafe in the face of 'all their 
157. 
enemies' ( cf. Thuo. 93.7). He may have had a leading role in 
putting an-end to the internecine wars, enabling the Greeks to 
face the invasion with a degree of unity (Pl. The 6.3)83. It was 
his interpretation of the oracle which proved correct, and his 
strategy which won the sea battle for the Greeks, widely held to 
have been decisive (Thuo. 74.1). For his strategic sense alone 
H. )84 . 
The walls incident demonstrated to the Athenians that he was prepared 
to forfeit the special favour the Spartans had accorded him (H. 8.124; 
Tbuc. 74.1,91-1) for the sake of Athens' autonomy. Yet again it 
must have seemed as though Athens' freedom had been secured by 
Themiatokles. 
It is clear that Themistokles sought to keep the memory of his 
achievements alive in the 470x. To some extent this was not difficult 
because his achievements were part of the overall Athenian achievement, 
and so his remindersafell on willing ears. Probably coon after 480 
Simonides rvrote'one or two pieces on 'The Sea Battle off Artemision' 
and 'The 'Sea Battle off Salamis' (Suidac s. v. There 
is auffioient'"evidenoe to put a personal relationship between 
Simonides and Themictokles beyond real doubt85. The role of 
Themistokles in his verse' will not have been minimized (cf. 
Simonidesafr. `91 (Edmonds) ap. P1. Th. 15.2)86. In 477/6 Themistokles 
wasgohoregos for a victorious trilogy of Phryniohos (P1. Th. 5.4)9 
I know of no scholar who has rejected Bentley's guess that one of the 
plays was the Pboinissai87. The IIypotbesis to Aiachylos' Persai 
suggesta that the two playa were similar. Again the comparison with 
the Peraii"reveals that the significance of Themistokles' contribution 
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will have been given due prominence 
88 Plutarch (Th. 22.1-2) 
records Themistokles having built a small temple of Artemis 
Aristoboule near his home in Melite. It was felt, Plutarch claims, 
that Themistokles had overstepped the mark in this implied self- 
praise Remains of the temple have been discovered90. Plutarch's 
(or his source's) interpretation of the motives behind the building 
may only be guesswork but surely correct91. We might add that the 
intimation that Themistokles had given the best advice ( ßau)Wö4 i. voc) 
was not merely a celebration of past achievement, but carried the 
implication that Themistokles was still offering the beat advice, and 
in view of past experience, the Athenians would do well to accept 
his suggestions now. Finally, we have Plutarch's statement 
(Th. 22.1) 
that Themistokles cultivated the tedious habit of referring repeatedly 
to his own past glories. We have already noted the possibility that 
Plutarch may be confirmed by the 'Themistoklea' honour' ostrakon92. 
The final category from which a man might derive good repute 
was a) his personality. We shall stay with Themistokles. The last 
two items discussed - the Aristoboule temple and Themistokles' self- 
laudatory speeches - illustrate an important trait in Themistokles' 
characters his arrogance. I do not believe that Themistokles' con- 
fidence in his own ideas was itself a disadvantage to his reputation, 
but rather the implication of his attitude as expressed in the 
Aristoboule temple that the-Athenians should accept his opinions and 
advice on trust because he-had shown himself wise. This was probably 
also the context in which he had made the references to his past 
achievements (Pl. Th. 22.1). The same attitude can be detected in 
a fragment of Ion (fr. 13 ap. Pl. K. ' 9.1) citing a comment of `' 
Themistokles'that he the '. ý£ p! ý'9. ýJLKc 
l,, Suoh an approach was a ne ation of 
. 
ýlýcýtl6_l.. üýV ýtCýSitýýCU.. _ 8 
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rational debate and an, insult to the intelligence of those whose 
business it was. to choose between rational arguments. This feature 
can only have emerged after his aohievements in thelPereian wart'=--- 
and'the Plutarch passage suggests that this development was-in the 
period leading up-, to his ostraaism93. -. 
Another trait of oharaoter whioh had a negative effect on 
Themistokles' reputation probably only at a later stage in'his , 
career was hia wiliness. That, -. he-was tricky --let us. say resource- 
ful-- had been attested by.: the. two messages to the. King and-by the 
walls. incident. -Once the=faot was established it will not have been 
difficult, as the ancient tradition shows, to interpret many, of his 
actions as double dealing.. It hae been shown that such a character 
trait was viewed: positively by many of his aontemporaries94, but it 
nonetheless, leftýThemistokles. open to. the suspioion that, hemight 
turn his 'resouroefulness' , against ý the ° interests : of , the. 
demos95. 
It is difficult 
, 
to know how muoh of the "information'offered by 
Plutarch should be aooepted, but°thelfact that so many anecdotes 
were developed to. illustrate Themistoklee' wit encourages accepting 
this as a : historical.: personalityrtrait96..;, A-sense of humour-is '_ 
always. antasset- topolitioians relying >on. popular appeal. The 
tradition'-. thatýThemictokles wee. partioularly intimate with the man 
in the=street firstrooorded; ýby-Cioero,. 
(de{Sen. 7.2; cf. val. Sfax. 
8.7. ext. 15; Pl.. Th.: 5.4),., with, ite, suepiciously Romanring, 
doesn't-inspire: confidenoe, though{Themictokles'. commenta about,,, - 
his-ignoranoe of,. the. finer=arts (Ion; fr. --13-ap. Pl. -IC. 9.1) perhaps 
9 
confirms an appeal--to popular,: sympathies 
7. 
,-- 
It ißhard- toknow toý. what, extent, Kimon-had developed his- 
public personality--by the, mid-470x.;: We, have already-noted=hie 
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generosity. He had perhaps already-developed an easy manner 
(. 
-cf. 
Ion fr. 13 ap. Pl. K., 9.3; Pl. K. 6.2... 3; 11.2). There 
may have; been-a real contrast between Kimon., and Themistokles. The 
latter's arroganoe wee oontrasted: aby a more sophiatioated: approaoh 
to. self-advertisement. by Kimon. While, Themistokles emphasized his 
own aohievementa,: the, epigrams set up for : ion sought to flatter the 
demon (P] .. _IC. 
7.4_5)98 The festive atmosphere of the "Theseus" 
bones oelebrations. was. more -engaging 
than Themistokles& autopane- 
gyrios.. The slippery element in Themistokles' character was 
contrasted with. Kimon's, atraightforwardneaa, even naivety 
(Stesimbrotos fr.. 4dap. Pl., K., 4.4)99. On the whole it is best to 
believe that-already, by the. mid-470a, Kimon's personality was an 
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asset to him, politioally. 
Regarding-Aristeidee' character little can be said beyond the 
fact, mentioned earlier,, that, the tradition of_his fairness was 
probably contemporary,; and. should"also have been:; an asset101. 
Our_finalRcategory was 3. -philoi support. -; It is incontestable 
that 
. at 
the beginning _of a, man! a career the advice and support ho 
would receive from bis wider, : family and ; their. friends must have been 
invaluable. For. . lesser, politicians this basis of support no doubt 
remained. important. for, their. whole careers. . 
But what-of the great 
leaders on whom we are forced to, concentrate by the bias of our 
sources?,. How important. would an. eztensive: philoi complex be in 
achieving the final success, inpolitics, that iss not; eleotion to 
office, but the. ezeroine_of real influence. on the decisions of the 
Assembly, thus, determining the direction of-Athenian policy;, and 
the. ability, to command enough support to effect the ostracism of, 
an enemy or to escape ostracism oneself? -,. -Bicknell 
has written 
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"Cabala of noble philoi ... frequently linked by marriage ties, 
'work, together as hetairoi..., Followings of -lesser men, local 
olientelae en!, : much harder to control, urban, supporters, are pooled 
by, gthexhetairoi,,... Until, Perikles' day,... local resources of 
patronage remained, available and"were_the key to political power, 
notwithstanding. the fact_, that'', the Solonian crisis, the tyranny and 
"Kleiathenea' reforms had-resulted in, even the rural. demoe aoquiring 
aýmeasure of self-assertiveness"102. Seeley suggested that "perhaps 
awealthy, family. could,. influenoeý, the political behavior of its 
1 dependents-by economio, pressure"03. we have already pointed to the 
evidence", for the aeries of marriages which had linked:. the Philaidai, 
Kerykes and Alkmeonidai: by.. about -479-8"" Thersignifioanoe of this 
formidable nexus of-families-has not gone unnoticed by scholars. 
Bicknell, without_exaggeration. ýcalled: it-a "grand coalition"104. 
Suohja 
-coalition -should 
have been. -able to°oommand not-only an 
extensive-oomplex, of, loyal-philoi, support., but. also support from a 
correspondingly-large number of "dependents", that following of 
"lesser men, local-clientelae and-too urban supporters". There is 
no -evidence, to . suggest-that; 
Themietokles.. should-have, had anything 
approaching, comparablex support-of,, this . 
type.; __ 
::: We, -stated at, 
the, beginning-of,. this chapter that our aim was to 
characterize, the, relative, importance of,, the categories we have set 
up, -and to do; this, itiwouldtbe,. worth^ relating them to the moderate 
politioal., suooess of... Themistoklesin; the first half of the 4700. 
Yet. itswill-be objeäted; that, our: first; oategory, persuasive. argument, 
remains; an unknown ýquantity.. ° r Nor ., sere. we . able 
to show, decisively 
whether: Themiatoklee"or'his enemiea, ahould have-found more support 
as"a, result,. of: reputationrbased ow personality* In terms of 
I 
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reputation based on personal achievement Themistokles clearly out- 
stripped the collective reputation-of his enemies, 'while they 
could individually point to family backgrounds more prestigious 
than Themistoklea'S- collectively, through their marriage ties the 
reputation they could derive from this source was immense. A 
further consequence of this "grand coalition" should be that 
Themistokles' enemies were able to depend on the loyal support of 
many more "dependents" than he could. So we are reduced to'Baying 
with certainty only that in terms of personal achievement 
Themistokles was paramount while his enemies could rely mainly on 
the reputation of their families and on their philoi support. 
It`may be further objected that the other side of the oomparieon, 
the measure of success, has not been sufficiently firmly established 
to render any conclusions valid, for while we denied that Athenian 
foreign policy down to Karystos can be cited as evidence for a 
decline in Themistokles' influence, we admitted that, with the 
probable exception of Karystos, the choice of targets needn't have 
been opposed by Themistokles' enemies. But even if this was the 
case, we should-still have to characterize Themistokles', role in 
Athenian politics in this'period as successful. There can be no 
doubt that Themistokles' enemies were concerned primarily not with 
bringing Themistokles round to their way of thinking in terms of 
foreign policy, but with his extinction from the political arena, 
regardless of the aims he pursued; policy was the weapon of personal 
animosity'05. That they were unsuccessful in achieving this until 
471/0 is a fact which saves our whole approach from sinking into a 
106 
quagmire of uncertainty. The date of Themistoklea' ostracism, 
whatever the ups and downs of Themistoklea' suaoess in implementing 
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his policy may have been, is clear enough evidence that the nature 
I and extent of broad based support of "dependents" has been 
S 
exaggerated. The number of 'floating voters', so to speak, who 
were not sufficiently dependent on, or loyal to the next family 
up the hierarchical scale to take its advice about whether to vote 
and who to vote for was obviously greater than the number of 
dependants and loyal supporters who could be mustered, throughout 
the 470s, collectively by "the three most aristocratic families of 
early fifth century Athena". This fact, obvious though it is, 
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is worth stressing because some recent work on Athenian politics, 
while correcting some of the anachronistic interpretations of past 
generations., has at points given the impression that the elucidation 
of family politics is itself a sufficient explanation of success or 
failure in Athenian politics. Clearly, other factors were of 
decisive influence in determining success. All we can conolute at 
this stage is that reputation' based on personal achievement may have 
been the decisive feature in seeirig'Th©mistekles through the 470s. 
We shall try to fill out this conclusion after analysing Athenian 
politics from Karystos to Themistokles' ostracism. But before we 
do that we must take stock of the situation in the Peloponnese. 
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CHAPTER TEN. SPARTA AND THE PELOPONNESE, 478/7 - 465/4" -. 
We do not know whether those elements. at Sparta, who supported 
the agreement with Aristeides and ICimon and the consequent transfer 
of-hegemony in 478/7 did so only with a view to Sparta's securing 
her position within the Peloponnese, or whether some, at least, saw 
the, prospeot of Athena engaged in an everlasting war as, an --, 
opportunity for Spartakto expand her influence outside the. 
Peloponnese. 
_I suspect 
the-latter*_ That the Spartans-in fact 
desisted from-suoh expansion, 
1 is explicable because even those who. 
were enthusiastic about, extra-Peloponnesian, activity will have 
recognized the need to re-establish control in the Peloponnese, as 
well as aooepted: the. argument that some time should be, given to rob 
Themistokles of ammunition aimed. at. stirring up. fears of Sparta. 
The Spartans had_most probably not been secure within. the 
Peloponnese in the, decade or so before 480?. As well as the 
provocative behaviour of 
_Argoc,: events 
connected with the,, Persian 
Invasion left debts-to beaettled. Elis.. and Mantineia had failed 
tosend their contingents to, Plataia, on time] "the battle ***-was 
not, a sudden affair, and. the abstention,... -, must be taken asp 
deliberate"3., The oitizens of the, two, oities, aoted before the, 
Spartans and exiled their generals (II. 9.77). It has been argued 
that after the Persian invasion. Karyai, suffered, for itaýalleged- 
1'ediem4. There may well have- been other, action s_, of. this kind of 
which no record remains., Apriori, we should anyway assume that 
Sparta saw to her, internal-security-in, this'period5. Another reason 
for believing. ina tightening up of. seaurity. is the discernible 
development towards bawkiehnees, presupposing as it does a senae. of 
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internal security. Leotychides' actions in 479 show that he was 
enthusiastic for an expansion of Spartan influence in mainland 
Hellas. As hinted at above he may have believed it worth Sparta 
staying her hand in Hellas in the hope of achieving the political 
ruin of Themiatokles. The actions against Eion and Skyros, and 
maintenance of influence in Athens, may have convinced 
Leotyohides and like-minded men that it was no longer worth Sparta 
continuing, her_passivity. A witness to Leotyohides' 'crime' was 
conjured 
. 
up in., 476/56 by those who feared the consequences_ of such 
agitation7. The desperate remedy employed suggests that they feared 
extensive popular support. for him. Those who were angered by 
developments, in the Aegean between o. 477 and o. 475 may have pointed 
y r... 
to the.. useful bane. Pausanias was occupying8. It is tempting to date 
his recall and imprisonment in the mid or late 4709 (though the 
chronology is quite fluid) and to see it as a reaction against a 
development towards_. bawkiahness,, similar to Leotychides' case. But 
the. deoisive-evidenoe, of course, is the Hetoimaridas debate9. That 
a. motion to make war on the. Athenians10 could be debated is evidence 
not. only,. of Spartan, anger with the Athenians but also of a sense 
of eeourity_within the Peloponnese. That it was defeated was 
probably the result of a revival by Hetoimaridas of a latent sense 
of insecurity. It is, true that Diodoros does not specify the. 
"A ous 
ipr4owta5 used, by. Hetoimaridas, but in view of the events 
of the next-ten years it would be surprising if none of his argu- 
ments were connected with feelings towards Sparta in Argos and 
Arkadia,, and perhaps Elio and Measenia, tooll. 
Peloponnesian chronology 
 
during 
, 
the 470s and 460a is. not, 
straightforward. 
. 
Apart from the notorious difficulties surrounding 
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the' dates of the third' L'eaeenian"war12; the, paucity of information 
concerning the battles of°Tegea and Dipaia`has caused historians 
to°date them accordingto deduotions-based on disputed' inter- 
pretations' and chronologies. '- There"is ""a variety of approaches 
to the'problem, and it would'not`be profitable to examine°`sll'in 
detail: `; The -discussion which 'follows'is' susceptible, to the" same, 
uncertainty. as others. ýYet'foiour-purposes it is essential only 
to"show"that there was an ariti-. Spartanmovecaint in the' Peloponnese 
in"the lit. 47Oä. I shall'°argue, that'it isý`eafer to dateTegea in 
the, 470., but-'even if-those soholars*who`date°it in the 460s13`are' 
correct, the beginnings', of the movement which led, to, it would°-have 
'- toQbe located in the late 4708. 
The' basio° evidenoe`for `the "anti-Spartan movement within the 
Peloponnese is ßerodotoe'kreport of`five, spartän'victories (9.35), 
apparently in'ohronologioal'orders 'Plataia, Pegea (over`th0 Tegeans 
and`'Argives), `Dipaia (over all the Arkadiane, exoept the). antineians), 
Isthmos, (over "the`1"eeseniane)'and Tanagra. -Paueanias'(3.11.8)"helps 
üs"by saying that from Isthmoe"the 11esseniane'retired`to-Ithome, which 
löcates', the'battle beföre" 462'when the-insurgents were'ilready'"' 
blookadedt"on Ithome14: 'Another" useful", 'testimony is Polyainos 
(1.14.1), who: mentions a King Ärchidamoä'wbo`foüght "the Arkadians". 
There. are. good reasons-to iderLiy the King-with Arohidamos 1115. 
The: designation-"the=Arkadians"=suggests the battle at°Dipaia rather 
71 1ý 
than at Tegea. ' Dipaia-ehould, thereforö, -be-after'Arobidamos''- 
aooession=in'469p816: ``Igokrates'(6.99)°indicates`that the Spartans 
were -heavily, outnumberodatPDipaial7: "Wade-Gory suggested this 
might be explained by-' 1 18 
an"equally adequate explanation would , be 'that iother'föro i had, I to 
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be-deployed elsewhere at the same time. This could be explained 
19 
by, the"faot that the third k'essenian war had begun in 4698. 
Potentially more useful is the combination of two facts. - According 
to Herodotos (9.35), although the Argives had; assisted the Tegeans 
ät. Tegea they are not mentioned at Dipaia, and., it is, therefore, 
safe-to assume that they were not-present. In the late 460a Argos 
was an enemy of Sparta (Thuo. 102.4). There is no reason to-believe 
that between the battle of Tegea and the late 1460a there was a 
period of friendship20. One naturally wonders why they were not at 
Dipaia. Diodoros (65.1) says war broke out between the. Argives and 
Mykenaians in 468/7* It is-clear that hisýsouroe,. Ephoros, has 
drawn-a causal link between the beginning ofythe-third Messenian 
war-and the Lykenaian war (Diode 65.3 and 4)21" Some eoholare, ' 
accepting the causal link, have dated the 1ykenaian, war to o. 464, 
because they, believe-the )Iessenian war'to have. begun. only. in 465/422" 
Ifýwe, accept Diodoros'. 469/8 Messenian war date, as we have done23, 
there is no, objection to, aocepting his 468/7 Mykenaian war date. It 
bas-been suggested. that the reason for. the Argive absenoe; from, -- 
Dipaia was her war with Mykenai2a. The suggestion, is. aooeptable, 
and allows a plausible reconstruotion of : events. -- 
The anti-Spartan movement in. Arkadia may have-. been-gathering 
strength since the. -battle of. Tegea. k(see below); xand-will have been 
enoouraged, by"the-beginning. of the Meaeenian, war. Sparta had. lost. 
face because: of:, the recent'<Pausanias. affair 
25. Diodoros (65.3)tella 
ua that the-Argives. invited their°alliea: to help them, and_Strabo 
(8-6-199-P-377) says they; inoluded.. Tegeana (and Kleonaiana). It in 
e- .1 
possible tbat, at. theýsamoitime"other Arkadian, states (except 
Mantineias'II. 9.35; : Xen.. Holle °5.2.3) aoted in'concert in defying 
Spartan hegemony perhaps by refusing to supply contingents for the 
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Messenian war, but possibly even by mustering at Dipaia in 
preparation for a campaign against Sparta in support of the 
Messenians. The 'Spartans, anyway, made an attack which resulted 
in', the battle of Dipaia. The Tegeans were present at the battle 
(Paus. 8.45.2). Either they returned from Mykenai after the 
Mykenaians had been defeated in battle (Diode 65.3), or they bad 
divided their forces between Mykenai and Dipala. The Argives, -of 
course, stayed to secure the defeat of Mykenai. The revolt of 
Arkadia, then, suppressed by the battle of Dipaia, thus becomes one 
of-the 
LcCouS ; 'D A f-USA along with the Meeeenian war, 
which prevented the Spartans bringing aid to the besieged )ykenaiane 
(Diod. 65.4)26.468/7 is thus a terminus post quem for Dipaia. 
Several reasons require us to date it shortly after 468/7. Diodoroa 
appeara, to date the outbreak of-the L'ykenaian war (65.1). " Although 
the Mykenaiana had to be besieged, they were taken by storm, not 
starved out (Diod. 65.4), and so we should not'. postulate a lengthy 
war. It perhaps ended in the'nezt'arcbon-year, 467/6. According 
to, 'our-interpretation Dipais was fought'=during the Mykenaian war, 
so between 468/7 and 467/6. It seems more likely that the concerted 
ArKadian' action should come about--at the, beginning of the Argive 
action-against Mykenai, soon after it was obvious that the Spartans 
felt compelled to retain their. foroes in Lakonia and Meseenia, 
rather than that the Arkadians should give the Spartans a chance to 
deal with her enemies-one by one, '-Finally, -by 465/4 the Spartans 
were sufficiently recovered'from their problems of security within 
the Peloponnese to be able'to oonvinoe-the Thaaians that they would 
be prepared to invade Attika 
27.., Let us describe the date of Dipaia 
as about 467. This date receives slight and indecisive confirmation 
1690, 
from the chronology of Themiatokles' flight. Andrewes was right 
to dismiss Buaolt'a contention that the Spartans must have already 
defeated-the`Arkadiens when they applied for Themistokles' 
extradition28. + But Themistokles' behaviour does suggest that 
Arkadia was-not safe from Spartan intervention, which corresponds, 
we may assume, less to the situation obtaining, before Dipaia, than 
after it. Themistokles' flight from the Peloponnese should fall 
within`. -the period spring 468 and summer 46629. 
f The relationship of the battle of Dipaia to that of Tegea in 
not too clear. But contrary to what Busolt says, there is, in fact, 
reason to suspect that Dipaia did not follow closely upon Tegea30. 
At Tegea the Tegeans had no other Arkadian allies. By the time of 
Dipaia a completely new and radically altered alignment had taken 
shape with-the revolt of all Arkadian states, except L+antinea, from 
Sparta. One naturally lookafor-either a long gap or a significant 
event. The troubles-besetting Sparta, associated with the third 
klessenian war would provide an explanation of the upsurge in Arkadian 
self-assertiveness. That merely gives us a terminus ante quem of 
469/8 for the battle of Tegea. The Hetoimaridan debate provides a 
lower terminus. post quem for Tegea than Herodotos' battle of Plataia. 
Teges town was'not'destroyed after the battle (Simonides fr. 129 
(Edmonds))31. Aa Busolt noted, ithe,. faot that the Tegeans were to 
fight another day underlines the implications of the epigram32. 
ßad there been anzindecisive, war of this sort against the Tegeans 
at some stage-between-479iand 475/4'it would be inconceivable that 
the proposal to make war on Athens should have been almost accepted 
at Sparta. The first hint'of: discord'between Tegea and Sparta 
comes with Leotyohides' choice of --Tegea as his place of exile. 
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Yet this should not be over-interpreted. Leotyohides was afforded 
protection by the sanctuary of Athena Alea, not by the Tegeana 
(Paus- 3.5.6)33. But his presence there must have recalled the 
trauma oocasioned by K1eomenes'aotivitiea. in. Arkadia(H. 6.74. -5)9 
and may have featured as an argument in Itetoimaridao' caee34.. 
Pausanias (3.5.6). succests that the Spartans were in a position to 
force Leotychides' extradition,. but chose not to.. This fits with 
an attack on Tegea while. the, Kingýwas, still there,. i. e.. 476/5_469/835. 
The purpose of the action against Tegea, then,. may have been nothing 
more than a demonstration. thatrit would, go ill with the Tegeans if 
they. were to listen to any revolutionary suggestions Leotyohides 
might make. It would also, serve as. a, warning to other Peloponnesian 
states. As such it fits. best as. a. direot aonsequenoe, of the 
Hetoimaridas debate. It was areassertion of Sparta's firm control 
over the Peloponnese36.. So a date in, the second half of the. 470a 
seems much more likely than one. in the, early. 460s. 
It is possible, that the action against Tegea had the opposite 
effect, to, that intended, embittering, feeling, towarde. Sparta throughout 
the Peloponnese, as witnessed. by the near. unity of, the Arkadiana. at 
Dipaia. Perhaps another reaction was the, decision of. the Eleians 
to synoikize in 471/0 (Diod.; 54.1)37.,, It is, gratifying,, finally,,, to 
note that our chronological deductions, based on the literary evidence, 
can, arguably, be supported in broad,, outline by numiamatio evidence38. 
To sum ups the period following the transfer of hegemony saw 
at Sparta a generally-aocepted drive to secure firm control of the 
Peloponnese (except the Argolid). There may have been some who also 
wished to expand Spartan influence outside the Peloponnese, too. 
The Hetoimaridas debate provides evidence, paradoxically, both of 
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extra-Peloponnesian ambitions, with the sense of security within 
the Peloponnese which those ambitions presuppose, and of the fact 
that this confidence was shaky, in so far as the Spartans could be 
persuaded to believe that this security had not yet been achieved. 
The second half of the 4708 saw the Spartans noting high-handedly 
in a counter-productive attempt to discourage any tendency towards 
self-assertiveness in the Peloponnese. The "strong sense of common 
nationality among the Aroadians of the earlier fifth century"39 
certainly achieved some kind of political union which warrants the 
designation 'Arkadien League'40. The divisions in the League, 
manifested in the absenoe of Arkadian support for Teßea at the battle 
of Tegea and in the consistently aloof stance of 1! antineia should 
not be used to minimize the significance that the degree of unity 
the League could'ahow at Dipaia had for Spartan security4l., Argos 
was consistently anti-Spartan in the 470s and 460842" The third' 
the first in 
Measenian war fell into two stages , 469%8-465 4, when there must have 
been a series of engagements, -at 
the end of which the Spartans appear 
to have regained virtually full oontrol. Shortly after the Great' 
Earthquake launched the second stage and threw Sparta into-dire peril. 
The failure of the Arkadians to re-eetabliah. their pre-Dipaia unity 
in order to exploit this situation may in'part'be explained by the 
fear Athenian assistance to Sparta engendered in potential Arkadian 
enemies of Sparta. If so, the deal over the transfer bad paid an 
unexpectedly high dividend. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN. THE ATHENIANS, 475-4 - 471/0- 
C 
In chapter eight we argued against adding to the evidence for 
the period between Karystos and 470/69 by postulating Athenian 
military activity. I suggest that the inactivity is explicable 
primarily in terms of Themistokles' response to events in the 
Peloponnese. This suggestion requires some defence because no 
source connects Athenian policy at this time with Peloponnesian events. 
'While the details of proposals to make war on Athens made during 
the IIetoimaridas debate may not have become known at Athens the 
atmosphere of growing hostility towards the Athenians which formed 
the background to the debate and which may have found other expressions 
was most probably known to t' 
guess that 'Themiatokles will 
Sparta's attempts at gaining 
Peloponnese, and have warned 
their ultimate objeotivea to 
he Athenians 
1. It is not arbitrary to 
have pointed an accusing finger at 
a firmer grip on her control of the 
the Athenians of what be interpreted 
be. To do so would have been consistent 
with his actions in 479-82. nis reputation for anti-Spartanism was 
probably not based solely on bis stance over the walla, Pagasai and 
the Amphiktyonio proposals. The attempts by'Sparta to annihilate him 
in the 460a suggest he-was still actively anti-Spartan then, and so 
it is reasonable, almost necessary, to assume"be was anti-Spartan 
in-the intervening period also. 
It would not have been difficult to portray Spartan actions in 
the Peloponnese as the first stage in a domination of mainland Hellas 
which would eventually include-Athena, and one can imagine how 
Themistokles could have related-this to the question of involvement 
in-Asia. Ifs for example, an embassy from a group of men planning 
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to stage an anti-Persian revolution in a Greek city of Asia appealed 
for Athenian military assistanoe, Themistokles, while wishing their 
cause well and without advooating renouncing the intention of 
becoming an active 'protector' of Asiatic Greeks, might have been 
able to point to the threat which Spartan expansionism was posing 
Athens, and warned that the Athenians could not risk a large scale 
engagement in Asia while the danger of a Spartan 'stab in the back' 
existed3. Bearing in mind the ambivalent attitude we deduced the 
Athenians must have bad towards theitIonian kinsmen and other Asiatic 
Greeks as a result of their less than 'patriotio' role in the Persian 
war, the Athenian demos may well have been content to allow the 
Asiatic cities the chance of showing their own commitment to ridding 
themselves of the Persian yoke. The crisis would come when cities 
which had done to and bad joined the alliance were attacked by the 
Persians again. 
On the other, hand, if we are right to date the battle of Tegea 
in the second half of the 470a, it is difficult not to guess that the 
Tegeans and Argivea, once decided upon conflict with Sparta, sought 
a military alliance with Athens. The rivalries and hostility of 480 
and 479 were less relevant to the Argivea and Tegeans now than the 
evidence of Athena' posture as proteotor of the autonomy of Greeks 
threatened by Spartan interference which Themietokles had, as 
representative of the Athenians, assumed after Plataia. If such an 
appeal were made I think Themiatokles would have been a vigorous 
supporter of advancing aid. 
There ia, indeed, some in3ireot evidence that the question of 
supporting the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese was in the 
air. We have seen that Cicero (do Off. 2.49; ct. Val. L: az. 6.5. 
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ext. 2) mentions a proposal by Themistokles to burn the Spartan 
fleet at Gytheion. It is very possible that be or his source has 
simply confused Themistokles' stance over Pagasai with Tolmides' 
action against the Spartans at Gytheion (Thus. 108.51 Diod. 84.6). 
Yet; Cicero seems to have been very well informed sometimes about 
details of Themistokles' life4. It is not impossible that Cioero 
has conflated Themistokles' stance over Pagasai not with Tolmides' 
actual burning of the docks, but with a historical proposal by 
Themistokles in this period connected with possible assistance that 
could be afforded the anti-Spartan movements. 
There is better evidence to show that aid to the movement in 
the Peloponnese was a. divisive issue in Athens at the time of Tegea. 
Simonides fr. 130 dmon1s is dedicated £L 
7SEäövtu5__iP. ý, dtEýS ; _ý VOLL-0US. _ No adequate reason 
has been 
advanced for the tendency of modern scholars to ignore this valuable 
document6. Yet Herodotos (9.35) says the Tegeans and Argivee fought 
at Tegea,, with no hint of Athenians. Thucydides, (102.4) says the 
Atheniansabandoned. their alliance with the Spartans only in the 
late 460aß which, without commentis incompatible with military 
oonflic. t, between the two states before that time. But rejection of 
an, appeal by the Assembly did not prevent private volunteers offering 
their assistance (H., 6.92).., Iterodotos' omission of, these probably 
not numerous Athenians who fell at Tegea may be the result of the 
abbreviated, nature of his or his, source's reference to the battles 
in 
, 
the list, ( 
acf. the, slightly 
fuller account of Pausanias 3.11.7). 
Thuoydides_was correct in-implying that the . two, states, Sparta and 
Athens, were officially allieduntil the late 460x. Themistokles, 
then, 
, 
failed, to persuade a majority of the Assembly to support the 
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Tegeans and Argives against the Spartans but, apparently, succeeded 
in motivating one section of favourable opinion to this degree of 
commitment7. The reference in, the, second couplet to the freedom 
of Hellas gives us a hint as. to the light in which Spartan notions 
in the Peloponnese may have been cast.. 
Finally-it, is tempting to interpret the elusive battle at Oinoe 
in a similar way8. The-Peisianakteion 
(Pl. K. 4.5) was most probably 
built shortly before 4609. Such an interpretation of the battle 
would enable-us to understand bow it. -could have taken place some 
time before the erection of the stow and . 
have been portrayed in, 
it. While it is. possible to believe that the Oinoe painting was not 
included in the,. original building 
10, 
we should only resort to such,., 
a hypothesis; if-no , 
other explanation of the evidence is possible. 
Its inclusion. in a. building which celebrated the achievements of 
Kimon's family causes no difficulty when viewed against the background 
of hostility felt at. Athens towards Lakonizers which erupted after the 
Spartan. insult. to the Athenians in 46211. if Andrewes' location of 
the battleisite-is accepted. then the engagement cannot have involved 
large numbersl?. It would be possible but hazardous to attempt to 
fit the battle into the pattern. of events in the Peloponnese during 
the-470s-and. 460e whioh: mightiaooount-for the-size of the forces , 
involved. It iss however, safer to-conclude only that Oinoe could 
have. ooourred during. the,: 470e or 460s before the Athens-Argive 
allianoe, ". as-its-representation: in a 
building roughly simultaneous 
with the"allianae suggests, and that Thuoydidea' silence could be 
explained bye believing-the. -Athenians . who., 
died there -did so- as _, 
volunteers and not, as representatives of, the Athenian state 
3. If 
this is correct these volunteers may, have gone as a result of attempts 
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by Themietokles'(or his political heirs) to persuade the demos to 
protect Argos. 
There is sufficient reason, then, in view of earlier and later 
Themistoklean actions, and in view of the indireot'evidence we have 
just noted, to believe that Themistokles and his friends were 
advocating support for the anti-Spartan movement in the Peloponnese 
in the second half of the 470a and it may well be that they justified 
their stance byyportraying Spartan actions as representing a 'potential 
threat to Athenian security. 'Thi'feare that they engenderedrythereby 
may in"part'explain the lack of anti-Persian activity at this time. 
But the Athenians also ceased military operations against non-Persian 
targets throughout the'Aegean. ' This was perhaps in-response to the 
analysis of international relations off ered`by Themistokles' enemies 
whiohimay have interpreted high-handed actions like that against 
Karystos as leading inevitably to bad blood between Athens and Sparta, 
and indeed, other Greek statesl4. ' 
This tendency towards C6u_ may be' further accounted' for 
by the need to turn seriously to the reoonstruotion of Athens and' 
Attika which the Athenians had begun immediately after their return 
but'whiäh must have progressed' only ata slow-pace-because of the 
long oampaigns'-of 478,477 and perhapo"476, `475 and 474 also. The 
need `to reconstruct affected all citizens, ' and the probably 11 
not 
numerous wage-earners will' have benefitted from the need of their märe 
wealthy neighbours to employ extra hands in reconstruction, ' be it in 
Athens or Attikal5. This more practical reaction tO the'destruotion 
of"Attika may"have been replacing the emotional lust for vengeance 
which probably characterized Athenian feelings in the period 
immediately after-the return to Attika. 
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This inclination towards J 
(Y O must also have been 
effective in contributing to the rejection of the positive elements 
of Themistokles' policy. Other reasons, however, may also be 
deduced. The significance of the existence of an alliance-between 
Athens and Sparta so far unbroken by the latter should not be under- 
estimated. The instability and disunity of the anti-Spartan movement 
in the Peloponnese, demonstrated for us by the lack of Arkadian 
support for Togen at the battle of Tegea, will not have commended it 
as a reliable partner. The emotional repugnance of joining arms with 
ffiediaing Argos must have been considerable. These must have been 
some of the considerations against which Themistokles will have 
applied all the influence he could muster, for he had committed 
himself irrevocably to an anti-Spartan policy, and his political 
position would become extremely vulnerable if the Athenians not 
only rejected the idea of support for the anti-Spartan movement but 
also turned to the war in the east with such commitment that they 
became dependent on the good will of Sparta in Hellas. Kimon (and 
Aristeides) were, conversely, equally dependent politically on the 
policy of friendship with Sparta to which they were committed. In 
portraying Sparta as a threat to Athenian security, I suspect that 
the persuasiveness of Themistokles' case was directly related to 
events in the Peloponnese, which, as we saw in the last chapter, we 
are-unable to chart in detail. But it is a fact that the longer a 
warning of danger-is held out without any substantiation the less 
effective it-becomes, Kimon's simple response to Themiatokles' 
Prognostications - 
DA Ov ' Aa. K. ESa-4-ýc4Vc, oi_ yf- -rot-of" f_zos- (5tesimbrotos 
fr. 7 ap. Pl. K. 16.4) .. will have gained more credibility as time 
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passed and Themistokles' warnings appeared more and more baselessl6. 
The Persai was-first performed in Athens in 4732 (Hypothesis). 
It will, then, reflect feelings, say, in 474-3. The play evinces an 
admiration for the achievements of Themistoklee17. It is reasonable, 
then, to interpret the implications of passages in the Persai in 
terms of what it can tell us about-the arguments used in the debate 
on foreign policy in which Themistokles played a leading-role. The 
most striking impression conveyed by the Perasi in the fact that- 
Persian-power bas been completely destroyed, and has not, suffered% 
merely a military setback (Aiach. Pere. 249-55,260-61,278-9, " 
282-4,517,532-5,589-90,595-7,669-70,677-80,714,716,728-33, 
790-831,904-8,929-31,1008,1016,1035). The point is made so-, 
consistently throughout the play, and in such a variety of ways 
that it is fair to deduce that Aiachylos was supporting the view 
that Athens no longer stood in direct danger from another Persian 
invasion. - The words of Darius' ghost (790-939,7949 cf. 823-31) 
render the general implication- more explicitly andýmake the point in 
more--speoific terms; if Persia is, to prosper again she must learn 
the 
-, 
lesson, never again to make war against Hellas; the number of 
men-needed-to do so. cannot be supported by the produce of Hellas' 
barren. -land18. The point that the Persians were not planning to-,. 
invade Hellas againis made from another angle, too. 'FarlyAn the 
play Atossaänotee that in the event. of defeat Xerxes will remain 
King. (213-14);;. the-audience is thus. reminded that-despite his 
defeat Xerxes is-still; on. the throne. ., It ia-emphasized that the 
mietake. of invading -Hellaewas-made as a"reeult'. of. youthful. recklees- 
ness (744,782,. Cf. 753-89 829-31). : By theytimerthe play. was 
performed some ten years had passed sinoe`the Greeks, learned of-the 
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young xerzesf intention to mount an invasion, and the implication 
may have been recognized by the audience that a more mature man - as 
Xerxes in 473/2 was - would be unlikely to undertake such a rash 
venture. 
I think we may deduoe from this that Aieohylos was supporting 
Themistokles' rejection of one particular approach his enemies were 
making to discourage the demos from accepting his anti-Spartan 
proposals. It would be an obvious method of discouraging involvement 
in the anti-Spartan movement to suggest that the Persians would be 
quick to mount another campaign once they saw the two "yoke-fellows" 
at warl9. 
A related question was the position of the cities of the Asiatic 
mainland. We interpreted the declaration of intent of the Athenian 
alliance as both a promise of protection to those who revolted and 
a threat of reprisals from the alliance to those who remained loyal 
to the King. For a few years the more announcement of intent may 
have provided a pro-Athenian wave throughout the coast of Asia, but 
the example of any city which chose not to join the alliance and 
which was not being ravaged by the alliance's forces will have slowed 
down the momentum of d. nyn pro-Athenian wave. There may have been 
revolts within some cities from the alliance. We showed that although 
Themi stokles probably had suffioient. political acumen not to advocate 
openly the abandonment of interest in these Asiatic cities, the 
policies he was advocating in fact would have prohibited Athens 
engaging her energies in Asia in auch a way as would. probably 
eventually be required if she were to back up the promise-cum-threat 
expressed in 478/i. Also, we were able to interpret the actions of 
the Athenian"dominated'allianoe down to 475-4 as directing energies 
_ Aso. 
away from conflict with Persia and towards rule of the Aegean, 
resulting in a heightening of tension within Hellas which had the 
effect of discouraging Athenian involvement in Asia; this effect 
was only one of the reasons we noted which encouraged believing 
Themistokles was influential in setting this course. By 474-3 the 
suggestion may have been made that Tbemistokles' policies were 
leading to the abandonment of an Athenian oommit went to involvement 
in Ionia. 
It is possible to interpret parts of the Pereai as an attempt 
to counter such an attack on Themistokles' policies. Two approäohes 
are discernible. Firstly, the impression is created that in fact 
most of the cities of the Ionian mainland have been freed from Persia. 
This is done by failing to list individual cities which, as a result 
of Xerxes' defeats are about to revolt from Persia (898-900,584-90), 
as Aisohylos had'done for the islands (879-96). Furthermore, the 
ultimate credit for the successes that bad been achieved in Asia is 
directly attributed to the victory at Salamis, and"so in large 
measure to Themistokles (595-7,904-8). In'thie way Aisohylos was 
mollifying the reaction to Themistoklea' policies of that area of 
Athenian feeling which inclined towards a magnanimous sense of 
responsibility for the liberation of Ionian cities. 
The sympathy of this magnanimous'area of feeling will have been 
won by a second device which I take, however, as directed primarily 
at the other extremity of the ambivalent Athenian feeling towards 
the Ionians. ' Aisohylos appears to be trying to minimize the fact 
of active Ionian Medism in 480'and'47920" The purpose of this may 
well have been to mollify that area of feeling which sought vengeance 
from those Greek cities which were still 'zing's land"21. The Persai, 
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then, can be seen as directing attention away from involvement in 
mainland Asia, as well as affirming the absence of danger to Hellas 
from Persia; as such it is fair to assume'these two elementa'were 
included in the strategy of"opposition'to'Themistokles, -and'that 
Aisobylos is lending poetic'-support to Tbemistoklest-position. ° 
Although we are unable to'give an account of specific stages 
in the prooess, it is easy to imagine how and wbylpopular"Athenian 
feeling gradually shifted"away from even the partial' acceptance of 
Themistokles' analysis of tbe'international'situation in favour of 
that of his enemies. We have'already noted"how the warning`of''a 
danger from Sparta becameryless'effeotive as time went by in explain- 
ing the Athenian refection of , Themistokles'anti-Spartan proposals. 
The ineffectiveness of'-this warning also removed one of the factors 
which contributed to discouraging active involvement in Asiaa?: ý' By'° 
0.471 the first stages in reconstructing Attika ='rebuilding and 
replanting - should have been completed23, "7making the' emotionally 
and materially attractive prospect of 'ravaging'the'King's land' 
more practicable. Specific events in the 'east' may have"stimulated' 
the Athenians'to the action they finally took in'470/69 (Diöd. 60.1, 
and 3). As well as the possibility of internal revolutions resulting" 
in revolt from the Athenian alliance, there'may even"havegbeen"the 
beginnings of renewed Persian military actions against Greek cities 
in the late 470s. Kypros, for example, an island so difficult for 
the Athenians-to dominate that it may have been viewed by'Themistokles 
in the. same light as mainland cities, may have'1been'dominated by{the' 
Persians shortly after the production of the Persai in 473/2 '` ' 
(Hypothesis). At any rate, the loss of Kyproe occurred between 473/2 
24 ci 
and 465, the date of Purymedon . 16. u1UU was, anyway, not a 
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condition the Athenians were, likely to-remain in. for long 
( cf. 
Thuo . 7099; P1. K. 18.1)25. 
The rejeotion of Tbemistoklea' polioies. is presupposed by, 
though does not in itself explainthe fact that the Athenians chose 
to ostracize him. Proposals and advice could be rejected by a vote 
in the Assembly. Why did so many citizens not only reject 
Themistoklea' proposals on Sparta and incline towards. aooeptanoe of 
pursuing the war in the east, but also consider it. desirable to have 
Themistokles removed for a decade? The sources do offer some 
indication of why he was ostracized, and they fit into the pattern 
we have reconstructed of a debate on foreign policy. But the 
rejection of his foreign policy forms only the background against 
which the deoieive reasons can be seen* 
Pluteroh (Th. 22.1 of. 22.3) and others attribute-the ostraoism 
of Themistokles (and others) to peövas, which is obviously true 
to an extent, but not very helpful26. To want to knowýwhy this. envy 
took the malignant form it did, when it did. Plutarch 
(Th. 22.1) 
also mentions slanders levelled at Themistokles. Slander seems to 
have been a regular feature of Athenian political life, as the comments 
on the ostraka show, and Plutarch (Th. 22.1) implies that Themistokles 
Aas slandered throughout his career and that it was only because of 
their envy that people- began to listen to them 
c! i GOveiv cýsýtýIcýS utývýäS_,. ý_7C, 
ýý? Q v4ýý/ " 
Something in Themistokles' behaviour must have Changed which made the 
charges levelled at him more plausible, or opened him to more telling 
oritioisms, for envy of Themistokles should have been at its height 
at the. time of his splendid personal aohievementsq not aeveralyears 
later. 
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Plutarch, in this context, has only one concrete example of 
such slanders. Ee>quotee Timokreon's accusations of bribery 
(fr. 1 
ap. Pl. Th. 21.2"-3)., At worst, these, and perbaps, other similar 
accusations, resulted in a trial at which . 
Themistoklesrwas, aoquitted27. 
Plutarah"oonnects the willingness of the demos to listen to these_. 
slanders,, with, Themistokles' painful tendency to refer frequently to 
his own achievements (, Cf. Plato Georg. 516 d),, noting, too, the 
disquiet. his"building, of the temple of Artemis Aristoboule. caused. 
We have already analysed the significance of these facts and con- 
cluded that what was particularly damaging to Tbemistokles' political 
standing-was the implication that the Athenians were wrong. to: rejeot 
his advice 
289 He was not prepared, in other-words, to-accept the 
judgement of a majority of citizens if it ran counter to his own. 
judgement. Our. analysis led us to emphasize one sideof the effect 
this bad, namely, the impression it created of": arroganoe,. and, tbe 
insult to the demos' intelligence his attitude implied29. Another 
related interpretation could be and was emphasized and exploited by. 
his enemies. " ,; 
In his written defence against Mediem charges, sent to Athens 
while Themistokles was living. in Argos as an ostracise,. he made use 
of 
-- 
-P6. PoZip0. ý5ýý1CLi, ýIrk 
(Pl. The 23.3) whioh had 
been slanderously levelled at him by. his enemies to the people 
SLAP, 
RAý, 01-Af-VOS 
4T, 
-UXýýaf-2/ 
a 
These accusations ( Ka 1'oýýcc-4 ) needn't have been formal. They 
had claimed he was- acýxaYcý. ýý- 
? ýýýJýCiýS_ ýýcýý 
ýou. ýot4. £Va. S: _(Pl. 
Th. 23.4)3. This is con- 
firmation of the implications we drew from Plutaroh's-comments about 
Themistokles' tendency to attempt to convince the Athenians that, they 
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should- accept his advice as a matter of faith, contrary to their 
on judgement31. In other words, even though the Athenians"had 
been rejeoting his proposals to support the'enti=. Spartan movement 
in the Peloponnese he would'not drop his pressure. Nor were hie 
arguments without appeal, as Thuaydides (138.3bin a general comment, 
emphasized, and as the presence of Athenian volunteers at Tegea 
demonstrates. 
So as well-as indignation at his arrogance, and perhaps even 
a 'sense of the constitutional impropriety of Themistokles' refusal 
to accept the Assembly's considered judgement, Themistokles' 
ostracism is explicable ass practical`measureyfor the proposals of 
his enemies to pursue in-earnest the war in the east'against the 
"King's land" were becoming increasingly popular, and it was feared 
that it would be dangerous to embark on suoh a drive while the 
persuasive and so divisive Themistokles was still in a position to 
move the Athenians to war with Sparta32. The last years had'shown 
that he would-indeed continue to exploit that position. Furthermore, 
such actions as Athenian volunteers fighting against Sparta must have 
been seen by the demos as provocative to Sparta. Themistokles' 
warnings of an eventual Spartan attack on-Attika will have been 
recognized as a potentially self-fulfilling"prophecy. His ostracism 
also represented an emphatic assurance of Athenian goodwill to Spartan 
imperialism within the' Peloponnese. These considerations, I feel, 
sufficiently explain why the Athenians felt it necessary, beyond the 
rejection of. -his policy, to remove Themistokles from Athens33. 
Finally,, 'let us apply these results to our attempt to" establish 
the relative importance of the three categories we distinguished 
which- contributed to"political success. Our first category was the 
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intrinsic persuasiveness of s manta arguments, and we emphasized 
that the fact that a man was advocating ' a' policy` which conformed 
with the desires of the majority of the demos made his arguments 
persuasive. We suggested that Themistokles in the'firat half of 
the 470s had deliberately emphasized that element in his policy 
which he knew would correspond to' popular desires. " It 'is likely 
that Themistokles put all his efforts into persuading the Athenians 
to adopt the less popular notion of"support for the anti-Spartan 
movement in the Peloponnese in the second half of the 470s when that 
movement becomes discernible. To were able to list possible reasons 
why''his arguments failed to convince the majority of Athenians, and 
conversely why his enemies' policies were more attractive. There 
is, then, 'a 'prima facie case for believing that these 'possible 
reasons in fact-contributed to'Themistokles' political' failure in 
the second half =of the '470s, and "so we should assume' that the 
intrinsic persuasiveness 'of 'the case Themistokles was presenting 
was lees compelling 'than 'that of his enemies*-' 
Our second category wa `good repute. ' 'In the ' seoond half of the 
470s'reputation deriving from the'glory of 's man's family remained 
static. `'As'far as reputation deriving from a man's own achievement 
is concerned, Themistokles should still have outstripped all other 
men, although he had actuallyachieved nothing '(as far as`we know) 
since '480-78, while Kimon had been able'to exploit such "achieve- 
ments" as Skyros''and 'Theseus*', bones with some -skill. The third 
source of'reputation, a man's character, -As an area in"whioh we can 
say with oonfidenoe'that: Themistoklee, credit went down. ' We have 
already shown that his attitude towards his past achievements 1 
suggested=the Athenians'should follow his advice on trust 'and'that 
this was interpreted as arrogance. In trying to demonstrate the 
wisdom of his attitude he had to refer repeatedly to his own past 
186: -., 
aohievemente, and he did so , 
to a boring extent...: We also argued 
that it , gras with- the war, againet Karystos, in 475-4, that , ; j, 
Themistokles'-financial integrity was first seriously called into 
question. These three elements - arrogance, tediousness . and 
dubious integrity - must have represented a serious deterioration 
in the assessment of Themistokles' character in the second half of 
the 470s. 
We. have no information which could shed light on the assess- 
.. ýý 
ment of the demos of the_personalities of Themistoklea', enemies at 
this time, though there is no reason to doubt that Aristeides (it 
he was still alive) continued to be well-respected (Pl. Ar. 26. I. -3)v 
or that., the attractive elements we pointed. to in Kimon's character 
in the first half of the decade diminished now or, were marred by the 
emergence of-any, less pleasing traits. The coincidence of the, 
decline, in the assessment of Themistoklea' character and his political 
failure is likely to be. signifioant. 
The last category, we, discerned was. success deriving from. the 
support of philoi connections. We noted above that the time-lag. 
between the formation-of., the "grand coalition" by 479-8. and 
Themistokles' ostraoism. in 4710 is incompatible with the belief 
that the extensiveness and influence of philoi support was the 
decisive element in determining success or failure in Athenian 
politics* This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that by the 
time of Themistokles' ostracism there is some reason to believe that 
the coalition was leas unified than in its first few years when it 
had failed to ostraoiae Themistokles. Since Perikles took on the 
oboregia of Aiaohylb s' Persai in 473/2 (Iß 112 2318,9) he should 
have had bin family's finances at his disposal, and so his father, 
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Xanthippoe, ehould already be dead. In view of the pro- 
Themistoklean tone of the play we may assume that Perikles was to 
some extent already in sympathy with Themiatoklee, or at least 
his policies. This is perhaps confirmed by his part in the 
prosecution of Kimon a decade later (Stesimbrotos fr. 5 ap. P1. 'K. 
14.4; Per. 10.5; AP 27.1)34. The coalition bad probably lost the 
co-operation of one area of Alkmeonid support by the end of the 
470s- let, despite the weakened coalition Themistokies is ostracized. 
Other factors were evidently of more consequence than philoi 
conneotions. 
To sum ups then, our'analyeis of Athenian politios in the 470a 
leads us to conclude that for leading politioian  such as Themistokles 
and Kimon success depended heavily on the persuasiveness of their 
arguments, the"reputation they could"win from personal2"achievement 
and on an, -attractivepersonality. The importance of reputation 
deriving from family prestige and support from philoi oonneotiona 
was apparently lees important to the great leasers, which is not to 
deny that these two elements were useful in the early stages of any 
politioians'oareer and probably at all stages for the minor 
politioians, whose oareers must unfortunately remain undooumented. 
`188. 
CHAPTER TWELVE* - THE KIMONIAN ERA 
..,. 
In chapter eight we showed that Diodoros (60.1) dated the 
beginning, of preparations for an Athenian drive against the Persians 
in the east to. the year 470/69. I can see no objection to accepting 
this date as correct, -and there are in fact interpretative reasons 
in favour of accepting it... Diodoros links these preparations with 
the election of Kimon-as strategos with orders to carry out the 
campaign, and , 
this, no doubt meant also the preparations necessary 
for it. So Kimon will have been elected to the strategic of, 470/69 
shortly after tbe. ostraoism: of, Themistokles in 471/O9expelled partly 
because his, presence-inAthens was, inoompatible with the-planned 
offensive., against Persian. strongholds in. the. east'. So the 470/69 
date for 
, the. 
beginning of; preparatione. fite well with the eeourely 
1 
.. I have nothing to add to the dated ostraoiam of.. Themietokleal 
deaoription. of _ 
the 
, 
preparatione . 
for and-execution of the military 
operation a. down, to -the: beginning of the Thasos revolt which bas been 
given 
2. 
xa 
There is little. to. be said-of political life in Athens in the 
period from. 470/69, until: the, Thasos revolt. Those politicians who 
bad. been sympathetio. towards. Tbemistoklea' policies will not have 
been foolish enough to. continue. to press for those policies which 
had-contributed to+Themistokles' ostraoiam, until the climate of 
opinion hadchanged3., We. know. of. two. men who advocated an anti- 
Spartan policy in the later,; 00a, 
MEphialtes 
and Perikles4. In order 
to aocount{for, the, influence. Ephialtes. was to command in the second 
half of the. 460s it. is, reasonableý-to wonder whether be did not 
occupy the strategia. during, the, late 470s and/or early, 460s. 
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Perikles had indireotly expressed support for Themistoklee' 
policies' by his ohoregia'of Aischylos' Peraai in 473/2 though he 
was a very young man still, probably 'in'-his early twenties 
%, t 
the Start of 
Plutarch (Per. 16.2)'would'appear to dateXhia political career 
right at the beginning of the 460aß though his evidence is euspect6. 
He shöüld have been able to control an+area of loyal Alkmeonid 
support, but we may doubt that his influenoe was extensive in the 
citygenerally. Ho, like'other men sympathetic to Themiatokles' 
attitude to Sparta, most`probably left the dangerous subject alone 
in the early 460sß anyway. There iss at least, no evidence at all 
of open opposition by Ephialtea or Perikle'e or anyone else to Kimon 
and his friends or to their policies in the first half of the 460a. 
Indeed, what - evidence"there is speaks of a olosing of-ranks 
and a unified effort by all Athenians behind the anti-Persian 
drive. Of the Seven I-Against IThebes, produced in 4687, "Aristophanes 
has Aeschylus say... that "every"man in the audience would have 
longed to be a fighter"'(Frogs 1022), but'this need not be taken 
seriously'*'** as an explanationA of why' Aeschylus wrote it. " 
Podlecki'e reason for this judgement is that he thinks Athens was 
at this time "riding on`the crest of success"7. In fact, she was 
probably facing discontent'among her'allie©, notably Naxos, and 
perhaps Thasos, `too, and, although there may have been an expansion 
of the Athenian' alliance in''469 and 468 , it is very possible that 
rumours of the'Persianintention'to mount another campaign had 
reaohed Athens by "t" time- Aisohyloa-wrote his play8. We may, then, 
take the evidenoe at'faoe value. The faot-that it was Aisohylo who 
made-this rousing'appeal is'signifioant of'the degree of unity this 
new drive and new'threat had foiged'among the Atheniane9. 
Igoe 
It is. only this relativelybrief period, after. the ostracism 
of Themistokles until during,, the Thasos revolt, some six or seven 
yeareg which can be. aptly termed the Bimonian era, and not, as is 
often the oaee, the. whole,; period from 478/7 until Kimon'e 
ostracism°. The. dominanoe which Kimon enjoyed during this period.. 
appears to have,. beenezploited to, the full in what we may deduoe 
to have been aniattempt to secure--bin own continued predominance 
by means of, both subtle, and,,, orude methods 
11. 
Four incidents give 
use glimpse of; -the politioal climate of the 
Kimonian era. - 
In 469/6, tbe. arohon, appointed the board of generals to aot as 
judges at. the, Dionyaia "-Tbe decision would appear, 
12 
according to. Plutarchg. to have,. been Kimon'a alone. lie oboes 
Sophoklesltrilogy, in preference to Aisohylos'. Kimon's deoision- 
may. have, been influenoed. by; purely-. artistio considerations; there 
is some reason, though,;. to. look for another ezplanationl3. The 
decision was. probably connected with Aisobylos' erstwhile sympathy 
for Themistokles!.. polioiee. -. "Kimon, it seems, could be vindictive"14. 
Between 468. and-. 46615. Spartan: envoys came to Athens and required 
the punishment of, Themietokles, for., what they. maintained bad been his 
complicity in. the allegeds, plots of, Paueanias (Thuc. 135.2). rI:, 
believe a plausible: reoonatruotion of the outline-of rausanies' 
intentions, and; explanation. of his downfall has, been made. by those 
scholare, who, have interpreted the charges of helotiam as based on 
Pausanias!, plane to; exploit: the; military potential, of. the helot 
population, -at.,. the, same"time; 
removing thethreat to Sparta, so 
paralysing., to her vital energiea1,6... The, 
_Spartans,. 
then, probably 
had4their own reasons, forýliquidating- Pau aaniae, and the boon of 
being able to implicate. Themistokles in the affair was a (surely very 
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welcome)'spin=off, "so to speakl7. " There"is'no doubt'that they 
had'the backing of certain Athenians. "The precise legal` procedures 
whioh'-took place between the'arrival'of-the Spartan envoys and the 
oondemnation'of Themistokles are not olear, "and are for'oür 
purposes not important. But a reliable tradition bas preserved the 
name of Leobotes Alkmeonos of Agryle in connection with an &? MirýWa. 
(Krateros'fr., 11; " cf. Pl. ' Th. 23.1; 116r. 6050)18. ' Leobotes, an 
Alkmeonid, appears-not"to have been otherwise active politically at 
this time; '"- we hear-nothing also of him, and, as far as I'know, he 
hasVnöt yet "appeared on'°any"ostraka19. 'It 'is fair to assume that he 
was used'by other"mený 'Plutaröh, 'in fact, has vague words about 
others' invölved . in a less formal way "in `this final attack on 
Themistokles. Among others be 'specifically 'mentions'Kimon' (ir. 25.7)20. 
At what stage in'the legal'procedure'Kimon and othere21 added their 
weight is"noVolear. - The'importantýpoint, however, "'is that Kimon and 
his'friends`supported the Spartan socusations22 In view of the good 
relations'Kimon enjoyed with Spartag one not unfairly wonders whether 
theyýhadlmade oontect'on this matter before the Spartans arrived at 
Athena. "Süohýoontact'would of course, be made witb'great tact and 
the cover-up'would beäarefully planned* We have no-evidenoe of a 
framing, operation, but`sinoetit . would fit the atmosphere of the 
Kimoniän era dincernible'from more`eeourely attested events, suspicion 
is justified23. 
It has been pointed out'that°'the''decision to pursue Themistokles 
(Thuo. 136.2) wa un-Athenian24`"'Tha-deoieion probably refleote the 
intensity of-feeling against Themietokies. It"is no'longer neoesaary 
to defend the o1aimýthat`the`idea' of Themistoklea' 1! edism is un- 
oonvinding25: "An explanation of the-'Athenian Willingness to believe 
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the accusations over and above the 'evidence' is required. 
Cawkwell made the valuable. -link between news of the intention of 
the King to mount another-operation against the Greeks and the 
. Cawkwell specifies the link by emphasizing exile of- Themistoklea26 
that "Themistokles had been less than zealous for the M 
ýý K ä5 
7V C) XC05! '27. -, Now we felt compelled to agree that while . 
this 
was in fact the case Themistoklea bad sufficient political acumen in 
the 470s to avoid admitting his true attitude. Instead, he directed 
Athenian energies and fears in, auch away as to bring about the 
cessation of hostilities with Persia.. As such there is no reason 
to believe that before. these accusations were made there bad-been 
any inkling that Themistokles. could have bad illicit dealings, with 
the Persians, and, this is supported by the silence of the ostraka as 
to"such suspicions. By 471/0 Themistokles was provocatively anti- 
Spartan, and was, ostracized, -in part, for this reason* while the 
Athenians-realized it would; be dangerous to embark on the war in the 
east in earnest-if: Tbemistokles continued his anti-Spartan agitation 
(es he surely would)-the intellectual leap bad not,. been made which 
could equate this, anti-Spartanism with aiding the King's cause. It 
was, I suggest, the, sudden and. blinding, flash of, the apparent 
perception which., the Medism,. hypothesis produced, allowing, as it 
did, no many facets of. Tbemistokles'ýobaraoter and policies, and of 
present circumstanoes, to-fit; into. the_pioture, it created, rit was. 
this which enabledTbemistokles'xenemiestowhip up the anger of 
the demos-to suchen extraordinary level. Feeling duped, and under 
the psychological. stress, of a-, new, Persian_threat, the Athenians will 
not bave. reoeived sympatbetioally, or rationally the more sober 
questioning of the evidence and interpretation of Themistokles' career 
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which'his philoi-may (or'may not) have'dared to pose and"offer28. 
Two other incidents remain to complete our thumb-nail sketch 
of the political--atmosphere-of the Kimonien: era. Stesimbrotoa 
(fr. 3-ap. Pl. The 24.4)teays that for having"brought Themistoklea'": 
wife and children: to. him, at-Admetos' court, -Epikrates of Aaharnai 
we proseouted"by--Kimon and"'oondemned to death29. The notioe has 
been widely aooepted ae`historiaal30 1. The harshness of the measure 
strongly suggests-it'belongs'to-tthe period immediately after 
Themistokleal-`flight, -- and' before. Eurymedon, while anger and tension 
were-still-running -bjgh31e, /^Tb9 incident probably illustrates the'-'ý 
methods Kimon used'in ezploitingýthe'atmosphere to remove political' 
32 
opponents. -There is°no'reason'to suppose the incident-was isolated. 
It is not our job to moralize, 'butit is noteworthy that even 
Sobaohermeyr, afterýtryingýto mitigate Kimon'a role an merely one 
of formal` acouser, -ihifting, the real, blame onto the demon, admits 
that'there- "blieb ein''bitte`rer Neobgeschmaok", 'which he has not 
unnaturally read-into, 
33the 
evidence 
The deoreeýagainat'Arthmioa'of, Zeleia34 should alao'be seen in 
the context of the immediate-aftermath"of-, Themietoklee' exile35. 
M. B. ' Wallace' has 'reoently: described , these a lotions of the Kimonian 
era aa'"the`first"atteeted judioial'witot hunt"in: weatern history "36. 
In view of'the'oppression'of, politioal opponents which was made 
possible by the'events'"and%feelings associated with Themistokles' 
flight, it-is not=surprising1 that'we: find, littleýevidenos of 
opposition to Kimon and, his friends,? -or-to theirýpolioies. If 
Kimon twasa gentleman="des älteren=Stillee"--- then- one` of his models 
wes Antiloohoe (_cf. ' Homer', Il. 23.420-44O)37" 
s4i.. .r 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN. THE END OF THE KIMONIAN ERA (465/4 - 462/1) 
The decision not to proceed to Kypros after the victory at Euryme- 
don was presumably dictated by-the need to establish Athenian control 
firmly on the northern Aegean 
l. The necessity of achieving this 
security will have been recognized-by Kimon, and there is no reason 
to suspeot that he did not approve of the withdrawal2. The operations 
in the north3 were probably seen as causing only a postponement of the 
war in the south which . would 
be-proseouted at a later stage. It is 
not impossible that Athenian plans to settle Enneahodoi and dominate 
the region were originally. intended to serve as a base of operations 
against Iakedonia but: in view of Kimon's active involvement in related 
operations at'Thasos and iwview of his later opposition to aggression 
against"Makedonia (see below) I do not believe such designs were part 
of the original motivation4, though some may have bad the possibility 
in their minds. The Drabeakos disaster was a setback. Some scholars 
are confident that the disaster will have reflected badly on Kimon5. 
There is no indication of this in: the. aouroes, and, as the scholars 
in the last note realize, -. such hostility would have been most unfair, 
espeoially. sinoe. Kimon might; not. even have taken part in the operation. 
I prefer, then, to believe that Kimon's reputation, no doubt at its 
zenith about 
., 
now, . remained unshaken by-the defeat. - 
Kimon did-not remain at Thasos throughout the duration of the 
siege6. At any rate, there is good evidence that be was in Athens, 
in late summerA649: when the first Spartan appeal for assistanoe 
against the L'eeaeniane was made (Thuo., 101.2; Aristoph. Lye. 1137-421 
Pl. -K. 16.6 _8)70 ,- Ephialtee 
oµt, výt1 _t , 
/xaýcv ?Lv 
s _TiLsaS 
a iýS" ýa-y W-f-LN: t W-oý. ý 7ýat11vaL 
?ö TPövyr. a. T15 _.... 15 -, --- -- -- - 
(Pl. K. 16.8). 
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Plutarch goes on to refer, to a. remark of Kritias' on Kimon's response 
to the request. - Ion, however, -is cited as the authority for a 
quotation from Kimon in the debate which was supposed to have been 
decisive in swaying the decision. Ion, then, quotes the actual. {' 
words while Kritias comments on the outcome and significance of the 
debate. There need belittle doubt that Ephialtea' striking phrase 
was also drawn from Ion's more dramatic account, and not from Kritias' 
more detached commentary on: the incident. 'tile have, then, 'in all 
likelihood, an eye-witness account, of part of, the debate (Ion fr. 
14 ape Pl. K. 16.8). We shall analyse the two phrases used by 
Ephialtes and Kimon after we have examined the background. 
The timing of the crisis was not propitious for Ephialtea' case. 
It will be remembered that we, suggeeted that Themiatoklea in the 470a 
had done his beat to. stir; feara., of, the danger from Sparta. He had 
had a , measure of success but , had failed _ topersuade a--majority of 
the Athenians that they should, join. with Spartals enemies in the 
Peloponnese, in crushing her. -, ýDuring.. the period in which Athens had, 
thrown herself into, the ant i-Persian . drive, 470/69 . -'- 465, there had 
been no. 'stab in the baok': trom. Sparta! aa Themiatoklee probably implied, 
and perhaps claimed there would be. - True, Sparta had been'engaged in 
continuing to assert her authority. withinýtheiPeloponnese, but this 
will have appearedto: have, been substantially completed by about 
467-6, the time of the murder: ofýPausaniaa and the suppliant helots " 
at-Tainaron. <_, Anyway, ahortly. 
before-, theSpartan appeal the Spartans 
bad been aeoure enough within. the Peloponnese to render a promise-to 
invade Attika plauaiblerto-the Tbaeians and-to Thuoydidea, and so were 
probably perceived as.. being-in. a,; strongýposition. Given the 
opportunity, the, -Spartane,; so-atheýAthenians mistakenly believed, had 
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not had any unfriendly intentions towards the Athenians. 
In view of the fate suffered by Themistokles as a result of 
his refusal to cease pressing for actions to counter the alleged 
threat from Sparta, we may even describe Ephialtes' stance as daring. 
The difference, of course, ' between Themistokles' position in-the 
470s and Rpbialtes' now was that the Athenians were no longer analys- 
ing their relations-with Sparta against the background of the 
possibility of a new Persian offensive in Ionia, the Aegean and 
perhaps also against Bellas ultimately. Eurymedon had enabled the 
Athenians to-tolerate the luxury of questioning their relations with 
Sparta. 
But if our conclusions on Themistokles'`proposals in the late 
-4709 are correct, then Ephialtes' position now was less extreme. 
Sparta's very existence was in peril when she made her appeal8. 
Failure to send-Athenian support might have been sufficient to cause 
the destruction of Spartan power; support for the insurgents would 
certainly have beeng. -Fphialtes shrunk from proposing this measure e" 
Unlike Themistokles, in the present circumstances Fphialtes could 
hardly attempt to portray Sparta as a threat'to Athens' security. 
", Let'; us examine Ephialtes' approach, to dissuading' the dispatch 
of aid more closely., Clearly, he bold out the non-intervention of 
the Athenians as=leading to the annihilation of Spartan power = they 
should" not ävccrtävac. i Spartat that is she should remain prostrate. 
His°justifioation for Athens following this course seems to-have been' 
twofold. It was-to 
", vrt pi j5 tthat he 
drew attention: -Since=present circumstances could not have illustrated 
this quality we`may'assume he catalogued incidents from`the`past; -, they 
will not have-been`laoking,, and we needn't'list all"the possible 
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examples which be might have used. 
The course for which he was', pleading, though, was not justified; 
exclusively by Spartals past arrogance.; Ephialtes',, words indicate.., 
that be projected the influence this quality would have in the future. 
The idea of permanence. contained. inthe, word Kai Ueac suggests by 
implication that in. bis speech Ephialtes painted some picture; of, the 
effect that allowing-the re-emergenoe. of her arrogance would have. 
Apparently be analyzedt, tbe relationship,. ofAthensand, Sparta within 
such a. potential situations Athens.. ahould'not ,. 
L. 
ý/ýCct. vac___ 
RV_TC-exo_ toi 7rä £nt 'CÖ-S... / The word 
here has been loosely rendered in a, variety.. of waysl0 though most, are 
too strong. "Competitor", would be more appropriate., than "enemy", or,,,, 
the like. The word has the . 
implication: that the competition. is evenly 
balanced, which at the time of: tberdebate was not". true. _, 
Ephialtes, 
is looking to. the future when Sparta has regained the upper-hand, 4and 
will, be vying with Athens for; influenoe in Hellaa and. behavingawith , 
characteristic arrogance., This presumably, _means<thatshe would. refuse 
to recognize Athens, as an, equal. 
But which areas would be the prizes of this competition for 
influence? Not the Aegean and Ionia; events since 478/7 had appar- 
ently shown that Sparta was not opposed to the ezistenoe of a naval 
allianoe under. Atbenian, leadership. _.. 
Again,,: tbe timing of'the debate 
wss; unfortunate. foraEphialtes,, for, it: foroed him to, talk, in, 
generalities. Themistokles bad been uneuooeasful_in, kindling_interest 
in the exeroise, of Athenian, influenoe in,, mainland Greeo e. The throat 
from; Persia had been removed only some twelve.. to, eighteenmonths, -, 
before the debate on aid, uto, 
Sparta,, and. ainoe. then the Athenians had 
been. busy establishing-security in, tbe northern-, Aegean, and, we con- 
oluded earlier that L"akedonia was most probably not publicly specified 
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as"'an ultimate objective at tbis'early stage. So by the time of 
the debate Ephialtes had no prior public discussion of possible areas 
of'mainland expansion by Athens upon which to draw and to use in his 
argument. 
The vagueness' suited. *Kimon's rhetorio. 'We may assume that Kimon 
showed up any ehortoominge in Ephialtes' case on a rational level, but 
he pas also able to exploit en emotional approach as a result of 
Ephialtes' vagueness aaýto'future-oompetition, drawing as he did on 
the interpretation of -the lameness oraole11 offered by men like 
Hetoimaridas to-create the impression "that the'Spartans were ready to 
respect Athens as an-equal päartner-in-the hegemony of Hellas, adding 
the'''yoke-fellow' image himself-perhaps, though-this too may have been 
borrowed-from Spartan'rhetoric. The detailed"questions of where the 
line between the two-sphereaof influenoe'was to be drawn were left 
unanswered. The`vote-was''taken, "and Sparta'saved, but the debate was 
not'over: the detailed questions now passed into public debate where 
rational analysis had"a greater I chance of carrying weight against 
Kimonian influence and rhetoric. " 
I see no way of - determining whether Thuoydidee took the second 
half of 465 or the first half of'464 as=the point at which he dated 
12 the beginning of the, Thasoa revolt. It lasted"over two years and 
so if the beginning were dated in 46 /4'it will have ended after some 
point in 46. V2* Equally -- possible'ie'a date after"some point in 463/2-0 
Thuoydides' expression suggests that the siege did not last only a 
short while into the'third`year. ` On bälanoe; ctherefore, a date in 
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462-is more likely to be correct. Furthermore, since Kimon was 
expected to mount a campaign against Miakedonia after Thasos' 
capitulation (Pl. K. 14.2), the latter is likely to have been nearer 
the-beginning of the campaigning season than the end. 4631L is a 
fairly secure date for the end of the Thasos revolt. 
It is clear that in his ezcureus on the Pentekontaetia 
Thuoydides did notat all times observe strict chronological order" 
in=his narrative-order, on top of the occasions when he warns us of 
a departure (the safest example is 109.1-3). But as a working rule 
it'is, nonetheless,: necessary to'take his narrative order as 
chronological, unleme compelling reasons to the contrary can be 
givenl3. So the second Spartan appeal (Thun. 102.1; P1. K. 17.2) 
was'made after the collapse of the Thasos revolt (Thuo. -101.3; P1. K. 
14.2)14. Thucydidea' narrative (102.1)-euggests that the request 
followed soon after'the end of the Thasos revolt. - On this basis one 
would assume the request tojhave been sent around the middle of, or 
in'the second half of 462. That this assumption is correct is 
suggested-by a-number of other arguments which confirm it15. 
a--ýBy the time-of the: aecond Spartan appeal for aasistanoe,. about 
two'years'after the first-which opened the public debate, we have 
some indications-that deoieions°had been made on the direction in 
which Athenian energies should be,, aiaied , abroad and-where limits 
Ishould`, be set16. Some traces have remained of-the public debate 
which-led to these deoisions. - There is no reason to suspect that 
anyone in'this period (464-2) opposed the idea of pursuing the war 
in the'south-east against the Persians. We supposed-the intention 
to reconquer Kypros was postponed only until the situation in the° 
northern Aegean permitted. In view-of Kimonts hitherto vigorous 
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anti-Persian etanoe, and of his fateful campaign against Kypros 
after his return from ostracism (Thun. 112.2) it is permissible to 
assume that Kimon was not unenthusiastio, about the prospeot of 
renewing the, offensive once the situation in the north allowedl7. 
The only evidence we have of the attitude of. other men in that 
Perikles with fifty ships, and, F. phialtee with thirty sailed, past the 
Chelidonian islands (Kallisthenes fr. 16, &P-,.. Pi-, K- 13.5). No matter 
what we might think, of_, Kalliothanes we cannot simply dismiss this, 
notice18. Unlese. Plutarch or Kallisthenes has been, misleading,,, Ký. 
Perikles' expedition, should be in close temporal conneotion; with 
Epbialtes', and so both should., be, dated_between, 465 (Elxrymedon) 
and . 
462 1_ (Ephialtes'., deaths AP 25.4, with. 26.2)19,. While their 
support for the operation is. notput beyond; diepute, by their. taking 
part in it as generals, we should,. in the absence. of: any indication 
to the contrary, , assumethat. 
they in fact 
, 
did_support. it20. The 
notice would appear toauggest, tbat. the fleet commanded by, Fphialtea 
and by Perikles was expected to prevent any, incursions by the Persian 
fleet into waters west, of the Chelidonian islands and that they, showed . ,. >.. v .rti. _ ,-..... 7. -- Ik'nI.. . I- 11 . 
sufficient daring; to sail east of theislanda,. ahowing, tbe flag and 
creating the impresaion,, in the areathat. the Athenians had by no 
means, relinquished. olaims to the region and. perhepa implying, that 
a,. new. Athenian, offenaive. was imminent., Ths; positive attitude of 
Ephialtes and Perikles, to a. renewed offensive-against Persian-.,, -, 
dominated areas ., 
in., the, south-east, will form an important argument in 
ouraseessment of the nature of, Athenian politic s in our period. 
We could, rbut, needn't, apeoulate. on tbe, bvarious auggeatione whioh 
men-mayhave made on how. thie attitude, to. Pereie, taken for granted 
probably by all, should, be. related to. the other suggeationa whioh 
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were mooted as tothe expansion'of Athenian influence within 
Hellas 21 0-.. . 
when the Spartans-dismissed the Athenian contingent from 
Lakonia, the Athenians'oonoluded alliances with Argon and Thessaly 
£üOü5 (Thuc. "102.4). We must assume, therefore, that very little 
discussion was necessary either among the Athenians or their 
prospective allies, and this'suggests that the issues involved`and* 
the terms the parties were prepared to agree upon had been discussed 
before the dismissal of the Athenians. For the Argos alliance this 
upplianta. suggestion is supported-by the evidence of Aisohyloal S 
Commentators have seen in the play a, recommendation of an'alliance 
with'Argos22. It cannot be'doubted that-, Aisohyloa"ie at pains in 
the-'play toi express admiration 'for fthe god-fearing and unhesitating 
resolution the Argive `people ` showed , (605-9) 'in ° deo iding "to support -= 
the--just-cause in the fäoo: of; violenoe"(forebodings' of violence 
aboun4: 342,356-9,377,398-401,439,451-4, ' 474-7,632-8,663-69 
678-83,710-953, '1043_6)23. - The' same cannot -be` eaid"of °the -more , 
careful assessment of the ''situation whioh Felsegos makea24. And the 
0 ourse of the'trilogy'wäe'to demonstrate that Argive loyalty"to their 
deoision was not-to be broken by°thatreality of war, or even of 
defeat25. "'Aisobylos would appearlto+be'tryingl with the evidenoe 
of myth, to ` reassure-wh't we''areýjustifiedwin assuming was the 
suspioion of his audienoe as'to Argive integrity26. The parallel 
to 'the' aituationlrepresented-in'the'Su pplianta offered by the 
Predicament of Themistokles at'Argos has"been-noted by soholars270 
Despite the lsoktofiindependent evidenoe, I am prepared to guess 
that 4the Argivee letýit. be, known'that they would be prepared to 
proteot Themistokles, 'from Atheno-Spartan extradition demands. 
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Podlecki and Forrest have>stressed.. seeinE the Suppliente, as "a 
thanksgiving for services -rendered to . 
Themistokles", an; expression,:,, 
of "the -gratitude of -Aeschylus :..... to Argo 8,,, 
28. 
-; Rather, I -think we 
should - see the parallelýprimarily; as; a reminder to the Athenian 
audience of the steadfastness. and : loyalty the Argives_were capable 
of - showing29 
, There is no doubt that , 
Aisohyloe was at -pains i, to emphasize the 
faot; that the deoision faoinß the: Argives-was such that,, it., aould 
only ibe reaobed by . the final : authority of the Aaaembly. 
(365-9,601, 
.y 
603-249-, 739-409 942-3,, 965). 
_It, 
has been observe d that the point is 
stressed so strongly as; =to require 4explanation3O. ., -_Later 
in the,, 
fifth century the Argives, were considered to have, &,. democratio form..; 
of'government. (Thue. 5.29.1,31.6,, 44.1). Later,, oonflicting Argive 
traditions agreeds in, seeingýArgive love"of:, 'isegorial and--,! autonomia' 
as; very ancient. (Paus. 2.: 19.2;; -4). , The process, whiob, led, to, what 
was, eventually termed 'demokratia'-hadýalready, beguný"_in the ethos 
represented by"Homer, if. tbe, privilegekof.. voting in., full,. Assembly., 
is. accepted, as it- mutt "be, ass 'feature of democracy.,. We are 
fortunate-in-being, relatively.,, well-informed, aboutsome of the,, develop- 
ments"in,. Attika-whioh, may. _have,, been, significant in forming ;, the t.; ý 
process which led to democracy, there, ", andýabout, some: of. the; events 
which may be' takenvas_oharting stagesain_that=prooess, Scholars in 
both ancient and, modern,: times have-disagreed`., on,, the;, question of at ,, 
what"point; the-term 'demokratia'; beoomes"applioable. Although in 
the late 460e we7are, still"., some, decades away from"the-first certain 
record of the, word-, (H., 6.43)31,,; it is_arguable; that certain 
expressions in the, Suppliants provide: evidence, that an awareness of u -t 
perhapo. the most basic'-principle of 'demokratia' - the right of the 
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Assembly to decide certain issues - had' been conceptualized32. 
But the process which at Athena had led to this degree of conscious 
independence on the part of, the demos was,, we know, gradual. `-, In 
view of the Argive constitution later, the Argives in 4641will 
probably have been at some 'stage in. a process which weýmay assume 
was. comparable, - though no doubt in many, ways different to that, at 
Athens. -We have noway of knowing at what ý sta1ge she was33. " .. It, jet, 
therefore, -to, a large extent meaningless to say that the'Argive ý-' 
constitution was or, was not. democratio in 46434.. Forrest and Podlecki 
do. believe, that Argos was: in. some, way-democratio at'this time 
3?. 
They assume that. this. faot in itself would have*reoommended a drawing 
together of, Argos and Athens.. " Igow, ''before-we: rely on'evidenos from 
3 
later in 'the oentury_ahen}the'Greeke had beoome'far-more'oonacious of 
the'; principles and implications of. democraoy, it is'important to 
remember-that we". have-good evidence that-around mid-century the" 
Athenians'were happy! to support whichever elements in a city were 
pro-Athenian, irreepeötive of the constitutional forms which those 
elements favoured (Pe. Xen. 3.11)37. ' Sinoe' interest in "an alliance 
with Argos was stimulated-primarily by her'value'as: an, ally against 
Sparta (as events show),, 'and since it is difficult to believe that , 
any, group in Argos -, irrespective of their attitude -to, 
constitutional 
forms,, - should be less than hostile to Sparta38,: there is no reason 
why the extent of democracy_at. Argos, in 464 should have been relevant 
in commanding her_, as an ally, to'the Athenians. 
Ehrenberg, explained. the emphasis on the Aasembly'a authority 
and the technical, phraseology merely; aathe poet and audience seeing 
events incidentally in terms of_, "their own daily ezperienoe"39. But, 
as Podleoki insisted, 
'this. 
doex not. account.. for the central position,, 
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the theme is clearly intended to assume40. I shall argue below 
that the theme may, indeed, deliberately reflect the question of 
the'=sovereignty of the demos, in Athens. But there is a further 
(not alternative) explanation which is relevant here. we have 
already seen-bow:: Aisohyloswas at pains to allay the dubious feelings 
of the Athenians-. as-to the prospect of having Argos as an ally. 
Another wayfof doing this would be to portray the Argives supporting 
the decision to go-toýwar for a just cause, not half-heartedly, but 
unanimously. -; The point is made in a powerful speech at the dramatic 
centre'of'the=play. (603.. 24) and repeated towards the end (942-3)" To 
an Athenian ` audience the most effective way of illustrating a city's 
determination', to adhere to a course of action was to portray the 
unanimous-vote'ýof aýpacked Assembly. - Furthermore, the point is made 
thatýany: deoieions concerning the possibility of war would be made 
only{with the: full: support of those involved in fighting, and not ... 
imposed . ! from - above' $-.: 
ý. wJý.. KcLZ£ýmýaýýö 
£Vaý ; >_V. ! ý. TV 
P2, 
: Tg0. cý. vý 
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1.;, j ýýýcsa'ýý 5" 
____. _ 
(946-9)" 
Whether this besic-democratio'prinoiple, and perhaps other more 
elaborate prooedurjee, wera in'faut adhered to at Argos in 464 will have 
been le aaimportant than the impreasion, of unanimous and steadfast 
support for a just cause it created for the Athenian audience con- 
sidering `an alliance 'with' Argos. 
So much for ' the` positive recommendation of an alliance with Argos 
in the Euppliants* Can we deduce anything further of Aisobylos' view 
of how such an alliance might fit into the wider pattern of inter-city 
,: 205. 
relations? - Not muoh, beyond a clear anti-Spartan '` attitude, 
discernible from a variety' of °anglea41. ' 3Soat? obviously reaommend- 
ation of an allianoe with`Argos`implied, hostility`to Sparta beoauee 
Argos and-Sparta were Inotonly traditional enemies but possibly in 
a state of war, for'Thuoydidea (102.4) desoribea the Argivee as 
*a tö LS to ö Sparta' bI the time' of the Atheno=Argive' allianoe4Z. 
Perhaps a more profound hostility towards Sparta'may be deteoted in 
the theme of supplication'. ' 'The religious obligationto honour the 
suppliants' right is central to the play. -One'of the gods to whom 
the' suppliants address their prayer-is'Foseidoi (218). It is-difficult 
to'believe that the Athenians in-the 464'eipedition*eent'to'Lakonia 
did' not'get'wind of the'theory'whiah attributed'thecause of°the 
earthquake to the Spartan}eaorilege oommitted'by`trioking`aömei 
euppliant'helote from the'ehrine ofPoeeidon, at Tainaron (Thnä. #128.1) 3. 
While `the situation at, Tainäron *wasink mi any äeym'"different 'toý-that' 
repreaentedFinthe play, 'the'°bäsicrqüeation'oP pöllüing'the`altar does 
invite'aomparison, " and' the contemporary Spartan lick o! =piety°ööntrasta 
with the Argivea'piety-_inýthe myth. 'The implioation'ii'not-only that 
as 'suöh'' 'Sparta dOesYnot- desirve support, butslso`- that 'it, may 'prove 
dangerou8, 'for she bad invited catantropb'e"by'ker-asorilesee" 
Wnoted above, that'after'Eurymedon'theAthenians' felt they could 
aflorCthe' luxury'of disoueaing the value `öfýtheir' ellianoe"with 
sparte: ' ` One` of 'the'reaeönewhy Themistoklee' pre=omtraoiem polioy 
had'been'-rejeoted was probably fear'of`Spartan'military'might. The' 
Athenian relief'foroe in'Lakoniain'464ýwereable'to view the severely 
debilitated, cönditiön'Spertan-power was now in: One of the reasons 
for `rejeoting en`anti-Spartan`pölioy'had`now been removed44, 'The 
parallel'in --the Suppliants with, Themietokles may well have served an 
206. 
a"reminder of"Themiatokles';, pre-ostraoism polioiea, intended, 
perhaps, to prompt discussion. Such a reminder should have been 
very pertinent and effeotive.. in the period following the return of 
the first Athenian relief force. 
The last three points we have just made to illustrate the anti- 
Spartanýtendenoy of the Suppliants were, deduotions. The final point, 
however, is evident in the text. u, _Aieohyloe supports 
(250-59) the 
Argives (by implication against the Spartans) in their claims to 
seniority and leadership45. -, -The extent of Pelasgos' kingdom is 
surprising be claims it reaches up to the Strymon. His claim brings 
us to; tbe question of how,, beyond enmity to Sparta, an Atheno-Argive 
alliance might fit into the pattern of inter-city relations, of which 
we said not much of an,. answer, can be offered. I suspect, however, 
that some reflection of current, opinion is contained in these lines, 
and that our ignorance of the debate blurs our appreciation of it. 
As we shall see,. between 464: and, 462 it was decided that. the 
Athenians-should attempt. to annex part of Makedonia. Giflke therefore 
took Pelasgos' claim as. an expression of, purely Athenian ambitions to 
be eohieved with allied (including, lrgive) assistance, the fruits of 
which will be enjoyed by, all. 
6. 
ý. Ae it stands her case is not well. 
argued, but it may, indeed, --. point in, the right direction. 
It is arguable that Alexander enjoyed good relations with Argos. 
Itpas-believed that Alexander was of; Argive descent (H. 5.22, '8.137)47. 
When_Mykenai. wae captured by the: Argives, part, of , the population was 
given. a home : in . MMakedonie., 
(Paus. 
17.25.6), whioh could be interpreted 
as oo-operation between Argos and-, Alexander48. One might, then,: 
imagine that Aiechyloa wee refleotingone_tendency, in the public 
debate of 464-2, whioh, was arguing, against- aggressive military action 
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against Makedonia, and in favour of cultivating friendly relations 
with Makedonia, which would at least secure a supply of timber. 
This task would be made easier by friendship with Argos. Pelasgos 
says (258-9) his domain is bounded by the sea. This is reminiscent, 
perhaps, of the dual hegemony principle. Did some envisage not 
merely allying with Argos as with, for example, any other member of 
the Athenian alliance, but as taking Argos as replacing Sparta as 
Athena' "yoke-fellow"? 
But the evidence for good relations between Argos and Alexander 
is not compelling., The main point upon which it rests in Alexander's 
reception of ltykenaian refugees. The same source also notes that lese 
than half of tb®: population of Mykenai were received by the 
Kleonaiane. Forrest took this as an unfriendly act49. The, 
Kleonaiana, however 9 bad joined with the Argives in the initial attack 
on 1ykenai,, end they were present when it was captured (Strabo 8.6. 
19 (p. 377)). Assuming the Argives were merciful enough to desist 
from slaughtering all those who had been in favour of resistance .. 
(and to-judge by the stand made by the 1'ykenaians they were the 
majority), the simplest explanation would be to suppose that those 
who had urged making terms with Argos (a minority of Lykenaians). were 
settled by the. Argives in nearby, friendly Kleonai, while those who 
had been-determined to resist were expelled from the Peloponnese as 
a danger. Their reception by Alexander was not necessarily unfriendly 
towards Argos, but it certainly loses any prima facie claim to being 
a friendly gesture. For these reasons I prefer to interpret 
Pelasgos' curious claim differently. A military alliance between 
Argos and Athens would give the Athenians, as allies of the Argives, 
mythological justification for involvement in )akedonia, and, indeed, 
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the whole of mainland Greece. On the more rational, strategic 
level,. Argos may have been seen as protection against attack from' 
the Peloponnese50. So Aisohylos' Suppliants is a valuable reflection 
of some of the issues being discussed in the public debate on the 
direction of- Athenian foreign policy which was stimulated by the 
debate on the Spartan request for aeeistanoe in 464" 
The possibility of an allianoe with Thessaly must have fitted 
into the discussion of Athenian foreign policy in these years. As 
well as the implications of Thucydidee' tu") Büs which we have 
already noted, we may also note ICimon's pregnant remark at his trial 
in-462 that be was not, an others were, a proxenos of rich Theaealiane, 
to be courted and given gifte, (Pl. K. 14.3). So his enemies could be 
represented as serving certain Theeealian interests in prosecuting 
him for having failed to invade Yakedonia. The Theaealian alliance, 
then, may have been proposed in connection with the invasion of 
Yakedonia5le 
On his return from the-successful siege of Thasos. and consequent 
aoquisition of. Thasian mainland possessions (Thuo . 101.31 Pl. K. 14.2) 
Kimon was 
' 4rcL5 
prosecuted for having been unwilling. ( I.. 8. Ck) 
to annex a large part of.. -Makedonia 
even though-this was considered an 
easy task. - The prosecution sought thereby to demonstrate that 
he 
must have been bribed. by Alexander (Pl. IC. 14.2) and demanded the 
death penalty. (Pl. Per.. 10.5). - AP 27.1 says the occasion was ICimon's 
EU S UV a- L-. 52 
.. 
There was-at least one fifth century account of 
the trial, by Steaimbrotoa (fr. 5 ap. Pl., K.. 14.4)53. Now, it may 
seem obvious, but einoetbe fact is significant and has been 
insufficiently emphasized, perhaps it is worth noting that the 
aoousationa, againat Kimon could not have been made unlese, Kimon-bad 
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been direoted'by the Assembly to"lead some kind of incursion into 
akedonia if circumstances should permit. ''That he was aoquitted54 
should not'obsoure'the fact that'without such an order the 
accusation would have been quite absurd; "in'that it would'have' 
taken ICimon to task for not doing something which he would certainly 
have=required the authority of the demos to do, and'it is hard to 
imagine that the oase'should have been presented to court. -4-ý'. 
r . So` the'trial of'Kimon` is evidence that by 462 the Athenians' 
had-'made at least this decision on Makedonia as a result of the 
publio`debate. The I Athenians evidently oonsidered"the opportunity 
offered. by their presenoe in the area and by the psyohologioal effect 
oreated'in the area'by Athenian"suooesa worth grasping even though 
this meant a"further` postponement of the planned Kypros oampaign. 
The decision may also have been prompted by the knowledge that 
Alexander"was a"potential or real"competitor in the area55. The 
imperialistio'mood of the-Athenians in the years following 462 makes 
it`unneoeeeary and unwarranted toý-look'for"any other explanation 
other than purely imperialistic ambitione56. By combining-the' 
Makedonia decision with"another important deoiaion reached in'462 
we may perceive the drift of Athenian'oonoluaions reaohed in the 
publio debate*'- ' ýy"` 
='The Spartans, 'thanks-to`Athenian and other allied aid in 464, had 
managed to-oöntinei. the insurgents to Ithome. Since, then they will `ý- 
have been following the-Athenian publio, debate with"interest and 
alarm. Their action in calling in Athenian assistance in 462, 
although-not: in an"emergenoy, may appear to have been astest of 
Athenian' feeling. 'Without speculating on the Spartan background to 
this most`ouriou sýepisode to try'to decide whether the requesttwae 
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in fact intended as a test, we are permitted to apply it-as, suoh. 
There is no reason to suspect that the vote at Athens, was"a{olose 
thing, for Kimon was sent with a large force (Thun. 102.1: XX 
JCL 
OÜ Kö 
(rCJ ). We may, therefore, -deduce that the idea of 
breaking with Sparta and allying with her enemies in the Peloponnese, 
notably Argos, supported so vigorously by Aisohyloa, was eventually 
rejected by the majority of the Athenians, who sought instead to 
support actively Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnese., =Evidently 
however, -the majority of Athenians considered that involvement in 
3! akedonia could not in fairness be castigated-as violating the. 
principle of dual hegemony. 'What evidence is there of the attitude 
of leading Athenians on the question of, relations with Sparta and 
of the proposed invasion of, Makedonia? 
We have-seen_that. in 464 Kimon was the chief spokesman of those 
whose considered it best to support Spartan power, at least within 
the Peloponnese, and since Kimon led the second relief expedition 
in 462. eS may assume he was oonsiatent throughout the two interven- 
ing-years in-advooating the maintenance- of good relations with 
Sparta. Ephialtes'proposed break with Sparta had been defeated in 
464. There is no evidence of his stance in the period 464. -2. 
Themistokles somehow earned himself a reputation for being open to 
bribery.., Ephialtes, by contrast, had been careful to win-a 
reputation -for being 
ä. SGJ O Sö rcvjtos (AP 25.1)58. Themistokles 
had been ostracized, mainly, because he had persisted in advocating 
an anti-Spartan, policy despite the repeated rejection of his 
proposals by the Assembly. Perhaps Ephialtes had drawn a lesson 
from the experience of Themistokles in this, too. It is possible 
that, having made his views known, perhaps in greater detail than 
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was possible in the 464 debate, he desisted from repeating himself 
in the Assembly, though no doubt expounded his views through 
personal channels, concentrating instead on cultivating his 
reputation by activity in the strategia and in his attacks on the 
corruption of certain Areopagites in their handling of 'euthynsi' 
(Pl. Per. 10.7; AP 25.2)59. His reputation for being .. 
S6 Lp r, 
CPös_ (A? 25.1) was surely in part 
derived from these prosecutions, but it may also have been enbano"d 
by his respect for the finality of a decision of the Assembly. 
The attitude of Perikles to the extreme anti-Spartan, pro- 
Argive aspect of the public debate is not known. We shall be able 
to show in the next chapter that his career was generally anti- 
Peloponnesian and we might assume that during the public debate he 
supported the anti-Spartan point of view in some pay, We do have, 
though, clear evidence of bis position, and of gimon's, on the 
question of aggression against Makedonia. 
Kimon's refusal to invade Makedonia was not thought to be 
defensible in terms of the military situation (P1. K. 14.28 
c/ n / 
Thus his decision was not a tactical one, an area in which strategoi 
must have enjoyed considerable freedom, but represented a decision 
of overall strategy, of foreign policy. Such decisions were the 
prerogative of -r 
A 01VO-tc. uv KO IVoV (H. 9.117). The 
60 
prosecution, however, perhaps mistakenly, sought to use this manifest 
transgression an the basis for the even more serious charge of 
aorruption61. Now, we do not know whether Kimon attempted to defend 
his notion in military terms. The surviving aooount has no traoe of 
it if he did (P1. K. 14.3). The portion of his defenoe which has 
z 
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been preserved suggests that he justified his action in terms of 
the wider issues of-the direction of foreign policy. Firstly he 
cast aspersions on the motives of his accusers, implying-that they 
were in the pay of "rich Tbessalians", suggesting thereby, that 
their concern was not for the good of Athens but for that of certain- 
Thessalians62. Simon referred to his proxeny of Sparta,, -apparently, 
in-order to claim that be could not be guilty of corruption because 
be modelled himself on Spartan frugality and, self-control. 
(. iº, J. 
_ _-7OLP cw'ZOLS - 
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above which he would honour no amount of wealth 
I 
nPo TI lt, ". äv UZov )f and he was able to 
point to: the, booty he bad dedicated to the -city, taken 
ö 
------- 
His rpýýýüýV. His reference to his love, of Spartan ways. was. 
relevant in trying to establish his probity. But. bis referenoe, to 
his Spartan proxeny, may betray, too, his unwillingness to_carry-out 
actions which would. offend Sparta. The vagueness of the implication! 
of "dual hegemony" bad , now.. become clear; Spartag,, and her proxenos 
Kimon, objeoted not only-to Athenian, influence in the Peloponnese but 
also in. itakedonia (hardly, a direct threat to Spartan. security)-and, 
we-may presume, other areas of northern and oentrai Qreece6304 
-We-are compelled to deduoe-, that-those, who. spoke against Kimon, 
whether they were motivated: primarily by, private animosity or not, 
were prepared to be seen publicly-as being in. favour-ofaegression 
against uakedonia64. Sealey has. argued that Perikles' role in the 
prosecution was one of at-'least ', 'three occasions;.. * when Perikles, 
cooperated with. Cimon"65. The core. of his argument is -that ., the-, . 
story as, represented by, Stesimbrotos "presupposesgtbe certainty of 
prevarication by: Perioles". upon which he thinks other elements have 
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been built; he says Stesimbrotos is particularly valuable since 
be preserves contemporary gossip. -which itself "presupposes what 
is matter of common knowledge"66. I suggest another approach is 
methodologically preferable. It is important to distinguish between 
objective, public fact and interpretation of the facts. Stesimbrotos' 
account contains only one public facts -Perikles spoke once in 
accusation of Kimono Now, Stesimbrotos would appear to have come 
to Athens after 435, and his work on the three Athenian statesmen 
was completed some time after 430/29 
(fr. 11-ape Pl. Per. 36.3)67" 
So while he was doing his research Stesimbrotos may have hal e 
opportunity of witnessing the mature Perikles, the great speaker, 
( cf. Eupolis fr. 94 (Kook) ape schol. Ariatoph. Ach. 530 
( Koster 74: ); Diode 12.40.6)68. At any rate, 
the men'to whom: Stesimbrotos will have spoken at-Athens will have had 
the memory of the mature Perikles dominant in their recollections, 
and Stesimbrotos-will have-gathered an impression. of Perikles as a 
remarkably powerful-. speaker. --Perikles' participation 
in the 
prosecution, as a man-of about thirty, was his first important 
public appearance (AP 27.1 - unless he had appeared earlier without 
distinguishing himself). -Other senior men will have-taken the floor 
before him and-have'spoken longer. The young Perikles was con- 
firming-, his politioalýindependenoe from. the-"grand coalition", a 
hint. kof. whioh he had given already in 473/29"and-whioh by.. now may, 
in, any case, have been. well-known69. But it was not his place to 
speak 'vehemently. or long70. , As. suoh, Stesimbrotos' one publio. 
faot 
has, an`authentio ring, -and 
is likely tobe based on a good source. 
It: is possible-that. Stesimbrotos himself is responsible for two 
misinterpretations of the`. public faot. whioh are discernible and. are 
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based on one anachronism. The first is that Perikles was 
-C00o5 of the accusers. As we have just said it 
would not have been proper for probably the youngest of the 
soousers to be the most vehement, and Stesimbrotos has probably 
been influenoed. by Perikles' later rhetorical skills or by stories 
of his opposition to Kimon, or both, and has assumed Perikles would 
have been the most vehement7l. The same anaohronistio view of 
Perikles' position has led Steaimbrotos to misinterpret Perikles' 
minor role as being motivated by a deliberate desire to do as little 
harm as possible to Kimono a view encouraged by Kimon's aoquittal. 
That Stesimbrotos haa. misinterpreted Perikles' performance is con- 
firmed by another tradition (AP 27.1) which recorded this as the 
first occasion on which Perikles distinguished himself. Within 
accepted conventions his apeeoh was outstanding and he showed promise 
as a speaker72. - 
The evidenoe to conneot Ephialteo with this important trial is 
I 
only circumstantial, but, I believe, adequate. 
We discerned in Ephialtes' speech of 464 concern about Spartan 
attitudes to future Athenian ambitions which, we concluded, must have 
been on the mainland. While be probably chose not to fan the 
hostility towards Sparta which seems to have been one feature of the 
public debate, there was no reason why he should not develop into, 
speoifio"-proposals those vaguely expressed territorial ambitions. 
The vote in the Assembly in 464 had not rejected these ambitions; 
it had merely rejected Ephialtes' assessment of the effects his 
predicted: -Spartan-arrogance would have on the ambitions. Logically, 
then, we may associate Ephialtes with the mainland expansionist 
designs expressed-in the decision to invade i4akedoniag and, as such 
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there is a prima facie case for assuming he was associated with 
those other mainland expansionists who were behind the accusations 
levelled at Kimon In 462. 
Another argument. commonly used to. conneot Ephialtes with this 
attack on Kimon is the analogy with other known relations between 
the two men. But before it can carry weight, I believe it requires 
the demonstration-we"have made that the; question of mainland 
expansion was common to-the=conflict between the two men in 464, (if 
only indirectly),, and to the trial of Kimon in 462. It is not- 
sufficient-to argue; that, because Ephialtes opposed Kimon over friend- 
ship with Sparta in 464 and/or because-of the personal-animosity 
which that conflict caused-or reflected, we should assume that each 
man opposed-the-other on every issue he chose to support. The 
relationship between-. Aristeides and Themistokies, in 480-79 warns 
against that, assumption. - As it isq-though, -the assumption would in 
this case have been correct73. - 
Plutarch 
, 
(Per. r10.7),. posaibly- provides further evidenoe of, 
Ephialtes'- involvement in the trial.,, 
-, 
We-left open-the precise 
definition. of the nature of_Kimon's, trial74., Whether it was at-a-- 
'euthynai', as. auch, or an 'eisangelia'ýresulting from dissatisfaction 
with an original decision, . 
APO s remark. that Perikles __6CQZjý 6rr- 
sts_.. v v0. . s«_. _. - 
(27.1): of ý Kimon' a strategic might be hold 
applicable toeither.: It waa. precisely%in connection with 
'euthynai' that Plutarch-(Per. -10.7) gays Ephialtes earned a 
reputation for being a! 7Coýý? üýt-výtoV and, ifrwe accept Sealey's 
suggestion75 that Ephialtea'».: attacks onwindividual, Areopagites- 
n£ýC, Tcýý!. ý: ýw, lýºý: £ 
ýwý/_ (AP 25.2) should refer to their 
practices in judging 'euthynai!,, the. trial of"Kimon might-be said-to 
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conform to a style of politicking characteristic of Ephialtes. 
Finally, in support of the belief that Ephialtes was 
associated with the trial is the fact that Plutarch (Per. 10.7) 
says Ephialtes had the reputation of being 
dT6kpu. ZT1toV____ in 
trials t-nV,.. 
_ 
Sri4oJ. GtöcKQÜ. Y_CcjV.... _ 
Our sources, 
perhaps-as a result of their selectiveness or of the derivative- 
nature of the tradition, have omitted mention of that part of the 
process(es) resulting from the charges levelled at Kimon which dealt 
with Kimon's refusal to carry out the orders of the demos. Again' 
we may detect in the trial an approach whose type was characteristic 
of Ephialtes' attacks on his enemies, in that Kimon's behaviour 
lacked respect for the demos' sovereignty. 
We have contemporary evidence that`the sovereignty of the demos 
in deciding questions of war was an issue at this time. The question 
of sovereignty is a central theme of Aisobylos' Suppliants., Pelasgos 
repeatedly assert that be must obey the decision of demos (365-9, 
398-9,946-9)" It is possible that during the public debate which 
followed the debate in the Assembly in 464 on aid to Sparta, Kimon, 
at the zenith of his influence, sought to discourage the demos from 
adopting plans which he disliked by warning, after giving his reasons 
for disapproval, thatlehould these plans be adopted, the Athenians 
would not be able to rely on him to help effect them. There may 
have been a deliberate ambiguity: would he refrain from standing 
for election or refuse-to accept the orders of the demos to carry 
out actions of which be disapproved? His enemies no doubt emphasized 
the latter. Aisobylos, composing the Suppliants perhaps in the 
winter of 464/3, is thus lending. support to, those enemies of Kimon 
who criticized Kimon for his threatened refusal to obey the orders 
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of the demos by asserting the propriety of a magistrate' duty to 
act only as the executor of the demos' will and not independently 
of it in cases which were central' to the well-being of 'the state76. 
We are unable to trade the development of this etrand'in the 
debate between the production of the Suppliants in spring 463 and 
the next occasion where it apparently occurs again in the record, 
namely, 'as the basis upon which the more serious charge of bribery" 
was built, a charge which resulted'in the trial of Kimon probably" 
in mid to late summer 462. It was one thing to threaten such action 
but another to carry it out. Kimonts refusal to invade Vakedonia 
must have given grounds for some form of reprimand, andlwhether'the 
transgression was dealt with at the trial for bribery of which we 
have an aocount or some prior process, it`seems olear'that Kimon aas 
acquitted of it, and, if, our analysis of his defence is correot, he 
should not have been77, --The popular indignation this blatantly biased 
judgement might: be-ezpeoted'to arouse enabled, I"believe, `Fphialtee 
and his friends to` stimulate the-demos to act against a related 
problem of'whioh"Kimon's acquittal was probably only a particularly 
important outbreak. ý": " 
Now, the principle of the accountability of magistrates lea'''" 
firmly established at Athena by the late 460x78. we have notel'the 
evidenoe that Ephialtes was- renowned" for being vigorous" in"his 
dealings with Ieuthynai* and we may deluoe that-be tried to see to 
it that none of his enemies were given an easy passage, so'toýapeak. 
At this stage 'euthynai' were julged by the Areopagos79. R. W. Wallace 
has reoently emphasized that-"in the superintendenoe of öoVciµacrL&(, 
and - £ü' Buv au"the AreopaCo a' held "powere tantamount to control 
80 
over" the-"political futures" of etrategoi. If+Sealey is right' 
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that Ephialtes' prosecution'of Areopagitea was in connection with 
their handling of 'euthynai'81 then we would have evidence that 
Ephialtes considered their, judgements, were biased. Apparently 
he had a degree of suooess (AP 25.2)y but if he used the prooess of 
'eisangelia' the trials will-again have been judged by the 
Areopagoa82. Perhaps in order-to make Areopagite bias less-obvious 
some clear cases were decided-in hie favour. There is no reason to 
believe-that appeal would be possible (AP 8.4 - contrast 9.1 and Pl. 
Solon 18.2). 'Probably not all oases went his way and 'they 'are' likely 
to have been the most important politically. 
"A man of Kimon's social connections will have had many philoi 
in the Areopagos83. Since 487/6 we should imagine that the council 
was-increasingly'oomposed of men less interested in real political 
power than in social prestige. -, Most of them will have desired to 
cultivate their relationships with politicians in proportion to their 
social and political standing. Starting with the formation of the 
"grand coalition" and accelerating with the ostracism of Themiatokles 
and the successes of Kimon which followed, a snowball effect will 
f have been inaction, By the mid-460eAt had become a vioioue circle; 
because ofýtheir prestige Kimon"and°his friends-could-influenoe enough 
Areopagites to make-it=diffioult for a young an to get on in his 
career"if be appeared--to support-policies contrary to those of Kimon 
and bin friends or if he was personally obnoxious to them. The 
simple solution was -to°oourt"the friendship of Kimon, and no doubt 
many did. Such"men-would have enjoyed the procedure in-reverse 
4. 
Vow-this type'of abuse"of-influenoe was not an issue upon whioh 
wideepread: publio indignation'oould be mobilized. 'What could be, 
more natural among philoi? 
85. 
Only'a very small percentage of the 
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citizen body cared about the attempts of Ephialtes and his friends 
to achieve success in the, city as an end in itself. But in the issue 
over Makedonia Ephialtes was given, a chance to show that Kimon's 
influence was not merely., being used to promote-the careers of his 
own. friends but also, to attempt to. carry out his own foreign policy 
against the orders : of , 
the demos, with impunity, and on such an issue, 
Ephialtes might . 
hope tommuster sufficient public support to effect 
a change in the system. which.. allowed suchexoessivefreedom to the 
role of. friendship in political-life. Kimon! s behaviour in-462 and 
his acquitta186wac a, revolutionary assumption. ofpower byna. 
magistrate-whioh wouldhave represented. a serious limitation to the 
sovereignty, of the demos wbich. bad been an accepted feature of 
political, life . since , 
508. 
F.. Y. 'ä avi, w 
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There were , other, opportunities open 
to, oounter suoh, attempted_ 
assumptions of power by individuals. It"would, be, poesible to fail; 
to elect a man like Kimon to. the next., strategia,. or to ostracize him. 
But neither. removed the cusoeptibility of. -the system. 
The transfer of 'euthynai' 
, 
from the Areopagos to popular super- 
vision, is the element of, the 462/l, reforms most securely attested 
and least disputed87. In therpresentstate of our evidence there 
will always remain_an element. of doubt asto other possible changes 
Ephialtes, and perhaps hin associates, might,. have introduced88. As 
we have seen,, the; change. in the authority-hearing 'euthynai' won 
support because of a specific, abuse, by Kimon in 462 on a question 
of executing foreign policy. _.,, The. change, £ 
however, thereby_ lessened 
the general -influence of , 
favouritism. which Kimon. and his friends had ..., x.. n 1. ..... w ,Oq.. . 1. c .rF-r 
been able to apply, to the careers {of politicians89. Other changes 
which have a good claim toinclusion can be seen within the framework 
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, 
of execution of'foreign policy. The establishment of the Boule 'ýý 
and heliaia, in place of the Areopagos, as the authority responsible 
for bearing 'eisangelia', as Rhodes has shown, was probably 
Ephialtea' work 
9o. The development which resulted in the classical 
pattern of jurisdiction in which the' ärohon's court had becomeys 
mere preliminary stage of the process with no verdict, and automatic 
91 
reference to a dikasterion, was probably gradual. And'even if 
Ephialtee was responsible for proposing some epeoifio''l'egielation 
on procedure, this too, it has been maintained, was probably aimed 
at preventing the potentially powerful influence of the Areopagoo'on 
the'deoisions of arohons, and so again to proteot the political 
oareers 'of men `who might -suffer as a result of such influenoe92. 
Recent scholarship his rightly reacted against the conventional 
picture of Ephialtea as ä doctrinaire demoorat whole work represented 
a daring leap into the 'political ünkriör6193. Instead, a generally more 
convincing attempt has ' beenmade`to interpret his work within the 
immediate'politioal context of 462/19' I baveKaäoepted Sealey's main 
thesis that Ephialtea'was conoerned to put an"endIto the abuses to 
which the Areopagoe' conduct of 'euthynai' had led. Sealey wýa"" 
aware of the role Kimon'e acquittal may have had in stimulating the 
reforms94, but he' failedtoanalyse the way, in which the trial should 
be relatsI to the mustering-. of popular support for the reform. Not 
only did he not go 'into -the 'impliäationa " oP the `trial ' (in 'this 
context) in'detail'büt he hee`aleo'taken inadequate note oP the 
aignifioanoe'of Rhodes' recent d®monstration that 'eisangeliai' were, 
in`the pre-Ephialtio-period, `heardby `the`Areopagos95. "This means 
that even it Kimon"was triedat'en'eiaangelia', `as Seeley believes, 
be was acquitted by the-, Areopagoa and not a popular court. This 
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enables us to see his acquittal as the main stimulus to the popular 
indignation at the system which allowed the flaunting of the 
demos' orders to go unpunished, and to to enable Ephialtes to 
mobilize support for the reform of the syetem96. 
J. Martin, whose interpretation of the reforms is essentially 
convincing, has noted the importance of the trial of Kimon as an 
illustration of the great influence the Areopagos could wield in 
the debate on foreign policy, and sees Areopagite control of 
magistrates as setting limits on Athenian expansion and preserving 
the understanding between Sparta and Athens. He believes Ephialtes' 
Purpose was to remove the possibility of the Areopegos' exeroise of 
these oonstrainte97. But he has not emphasized sufficiently the 
question of sovereignty which formed the baokground to the trial 
and whioh provided the popular support for the reforms. 
Rusohenbusoh's one sentence summarizing his view of the essence 
of Ephialtes' motives implies muoh that is valid: the necessity of 
changing the authority hearing 'euthynal' before he could achieve 
a successful condemnation of ICimon's ""Amtsführung", thus paralyzing 
("lahmlegen") Kimon politically and before he could effect a change 
in policy towards Sparta. The, assumption of Areopagite favouritism 
98 
and the apecifia link with foreign policy are correotq but much is 
left undeveloped. I have no doubt that R. W. Wallaoe is oorreot when 
he argues that Ephialtes was seeking to remove the constraints which 
could be imposed by the Areopagoe on the success of the careers of 
certain ntrategoi. His failure to elucidate the reasons for the 
hostility between Fphialtes and the Areopagoa raises the central 
issue of the nature of the politioal conflict in the late 460a. In 
short, R. W. Wallaos believes that Areopagitea would feel "a natural 
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aversion .: * toward an increased democracy that would'restriot, 
their oompetence"99, and that they were""conservative, hostile to any 
political competition". "Radical politioiane""on the other hand- 
presumably thosewho`'wished to 'increase democracy#'- "working 
through" an Areopägite-dominated "machinery would meet it'best" 
impartiality"100, and be believes Ephialtes restricted the competence 
of the Areopagos because-it had "been active in blocking or hampering 
both greater democracy and his own political ambitions which were 
dependent on'it"101: Thus R. W. Wallaos does not grapple with the 
ohicken and egg problem posed. Either Ephialtea and other "radioal 
politioians" wished'to`threaten the oompetenoe of the Areopagos first" 
and that body sought to-diminish the'euooess of such men, or the 
Areopagos chose to thwart men'likerEphialtes who'then, and for"that 
reason, embarked on a campaign of reform102. Since R *W9 Wallace 
rightly rejects the idea of a "theoretical question of `self-government" 
as "unsupported"103, -there'seeme little reäson to recommend the first 
alternative, for than theý'radioals'''lack'any motivation`for taking ön' 
the`Ar®opagoa in"the first'pläce. So we should examine'-the` 
possibility that the-Areopagoa conceived°a"dislike for"Fphialtes and 
hin friends, and that the'prejudioe`which resulted from this dislike 
was a cause, not effect; of Ephialtes' reforming zeal. 
Why might the - Areopagos' bav®" taken'° a` dislike" to men of ' Ephialtes, 
ilk? The answer, of'oouree, `depends'on'what such men were like 
politically, and'onýwhat: the'bulk, ofýthe Areopagitea'were like 
politically. ' R. W. Wallaoeýmentions "possible tension between"' - 
Areopagites and-strategoi', for`influence=during. this' period"104: 'If H" 
this were the oause-we`k'ahould`Fexpeot all influential strategoi tö" 
have suffered at the hands of, 'Areopagite-jealousy. But'the"acquittal 
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of Kimon in 462 and his attempts (Pl. K. 15.2) to rescind the 462/1 
legislation show that some prominent strategoi had an excellent 
relationship with the council. The case of Themistokles may help. 
B. W. Wallace notes that the condemnation of Themistokles by the 
Areopagos on the one band, and its acquittal of Kimon on the other, 
may be significant105. There is no evidence deserving credence which 
associates Themistokles with any plans to limit the competence of 
the Areopagos, or with any interest in expanding $democratic# 
institutions 106. One feature that Themistokles and Ephialtes had 
in common was their enmity with Kimon. We have noted that'Kimon is 
likely to have had extensive personal connections within the Areopagos 
in the 460s. Their enmity-with Kimon is perhaps a sufficient 
explanation of the prejudice men like Themistokles (by the 460s) and 
Ephialtes probably found in"the Areopagos, but it leaves unanswered 
the question of the-causes of the enmity between Kimon and men like 
Themistokles and Ephialtes. - Recent scholars have tended to emphasize 
the personal element in political conflict. Nonetheless such conflicts 
were at least partly expressed in, and, I believe, partly caused by 
real differences in-policy. " There is evidence that Themistokles and 
Ephialtes advocated a Jiff erent"direotion in Athenian foreign policy 
to that favoured by Kimon. As a-discernible cause of conflict between 
Kimon and Ephialtes, and since the animosity of the Areopagos towards 
Ephialtes can, on the available-evidence, only be explained in terms 
of his conflict with Kimon we should emphasize'Ephialtes' foreign 
policy as the reason for-Areopagite prejudice against Ephialtes107. 
Thus it is not only fair'-to say that the immediate`oause of the reforms 
of Ephialtes was, as we have maintained, an issue of foreign policy 
(Kimon's trial over Makedonia) but also that the more distant back- 
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ground to the reforms was also a , divergence over, foreign policy. 
It is, therefore, wrong to divide, the major: politioal. oonfliots of 
the late 460s into two aspects, , 
foreign, policy and domestic policy. 
The latter was a mere weapon used in the realbattle which was then 
attempt to execute foreign-policy ambitions. This seems to. me. to 
be true of the whole period with which we. are concerned. 
The. reforms, "then, ", are. adequately explained, if, we. believe that 
Ephialtes was, seekingztoyremove, the judgement of a magistrate's- 
action from, a_body whiohý_was prejudiced in. favourLof his personal 
and political, enemy to, one which, as. our, analysis of success in the 
470a showed, wasiless,,, susoeptible. to. the influenoe of. philoi 
connections, namely to, bodies, representative., of the Fkklonia108 the 
popular support for the reforms,., on ;. the other;. hand,, oan be adequately 
explained by the. unacceptability of. a system which allowed magistrates 
to ignore the orders of-the demos-. with impunity.. The Athenians were 
merely defending,: the"basic principle,,. of., sovereignty which had"been 
accepted in practice. for; over forty years, against the incursions of, 
Kimono It is unnecessary,,, andutherefore unwarranted, s. to. add to this 
adequaterexplanation. -bypostulating a 
belief,, in the wisdom as, suoh. of 
an expansion. of the demos!,. participation. in,. the day to day running 
of. the administrative_andjudicial systemg. or in its right to so 
participatelog 
_ .., .r.. ,. 
The closeness :. in time of the">behaviour of Kimon which neoessi- 
tated. the reforms, and the decision, to.. send Kimon with further: 
assistance -to-Spartall0 is., evidenoe, ýof,, a remarkabledegree of political 
maturity. ., . FottonlyJhad fthe_ demos, , by. _its orders pto -invade . 
Makedonia, 
rejeoted, oner, element-of Kimon! s policy; but. they, had been forced by his 
manipulation, of,. state machinery,. to. effect; preventative reforms..., In a 
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less politically-mature environment we-might-haveý: expeoted his, 
behaviour to have evoked a complete reaction againat'all'aspects 
of his policy. Such mighthave; been-the case had those in the=demos 
who had been supporting Kimon before the L'akedonian affair"been'doing 
so largely because they supported the `man rather than his policies. 
As it was a majority of the demos was still prepared to'employ Kimon 
as the man most fitted'. to preserve'the-good relations'with Sparta 
Cf. Pl. K. 16.2) which, by their support of her position within 
the Peloponnese, they showed they wanted to maintain., ' 
Against this might'be'raised'the-'hoplite absenoel theory, by 
which it is imagined that the reforms of`Ephialtes were suocessfully , 
carried because`a large number of hoplites were absent'at Ithome;: and 
that this group would°have`opposed them. There is-nothing-to commend 
this idea. 'hot-only'isýthere no-sign in the ancient evidenoe'that, 
the reforms were carried because of: -the. hoplite absence (as opposed, 
to the personal, -absence. of Kimon:: Pl. -K. ° 15.1). but the idea is not 
even' persuasive. cThe"reforms sought to-? divest the-Areopagos, composed 
of the two upper census classes, of responsibility for control over- 
magistrates and to invest; it inpopular'bodies, composed-of all oonsus 
classes, which in practice, no doubt; -included only 'a very small 
proportion of the upper-two census-classes. "The proportion of thetes 
to the other three'census"-groups cannot be determined with confidence, 
but they are unlikely' to, have'repreaented more than half of the total 
citizen population, in 462/1. "The tendency of the least poor, -to'b'e 
able to afford the least time for active'involvement inpolitics will 
have rendered"tboyzeugitai'tolase'at'leaat`-as influential as the, 'thetes 
in the beliaia (or dikasteria), F. kkleaia and Boule,, though'it'is, 
probably wrongs anywayy to imagine political. differences corresponding 
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to property differences. 3o therwis no reason to believe that the 
zeugitai, as a olass,; would, object to the reforms, nor that the 
thetes, as thetes, -would be particularly_zealouslll. Furthermore, 
the hoplites oanýnot, hsve`been"so--opposed to the reforms, for they 
could have repealed them on their return had their vote been 
decisivef anger expressed towards Kimon because of Spartan' behaviour 
would have been no reason to accept the ex hypothesi anti-zeugitai, 
112 
ý: , p,, t. pro-thetes reforms 
One of the reasonsýfor. Kimon's ostracism in 462/1113 was his 
refusal to acceptýthe'considereddecision ofýthe demos on the 
desirability of a system of.. accountability less susceptible to personal 
influenoe. = It is`important to=distinCuish: this as an independent, and 
perhaps equally, effeotive reason, from the-more emotional anger at 
the Spartan insult-for: whioh-Kimon'and others were made scapegoats. 
At 'Ximon'=15.2 -3-Plutarch-seta Kimon's repeal attempts'as the back- 
ground to. his ostraoism,.. thouah . he. mention's only the slanders 
concerning Kimon=and'his sister-( cF. "Pss.. Andok. '4.33) and the 
accusation of noucwv. ¬ ov. - Having explained the grounds 
for this latter-accusation (K*". l6. lt'-1l7; 1). Plutarch co©ee'back to 
the second, relief expedition and=its dismissal (which he had bad in, 
mind; at 15.1) and'oontinues his account of the attacks-on Kimon. The 
Athenians were angry, ' "ýýS''° ýKWVr5, uvc7-c eepeoially with-Kimon, 
at the insult -theyhad: suffered-"Kc2" 
l(pas'7Z4ö ývoý`_" L ro 6uJ5_°: _ 
GW-t röad(K" 17.2). ISo-far. 
-we have anger, at" the "Lakonizera and . the accusation'- that Kimon 
was one, -. coupled: with-- slanders about' his =sister The -latter may ber' 
what is meant byý, the . 'po°T a6 %5 cf.. ° Ps. Andok. 4.33), but may 
refer to the charge, mentioned by. 'PlutarchratA Perikleas 9.4 that Kimon 
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was µ(-aa 
&1 t. ov as , well as 
being a Lakonizer. It will be 
remembered that-Ephialtes was able to muster popular support for 
hie reforms as a-result of. Kimon!, s disregard for the will of the 
demos.. Kimon's attempts,; now to; repeal the reforms which sought to,,, 
oreate. a more thorough oheok on the responsibility of men like Kimon 
to the will- of the demos could appropriately have, been dubbed 
fA- 1,0OhytA-L[L 11 .., 
In a way it is unfortunate,. that, the second relief expedition to 
Lakonia ended so embarrassingly; for Kimonj bad-all gone well, he 
would no doubt-still bave, attempted. toresaind the reforms, and we 
should have bade moreaoourate indicator , of the strength of the 
demos' determination toý, proteot its sovereignty against the. refusal 
of! one ofits leaders not. only to; aooept its. decisiono, but, to do so 
on an issue_whioh. was intended, to strengthen the., ability of the demos 
to, exercise ita"control: over, attempts. at. ignoring its sovereignty.: 
Plutaroh's: evideno e certainly.. shows that., thie. played a role in Kimon's 
ostracism,. but -the other, ma jor; element, '. -, anger - at. friends of Sparta - 
was also effective in aonfounding", his situation115. 
There seems; no. reason to euepeot, that. Kimon made any attempt to 
renounce his friendship; for; Sparta. a It would-, be daring to. base any- 
thing at all on Plutarch's absurd-tale, of Kimon's ardent patriotism 
at_ Tanagra and the,. suspicions of,, Perikles!, friends. and, of the Boule u,. 
(Pl. K. 17.3-5; Per.. 
110. 
'-1 -2)116.; But-the anecdote might appear 
to seek to disprove the Athenian assumption that Kimon would savour 
the Spartans.:. 
_ kore concretely,,. the,. traditions which 
linked his name 
with peace neeotjatjonB with_. Sparta. specify- his continued "proxeny and 
presuppose good relations between , 
Sparta, and Kimon (Pl. K. 17.6: -18.1; 
Per. 10.3; Theopompoe Sr. 881 17epoe Cim. 3.2"-31 Andok. 3.3(? ); 
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Aisobin. 2.172(? )). This suggests he did not turn his baok on 
Sparta117. Others atAthens'were certainly more pragmatic. No more 
persuasive context than now can be found for the renunciation of his 
Spartan prozeny by the-elder Alkibiades (Thun. 5.43.2). We noted 
118 
earlier that-the Peieianakteion appears to have been completed by 
0.460 and that the Stoa contained paintings celebrating and intimating 
119 
victories of 1Cimon's'family. The decision to include a painting 
of the Argo-Athenian victory over the Spartans at Oinoe was probably 
taken"after Kimon'e dismissal from Lakonia. " It is impossible to know 
Whetherthe''aotion'wee a purely ingratiating gesture to popular 
feeling by Peieianaz himself or'a more subtle attempt by Kimon's 
circle to claim that while they wiehed'to preserve good relations 
with Sparta they were'first and foremost'loyal to the greater glory 
of Athens, 'and that they too were proud of this minor viotory over 
Spartan boplites by a'group 
120 'of'Athenian volunteers. To shall see 
in the next chapter that IKa11iäs Aipponikou, who had married Kimon's 
sister, went on an embassy to`Persia in'461jand we shall interpret 
this as an attempt'by the Athenians to`faco the danger of military 
conflict with Sparta`withall their energies. Thus Kellias also 
recognized the break with ' Sparta'änd'regieterad his sympathy with 
the anti-Spartan fealine in'thin constructive way. The fact that 
Kalliae and Elpinike äppeer to`have''divoroed is perhaps to be conneoted 
with'Kallias' stanoe"now121. That"differenoea between Kallies and 
;:. Kimon should'be'dated-around this' period is suggested by the fast 
that a. 455"Kallias gave'his eon`Bipponikos in marriage to the relative 
and ex-wife of Perikles aý with tbe'woman's agreement (Pl. Per. 24.5), 
suggesting göod'relätions between Kallias and Kimon's enemy, 
Perik1esl22. ',., 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN. FROM KIISON' S DISMISSAL UNTIL THE DISPATCH OF 
AID TO INAROS. 
There exists what may be described as an orthodox chronology 
of the period from the and of the Thasos revolt until: the'signing' 
of the Five Years' Truce, despite: minor differences within the broad 
framework. Nonetheless, attempts both old. and new to challenge this 
l 
framework cannot be, diamissed out of hand. In chapter thirteen we 
argued that it wasmost likely that the siege of Thasos ended in 462, 
though we admitted that a, date in 462/2 could not be ruled gout, as any 
time before. 46 J2 could be.. Before we try to assess the chronological 
indications for the placement of events between the and of. the. -Thasos 
revolt and the dispatch of, aid to Inaros, let us note the. evidence 
of Thucydides which-provides. a possible terminus-. ante quem for the 
beginning of Athenian, involvement-in Egypt., 
The 
, 'signingl , of 
the Thirty Years!. Peaoe is, datable,, to . the 
period between late-summer . . 
446and, late winter 445 (Thun. 87.6 with 
2.2.1; 
, cf. 
Diod. 12.7; Paus. 5.23.4)2.. Before-it was conoluded 
Pleistoanax had invaded, Attika, and this is unlikely to have been 
after autumn 446 (-cf. Thuo. 2.21.11 Diode 12.6(447/6)). ,.. 
We 
should construct our chronology on the, assumption, that this invasion 
occurred after the. expiry of the: Five, Years' Truce 
(Thun. 112.1)4. 
Thus the Truce aas not aonoluded after autumn 451. Between the Truce 
and Perikles' Gulf operations (Thuo. 111". 2, -3). thereelapsed three 
'empty' years (Thuc., 112.1)5. -Perikles' operatione,, ýthong 
did not 
take place after autumn n 454" 
They were Oý ']CaýýW 
LfrC( OV 
the, unsuccessful expedition Kto Thessaly. 
(Thuc. ill. 
_1 -2). 
For ATL 
this positively implies. thatAbe two expeditions were in the same 
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season, and we may agree, at least, that the-expression permits 
auch an interpretation6... This brings us, to summer 454 an the latest 
possible date forthe Thessalian expedition7. An even more intimate 
chronological link is made, between the end of the Egyptian expedition 
(Thuo., ll0.5)°and the Tbessalian expedition, being joined only by CR 
(Theo. 111.1). ATL would. date -the end of . the Egyptian expedition to 
immediately before the Thessalian`expedition, though I am prepared, 
with'Cloche, to believe that only part of the Thessalian expedition 
was subsequent to the. dieaeter°in'Egypt8. So summer 454-should,, 
according to Thuoydides'-svidenoe, be the latest possible date for 
the end of the Egyptian. ezpedition9. 
-What about a terminus post quern for -the end of the Egyptian 
expedition? Happily we: have good external evidence that Tolmidea' 
periplous (Thun., 108.5) Baas ' in - 456/5 (sohol. Aisch. 2.78 (Dindorf 
55_6 . )100 The end of'-the Egyptian campaign must be dated after 
Tolmidee' expedition* There-would be no reason for Thuoydides' 
placing Tolmidee',, -expedition:; before his narrative (Thuc. 109.1--- 
110.5) of°the second andýfinal. stage of, 
_the 
Egyptian expedition if 
it. -occurred, in. faot,. after; the. Egyptian,, disaster. It could , as 
easily and, effeotively, have,, been-placed before the Thessalian 
expedition (111.1)11. Could., we-be-. quite, aure that Thucydidee took 
the'end of the expedition?. to be; the capture of; Proaopitia-(109.4, - 
110.1) Tolmidee' expedition-wouldprovide'a useful terminus. We 
know that i! egabyaos' tampering, with, nature could only have been 
successful in, -or a month oriaoLbefore. June12. " If this was after 
Tolmides' periplous, we would be I able " to, establish 456/5. as the F 
earliest= possible date efor:. it. ; Hut', it ie; not impossible: that ý' ; 
Thuoydides took- the destruction 
, ofxthe:. 
S L'a-ýn/oL (110.4 -5) 
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as the point which marked the end of the Egyptian expeditionl3. 
This would mean that it would be possible to maintain that the 
capture of Prosopitis occurred in May or June 456, Tolmides' 
expedition in 4595 and that the end of the expedition, the 
destruction of the "c-ö/o L) followed in the second half of 
456, perhaps even at the same time as Tolmides' expeditionl4. But 
Thuaydides is unlikely to have taken the destruction of the 
S O/a 
as the and of the expedition; the capture of Prosopitis is a much 
likelier candidate, for it is in this context (110.1) that Thuoydides 
mentions the six year duration of the campaigns suggesting that it was 
this particular point which determined his arrangement of the 
Egyptian narrative within the order . of events in Greece. So while 
we cannot rule out a date between summer 456. and summer 454 for the 
end of the expedition, the capture of Prosopitis is more likely to 
have been in summer 455'or-454" 
When we turn to the beginning of-the campaign-it is equally 
difficult to establish a', preoiae date. Thuoydides datee'the capture 
of Prosopitis to six years after the beginning of active involve-- 
mentl5, which, therefore,. was in one of the. summers between 462 and 
460-inclusive. Is it possible to'fit the`beginning, of the Egyptian 
expedition in 462? If Thasos was over by the=end of 463, and we 
concluded this was unlikely, 'Kimon'could"have gone to Lakonia in 
the first half of 462. Dismissed, -,. 'the Athenians could have had their 
alliances with Argos andThessaly='signed' before the end of spring. 
As soon as it was safe to sail the. Athenians took pau paktos, and, 
receiving the 1eaaenians who had capitulated soon after the dismissal 
of the Athenians, settled them. there. The t: egarian treaty might have 
been conoluded shortly before the arrival of Ineros (or his 
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ambassadors), which would have been`'just as: the, Atheniana were: ' 
leaving for Kypros16, winning Athenian' support. -' If,, -for argument's 
sake5we leave out of consideration the, bighly'controveraial date of, 
the, end ofýthe 1'essenianwar, and`the related problem of the'datey 
of the settlement at flaupaktos, I, would not-be-prepared to deny that 
such-: a chronology is possible. Lacking.: conolusive`arguments we must 
rely on probability. Awe saw. it. is unlikely. xthat. Thaeos, had='ended 
by -. the: end of 463. ,., Since. Kimon 
is -specified,. as ied,. asbeing =, present at 
its capitulation (Pl. K.: 14.2), which was probably, in -4632, and, 
sinoe he. had to stand trial, most"probably,. before he`wae.: dispatohed 
to Lakonia, he is unlikely to have'returned until rather late in the 
season for him to embark with the fleet onktheiKypros- , gyptianr 
expedition. At tbe'other`: endý'of the campaign, too, probability 
17 
Weighs against the end`being. in 456: "-462 then, for the beginning 
of'the campaign-is not impassible, z but it isýtinlikely: °`ý 
<v" Thucydides is not. of verylmuoh more help in, choosing between' 
461 an 3- 460; , but Herodotoo maybe. - He. says-(7. x151) that, "a good, '-- `, 
while after 481 Kallias was -, on an embassy to Artaxerxes on business 
which he does not, specify, when,, perahanoe (-, "TVýý ý/ ), an Argive 
embassy approached the King and asked whether he.; had adopted the 
friendship his father had: formed: with. the`Argivee or whether he 
regarded them as enemies. '` Modern`soholara, traditionally oonneoted 
this Athenian embassy=with: the: famous'Peaoe of-Kallias of a`later, ' 
18 date. -E. -Walker argued thatythis: oannot-be; right, and. that for 
Herodotoa''embassy "the ýdateýthat'suits beat --lies, somewhere between 
462'ß. C. - and 460 ýB. C: 
19 He argued - rightly. that=the Argive"embassy 
muat, be-fairly soon after'Artaxerxes"aaceaaion; 'and,, concluded A- 
correctly that it ahouldFbe. after the alliance with-Athena20 .,;, It`is 
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now widely aooepted-tbat-an Athenian embassy, was.; at, Sousa in the-> 
late'460a21, So if. the Atheno_Argive: allianoe was-towards the end 
of.. a62, this joint Atheno-Argive, embassy oono®rning, -, (ý%), tI' cannot 
have, been, on its, long ýjourney. much ; before winter. set in., -It-is-as 
likely-that it was postponed-until spring, because of, travelling 
conditions in winter. , 
In,, view of. the. distanoea involved (see 
if"--5.52) the results -of: the discussions are unlikely.. to have been.;. 
known; at-Athena long before. the,;. end , of "the campaign season of , 
461... 
Any: deoieion on whether_to-prooeel against Kypros must have awaited 
*ti 
the; resulta. of this embassy. Thus it is unlikely that the expedition 
I 
against: Kypros (Thus. 104.2), -and-, hence the-eimultaneous aid to Inaros, 
were dispatohed'still in: 461... -460. is°tbo probable date: for"the. 
beginnina. of. the'Egyptian expedition-. 
Letiua examine Thuoydideal, seotion 103.1 r. -": 104.2. After -the 
alliances with: Argos; and: Thesaaly, (Thuo. -102.4), -whioh. we'dated to 
towarda'. tbe and of 462, -. Thuoydides'ohronioles. the capitulation rof,,,, 
tbe. rebela, on; Itbome,, (103.1). The Measenians we; e given safe passage, 
and voczo c...: 2ýýV_-£S- 
`ý£ý1[Lleý. 
Y`ý. E$_J' CtU%ý. o tOV. __KO. 
LLý KLýiQ1/ ýý VýY -tý1xC? 
Y__ ý IGný£. rj 
VF. wýrtiC I-A okPw4 41/ý. '_o kwu ýýýý 
(Thuc.,: 103.3).,;. The case-. for, believing} that-, this, notio e, and the 
earlier one 4 stating., that 4 the -, rebels capitulated".,, 
(103.1), 
-, come 
in: their, proper. chronologicsl; position-, in Thuoydides' 
narrative - ban -been argued', in*. detail, 'and-in. my. -view, "t"oogently.,: -Itt: =s 
would,: however, , 
not be, methodologically acceptable to: amend- csF_KC_r_(J 
23 
on i_the. strength. of "it. s. For.: this. -reasong and` for the positive "" 
independent evidence supporting, it, I -have: aooeptod -the - solution-. to 
the; problem, posed-by believing "the,, revolt. -began about 465.. 4, which 
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Hammond. -and Scharf proposed--j and-which'obviates the need'to emend 
oper while allowing the=end. ýof'the'revolt toýcome'in its-pr 
chronological position' in'Thuoydideof'nar'rative. `There have been 
however, ' repeated -plea a-bv-scholars to take the'end of the revolt 
down ', to the mid"-450 at-" pulling'down ý with it the - oapture ` of 'Naupakto s 
toihortly before 5. -I do not-propose'to 
enter into'. 4the arguments' 
against -end, 'late büt4I shall 
makeýa'few'points in-responseýto`argnmentswhich'havereoently been 
directed'speoifioally against the``earlierdate', -for'ýthe capture-of ', ° - 
Naupaktos26. 
Diodoros (84: 7)`dates the oäpture'ofýNaupaktos'to`456/5: IT. 
has almost`certainly=lumped together the-earlier`o pture=andýsubeequent 
settlement'with--. Tolmides''famous; later periplous (Thuo. `108: 5; ` 
sahol: Aisoh. 2.78 jDindorf 55-6 )2?. Thiawould - be 'part ioulsrly= ts 
easyato understand it Tolmidee had in'taotoaptured Naupaktos`' 
originally, and'so`the'ezploit; would already have'been, lumped together°`k 
with his othersby Ephoroe8. 
'ý', ° Roice' deduoes that the fact that`-the`Korinthians'r hatred"'Por the 
Athenians waa-- originally'caue. d not least'. '(ýOÜX`, KIIrCO-=" )yby the 
Athenianst--oo-operation with Korinth's enemy, itegara 
(Thun. 103.4) 
implieä'that'Naupaktos was'captured`after the"Atheno=Megarian co- `- 
operation, -for otherwise -Reeoe , thinks; -Thuoydides' would, °-in effect, 
be -'saying the Korinthiane oalmly_watched the - ocoupation«'of Naupaktoe' [ 
by their greatest-°'tradeirival#andonly-subsequently were they'aroused 
to"Pieröe'hatrsd? 9. '° Let"usýtry toýimagino the`wayýmost Korinthians` 
will have viewed the"oapture'of-, Naupaktosson the'one hand; and they- 
Megara'-allianoe on the'other. ý'We. noted -`earlier, that -the coolness 
in=relations betweenR'Athen s'and Korinth'in 464-may'have been5if not 
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solely aauaed by Kimon'a"blundering and bombastic behaviour, then''; 
certainly agCravated by his person. ° Korinthian fear of too close 
a tie between Athens and Sparta may also have been a faotor30. "-The 
rupture of -Atheno-Spartan relations and the decline in Kimon's' 
political fortunes'may then be expected to have occasioned a 
sympathetic response in-the'Korinthians. " They are"likely, moreover, 
to-have understood Athenian 'outrage at the insulting behaviour of the 
Spartans, and as such they may have felt that the Athenian alliance 
with : Argos was directed not'at Korinth but at Sparta31. ' In the same 
way the capture of Naupaktos must'have -been recognized as a potential 
base for operations against the Pelopönnese, '°but Sparta was the enemy 
against whom Athens was wielding the threat32. ` This might have 
dangerous consequenoss for Korinth, 'if friotion developed into oonfliot, 
and if, the conflict escalated", ' but Sparta, at any rate, -,. was unlikely to 
adopt an eggreseive 'stanoe: "I believe 'both Athens and ' Korinth viewed 
the Capture of Naupaktos primarily'in'military terms33. If a commercial 
threat were perceived it äan"only-have been' interpreted'as legitimate 
Competition" or, at woret, 'neddling in Korinth' a sphere of influenoe. 
And Thüoydides, -of course, does not *say there was no friction before 
the alliance with Megara. 
The alliance with bfegara, - on the other hand '"reproeented an aot 
of weir against Korinth, and }announced that 'the Athenians considered 
the whole Peloponnesian "League 'to 'be their -enemy34. 'ý If 'Sparta was likely 
to avoid aggressive action`; -Athens appeared unwilling to'}let the 
matter drop. This act, furthermore, - put the "possession of `Haupaktos 
in'a-new and dangerous light *', '. The potential'threat- to Korinth'a vital 
interests which had seemed to ! present 'Only- a remote risk of being "" ý' 
acted upon now took, on a 'greater urgenoy: ): Before the -Megarian-<--4,, -'° a 
236. 
alliance the Athenians and Korinthians were at peace, after it they 
were at war; as such Thucydidee was right in isolating this action 
as the prime cause of Korinthian hostility. Reeoe's deduction, then, 
is invalid, and furnishes no argument against an early date for the 
capture of Naupaktos. 
Hammond believes the settlement of the MSessenians at Naupaktos 
(captured, he believes, in the preceding season) must be dated after 
Tanegra because of Thucydides' Ka zý 'Oö 'F7 " He 
rejects the traditional view that this enmity be equated with that 
caused by the Spartan dismissal which amounted only to a &a-T OPä. 
I (Thuc. 102.3) and not 'enmity' which "came after a ,.. (Pavr, -PL 
deolaration of war"35. But immediately on their return from Ithome 
the Athenians entered into an alliance with the Argives, who were 
ýW1OX9-µL. oc5 
to the Spartans. It was this alliance which was, 
effeotively, a declaration of war against Sparta, and which established 
a-state-of ýGo5 between the two. 
Finally both Hammond and-Reece objected on a priori grounds to 
an, -, early date for the oapture. of Naupaktos36. Whether the capture 
is. ýprobable or not at the early date is dependent on bow we interpret 
the Athenians' motives. As an attempt to gain influence in central 
Greece itýmay.. indeed seem ill-placed in a 462-0 context. But I think 
we should see the action primarily as a. threat 
to the Peloponnese, 
especially aimed at Spartan interests, and less as a base for 
influence in central Greece. Naupaktos was captured before the 
Athenians knew they were going 
to command-not. only Pegai but also 
the land route from the Peloponnese into central Greece (Thuo. 
103.31-4)" It was possession of both land and sea routes which gave 
the Athenians the power to-; impose their influence on central Greecel 
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control of, the, Korinthian , 
Gulf, however, assumed significance for 
influence in central-Greece only when they could secure - the, land, 
route. - I do not deny that the decision; to attack Naupaktos was 
made in the awareness of the potential value it had for influence 
in central Greece, but since it. would not assume. it immediately, 
and since it did have, as. well, other strategic advantages, we may 
see-its-capture as being primarily motivated by. -the advantage it. 
would give the Athenians as. a base against the Peloponnese. Control 
of ; the , 
Gulf, which I4aupaktos provided, was, used by Tolmides (Thun. 
108.5) to attack; the Peloponnese, and-. by, Perikles-(Thuo., lll. 2-3) 
for operations against targets in the Peloponnese (and, in western 
Greece). So as a direct response-to the insult caused by Spartan; 
behaviour in late 462 it is not improbable to locate the capture of 
Naupaktos in the early_oontext, and-it would seem logical to place 
it as-, soon as possible after .; 
the event which caused it, which would 
. be at. the beginning of the oampaign. aeason ot,, 46137 
After the capture-of. Naupaktos, ", the Yessenians, in 46159, ý, 
capitulated38, and were soon-settled in Naupaktos. (Thuo. 103.1,3). 
Very shortly afterwards,. still . _at : 
the . beginning ; of 46059, the , 
Megarian allianoe was *signed' (Thuo., 103.4) and, was followed I olosely 
by.,, the successful request-for aid. from Inaros (Thuo. ; 104.1) whioh 
caused the diversion of the-expedition bound originally for Kypros 
(Thun. lO4.2)399 
< .... s 
So much for chronology; ., let us try ; to understand the events 
and to deduoe. what they can tell; ua of the nature, of Athenian politics 
in the late 460.9.1 The resulta, will-confirmýa tendenoy which we have 
observed throughout our-period in the'relationehip between the demos 
and its . 
leaders, and will, also show,, this ,. 
tendenoy,, to have developed 
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to-an extreme form by 460. .-,.. -. 
: w. The deference the Athenians had. proved themselves willing, to 
show to Spartan power within the Peloponnese was thrown to, the wind 
in autumn - winter 462/1 with the dissolution ofthhir alliance with 
Sparta and their alliance with Sparta's enemy, Argos. In. view of the 
consistent loyalty they had evinced over the past sixteen years the 
Athenians felt justifiably-outraged at Spartan-suspicions40.. The 
renunciation of Spartan ' friendship by some philolakonian men 
indicates how universal the feeling of outrage was at Athens. 
'ý ý-It is perhaps impossible to decide whether the, Athenians took 
tbe'measures they did in this period; primarily out of fear of attack 
by Sparta4l or out of anger at. theinsult. ato: their, honour.:, I suspect 
the'latter-is nearer the-truth.; Be°that. as it may, "Athenian actions 
in=461-, all point to the fact that war. with Sparta", and. perhaps the 
Peloponnesian League, too, was expected. -The. Thessalian alliance 
should', have given Athens a-considerable advantage with the, use. of" 
Thessalian cavalry. Argos was useful, in ý that ,, she . would 
be., likely ; to 
, 
prove implacably hostile: to Sparta, was not. an inconsiderable land 
power"and was strategically, protective ý to, 'Athens ;(.. cf., II. 9.12)42. 
Naupaktos. was a useful base. for operations against 'the, Peloponnese.., 
Thus the plans to invade L'akedonia, were again:. postponed 
43, 
°and the 
operations to recover the: Persian held areas of, Kypros, postponed - 
since Eurymedon., also had-to be: ehelved. The faot. thatthe Athenians 
were expecting war in Greece is illustrated moat strikingly by the 
decision-to send Kallias flipponikou"s. to Sousa to try to negotiate a 
peace with Artaxerxes. Kallias' construotive_reaction to the-Spartan 
insult449 assuming he proposed the embasay, -, and, its, acceptance by,. 
the Athenians was a recognition of the fact, expressed also in the 
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ostracism of Themistokleä, "that war with Sparta was not safely 
oompatible with continuing to faoe" theI Persian's. ", It' is perhaps 
idle` to'epeoulate on what the terms proposed by 'eaoh"side may have 
been=. 'ä At'any rate, the' Athenians're jeöted any agreement, as the 
planned Kypros campaignshow®'. " Artaxerxes must have been aware of 
developments in Hellas. `The embassyhad°been an implicit admission 
of the weakness of their position. 'The Athenians may'even have 
feared an offensive in Ionia and' hey'Legean'by' the King as a 
result. The Athenians in 461"i have seen themselves as being 
45 
ön the - brink of losing ällý the gains of the 460e. "' The thought 
of 
such's-reversal will not only'have' stiffened their resolveto'show 
no weakness-in the east'and south=east but will also have anted as 
a significant intensifier, to"their existing'hatred'of the'Spartans, 
whom they will have'-regarded as the cause of 'the vulnerable position 
into" which Greek''freedom"-was"being pushed So; Some time after 
46. 
the-return of-Kallias, probably in 461, the Athenians took the bold 
decision-to mount a campaign against Persian"strongholde'inKyproI, 
deäpite'the'tenee-situation I}in IIellas. Betöre"they'emberkedonIthe 
campaign in mid 46047newe'of th®'end'of 'the Ueeeenian revolt 
arrived, ''arrangements were' being' made 'to accept the', refugeee' and the 
plan tö-'settle then ýat Maüpaktýös `süg ested itself: '-Thia plän was not 
0alculated 'tö' relieve tension between `Sparta'and 'Athens: ' So far the 
quarrel -°involved'only Sparta'and `Ätbens. We-have already analys=ed 
how'the`ällianoe with Zlegare transformed the dimeneione. of the orisie 
in Hellas. It would'be-naive' to' believe "a' desire to protect 'L+egara 
from Korinthian injustioerpläyedýany'role in'the"Athenians''deoision 
to' äooept the öffer : öf °"allianöe48. ' '- It `ia `obvious that' the allianoe 
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represented an immense strategic gain to Athena49I that the 
Athenians were motivated by a genuine fear of Spartan aggression 
is not impossible5O. At any rateq°all are agreed that even if the 
earlier alliance with Argos had not made war with the Peloponnese 
certain, this alliance rendered the outbreak of hostilities 
imminent5l. There can, be no doubt, irrespective of when we date 
the Athenian attack on Ealieie (Thun. 105.1)52, that in summer 460 
the Athenians were expeoting to go to war in Hellas shortly. An is 
well known they did not, as a result, postpone the Kyprian expedition 
in order to have their foraee nearer home9but instead listened with 
willing ears to the appeal for assistance from Inaros and committed 
some two hundred triremes to Eeypt53. 
The idea that the Athenians should have embarked quite 
deliberately on a war on two fronts has evoked a wide range of 
response from modern historians. To-Belooh it would have been "ein 
offener Prahnainn" while Burn, more kindly, thought it an example of 
"superb self-confidence"54. The course of action embarked upon in 
460 looks like the result of a serious misjudgement. Some facts 
pertinent to an assessment of the situation facing the Athenians in 
460 are probably unknown to us, but one is hard pressed to imagine 
any which would alter an assessment of the situation sufficiently to 
allow us to accept their actions as well-advised. Eindsight confirms 
first impressions. It. is tendentious-to deny that the Athenians 
blundered in. 460. 
The ancient sources preserve a virtually total silence on 
attitudes at. Athens in 460 on - the question of embarking on an 
ambitious and distant commitment just as war in Helles appeared 
imminent550.. Modern historians have sought to fill the silenoe with 
deduotinna based on interpretations of other pieces of evidence. 
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The expedition against Persian interests fits perfectly with what 
we know of Kimon'a views on foreign affairs. Beloch used this as 
an argument for dating the expedition to before Kimon's ostracism56. 
Ve have seen that the evidence weighs heavily against dating the 
Kypros-Egyptian expedition so early. Others have accepted the 
sensible chronology and suggested that Kimon's friends were 
sufficiently influential after his ostracism to put hin anti-Persian 
policy into effect57., when the question of proceeding against Kypros 
and that of assisting Inaros were discussed some friends of Kimon may 
have spoken in favour. But their anti-Persian attitudes in the 4608' 
will-have been so intimately associated with the principle of dual 
hegemony in Hellas that I suspect they may have chosen to keep a-, " 
low profile. Their association with Kimon and'his pro-Spartan stance 
would lead us to expect`tbat they lost a great deal of political 
credit, and therefore we should not attribute powerful' influence to 
this group unless no other explanation of events is possible. 
`ý"Interest naturally centres on 8imon's'enemies, who, °"we would 
; imagine,, gained in influence as a'reeult of the events of 462. Among 
the enemies of Kimon there may have been men"who were not opposed to 
his policies but were personally obnoxious-to him. Such-a"man might 
seek the political friendship of"Ephialtes. He might, for. example, 
bave'been particularly enthuaiastie. about re-opening the campaign in 
Kypros. '- In order to preserve the' valuable friendship of a an of 
iEphialtea' stature he would have to support bim, -for example, over 
)akedonia, though he may have-not liked the venture much. -He would 
have gladly supported him over the Areopagos reforms. Such a man 
would have gained in political credit as a`result, of 462 and he would 
bave'vigorously supported the Kypros campaign. - 
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.,. But of Kimon's enemies it will obviously have been the most 
vociferously anti-Spartan who will have experienced a sharp increase 
in the reepeot they enjoyed in the oity. Ephialtee aas probably 
dead before the end of 462/1 (AP 25.4 with 26.2)58. Had Perikles 
been, associated with anti-Spartan policies? We deduced that. 
Ephialtes had been, like Perikles, a supporter of the Eakedonian 
"- venture. Ephialtes may have dropped the question of breaking with 
Sparta, in the period 464-2, but he had made his position clear enough 
in:. 464, and in 462 there is reason to believe he will have been the 
main advocate for breaking relations. The identity of Ephialtes' and 
Perikles' views over the Makedonian question suggests that they also 
shared, -similar views on 
the related question of relations with Sparta. 
Scholars have warned against inferring a staunchly anti-Spartan 
position at this early stage of Perikles' career on the basis of hin 
later; intransigence towards Sparta59. The warning is entirely valid, 
but even without such an inference there is enough evidence to allow 
us_, to conclude thatlin 460 and the years following, Perikles offered 
noropposition to the war against the Peloponnesians. 'Participation in 
a. oampaign does not prove a general's support for itj but in the 
absenoe-of evidence to the contrary we-should assume he did in fact 
support, it. Perikles' generalship-recorded by Thuoydidea, (iii. 2--3) 
was-energetic and aggressive, hardly the leadership of a man-opposed 
to,, or. even unenthusiastic about the warte. , That Perikles'suspicions 
of:, Sparta date from the earliest stages of his career is strongly 
suggested by his association with Aisabylos (no, friend of Sparta) as 
ohoregos for the Persai in 472, a play which we interpreted as 
11 
indirect support for Themistokles' attempts to turn Athenian energies 
towards mainland Hellaa by assuring them of the annihilation of the 
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Persian threat. On the other hand, Perikles' assooiation with the 
suspension of hostilities in 446, when Athena' baok was against 
the wall, and the fact that he was probably not opposed to the 
cessation of hostilities in 454 or to the Truce of 45161, for both 
of which there were very sound reasons, cannot berinterpreted to, 
form the basis for sufficiently reliable inferences about Perikles' 
general attitude to Sparta and-the Peloponnese to justifiably 
outweigh the consistent-oonolusions to Which the evidence we have 
cited leads. There is, -then, good reason'to support the traditional 
view that Perikles was anti-Spartan in the late 460sß-and, therefore, 
that he not only gained in political credit as 'a result of 462 but 
also-that in 462-0 he was not opposed to the actions which contributed 
to the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War62.  
Thucydides chose to mention the names of four Athenian generals 
of the First Peloponnesian'War63. We may presume that the three 
others besides Perikles, that. is, ýMyronides, Tolmides and'Leokrates, 
were also supporters, probably even before the outbreak of hostilities, 
of policies that were=in some way-anti-Spartan. Let us call these 
men mainland-expansionists. 'These-men are-also likely to have 
benefitted-from the events of'462. It is often said, or assumed, 
that these enemies of Kimon, sometimes irrelevantly described as 'the 
democrats!, 'cameýto, power' in 462. The expression is misplaced and 
misleading. An investigation into the-attitude of these mainland 
expansionists to theýqueetion--of pressing the war against Persian 
interests will reveallsomething of the oharaoter of Athenian politios 
at thiaýtime. 
We. do-not know what attitude (if"any) Perikles and other mainland 
expansionists expressed over the question of pursuing the war against 
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Persian interests64. But I think we-can say that either a) these 
menLwere able to influence Athenian policy decisively and they 
supported the war on two frontefýor b) they opposed the. pursuit 
of the war°against Persian-interestsTbut, were in. faot"not so 
influential as is usually asaumedo or o): -they did not. oppose. tbe 
pursuit of the war against Persian interests. 
_;, _a) Since the first possibility carries the, oorollary-that the 
mainland expansionists were stupid, it is perhaps, surprising to find 
that-it has been the most popular explanation . of, 
the events. of 462-0. 
Scholars have-laid greater or-less°emphasis, oný the role-of Perikles, 
with varying-degrees-of:, apology or., condemnation for the decisions 
taken65. We saw above.. that theretis no, reason-ýto; believe that 
Ephialtes and-Perikles had opposed the idea of, pursuing the war 
against Persian_interests: in-the period. after, Eurymedon, and although 
we refrained from speculating how, we; said . 
thisýoould. have, fitted 
rationally into. a, policy of mainland. expansion. The deliberating 
atmosphere of the situation in. 464-2 cannot-be compared with the . ti 
situation in 460. -The'alliances. wbioh the Atbenians'bad concluded 
made it likely that-a reaction would set; in which would-be, beyond 
the Athenians! control.. Therefore-the evidence for: the attitude of 
Perikles and-Ephialtes in. the-"periodK464-2 oannot=be used toýolaim 
that. Perikles must havetactively'supported: the°gypros-Egyptian 
expedition in 460, or that; thepolioy, of: Ephialtes and-Perikles 
was over-ambitious-in-the period-464-2, with: >the. -oonsequenoe that 
an, over-ambitious polioy maybe attributed'toPerikles? now, -in 460. 
The"idea that Perikles and other leaders who"_, shared, similar views,,  
were, stupid.. or:. that they simply suffered, a, temporary aberration into 
imprudenoe is not-impossible, r, 
but. it is: not a safe basis -. upon. which 
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to:: build a reconstruction. We should examine the other two 
possibilities. 
b) It is precisely the men who should have gained in influence 
asta result of the events of 462, the anti-Spartan mainland., 
expansionists, whom we should, bave. expeoted. to oppose the: Kypros- 
Egyptian expedition. - That they were influential-rin this period is 
suggested by-. the fact that, Thuoydides chose to mention the names only 
of, -leaders active in the operations against the Peloponnesians. His 
choice may be-deliberate and. refleot their political standing66. Yet 
this raises the question of how. influential, in, faotj leading men, 
were in Athens in our period. We should reoallat, this point what 
we concluded was Themistokles' reluctance to. propose openly a course 
of, action he knew to be-unpopular,, though", he was at the zenith of a 
remarkable career; ' we should. reoall-. that despite the'rejeotion°of 
Themistokles' policies, the""grand coalition" failed to influence 
enough Athenians to ostracize Themistokles,: and that-be seems, 
eventually, to have been expelled, not-, so-. muoh because, of the loyalty 
ofAis enemies'=supporters but-because of his refusal-to-accept the 
considered decisions of , _the ýma jority of the,, Assembly. If the main- 
land expansionists did insfact oppose the. Kypros-Egyptian. expedition 
-sand-it cannot be excluded; as"impossible.. --. then, we should have to 
Conclude that despite, theirF. prestige: as°a, result-of the events of 
462; they were unable to diesuede, thedemos. trom a , course of_aotion 
which was carried by less prestigious: men - than, themselves -because 
the: project itself-was already`popular. _ 
If, so,, it should not cause 
surprise for it would fit, into- a, pattern of behaviour whioh-we have 
observed throughout our period. ., In deciding, questions of high policy 
the Assembly was-to-e very real extent independent of, the: views of_ý_, 
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its "leaders". 
o) I do not, however, believe that the-mainland expansionists 
did in fact seriously oppose the campaign in the east] my reasons 
will become clear when we discuss the nature of this group of men. 
Their failure to do so, however, does not require us to abandon the 
interpretation of the relationship between leading men and the demos 
which we have just outlined; rather, it enables unto make a more 
precise characterization of that relationship in the context of 462-1 
which oan'be understood within the broader framework sketched above. 
: Z- Of these mainland expansionists only Perikles is known to have 
been a friend of Ephialtes. Even if we could assume that the others 
of whom we know, i". yronides, Tolmides and Leokrates, had all been 
friends of Ephialtes, too, -we would not'be justified in seeing them 
as working with eaoh'other rather'than`againat each other, eapeoially 
after Fphialtee' death. While the direotion, though probably not the- 
details of their polioies were the same; -eaoh was seeking to inorease 
his individual influenoe, not their collective influenoe. And each 
will have been concerned not', -only to influence the direction of the 
oity's energies, but also to be seen to, 'be suooessful in sohieving 
this goal. The demonstration'of this ability will have made the 
possibility of his politioal friendship, that iss his support, more 
attractive to other politicians. Such friendship was a contributing 
taotor in achieving euooese, -that is, in influencing the deoisions of 
the oity. In 460 the importanoe of proving oneself suooeseful will 
have been partioularly. great 9 for inýthe. previous decade et least 
three major figures bad been removed from-the political soene, 
loosening alliances and creating 'we-may presume, a greater fluidity 
than usual in the oonstellation`of`politioal personalities. So com- 
. 
ýý 
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petition among the mainland expansionists is likely to have been 
keen. It would be difficult to guess who was most respected and 
influential among them in 46067. These observations on what was 
probably the nature of this group of men, make it easy, I believe, 
to imagine that most of them were reluctant to make a stand against 
proposals which were obviously popular and likely to be carried, 
anyway. They had no desire to be seen to fail to persuade the demon 
to their way of thinking. 
Their failure to oppose the prosecution of the war against Persian 
interests can also be understood in the context of two themes which 
had characterized the relationship between the demos and its leaders 
in the last two decades. The sovereignty of the demos' decisions 
had developed into an issue over the two decades since the victory 
at Salamis. The issue is discernible in'the ostracism of Themistokles 
in so far as he refused to accept as final the judgement of the demos. 
A much more blatant usurpation of sovereignty by Kimon had formed the 
background to the reforms of Ephialtes, and Kimon's attempts to repeal 
them, in other words, his refusal to accept the judgement of the 
demos as final, bad contributed to his ostracism. The men of 460 
had learned the lesson too well. They were afraid to oppose the 
clear wishes of the demos . The conclusion to be drawn from these 
considerations leads us to the second feature of the relationship 
between the demos and its leaders. 
Not only were the deoisions of the demos substantially independent 
of the wishes of leading men, but the polioies of leading men were to 
a degree dictated by popular views. The same conclusion is arrived 
at by another approach. Tbemistoklea' views on expansion in Hellas 
had been rejeoted partly because of the negative effect they were 
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likely to have on the ability of the Athenians to. wage war against 
the Persiansq We saw that there is some evidence that Ephialtes 
and Perikles, while advocating expansion in mainland Greece, were 
probably in favour, in the period 465-2, of pursuing the war in the 
east. I suspect that they, and any other men who spoke of 
expansion in Hellas1had not only to not oppose the war against Persia 
but to appear to support it vigorously, in order to avoid calumny and 
suspicion69. It is probably significant that the man who led the 
embassy to Artaxerxes to seek an agreement, and who had perhaps 
proposed the idea, was Kallias, a man who had been closely associated 
with Kimono I doubt whether any of the mainland expansionists would 
have dared propose the embassy. 1 1, 
Against this background it is easy to understand the conree, of. 
events of 461-0. We have already discussed the capture of Naupaktos 
and the decision to send Kallias to Sousa. To explain the rejection 
of an agreement with the King we probably, do not need to-turn to the 
fact that the men who should logically have supported it - the 
mainland expansionists - were inhibited by political considerations. 
Because of the terms offered by Artaxerxes there may have been no- 
question of acceptance. But the response of the Athenians to the 
results of the embassy will have provided the mainland expansionists- 
with a barometer of Athenian feeling towards pursuit of the war. As 
we can see by later events, the intensity of feeling against-Persia 
had not lessened. The mainland expansionists will have taken note 
in forming their public, -opinions 
(if they expressed any) on the 
proposed Kypros expedition. 
The appeal from Megarag which must have come after the decision 
to proceed against Kypros, offered the, Athenians a chanoe of pulling 
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off a major shift in the balanoe of power in Hellaa. Acoeptanoe 
of the Megarian offer will"have dealt a serious blow to Spartan 
strategic superiority. The alliance will have represented a further 
snub to'Spartan pride, and as such will have had great popular 
appeal. It also meant the near certainty of war with Korinth and 
probably the Peloponnesian League, toot Those who had been friends 
of Kimon were prohibited from dissuading the demos from accepting 
the offer by obvious political considerations. One would like to 
know whether any-of the mainland expansionists opposed the alliance. 
Since the argument would imply that if the Athenians wished to ally 
with Mega-a they would have to abandon the Kypros expedition, they may 
have, felt inhibited. Most of the mainland expansionists were eager 
to be seen to be influential, and it was not wise to speak against a 
proposal which had every chance of being adopted, thus allowing one's 
rivals`the oredit`of being seen to appear to direct Athenian policy. 
It must have seemed muoh wiser to follow the trend of one's policies 
of'tbe last few years and be seen to be successful, too. The 
mainland expansionists, 'an individuals, failed to modify their'policiee 
to the new'situation: " Eben-if disaster ensued, they could hope to'put 
the blame upon those who had been-most vigorous (unlike themselvee)'in 
supporting the Lyproe expedition (and who now# on the question of the, 
1egara alliance, were probably eubdued). 
Ehrenberg expressed concisely a typical approach to explain the 
fact of Athenian involvement In-Egypt by, seking, "whose idea was it? " 
and than considering possible, Athenian candidates70. The approach-is 
misguided. Theýidea came from Inaroe, -an Cloche and Thucydides 
pointed out71. IIe, or his ambassadors, will have been eloquent end- 
Persuasive advocates of Athenian intervention. It has been con- 
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vinoingly argued recently that 'isegoria' was a reality at this 
period72. Active Athenian support for-the proposal need not have 
come from Athenian 'leaders' at all, but from the floor. It is only 
necessary to explain, as we have, the-absence of effective opposition 
to the proposals. 
The cool and detailed evaluation of the praotioability of 
conducting a war against the. Persians in Egypt at the same time as 
one in Hellas against what was likely to be the Peloponnesian League 
should have been possible in the Boule. It is possible that the men 
on the council for 460159 were incompetent and offered the Assembly 
poor advice. It is as likely that on an issue of such magnitude they 
chose to make no recommendation73. Yet although the decision to send 
aid to Inaroe was made without adequate regard for its practicability, 
we should at least recognize that the decision did not underestimate 
Athenian resources in morales the positive response was not the 
result of a fleeting burst of anger but was based on a deep-rooted- 
hatred which sustained the Athenians to the end74. Part of the 
explanation of this remarkable optimism or recklessness, and of 
their sustaining this level of activity for six years may lie in the 
increasing numbers of young men who were reaching the age to attend 
the Assembly who had not had the chance (so to speak) of contributing 
to the war against the Barbarian. Rot a few of these men will have 
lost their fathers in 480-79 and 46575. 
If the Assembly took a series of ill-judged decisions in 461-0 
a good part of the responsibility lies with the prominent men of the 
day, who, drawing on the experiences of the two decades since 
Salamis, failed to warn the demon honestly of what they should have 
been able to recognize was the dangerous direction in which popular 
251. 
feelings were tending, taking more care of their own political 
careers than the good of the city76. The citizens who experienced 
460. -54 seem to have learned to value a restraining influence in 
deliberations on policy. At least one of the 'leaders' of that 
period, still, no doubt, acting with an eye to the success of his 
own career, was able to develop hie political style accordingly. 
Thuoydidee considered this an important aspect of Perikles' careers 
.... 
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NOTES 
1. Correotly, raoan 527, }n,. E'CO(P0. ke i signifies' an "aotüal 
change of plaoe"i the 'sailors did not'witneas the debate. 
2. Of. Grundy 411-15; Macan`531; How and Wells 272; Green 205; 
Gottlieb 110; Schulte 118-9; Burn 469; Sohaohermeyr', +4) 841 
Knight 37; Podleoki'2) 70; Lenardon 1) 84- 
3- While it is true'tbat the case against Herodotos for unfair 
treatment of Themistokles has been overstated (eee e. g. Strasburger 
21-4; Guratasoh 49-51; Fornara 4) 66-74; Lenardon 1) 84)9' ' 
certain episodes, including the one we'are'diacusaing, 'are 
clearly anti-Themistoklean in motivation ( cf. Guratzech 521 
Schaobermeyr 4) 83-41 Podleoki 2)68-72; Lenardon 1) 84-5): - 
The traditional view can be found 'at - G. W. Williams 3) 601 Erbse 
27_81 Gillis 142_51 Cawkwell 40_31 Knight-35-7. 
4" See Gomme's survey 400-1- 
5* The "unfortunate-result of the battle" (Gomme'441)'was not' 
Themistoklea' fault'- be had-to defend 'himself - and in noway '" 
diminished his right to olaim thanks-for the favour he had done 
in warning the King{ cf. "Gomme loo. oit. ; See too J. W. Cole's 
comment, -45. F : (I, should like to thank Prof. Iieinz Heinen of 
Trier for-drawing my attention to this article). 
6. Later we shall be-able to suggest"an explanation of-ýexaotly " 
what Thuoydides meant'by'saying Themistokles made this claim 
VetS6' w5 a below N29. 
7. Bauer 49 and N3 e. g. -, an interpretation which E. Ueyer 372N1 
considered possible. 
8. at e. g. ' Gomme 441. j-*` 
253" 
9. OF. 1'. arohant 2631 How and Wells 272; Gomme 441; Hignett 
2) 242. - 
10. Hignett-2) 241 rejects Thuoydides' evidence here. On Thuoydides' 
reliability, see 11i1ton 263-6; it must be admitted, though, 
that Rhodes' suggestion (see Milton 265N51) that Themistokles 
tinkered with the details of his flight, while not tenable if 
they were to conflict with public facts, may here be acceptable. 
ti It is then, not impossible that Themiatokles, if be is the 
ultimate source here, sought to establish a 'patriotic' message 
after Salamis (on which see text below)., But we are primarily 
concerned not with the nature of a historical second message but 
with the relationship of Herodotos', account of it to the 
alternative tradition, and the light this throws on Herodotos' 
account of the immediate post-Salamis period. 
11. Doubts on the letters see last note. Couldn't refer to non- 
existent letter, cf. Podleoki 2) 26-7; Lenardon 1). 84. Knight 
37 rejects the historicity of a second message without facing 
the problem presented by Thucydides' evidence; -cf. 
Grundy 415- 
12* Hignett 2) 242. Cf. 
- 
How and Wells 271- 
13-- Nepps Th. 5. is similar, and probably based on Ephoross Bauer 
- 160-1;. Holzapfel 53. 
14. Bauer 159" 
15. Cf. Uxkull 69. For the other later accounts see Bauer-Frost 
58-9" They are discussed by Bauer 160-2. 
16. Uxkull 69. 
17. Podleoki 2) 26 and N26. 
18. See Uxkull 65. 
19., Ephoros' use of. Hellanikose Barber 113,122. -3; Schreiner 
254" 
1) 551N7; Jacoby (RE XI, 2, col. 2061); says of Ktesias' 
evidence, 'einiges, was neben Herodotos über Salamis brauchbar 
erscheint, kann aus Rellanikos stammen". Alternatively.. though, 
it is not-impossible-to believe that Ephoros was here following 
Kteaias in the main, but that his account has been ! contaminated' 
with another source, as Uxkull-67-9 did (following von Hanel 
demonstration that Kphoros had, u aed Ktesian elsewhere). 
20. Cf. How and 'Wella 271; ,,, 
Gottlieb 109 and N42 ('Adeimantoa' a 
ý. , slip forFurybiades)... The., plagierism of Herodotoe' Themistokles 
is discussed in more detail later in this ohapter. 
21. Contrast Gottlieb. l09-10. 
22. It is possible that. the. original source failed to name the 
second messenger and so, we should entertain the possibility that 
Ephoros took over Sikinnos from the Herodotean version, and in 
consequence 'rationalized' the first, messenger into a deserter, 
(Diode 17.1). Ktesias. may simply. have named Arnakes to fill the 
silence of bis source,, or, also disliking the use of Skinnos on 
both occasionslhave replaced him, by Arnekes as the second 
messenger; ýC 
f. Uaoan. 533 i ., 
Burn, 469. 
23. IIignett 2) 242. 
24. It.., would theng., be, no. surprise toff ind Ephoroe (fr. 191) could 
follow -Thucydidee' , account . of > the , 
letter. to . Artaxerxee 
(if POxy 
XIII 1610 fr. l, is Ephorosi, see Africa;. and if the author"ia 
drawing 
: on ,. Thuoydidee). 
25. The fact that Themistokles could, apparently, turn it into a 
favour to the King does not make, ite patriotio motive any the 
lees likely. See e. g. Podleoki2). 26;,, Lenardon 1) 84. How and 
wells 272 find it odd. 
255" 
26. Grundy 415 and Hignett 2) 242 note that Herodotos' message 
does not encourage the King's departure. 
27. Masan 525. Cf. 
, e. g. 
How and wells 271. L". acan's belief 
(524,533,2) 324-5,329,3301 cf. F. Meyer 372N1) that the 
Greeks had to await the withdrawal of the Persian land forces, 
is, however, erroneousi see Grundy 413; How and Wella 271; 
Hignett 2) 240-1; Burn 469N52. 
28. Though remember N10 above. 
29. Some reasons why sailing to the Hellespont in September 480 was 
probably never seriously proposed are discussed by Grundy 414; 
Masan 2) 330; How and wells 272; Ehrenberg 1) 421N87. 
Besides, if the contents of the message were as we have 
deduced, its purpose will have been mutually exclusive with that 
achieved by actually destroying the bridges. 
The fact that the Greeks never intended to break the bridges, 
I think, is why Thucydides castigates as deceitful Themistokles' 
F' claim to have been responsible for T, v u pcaY 
. -OÜ l, 
c \U6iV. It is a pity that Thucydides has para- 
phrased here. But since the message came from Salamis, it in 
impossible, as we saw, to imagine that it contained the idea 
that the Greeks had decided not to destroy the bridges; this 
means that it is unnecessary and unattractive to take 
tPda-e o1 r"ß'ci. to as applying not only to the claim made 
in the letter, but also to a putative claim in the message. 
This is what Gomme 441 does, taking it as confirmation of 
Herodotos' message. Others (Bauer 49N3; Marchant 263; cf. 
Fornara 4) 71) refer this to Themistokles' action in dissuading 
the Athenians at Andros from proceeding. 
256. 
The message will, no doubt, have inolude3 a promise to try 
to prevent the destruction of the bridges (as Plutarah's 
message oontainse see text below). To this extent it could 
be described as a message about the "non-destruction" of the 
bridges, as Thucydides appears to do. But only once the Greeks 
had turned back from their pursuit could Themiatokles claim to 
have prevented the destruction of the bridges. This be did 
for the first time in the letter. 
30. Burn 469. See also uaaan 2) 325. 
31.1 wonder whether the message mentioned plans similar to 
Themiatokles' alleged proposals at the oounoil of strategoi at 
Andros that the Greeks should 
_TPQTpýIýýý(1S, 
TOd 
CE)ý, jcrJCO . 
Ü0- 
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up 0. c 
(H. 8.108), on the ambiguities of which, see Vaoan 525-6. If 
euch plans were mentioned in the message the ambiguity would be 
desirable. 
32. Whether it had determined-Xerxes' deoision in quite another, and 
for our purposes irrelevent'matter. See e. g. Green 208. 
33" To a lesser extent, I feel, because the need for the ruse 
questioned whether Salamis-was in fact such a devastating blow 
to Xerxes' power as Themistoklea oertainly wished to`olaim. 
34" Reduotion of numberse see below N40. 
35" See above N29. 
36. C Fornara 4) 71- 
37- Soy Gottlieb 110iw ef. E. Ueyer 372N1. 
38. Raoan'a evggestion-(532)`that Themistokles' assistants were 
tortured to provide confirmation of the story, 'in view of the 
257" 
evidence for the nature of-Kimon's attempts-to stabilize his 
predominance in the early 460a (see chapter twelve) is 
attractive., But, as Vacan notes, they provided no information, 
according to Herodotos. 1Sacan, in fact, believes the story in 
Herodotos arose; on-the-basis of the Themistokles letter referred 
to by Thucydides.; rI think, -however,. that, this%letter was 
probably not in general circulation but. was-the result of- 
. Thuoydides' crown; research : (see Wilton 265 and--, N51, - 266 and 1152) 
Thuoydides' -research- probably merely confirmed, the common- 
tradition found in a. source prior to Fphoros and Ktesias and 
based originally-on Themistokles' claims in'the'470s as`trans- 
matted by oral tradition*-. 
39" I say "stage" because itfbears traces of 'various, attempt sto 
discredit Themistokles, notýall-ýof which have been completely 
synthesizedl see-below N41. ° r 'r. f 
40. I agree with the implioations. of. Schulte's=remarks 
(119) that, --,, 
Herodotos is expressing tbe-opinion"of. "the'Athenians in 
describing Themistokles as aa'oqös 'T-C, ca_L EZ 
JouA05 
° 
(contrast.,, t"acan 532). But. there 4s'. no-implioation that Herodotos 
disagreed with the ý judgement.. - .,. ..,, t 
'. .' 
Fornara°4) 70, ýbelieves; that. the' suggestion-to7break-the 
bridges is intended, to. ebow-Themistokles again hitting on exactly 
what the situation required. it, in true. (70, N13) that Uerodotos 
has portrayed , Xerxes as fearingwsuoh an. aotion. -Nonetheless, - -: ý 
the arguments presented againatsailing_'are perceptive, and cogent. ) 
and do represent a more-intelligent analysis of the situation 
facing the Greeks=: than the,, proposal to 'oatoh. Aaia in'Europe' 
(pace Schulte 120). At; any rate, the. reduotion of Persian land 
258. 
forces at Plataia (whatever the real figures involved) which 
= the non-harrassment of the retreat encouraged, was believed by 
fifth century Greeks to have been valuables Aisoh. Pers. 803.41 
Thuo. 73.5; ' cf. Plut. The 16.5; Diode 19.6,59.2. See How 
and Wells 273-4; Aignett 2) 267-8. 
4l. The adoption of arguments used by Eurybiades is noted by 
Cawkwell 42; Schulte 115 and Knight 37. This implied accusation 
of plagiarism seems to me the predominant means of minimizing 
Themistokles' contribution at Andros, but a different approach, 
not fully synthesized with the other, and indeed logically 
incompatible with it, can be detected. As Macan 531 noted, there 
is an assumption - or rather a hint - that Themistokles did wrong 
in dissuading the Athenians ( cf. Bauer 20). This is least 
veiled in the almost defensive tone of Herodotos' explanation 
that in part the Athenians followed Themistokles' advice because 
of the C' O 
i1 
he had previously shown. It is also implied 
by the fact that Themistokles should use this act as both a 
potential and real source of Persian gratitude. Such implications 
may derive from responses made to those who argued that whenever 
Themistokles sent the second message and whatever it contained 
he nonetheless did right in dissuading the Athenians from 
breaking the bridges, because of the reduction in Persian numbers 
at Plataia this encouraged. That this element is only faintly, 
if*at all, detectable shows that in Athens at the time Herodotos 
was absorbing his anti-Themistoklean source(s) it was generally 
believed that Themistoklee had in fact been tv Aou ), 05 in 
hie advice at Andros, and therefore it was more important to 
deny his authorship of it than to deny its wisdom. 
ý- 
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42. Masan-526.., 
43" It ia, unimportant that Xerxes in fact made his retreat without 
the bridges being intact (they were destroyed by storms 11.8.117). 
When the Greeks in 480 spoke of breaking the bridges it also 
meant harassing Xerzes', lines of communications and supplies 
and attempts at, crossing the Aellespont. "The bridges" was a 
shorthand, perhaps even symbolic way of expressing the things 
that their ezietenoe ensured the King. This in moat evident in 
the 'Perser (736) where Xerxes is said to have 
Ct6_ 
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44" Bauer 21 and N21 Cf. - the doubts of L'aoan 530 on the whole 
parenthesis. 
45. Schulte 116-8. 
46. H. 7.143 (oraole), 8.41 with Plutaroh Th. 10.1. (Akropolis 
snake)l Plutarch Th. 22.1. (Artemis Aristoboules in view of 
this personal interest in Artemis one wonders whether Themietoklee 
didn't play a prominent role in the Athenian dedication to 
Artemis (Pl. The 8.3. ). Note too Wilamowita' suggestion that 
the official hymn sung at the dedication of the Boreas shrine 
was "The Sea Fight off Artemision" written by Themistokles' 
friend Simonidess see Podleoki 2) 50-1 for references. 
47. Cf. Podlecki 1) 23. 
48. Schulte 116-7 and N77. 
49" See Podleoki 1) 21-3 for references and discussion. 
50. Cf. Bauer 20. L'acan 530 detects an archaic tone in 6XöPOO 
6-vaxao5 E)( Z: W "appropriate in the mouth of Themistaolss", 
and perhaps his actual words. 
51. Godley's (Loeb) translation. Maoan 530 has produced no trenchant 
260. 
argument against taking this as conditional in sense, an 
Stein 86 had also done. See too the references at chapter 
four p13. 
.R 
52. See further klacan 527. 
53" Macan 531 says they were "a concession to gain the Athenians". 
54" See chapter three. 
55. Stein 86. 
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CHAPTER TWO VOTES, 
1. Cf. 
, 
Macan 536; Schulte 120; see too Guratzeoh 52. 
2. Plutarch (Ar. 24.1) notes that the Greeks made financial 
contributions under Spartan hegemony, and may be referring to 
these events: ATL 189N15; Brunt 138. Kieahle 272-3N28, 
though, locates E+em under Pau sania s' command in 479/8- 
3- C£ 
I_ 
E. Meyer 374; : How and Wells 272; ATL 185; Podleoki 
2) 27. H. D. Meyer 410 goes, therefore,. too far in calling the 
action a "Sonderunternehmen Athens", "ein Ausläufer" from the 
Hellenic League. 
4" H. 8.4-5 (Artemision)s ? cf. Schulte 121-2. 
5. Ct. Barth 34, and generally on the tradition of Themistokles' 
avarice. 
6. C£ e. g. Barth 37; though some have found the accusations 
plausibler e. g. How and Wells 272; Hignett; 2) 244- 
7- See chapter eight. 
8. See e. g. Podleoki 2) 51 and N18. 
9. See Bowra 353- 
100 Podlecki 2) 53 would like to connect Timokreon' s Xpo go Ta. v , 
with the technical charge of 
, 
T'pocToa'ca- probably levelled 
at Themistokles (Pl. The 23.1; Thuo. 138.6). But the fact 
that Timokreon wrote a separate. poem, to celebrate the charge, 
of iedism against Themistokles (fr. 2 and 3 with Plutarch's 
commentary-(Th. 21.4)) suggests not that fro l, was written 
"at a time nearer to that at which-he composed" the redism 
poem, but that at. the time of the composition of, fr. 1 there 
was no hint ofAhe, later accusations of Uedism, for otherwise 
Timokreon would have made much more of them. Furthermore, the 
262. 
meaning "traitor to his zenos relationship" fits far better 
in this context than the legal term. See correctly Bauer l3 
and N3 and Mattingly 3) 233" 
11. Preferring the reading ý0,0WS to yxocN5 
12. Perrin in the Loeb Life of Themistokles translates "prayed 
Heaven 'no happy return of the dad for Themistoolest'; Bowra 
351, "praying that no attention be paid to Themistooles", and 
Edmonds 423, (adopting &1Oa- , in plaoe of 
W)QV ) 
"meat that they ate with curses on his head". 
13. C. Kirohhoff 41. 
14. Exoeptions inolude Maas (ß. F. 6A col. 1271) and Fornara 
2) 259N9" 
15. Pace Kirchhoff 411 ATL 185N10. 
16. A terminus post quem for the oomposition iss of course, of no 
use to us in trying to determine the date of Themistokleal 
alleged activities, but would be useful in establishing the 
range of dates in which Timokreon levelled his accusations 
(which I assume to be done for the first time in his poem). 
The Iathmoe provides a 480 terminus, while Bowra's Interpretation 
of 'Leto' as referring to-the formation of the Athenian Alliance 
(353-4, which I accept) provides a lower terminus of 478/7. 
Others had reached a similar conclusion by considering the 
prominence of Ariateidea, presupposed by. the poem, pointed to 
a date after his 478/7 strategic activities: Kirchhoff 40 
(expedition of Pausanias andýAristeides to-Kypros and area); 
Bauer 13, in 1881, was. probablyýtbinking of the Athenian alliance 
when he said the, poem was composed after 476 (only AP 12-13 and 
21-2 had been discovered by 1880); Wilamowitz 1) 138N27; 
263. 
Busolt 14N1; von Aomäszewski 8; F. Meyer 374N2; Fornara 
. 
2) 257N1 expresses this view but will not press it, insisting 
only on a post 479 date; Lenardon 1) 104- 
17- E. g. Wilemowitz 1) 138N271 % colt 14N1. 
18. See 'White and Lazenby 244" 
19. See chapter six'm76. 
20. Podlecki 2) 53 objected to thin approach regarding Pausanias., 
and he was followed by Mattingly 3) 233110 who added Leotychides. 
21. See above N10. - 
22. QC. Belooh 4) 108- 
23- Kirchhoff 42-4, followed'by Bauer 13, postulated Timokreon, 
among others, vainly soliciting Themistokles' aid while the 
latter was at Andros (Bowra 352 completely misrepresents 
Kirchhoff's views). Wilamowitz 1) 138N27 and g. Meyer 374N2 
also located the request in 480. See also the relevant references 
in the next note. 
24" The idea of a Themistokleon expedition, either in 480 or in one 
of the years following is now orthodox$ see ATL 185 and N10, 
191 and N26, followed by Brunt-141; ' French "1) 85; II. D. 'i! eyer 
410; " sealey 3) 245-69" Cf. 2) 246'for 480. Others who accept 
a later expedition include Beloob 145N1, ýcf. 4) 109; von 
Domaszeweki 8; Burn-'468R501 Lätze"263N5'('Timökrates' in a 
slip for-'Timokreon' ); 'Meiggs 41'5; ' Balcer 2) '22N4, cf. 25; 
Podlecki 2) 52; ` Vattingly 3) 232. None of these scholars has 
defended the assertion4 that Timokreon suggests that Themistokles 
was actually in Rhodes. "It presumably rests on the following 
two elements. The CV Ca- relationships this could have been 
264. 
established long before 480, and may, in any case, have been 
based on a visit by Timokreon to Themistokles, and not vice 
versa. Secondly, the expression that, having"been bribed not 
to reinstate Timokreon., Themistokles. went,, XP; 
`wv 25 Okf-PPo/. 
The metaphor prohibits. taking XC 
f" v literally; 
Themistokles needn't have been, and probably. wasn't,, at sea 
when he allegedly received. bribes.., And even if the expression 
is taken as indicating naval activity by Themistokles it needn't 
be taken as indicating that Themintokles sailed away from Rhodes. 
Kirchhoff 411 Fornara 2) 258N3 and de Ste. Croix 173N20 deny 
that Timokreon requires an expedition led by Themistokles to 
Rhodes. 
25. Deloch 4) 108-9- 
26o Cr Beloch 145N1. 
27. Fornara 2).. 259. On the context of the poem within Plutaroh! e 
'Themistokles' see, Kirohboff.. 39;,. Belooh-l45N1 and Fornara 
2) 2611016. 
28. This will be justified. in-chapter , size ,. _,: 
29* See Fornara 2), 258-60; , 
1'attingly_3). 231 Beloch. made. use of 
this argument only in bis "Griechische Gesohiohte"<144-5N1., 
30. Cf. Fornara 2) 260-1; E: attingly, 3), 232, ýthough-I do not-, agree 
with the latter's suggestion, that Themistokles was left to 
consolidate the Karian. distriot. in-478 and.: rejeoted Timokreon's 
approaches while there.,. It: isnot impossible-that Themistokles= 
was with the fleet, in 
, 
478 -but Timokreon offers no support, and, 
since the fleet should have begun this busy season early, his 
presence conflicts with the very probable date of his attendance 
as pylagoras at the Jºmphiktyonio council of spring 478 (on the 
265. 
date see chapter six N99)" 
31. It was rejected. by Mass (R. E. 6A ool. 1272); Kirchhoff 46-8 
- (härdly a "less sceptical interpretation" as Podleoki 2) 54N28 
describes it). Podlecki 2)"54 offers explanations of how the 
story could have ecaerged. 
32. Cf e. g. Kirchhoff 41 (4). "Podleoki 2) 51 think s'"there is a 
clear implication that Themiatoclea had ... violated an agree- 
ment between the two men". 
33" See chapter six and N99 on the date of the Amphiktyonio council 
and the disoussionýof'the tradition of Themietokles' defence of 
Kerkyra. We doInot'have any information on Themietokles 
actually restoring exiled men to their'oities, and line 9 of 
Timokreon's fr: 14 (i 
may be taken'in this'way. ''I do not consider this a"seriou s 
objection 
to the interpretation I'have offered. The defence 
made by Themistokles of the post-war independence of certain 
states may'have given`the signal for the return'of men exiled 
by nervous citie's. " AlsoTimokreon's'words`should not'be pressedl 
11 he may merely be the maritime metaphor of'the'" 
previous line )"rendering the 
idea that'Themistokles brought some men out of the turbulent 
seas in which they found themselves after'the"Persian defeat 
into the safe harbour of Athenian, protection; or, more simply, 
Timokreon may just be exaggerating in order to make the oontrast 
with exiling more striking. 
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CHAPTER, TEREE NOTES 
1. 
1.0 See chapter : seven. -- u '-, -',., --. 
2. Podleoki. l) 14,. 19-21,2)i6-7j-29,4)"4-5" -I. chooso to attack 
Podleoki'e representation-of. -this fairly common theory because, 
in my-view, 'hisýopinions deserve: to'carry considerable. weight. 
3. See e. g. üammond-. 2): 385-8. 
4. Badian" 15-1044. Lenardon 1) 105_6, cf. 38 considers listing 
11 the=play in the trilogy which included the Phoinissai and dating 
it; to 477/-6,, or: even equating. it with that play or a particular 
n tbeme. or scene : in-it. ';., Apart, -from chronological 
difficulties 
{ this, is, implausible, -beoauseof the, faot . that . 
it, is, hard. to 
imaginethat- the trilogy, =of,, whioh the.! Captureýof Liletoe' was 
a"-_part should have-won. ýfirst prize,; as-thet477/6 trilogy did-.. 
(Pl. 
-Th. 5.4. 
). 
, 
On"Badian'e pressing of. &Vap_Y jd7c tct>. -a^. _see 
Podleoki.; 2) 7fi9". 
5. Forrest (in; Podleakir: 1)_158118,2), -7p9): says that therewaa. not 
;::;., muoh time between. xthe. fall, ýof Miletoe and. a. produotion-in 494/31 
but . the . 
date cannot , be : ruled out. , 3"Recent rgrief" could, in my 
view, mean up, to -four , or.: five years : after tthe: event. iK Cf 
Badian 15-16N44. 
}.,. 4 
6. I. accept-. that Themistokles-Neokleoue Phrearrioa was eponymous 
archon in 493/2 (Dion. Hal-9, R. A. 6.34.1`. ). _- 
7. Polleoki-1)-14, cf. 20, -'2), -6-7--,, -! - 
80 Podleoki ý2) . 
6" 
9. Podlecki 1)'149,,, 19, though, -seems,. to suggeat,, the _play commended 
further support, which IToan, notbelieve is oorreot. See'too. 
Poileaki's comments below at. N17., µ : -; ;-;, i 4 "I -, , 
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10. See too Freymuth 53-63- 
110 Podleoki 1) 20; How and Wells 72; of von Stauffenberg 130- 
12* And-so the question as to whether Themistokles began his policy 
of improving Athens' naval defences in 493/2 does not make any 
i:? difference to the-, question-of determining his attitude to defence 
of Ionia. On-Podlecki's blurring of the distinction between 
defence of Hellas and defence of. -Ionia see below N17- 
13-, Podleoki 1) 20. 
14. Podleoki 1) 19-20. 
15. Podlecki 1) 20-1,2)-29,4) 5-6. 
16. Podleoki 2) 29; `"see too. 4) 6,1) 21. 
17. Podleoki 2) 6-7 confuses vigorous defence against the Persian 
invasion with a desire-to protect Ionia when he maintains that 
Themistokles'-"later policy: of, resistance to the Persian menace 
... suggests that be felt Athens bad acted wrongly--in abandoning 
the Ionians" after the*initial failures of the Ionian revolt. In 
fact it-tells'us nothing'about his attitude to the Ionian revolt. 
18. From Thucydides_webave-the acoount ofýtbe walls incident 
(90.1-93.2) andyin partioular, Themistokles' aggressive speech 
(91.4-6). His remarks about the Athenians being able TaC^Sý. 
aß. _(93.7") 
and the statement that f rom. - Argos: 1, s, 
ze T+V... 
_CL1ý. _ º'ýV 
YJýtf0ý/ 
_. 
(135.3) 
are not expressly- anti-Spartanibut-have been convincingly inter- 
preted as such (the former; by; Cawkwell; 44; ýPodiecki 2), 34, the 
latter by, I think, -everyone who, has oommented on, the passage). 
Plutarch's evidence is more explicit: -,, -at 'Themistokles'ý. 20, bew. 
recounts Themistokles'-, proposal. to destroy the Hellenic fleet 
268. 
anchored-at Pagasai ( cf. Ar. 22.2) and Themistokles' 
opposition to the Spartans at the Amphiktyonio council, which 
finally established Spartan loathing of Themiatoklee ( cf. 
K. 16.2. ). 
19. de Ste. Croix (176) drew attention only to Hammonds assumption 
that Themistokles envisaged pursuing the Persian war, but the 
ideaie fairly widespreads eee. e. g. E. Meyer 452-3,478 (in 
the years immediately after 478/7); H. D. Meyer 431-3 and B56; 
Kagan 40 and N38,57, -831- Podleoki 1) 21, "2) 96-7,4) 4-51 
Bengtson 1) 193. Othere'deduae that Themiatokles showed lese 
interest in the Persian war (e. g. -von Domaszeweki 9, Amandry 210; 
Sohaohermeyr 5) 67; Burn-565, -3)i188; Podleaki 2) 34 considers 
the deduction legitimate). I would not,, howeverg press the' 
argument of those who draw support for this deduction from the 
later allegations of Iedism (so°E. Meyer 481 (who takes 
Themietokles' waling- interest as a feature-of his later career), 
followed by Hignett 1), 190, and Cawkweli- 45_6; "-: cf. " de Ste. Croix 
176. See obapter twelve.. Diodoros. (41.4), says-that. in a war 
for hegemony Themietokles. thought'the-Athenians would have on 
their side the Ionians 
-c.. 
ä. , IV. c uIrEýýLa-Vý who 
would assist in freeing the other Asiatio Greeks. But the 
ý'» passage has no value, for the considerations are said to have 
been kept top secret (42.1"). In the-light of-. later events. 
Ephoros was not irrational°to aesign'this motivation to 
Themistokles' post-war naval>polioy. Furthermore, the section 
in which this passage'occurs (41.3-43.2). looks very much like a 
more elaboration'of, the simple fact that Themietokles fortified 
the Piraeus; any elements taken"from it would need to be 
269o 
independently justified as credible or trustworthy. 
20. See Cook's analysis' (10-16) of, 'the, evidenoe for where, in, 
so far as there was one, tbe'frontier line between Ionia-and 
Persia should be drawn. The" apparent successes of the' 
Athenians in detaching-coastal'cities from: the Persian-empire 
may have been one of the moat ` important: causes of-the material 
poverty of Ionia in the fifth" oentury -(9-10) in that ° sbec was 
unable to dominate muoh-of-the good'land, -wbioh, remaining 
King' a' lend, ceased to -benefit''the oommünity 'as a whole (16-18). 
Given the economic and strategic realities of the-situation'', 
Themistokles may well have-realized that the threat to Athenal 
I'defence" of mainland Asiatic cities might, in time, not only 
be from external sources but from within, too. See H. Schaefer 
109-11,302 and N4 for an analysis of the background to pro- 
Persian sympathies in Ionia. Olmstead gives an account of 
Persian attempts at expansion towards the sea only until MMykale 
in his article on "Persia and the Greek Frontier Problem". 
21. Thuc. 93.4 (see, correctly, de Romilly 107N1, cf. 57, followed 
by e. g. Cawkwell 45 and 55N10); Pl. The 20.1-2, cf. 7.3 ( cf. 
Ael. Arist. 46.186-7 (Dindorf II p. 252)), 4.3; (Diod. 41.3-5 
does not deserve credence - see above H19). 
22. Cf among others, Kieohle 271. 
23" HIerodotos' inclusion of these two powers in Themistokles' speech 
in 480 at Andros was not anachronistioi see kacan 535; flow and 
wells 272; further Schulte 122; pace Strasburger 21. 
24. Gelons H. 7.158 with Brunt 158-62; Argos: H. 7.148- 
5.2The idea that Athens had previously had an 'Aegean hegemony' is 
not convincing: see e. g. Brunt 146-8. 
270. 
26.: See chapter ten. 
27. Sources, see above N21. Interpreted thus by e. g. Be Meyer 452 
(though I find no, evidenoe to: -support Be A". eyer! a view that 
Themistokles was in, part: motivated _by 
the "nationale Interesse" 
rather than purely, Athenian interest);, -, Keil 70.71; Amandry- 
21A.. 11; Sohachermeyr 2) 369 5) 68; Kagan 58; Cawkwell 451 
Morrison"and, R. T. Williams 225; Brookmeyer 39; Podleoki 2)-32. 
The, argument that. the. -mainlandr; ezpansionist designs, of,. the 
! heirs' to Themistokles', policies -; Ephialtes and Perikles and 
, others - represent;. evidenoe of=, Themistokleslx. policy is worth 
. mentioning but Carrie s,. little, weight., - ;., _ 
CHAPTER. FOUR, NOTES 
1. Thsstory that Themistokles was rejected by the god at Delphi 
when. he tried. to make-the dedication personally (Paus. 10.14. 
,. x 
5". 6), does not deserve, oredenoes , see. Amandry 206-7j. _ 
Podleaki 
? )w27-8. 
2. ' Herodotoa says 
K vC, z, L It is 
possible, that he bad;; gone Qthere ! 'to disouss with her. leaders the 
271. 
atrategy. of tbe=next; oampaign"*aa, xignett_2), 275 (., cf. Maoan. 551) 
presumes, but Herodotos'etatement that Eurybiades was awarded a 
orown.. of, olives, suggests,. that the invitation bad, been made with. 
a, purely ceremonial agenda. This is not, to _ 
deny, that there, were 
strategictalks also, but there. 
_is; 
no evidenoe for. it. There is, 
therefore, no basis' for assuming that Themistokiea' strategy for 
the forthcoming season was identical with what we may deduce the 
Spartans to have. been, pace Hands 61. 
rr 
39 gignett. 2) 277" 
4. Ae e. g. Beloch 144; Lacan 2) 332-4; Schaohermeyr 1) 96; and 
Podlecki 2) 30_do 
5. See Podleoki=: 4)44; cf. Lenardon. l) 99; ,. Fornara 3) b17N21, - 42. 
Pane Beloch 144.. r7 fi,. 
6. By-seg. Busolt, 2) 
, 
189,: and, Nli _ Uow, and : Wells 2761 - -, Burn; -491. - 
7. See. -e. g. Fornara. 3), -, 
60-61, 
8. Cf. Ilignett, 2); 276N2. Note, too, the artiole,. by; _Labarbe, -p who - , --. 
is right, to -draw, attention,. to ;; the difficultiesin, the, llerodotean 
account of Timodemos-(34-6)., If: his suggestions are followed, 
as theyhave been e. g. by.; Luzley 2): 32tthen "Timodamos of 
Aphidna" was not_even an_Athenian., Sealey 1) 27 ; and 38N96 takes 
Themiatoklea' words as implying Timodemöe was not an Atheniin, 
but'interprete the oomment`a's "regional snobbery" aimed at the 
remoteness' of Timodemos' dame. I am undeoided, and so-assume, 
for argument's sake, that be was Athenia'n'. ' 
272*: 
90 see e. g. Podleoki 2)`30 for-the'implau'eibility, of''Ephoroe' 
attempt to portray the oomplaint`aa popular. Note too that the'' 
popular diesätisfaotion' recorded by Plutarch` (Th'*" 22.1=2) 1s 
certainly to be associated with' a later stage OZ Themistokles' 
career, as the resultant ostracism (Th. ý22.3)shows: c, f. IIignett 
2)' 276N2. ° 
10. One exception being Hauvette (aýc)cording to IIijnettý 2)' 276N2) who 
apparently included-suspioions of Themistoklee' honesty; though, 
as we have seen, suoh"accusations'wers'probably levelled only at 
a`later date. 
11. Cörreotly Kieahle 26Q-5N4. This explanation is favoured by 
Prestel 25; Kahratedt (R. E. 5`A2`col. 1692); Amandry 2091 
Schachermeyr 1) 95, }103, "2) 19"'319-5) 641' ßreen`210; Zinserling 
107.,, : >r.... ",.. 
12. See"e. g. -How and Wella`3891' Hignett, 2)279-851' Burn'504. 
13. 'See above, chapter one. Cf. 1"aoan 2) 332-4. Hignett 2) 278N3 
gives'no reason why heiconeider's Läoan'a poaitiontö'be rover 
bold". -Soholars who oonsider'etrategiö"disagreements as a possible 
reason for Themistokles' dieappearanoe"inolude Bu olt 2)`1891 Bury 
414; 4"E. Meyer 380-81; Burn490-91*`(whö had previously attributed 
toa, postulated appointment of the etrategöi' of '479/8 by the 
Ar'eopagoo: 2) 35); Hignett 2) 278; Podlecki 2) 30. 
14: see Bueolt 90-91N3; - -Dävieäý302j" ATL-159_60: 4' `"° 
15. Plutarch K. 5.4) has him only'fighting at Salamis. " 
2734 
1 69 The generally accepted year for his first. general ships e. g. 
Busolt 95 (though note 65N1); Podleoki 2) 33. Jacoby 2) 2N4, 
though,. will only accept 476/5 asrhis first certain, tenure*, 
Bicknell 1) 93N43,103N17,4) 173N18 is wrong to deduce that 
Kimon was strategos on the basis of the alleged embassy he under- 
took in 480/79 (on which see text below). See too Fornara 3) 43" 
,, 
Some,, suggestions on what to do with APO s (26.1) vcw-r£pov avrcc 
can be found in Radet; 
_, _Wilamowitz, 
l) 136;,,, yon, Fritz and Kapp 
170-71N76; Anastasi;,.:, Scott 117., Iýfollow Rhodes 2); 150 in,.. 
believing that the commentxahouldcrefer to the. earlyý470s, and 
has been misplaced. Smart's acceptance of, tho tradition at face 
value (138) is based, onrhis, proposedcbronology,. for. the 4708 and 
460s whioh,. it will be argued in. chapter,. eight,. ahould not be,, 
accepted. 
17. 'It might well be Krateros, cf. Gomme,: 309; fficknell, l)-, 93N43; 
Burn 505N49; but we are not, permitted.: to, oitej, him, as Wilamowitz 
-dids . 
"Krateros 
. 
bei Pluto, -Are 20"; (a - slip, 
for 10);, 1Y13 6 
similarly Bereward 45., "Plut.. Aristeides: lO, 10, ,, quoting from a ,, 
decree: in Kraterost oolleotion"; ý cf. Hignett., 2): 283..,, 4 
18. See Willemsen 28-9. 
19. See Hignett's discussion , 2) ; 283-4 of;, h"aoan., See also- Green 230 
Note,, 231. Munro: 3) 146-8yhad adifferent solution.. 
20. SeeGomme 62N1,309; --.. Burn, 505N49j Sohachermeyr,, 
l)-°316-7N2, 
2)=241N33 expresses caution in using the decree. 
21. If, Bioknell! a recent guess (1), 93N43) that Myronides was a 
Lykomld should be; correct.. r ,, ----ý y 
-22. See Thomsen (95N262), who. reportsýeherds of Kimon, Themintokles 
:,., - and Megaklee from the, same pot. . "D. 1!., Lewis knows of at least 3 
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Joins-, between Megaklee and Kimon ostraka; but see my remarks 
at 'chapter nine N82. 
23. Suspension of judgement: D. M. Lewis 3) 4,. the quotation is from 
page 3" 
24" Bicknell 4). 
25. L'attingly 2) 284-5- 
269 Bated-Feb. 
, 
15,1979- 
27* The study of the possible allocation of various, ostraka to 
ostrakophoriai by, -Ilattingly which Thomseyi, -t81, and, 
19180 announced 
was "forthcoming" has, unfortunately, bad to be postponed until 
after the-full publication of the Kerameikos ostraka. 
28. The-story should perhaps-not be dismissed out of hand ("a trivial 
story",, sneers, Podleoki, 2) 33, while =Fornara: l), 53, dubs it "a myth 
Of the purest.. transparenoy").. It has, at least two points in 
favour of, ita historicity: it, is followed immediatelyby-a, --, 
paaeagetbased on Ion; and, it does, not', fit, intorthe usual pattern 
of; Themistokles versus Kimono But an attempt to, seoure: for 
Kimon-some. of the: oredit for the. salvation, of=IIellaa+and Athene 
may well be -all ;, that. lies, behind, the Aale* At any rate, it 
perhaps testifies to the absence ofAany tradition. of. opposition 
by Kimon during the Persian war. Wilamowitz", l)`136N25, finds 
the-story,, plausible-but.. will. not", build, on it; ; i.,, Meyer, 2)41,, 
calls it a: -"gewiss authentisohe;. Geschichte"-, and-H. ýSchaaf er 
148; 
,, =Burn 2)-36; .. 
Hammond. 4) 265; and Kagan 60"acoept__it., as.. 
historical; ct. Kiechle 295, -,. ". 
29" gignott 2) 408-11;, followed., by-Fornara"1), 51 and: Knight', 40. r. 
Cf. 
_ 
Podleoki : 2) , 
23. 
. 
See too Bury- 415 "and -, Raubitschek 8): "127N1. 
30. Cf. 
} . 
Pl., Ar. 8.1; Comparison of Aristeides, and=Cato 5-3-: - The 
275" 
same basis may be behind another artificial tradition portraying 
a division of responsibilities between the twos AP 23.3 ( cf. 
Pl. Ar. 8.3); sceptioisms :, Wilamowitz, l) 139; Busolt 63N3; 
E. Meyer. 453N1{- though, "'im Kern richtig" according to A. D. -Meyer 
433N56- 
31- E. g. How and, Wells 286; , 
Hignett 2)273144; Burn 495N18. 
32. Podlecki 2) 29.., 
33. I see nothing in-Xanthippos', behaviour between 480/79 and 479/8 
which might hint at conflict with Tbemistokles; see chapter six 
and below. N35. 
It is not a, auffioient explanation of, Themietokleal dis- 
appearance_from, theýstrategia merely, to point to co-operation 
between Kimon,, Xanthippos, and: Ariateides, °as Bicknell 1) 93 and 
142, (cf. Knight. 32),: seems, to do., That this approach to 
Athenian politics is inadequate will be shown in chapter nine, 
especially. Tunro's. tbeory. of a deal, (2) 301) is not only "far- 
fetohed", (Rignett, 2) 278)ýbut aleo, works on a fundamental 
misconception . ofrthe naturerof-Athenian politic s at, this 
time. 
flow and Wells, 390, though, were,, sympathetio. 
34. There is. a degree of, uncertaintyrsurrounding, the date of. the 
recall of . the . ostraoises; 
(AP, 
-22.8; , 
P1. Ar. 8.1). AP 22.7, 
after describing Themistokles'; use of the new{silver, which he 
dates in the. archonship of Nikodemos. (the Berlin papyrus and, 
Dionysios Halikarnasseus 8.83, give, Nikodemos,, though the London 
papyrus, bas Nikomedes;., on Raubitsobekle. attempt 8) 127-8 to see 
in this disorepanoy, two, different arohonsFsee Badian 2-3N3-and 
Bicknell 5)'170R3- ýPaoe Badian, loo. '. oit. and 33 $Nikodemos' -is 
preferablel, ' cf. Podlecki ; 2)_-206N8). ; Nikodemos was archon. in 
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483/2'(Dion., ßäl. n8.83). ' At the'aame'time as this (? v too t- 
O LS T, of, S ) Aristeides was ostraoized. "The 
clear implication ... is'that the ostracism occurred in the 
some year as"the navy -bill", (Hignett 1) 336 - correctly rejecting 
Sandys' 'attempt-at assigning the ostracism to 484/31 cf. 
wilamowitz"l)-25). ^, AP"then"says Aristeides was recalled in the 
fourth year-'after hie ostracism, which would be in the archon- 
ship of Kalliades 480/79 (H. '8.51), though he says it was in the 
arohonship°of Uypsiohides, who'is not mentioned in other sources, 
and who 'oould have'been re on in one of the two vacant years 
482/l -or481/0. ' Plütaroh =(Ar. 8.1) helps us by 'saying that in 
the third year after'Äristeidea' ostracism the Athenians recalled 
the' ostraoisis. ý'This certainly, looks as though it derives from a 
reliable `ahronogräphio - aouroe ' (Cf. Mg-nett 1)'337)- It 'would seem 
safest to-take =the' "' TC cdf' rcL in' the, l'SS of AP an a 
corruption, rather "than. seeing -ä. PxovtoS 'ýYt+1lxcd00 as 
erroneous, ' and' plaoe Hypsiähidee' erohonship in 481/0 (despite 
theýoontentionsof 'Sumner 34 land N3): - This is the solution 
aooeptedý-by; "among, other a-, "Wilamowitz'l) 25-6;; Cadoux 118 and 
Hignett'1)'336_7. fPlütaroh'e evidence cannot be minimized by his 
mistaken statement ibat'`the'recall occurred "while 'Xerxes was 
marohing'trrough Thesealy andBoiotia" whioh'is-probably bis own 
comments- based purely ondramatic considerations. The attempt 
by Carcöpino, '153-7 (tollöwed, by`miretein 96-7) to apply amore 
subtle approaoh'to'AP$ a apparent, internal contradiction results 
in dating`Hypsichidea' arohonship`toý'482/1; whioh oonfliote with 
Plutarch. ' Nor can FIeroiotoa (8; 79) , be called `in to' support a 
recall "'in^-480/79 °'-"I'do not think -thatlhia account of Ariateidea' 
277. 
crossing from Aigina to Salamis on the eve of the battle shown 
that he thought Aristeides was returning from ostracism. -And 
if he had thought this there is some indication that he would 
have been mistaken, for Aristeides should have been back in_ 
Athens in time for the strategia elections of 480/79 which took 
place in "whateverprytany after the sixth there are favorable,,,, 
omens" (AP 44.4 - see"B. D.,. Ueritt. (277 for the tranelation))l -r, 
cf. Hlgnett2). -, 2771 Burstein 97. Some suggestions for getting 
around this are, proposed,. by., Sumnor 35, one of whioh"is criticized 
by Burstein 97. That Arieteides,.. was strategos is virtually 
certain sinoe,, he led, the military action on Psyttaleia (cf. 
Bury 4181 Eow and, Wells, 262-31 Ilignett, 2) 2771 Podlecki 1) 25; 
Burstein 97. This is denied by,. as well as Sumner 35, Fornara 
1) 51 and N4,3) 42 and Bicknell 2) 436N68. While the mawkish 
anecdote recorded-by Philoohoros. fr. 116 concerning Xantbippoe' 
presence at the evacuation of; Attika. ia-. quite-untru etworthy, the 
faut that be-led the Athenian naval contingent in, apring 479 
should mean-thatahe,, too was elected. strategoe for the year 480/79, 
since the tenure of. -the, strategia; began-and ended, like other 
Athenian offices, on the 1. Hekatombaion (see Pritohett'e 1) 
conclusive, ezamination : of ý tbe. "evideno e, against L'ayor's attempt 
to date the<beginning; of.. the: tenure shortly after the-eleotion 
which "may frequently have been held in the seventh prytany" 
(B. D. lteritt 278). The argument concerning Xanthippos' general- 
ship would be invalid if we accepted Hammond's idea that Athenian 
generals elected to the Eellenio League operations held office 
from spring to spring: l) 382, cf. 322. On the false notion that 
the tenure was according to the conciliar year see the references 
278o 
cited at Staveley 288N25. 
So, all in all, it is beat to attribute the recall to 481/0. 
35. So too Cornelius 502 (though, I. diaagree with the arguments he 
uses as well as bis other conclusions). The beat example of 
both these behavioural characteristics is furnished by 
Xanthippos (who, was probably the most prestigious of the generals 
besieging Seaton) in his determination not to return home uneucoesa- 
ful (H. 9.117) and. his dedication of the tackle of the Hellespont 
bridges (H. 9.121) - doubtless with much pomp. 
(Amandry bas 
argued that they were dedicated at Delphi (and states it as fact 
at Amandry 221). 11one -of ML's , reservations 
(54p with full 
reference to Amandry! s Fouilles do Delphos, cf. bMeigga 36) is 
decisive and the association in accepted by Hammond 1) 314 and 
Boorama 51. ., 
Even if we accept -asfhistorioally accurate the. tradition of 
hostility and suspicion towards the ostraois6a analysed by 
Burstein 105.. 10, we should, -or,: oourse, still expect them to behave 
in the way we have desoribed, in. order to dispel that suspicion. 
36. Beloch 144-6; oriticisfl, by-e. g. rEignett 2) 277-8 and Podlecki 
4) 4. I. ý. _ 
37" Further analysis ofIaspeots: of the political situation in Athens 
between Salamis and Plataia; is included in chapter siz. 
H_, ý, ý ý; 
r .. 4. ý, ý 
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CHAPTER FIVE " ,rf ,- VOTES 
1. First published by Robert 293-316 in 1938. Further work on the 
insoription is noted"by Siewert,, espeoially 5-8. 
2. See the references collected ýby Siewert 3. 
3. See Siewert -47-8. a ..,., 
4. See Siewert 48-51. ° 
5. See Siewert 61-75; a= cf. Meigga"505. Uerodotoa' silence,; however, 
despite Siewert=50-51, still remaina, puzzling, though not, 
decisive. (Perhaps the Athenian defence of, kedizers, °represented 
especially by Themistokles,; inthe 470x, encouraged the Athenians 
to forget this. unfilfilled»oath). ý. : r; ,,. .. -11 
6. see e. g. Meiggs505. '.... 
7. See Siewert 103-4" ",;, ý..... p 
8. As 1'. eiggs: 155-6,504-7,,; cf. ''2) 37-9.,. would.. Without relying on 
the -oontentions, of Cerpenter,:, tho-list; Of ýnine temples and'shrines 
which were rebuilt or: restored'in the decades following 479r- 
recorded by Boerema, (despite"tbe, faot'"tbat he is'prepared to 
accept-an historical the "temples clause'' (51,639 689 99)), does, 
in faut, provide confirmation of Siewert's arguments (102-6) 
against the authenticity of this clause (see Boerema's Catalogue 
42,46,49,52,53,, 64,66,122,125). See also Sievert 111-12. 
Schreiner. 2)-38N37; is not, convinoed-: by., this part: of, Siewert's 
case. Wüst 2)"148,, and, N2 came to precisely the"opposite, con-., 
elusion-to Siewert, -., that the Oath, is false apart from; the 
"temples clause"..: l: organ= 103., also- accepts, the clause., 
9. See chapter eleven- and: N15. 
10. Compare the analyses of-"e. g. '"ATL 102-4, Siewert 91-3 and Brunt 
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153-5t' I find- Bi urºt's most persuasive. 
11. See especially Burn's comments, 545N19 on-Raubiteohek's claims 
9) 179-80. 
12. See Busolt 2)-212-13N5; E.: Meyer. 391N1; ATL 101-49 186-91 
Brunt 153-6; Habioht. 34;. Sealey<6) 194-5; Frost 4) 186; 
Hignett 2) 342; ý Burn, 544-5"', Others who register their rejection 
include Mist 2) -144N2;. Sohaobermeyr. 1) 313N21; Green 275; 
Lotze 270. The aase for authenticity has been put by Larsen, 
1) 177-99 2) 262-4;. ýRaubiteohek 9) 181-3 has argued for a fourth 
century source behind a tradition (not in Plutarch) which claimed 
the Greeks, after Plataia, swore everlasting enmity to the Persians. 
Siewert 89-93 bases his support for authenticity partly on Larsen's 
arguments from; the, alleged. 'double' oath sworn by the Samians (901 
see chapter six N42), =partly on an interpretation of the Hellenic 
League and of; passagee. from Thuoydides which are themselves 
controversial (see also the interpretations of e. g. ATL 102-4 
and Brunt 153-5)" Veiggs 508 thinks "there is probably a genuine 
core to the 'Covenant of Plataea'", though only "a formal 
decision to carry on the war" and arrangements for "care of the 
graves and dues to the gods". 
13. Burn 526. 
14. Burn 526. 
15. See chapter four on the absence of evidence for division on 
strategy in 480-79, which some had believed existed and reflected 
socio-political divisions. A sample of the applioation of the 
eooio-politioal conflict interpretation can be found in e. g. 
Munro 3) 145; Sohaohermeyr 1) espeoially 89-90 and more 
extremely 5) 42-3; Green 210. 
281. 
16. Busolt 2) 200N6 (cautiously); Hignett 2) 321. 
17. Pritchett 2) argues on the basis of Krateros' book divisions 
that the transfer in fact occurred'shortly before Furymedon, 
and so is able to acoept-the tradition found in Theophrastos as 
historical. H. D. Meyer 444-5; Hammond 1) 332,338N2; 1! eiggs 
48 cannot, in any case, be right in assuming that a proposal to 
transfer was made in Aristeides' lifetime but that it was not 
acted upon, because this would not have' illustrated the point 
Theophrastos was trying to make. '-"See further references at 
chapter fourteen N22: '' 
18. Burn 527. 
19. Others who accept the plot include'Prestel 26; - Cbroust 284 and 
N24; Green 253,296N9 (following Burn); and Hands 58 thinks 
it possible, while Frost 1) 120N70 'says discontent "may have 
been of the type desoribed'by Plutarch". - 
-- -' 
ç/- 
i'!. 
ý 
a. ' '` - s' s' 'ya.. . 
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CHAPTER SIX NOTES 
1. Seeley 3) 241 fails to mention that Aristagoras, after 
repeating at Athens the arguments that had been unsuccessful at 
Sparta, was able to add that the t ilesiana were ax-ac-scot, of 
the Athenians. -Perhaps this, and not material benefits was the 
decisive factor in swaying the Athenians ( cfe e. g. rlolski 
2) 36-7). At any rate, however we interpret the emotional 
effect of Phryniohos' 'Capture of Miletos' it certainly had 
nothing to do with booty (H. 6.21). Kinzl 1) 284 also emphasizes 
booty as a motive for Athenian- assistance to Aristagoras. 
2. Justin-Trogus 2.12.25 must be rejected in the face of Herodotos' 
3" 
4" 
5" 
6. 
7. 
8. 
evidence. 
Podlecki-1) 20 is prepared to doubt Herodotos' belief on the 
basis of the Phoenician accusations levelled at Ionian loyalty 
to the King at Salamis.. I follow Xerxes' assessment of their 
performance, who, after all, was in a good position to judge 
(H. 8.90). See too Grundy 414 Note. 
But see the oomments, of. Wolaki 2) 42N42; von Fritz 2) 275N68; 
Hammond l) 311N3. 
Hignett 2)'249-50,. 
It is no longer necessary to defend this explanation of the size 
of the fleets . see Busoll 2). 193N3; Eignett'2)'249-501 Burn 
500 N34,5473- Meigge 331 and Lazenby 2) 272 on Athenian man- 
power in 480.. 
Beloch 53-4,,. cf. 2) 59 " 
There ia,, of course, no, evidence of reinforcements having been 
sent to Leotychides''fleet'of 110 ships at any time in the season: 
283. 
see the references above N6. How and Wells 3901 c f- 395 
claim that the data given by Herodotos are not sufficient to 
explain the move, and that reinforcements sent to Delos (after 
the Spartans had moved into Boiotia) would do so ( cf. L'unro 
1) 341,3) 146-8). Herodotos' silence on such an important 
development would be startling, and so it is better to take his 
evidence at face value. How and Wells 331 nonetheless reject 
the synchronism. Busolt 2), 214N2 has the fleet eagerly awaiting 
news of Plataia at; Delos, though, doesn't explain why news of 
victory should be a reason to proceed against a fleet "fast um 
das Dreifaohe"(215) as their own. ATL 187 think it possible 
that Plataia "inspired the naval forces with a new courage" and 
suggest (187N4) the, synohroniam derives from Phryniohos' 
'Phoinissai'., The latter. suggestion is unconvincing because if 
this was the play, perforred in 477/6 (P1. Th. 5.4) it is hardly 
likely that the poet would portray a synohronism whioh all his 
audience knew to be false, -whatever-the dramatic effect. Further- 
more, we do not know, whether, _the play contained a. 
desoription. of 
3iykale (see chapter nine i88). Larsen 2) 264N23 rejects the 
synchronism. See, too H. D., Veyer 413-141 Gauthier 7. 
90 Cf. Rammond 1) , 316N1. 
10. Hienett 2) 259, rwith further references. 
11. Hignett. 2) 252 apeculates. that. the Samiane also brought news of 
the withdrawal of the Phoenician contingent, that is, somewhat 
earlier than Herodotos (9.96) suggests. 
There is nothing in ,, 
the, souro es which suggests there was any 
division between the Spartan. and. Athenian leaders on the question 
of advanoing. beyond. Delos.; If anything. oan be based on Aerodotos 
284: " 
9.91 then Leotyohides'was certainly not reluctant*' The decision, 
however, was no doubt taken in council, as was normal ( ct. 
Brunt 140-41; H. D. Meyer 408; Siewert 85). IT. D. Meyer 414, 
while recognizing that there are no grounds for seeing the 
Atheniins'as pushing the decision, nonetheless describes the 
situation'in such a way'asrto leave the impression that they in 
fact did, and he thinks that the "einfachste plausible 
Frklarung"of'the advance is that Leotyohides bad to go along 
with them and the'Ionians if Sparta were to retain her credibility 
as hogemon. 
12. For a criticism of'the idea - whioh might have offered a rational 
explanation had it been acceptable that the Greek naval advance 
was intended-to force Llardoriios to`take the offensive in Boiotia 
by causing revolt in Ionia see Munro 3) 147-8 and ßignett 2) 251. 
Kinzl's explanation `1) '284'- booty - begs all the questionsr. 
13. Diodoros' statement (34.3) that the Greek leaders at Delon 
decided to liberate the Greeks of Asia has been rightly recognized 
as aFtendentious elaboration of ITerodotos which deserves to carry 
no" Independent 'authority see e. g. Hammond 1) 318. 
14" See FI. D. Meyer ^424; Burn 553; Fornara 3) 18; Lotze 266N1; 
Kinzl 1) 228. The order was obviously dependent on other 
strategic considerations permitting. 
15. I do not find l'unrols shuffling of Herodotos' chapters attractive: 
1) 342,344. 
16. See chapter three. 
17. Cf. L'unro' a ýoonolüding reflections on Mykales "Was )dyoale a 
big battle ör a-haety raid? designed to liberate the 11ellenes 
of "thetea'stern continent at large or merely to destroy the enemy's 
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last fleet in the Aegean before bin army could come down from 
Sarden? " 1) 344. 
The role of the Greeks in the Persian forces in the battle 
is discussed in, the text below. 
18. The most important analyses are by Righby 39-43 (though the 
whole aeotion 39-57 is relevant); R. D. Meyer 415-24 and 
Hammond 1) 416-21. 
19. See H. D. Meyer 416-7 for a, full statement of the arguments 
supporting this assertion. 
20. Notably E. Meyer 393N1,2) 217N1, explaining it in terms of the 
debates of the Archidamian war. Madan 2) 339 tends towards 
outright refectiong and Ehrenberg 1) 423N104 deeoribee it as 
"probably apocryphal, "; , 
Podleoki 2) 299 4) 6; Sealey 
2) 2279 3) 248. 
21. Nöthe, (referred to by,. Buaolt 39N1); Munro 1) 344 
. 
even aaye the 
proposal "hae. its humorous-side" and, think e it may have only been 
"an argument or"debating point,. in the controversy" (1) 345)" see 
too Hammond 1), 317{_, Hi&nett, 2), 260; Burn 552" 
22. See Parke 2), eepeoially, 95-6. 
_ 
23. This is the best, reading, of the MSS, _though aee 
äignett 2) 260 Ni. 
24. Parke 2) 96. tl. ý 
25. See H. D. ileyer, 415x24. 
-, p I t- -1 1 
26. i; aoan 805_61 Hignett 2) 257; Sealey 2) 226-7. 
27. On Ctf. P alrcEa., see Hignett 2) 257N5. 
28. Correotly,. Sealey 2), 227., 
29. see too Sealey 3); 243.,, 
30. Ephoros probably., included Aiolian contingents (Diod. 36.5). This 
is, of_course,. open, to, suspicion (though no one can disprove 
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Uammänd'sr'suggestion'1) 318 that this item-may derive from 
Hellanikos), " but' I take Herodotos' omission of them not as 
deoisive `(see' Highby" 51-3 j ,' Healey 3) 244)-but merely as con- 
firmation of>his-impreoise knowledge and, impressionistic account 
of the part played by=the'Aaiatio"Greeka in the battle. 
31. It should be noted that Herodotos provides no information about 
what, happened in=the'cities of Ionia'when their contingents 
returned home after the-'battle. '- Ile - says only that the action 
of the-troops at llykale constituted treason'( cf. 3ealey 2) 227, 
3) 243)" Fwe may"doubt''the'appropriateneea-ofAHorodotoe', overall 
judgement, but ^' we=oannot»acoept"the'judgement'and then, bowever, 
apply it-to, `another`iet of. 'putative' events of which his text 
otherwiae'has no hint: "ßammönd 1) 316-recognizes this, °admitting 
that to thelqueation-of-"whether'the"Aeolian and the Ionian 
mainlanders did revolt", from" Persia when the viotories° at 'Vyoale" wwwwww 
and at Plataeabeoame'known"'the "aouroee-give no clear answer" 
( 1)`319), -`°yet: -he is"nonetheless prepared to consider the 
possibility that some=did'revolt and that`'Aerodotos is guilty 
of having, "speeded=up"the'narrative for'dramatio offeot""( 1) 316). 
Gomme`257"oorreotly=relatea'fier6dotoa'. oomment to Mykale, yet at 
295 refers`to"it'ýfor"thejoonclusion'that in'the oitiee there 
followed a political', revolutiont'° cf. 335. -°(For-the baokground 
to loyalty toPersia"in'Ionia-see-H. Schaefer 109_11; cf. Cook 
149 16.. 18; =and=on` the possible°, aooialdivisions refleoted in 
differing-Asiatic Greek attitudes to, Persian ý domination, see 
EIignettv2)- 253 and: Sealey 3). '247). " This' Is not to say that no 
Asiatic}Greek=citie®`underwint a change`of regime in the weeks 
and months following" l! yka1e; ý but it r is wrong to cite Aerodotoa 
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9.104 as "evidenoe for it'(on Thuc. 89 see text below). For 
a detailed analysis'of the'individual cities of Ionia and 
Aiolia see Highby 43-55 (though I do not agree with all his 
arguments or "with the, idea that the 'cities" whioh°`were being N 
considered in'the"resettlement plan must have already rid 
themselves of pro-Persian regimes, (39)). 
There is no evidence for Leotyohides intefering in internal 
Milesian affairs: "-see"chapter ten Ni. 
Soholäre who"believe in a' widespread'ezpulsionof{pro-Persian 
leaders from the}'Aeiatio'Greek cities shortly after l! ykale 
include `Belooh 2)^'601-' E. Meyer 393N1, cf " 456; ii. D. Toyer 
4141 " Meigge 34,464; ° Bayer) and IIeideking 99 " 
32. Munro's belief'l) 344 that the "real'bueiness of the meeting 
was to determine'whether, the'fleet should now go home or to 
the Hellespont" is based 'on 'hie xearraingement of Herodoton' text. 
( cf. above'N15). ", On -Hammond' a -idea ( 1) 316) of what the real 
business was 'see text below. 
33. Kieohie 268 maintains only that the'Spartans and Athenians did 
not differ-in-their-aeeesament of the danger the Ioniano were 
in from"Persia. "H. D. "Meyer 416-17 emphasized Athenian agreement 
in the assessment -of 'the 
`situation. " It will be euggeete+d in the 
text belog that Dic doroal "aooount of the `Samos conference 'ie a 
conflation of Fphoroa and ITerodotoe; if aooepted it means 
Diodoros understood Herodotos in the way we are proposing. 
34" And 'so Highby 419 e. g. gie quite wrong to say "according to 
Herodotos, - the'Atheniane promised`to take upon themselves the 
proteotion'; of 'Ionia": " I find 'Podleoki' a' 4) 6 reaiaon for 
"the'I wondering whether' the Athenians gave onians ... informal"' 
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assurances" difficult to discern. He says the Peloponnesians 
suggested the resettlement. because the "Ionian coast" appeared 
indefensible, but then goes on to say that it may be significant 
that Herodotos reports the inclusion of the "other islanders" 
as allies immediately after this, and he asks if we are to see 
in this a sign of the Athenian assurances that the Ionians - by 
which, aooording`to his comments about the indefensibility of 
the coast, be should mean the mainlanders - would not be trans- 
ported to Helles but could rely an Athenian protection. At 
2) 29 he says that the Athenians are supporting the contention 
that they "had a right to-oount on the loyalty of the Ionian 
Greeks" (which, incidentally, is derived from Themistokles' 
appeal at Artemision, and isýnot expressed at the Samos conference, 
as recorded by Herodotos).,; '"and; (by implication, at least) also 
a oorresponding-obligation. to look after their interests". See 
text below and also chapter three. 
35" Hammond 1) 316- 
36- H. D. Meyer 416»16, '421-2e see below N42. 
37. See A. D. Meyer 415N25. 
38. See Barber 113, -118-20. 
39" It. has been"widelymrejeoted or ignored in modern scholarships, 
e. g. by Kirchhoff r5-61;, Bauer 45N1; Busolt 39 NN 1 and 2; 
8ighby'40; E. Meyer"329N1; '. How and Welle 3331 Eignett 
2)260j. . ATL-1881 , -ILII... Meyer 4151c251 , L'eigge 414; Hammond 
1) 318-19.. -(The textual4tinkeringm of Stoup and Sobwartz (see 
Buaolt 39Nl'for references) have been rightly ignored). 
Since Diodoros -. has =the , Asiatic Creeks as members of the 
League, from, the atart=of: the. oonferenoe he is able to have them 
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take part, in it1 whiohiin reality'. was not the case. Also, 
Diodoros can not, have the. Athenians press for admission of 
the-Asiatic, Greeks at that second stage at which he records 
an Athenian advocacy, of their-defence by the Hellenes. I-am 
concerned with the,, attitude of"the. leaders of the Athenian '<r 
contingent. in 479; to; the question of defence of the Asiatic 
Greeks, and ao, the distinction, between advocacy of defenoe- 
by, means of inolusion-in the, ßellenio League (a modern idea not 
found in anysource), and advocacy of defence an part'of-a policy 
of, the fIellenio", League towards some of its members (so Diodoros) 
is, an unimportant-one whioh"I have, deliberately blurred in the 
texte 
40. Sealey 3) 235, found this; difficulty alone sufficient to dis- ..; 
credit,: all; Diodoros! evidenoerfor the conference. 
41. Herodotean, elements_in, Diodoros; are unlikely to have been derived 
via Ephoros:.: see. Barber 118-20. f_. 
42. H. D. -2Seyer'"s; account of the,, Samos oonferenoe'(416-19) is"in 
part inapired'byý, Diodoros! olaim, of,, alleged Athenian. promiaes 
of, -independent assietanoe%to; the Asiatic Greeks (421)-though- 
his"N25 on 415-gives no. reason to.. trust Diodoros., Without using 
our,. own interpretation,, (see. further text below) of the conference 
an reason, -for, rejeoting, oneµthat"differe,.. I think there are 
independentgrounda for; oondemning, l'eyer's. sooount of the Samos 
conterenoo; as inadequate and improbable. 
He-believea. that_ the inclusion of.,, the-islanders into". the, 
fellenio League 
, represents a, complete victory 
for Athens (418),: 
since her-, main concern-was,, to secure the continuation of the 
naval war. (417) against Persia which the protection of the,, - 
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islands required.:, Thia, also had the effect of thwarting 
Spartan intentions to. pursue a; land war against the Medizers 
in Hellas (418)9 
The notion,. that, the,. Peloponnesians bad opposed the inolusion 
of the islands is remarkably widespread when compared with its 
improbability. (. af.. e. g. Kirchhoff 4 (implied ; E. Layer 
2) 217; Larsen 1) 18; 9,, 3) 14-15; - 
E. D. Meyer 2) 4991 ueiggs 
36,381 Lotze; 266 saysawe do not know whether Leotyohides had 
inhibitions about. accepting, the. ' islanders, but, the reference 
(266N1) to Herodo top, 9.106 (c P° 0 üµws CI f av ace f eiorovv1 cr oL 
c f. below N45): as justification; for his statement that 
"iierodots Bericht. sprioht: eher dagegen" is, misguided, since their 
giving waywasknot on tbe: question, of the islanders but. on that 
of resettling the mainlanders. The other argument be uses also 
suggests that be -believes 
the Spartans did, in fact not desire 
the admission, ofý, theislanders).. _If, Hellas, including the 
Peloponnese and Sparta,, were to remain secure from future Persian 
attacke,, tbe Greeka, bad,, to control ; 
the sea (Thuo. 93.7). The 
Greeks had-now_oleare3; the-Persian-fleet from the Aegean. It 
is absurd to: imaginethat. they now intended-to allow the naval 
bases on the eastern aide of the Aegean to be used by the 
Persians.. for. -a new-naval. build-up,, and that the Greeks should 
withdraw. snd (presumably): defend Hellas'-coasts from Delos again 
for, yeara to come. 
Three. problems. result; from H. D. Meyer's interpretation of the 
acceptence, of the islands into, the: Hellenio. League. Firstly, if 
the admission. of the, islands. represented such a blow to Spartan 
policy,.: why did-they give way on the_question? (On this points, - 
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see `Lott'e "261)`. ' The `aeäumption thit die Toner dabei 
mitgewirkt haben" to tndequte; H. DVeyer "joint s'in 
partic'ular'"to `thesamiäns'who; he `believes (418, following 
Larsen) 1vwere'already members, bringing us "to the second problem. 
I do not understand how`a belief in'the membership of Samoa, 
and' so the League' a "duty "to defend it ,° 
äan 'be reconciled with 
the . claim , that by ° admitting I the 'islandero to the Iiellenio 
League "gleichgUltig .: ' ob 'viele , oder wenige ionieohe 
Gemeinden `duräb'den' IIellenenburid geaohützt werden `mußten" 
Sparta""hatte'ýsein4Prinäip"durohbroohen. " (In faotg though, 
Samos Ras'probably{nota member before being admitted with 
Leaboe', 'Chiös ýetc. ý' `äÜ' Brunt 153-4N21' llammond 1) 317-18N21 
and there is eti11A 1ess ° justification to "oläim that Leeboa, " 
Chios 'etc: ' had been, -sworn into the League before Ltykele, 'ae 
Hoci änd "ells 333 and"de Ste. Croix 380'do) The last objection 
to H. D. `b! eyer'äAinterpretatiön concerns his'sei9 
as a result of-th®'inoluoion-of the islands"' I'von'Bectrafune der 
Perserfrounde'im hutterland, konnte k. eini fade'mehr sein". ' I do 
not knoce, whex }T. D -Meyer dates ! Leotyohidee' oxpedition aCainst 
Theo "l" but }if ý he Fis , wise be will follow the best' dating, to 
late `47 9' (sne"belöw'-876), 'er d an a result'drop'his contention 
about "the 'effect='edmission of -the'ielands'had on' Spartan polioy. 
So we? shönld°rejeot°H. D. Meyer'e'interpretation of the inolusion 
ofrthe'islands'not only=because'it'ie based"on no evidence, but 
also ýbeoäüse"Iit`'in'internälly inconaietent. 
H. D. Beyer aleäý believes `tliät wit)i thö"acceptance of the 
islanders Athenä'becae""Wortführer einer Koalition" of 
"Anhänger"'Who would be' prepared', to. stand up and be counted with 
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Athens against Sparta and the other Peloponnesians (419, cf. 
422,424), as well as some kind of,, leader (the Athenians 
"führten" - 419) of. Asiatic, - 
Greeks-(419-24) to whom the -,. 
Athenians alone, seem to,. have given .a promise of protection 
(421, following Diodoros 37.3). That the achievement of such 
a position,: indeed hegemony, =was a consistent Athenian aim ; -- 
throughout the war is the main thesis-of H. D. Lteyer's paper. 
Accepting, but only, for argument's sake, his framework, it in 
impossible to, sooept that the Athenians, between )Sykale and the 
beginninc of the oonference, had not taken the trouble to 
inform themselves of the attitude of the relevant Ionian cities 
to the resettlement proposals. E. D. Meer auggeets'that the 
Athenians had. gone along with the proposals at the beginning 
r of the oonferenoe. 
beoause, they had-lobviou sly reliedýon the }ý 
Ionians' firm-rejection' (417). ' ITe; imagines tbat-the Athenians 
are suddenly taken by surpriae, by,. the Ionian acceptance of the 
proposals. Such. inoompetenoe; would%be; incredible, and would-, 
contradict E. D. reyer! s own assesament. of Athenian intentional 
if the, Atheniana were aeeking, to_become epokeemen or leaders of 
the . Ionians ae.. the , ýoffery 
to;, proteot, tbe Ionians (Diod. 37.3) 
and the--alleged, championship of, island inclusion (IT. D. Meyer and 
others) wouldsuggest,,. why. did they. not do so from the beginning 
of the conferenoe,; (and in ý, olose collaboration with the Ionians)? 
There is as, little explanation of the contradictory position of 
the Athenians, in,, H. D. - Meyer! s, paper , aa in Diodoros it remains: 
a crux, not to stimulate and challenge the ingenuity of the 
hi®torien'in finding-e, further, hypothesia to add to the pile, 
but to -testify, yet; again , 
to Diotoros', lack of skill. 
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43" For this reason 'Rammond'a attempt to explain Flerodotos' 
failure to mention what-he believes was the Athenian opposition 
to the "non-admission of the mainlanders" at Samos in terms 
of Eerodotos'-"bias inýfavour"of Athens" 1) 317 in entirely 
unconvincing. ' ; Had such"- an, Athenianstance existed at Samos 
Rerodotos' failure`to'mention it would represent a bias against 
Athens. eSince his'biäs'in"favour'of-Athens is not contested we 
should'aooept', his'silenoe'on'the putative stance of the Athenians 
at Samos as evidence that it'did-notý in fact, exist. 
44. Brunt 140- 
C 
45" I prefer to -take Apogü 4i with £Z av o 
(1s. 3, o^ow jo, L, o(, ias Rammond" 1) 317 f' , von Fritz 1) 6021 Wolski 
2) 45 and N54. ".. 
46. I do not go into speculations on the question of Spartan motives 
behind the proposals (nor into,, the'reasons why the Athenian 
leaders at Simos'were: personally opposed). But I note that while 
Lotze 261-62, is, right to question the interpretation of von Fritz 
and others'of it as purely "machtpolitisch", Leotyohides probably 
did, as well as otber`reasone, - see' a -potential increase in 
Spartan power resulting, from-, the'execution of the plan. Lotze's 
argument (261) that Spartan compliance suggests otherwise, in 
not quite-valid here, for4such a`plan"could not have been carried 
out in the Rfaceýofopen-4thenian hostility to it. See too 
Volski 2) 45" 
47. Johnston: 106, s1so seeme`to`think thequestion'of the Ionian main- 
landers was -left' oprens - 
See ATL 190'W171 48* onthis'phrasetland, Blaokman 182 and 117 for a 
discussion of which islands may have been included. 
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49* See e. g. Bauer 44-5" ,, t- s.. ,-r, -. 
50. See von Fritz, comment-l) 601. ,-. f 
51. ATL 191 ( cf. 190 N17). They think the reason for their not 
being admitted at Samoa was that "events at Samos followed so 
closely upon Mykale that,: all the -newcreoruita. 
(islanders and-- 
mainlanders) did-. not have time, to be,. eworn into the League-on 
that occasion". - But Itileton would.. have 
had time, and Herodotos 
excludes the possibility ,, that. any mainlanders were admitted. 
I think; tbie, interpretation-, ie; aleo favoured. by Bauer 45N1, but 
I am-not sure, that rl, understand his note properly. lieigge 413 
and 459 thinks this -in: what, Thuoydides believed, 
but be rejects 
(35 and N4) his,. evidenoe. -Further- referenoes'et"Busolt 68N1 
(who rejects the interpretation). p; _For, 
the possibility that some 
Hellespontine; end island states joined the Hellenic League 
between Samos andýSestos see text:, below. 
52. Righby 41-2 (criticism at, H. D.; Meyer 421N36) with his reference 
to-Nöthe,; who, oamewto the; same reeult. Y.; Belooh 2) 
60. saye, in,.,, 
his oategorioal° way,,,. "mit;, den ; featlündieohen Stddten ... schlossen 
die Athener ein Separatbiindnis",. though heýrefere us in-his note 
( 2)-'60 N1) to Herodotoe_, 9.104 (whioh must be in justification 
of the earlier part ofrbia-: eentenoe". wbiab mentions the 'revolt 
of Ionia'); and, to Leo-(see Beloch loo. cit. for reference) who, 
however, on page 64. in fact follows a'ilamowitz 3) 338N21 in the 
unwarranted, deletion of v, . 
üýý0. )(OL from Thuoydidee' text. 
Despiteýallthie, I, still assume Belooh must have had Thuoydides 
89.2 in, mind, wben, he made; his assertion. See too Larsen 1) 182. 
53. Busolt 0,8ays it is "nicht zu erkennen" whether the "Schutz- 
verhiltnis", was formalized, but in 40 Ni be insists that ý6pp-/a 
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can be taken informally, -, an: Kirchhoff 
9 had proposed. See too 
now and wells, 3331*. -Gome 2571 - Hignett 2) 261-21 H. D. äeyer 
420-23. R.. 
54" Kirchhoff-91% Rammond l), 320,, (who, also, argue a for taking 
ýVtAJAOLyct,,:, : -ý : formally, within . 
the Eellenic Leagues 1) 320-21 
and 321-2N4) makes; the,. best oases Sealey 3) 236 is prepared to 
admit. that there may have been some mainland Ionians, but not 
many, at Seetos, and at 3) 244 insists that the expression could 
refer. exclusively, to islanders; cf.; 2) _ 
2411 this view- is 
implied by Lotze ä26I.. :, 
55" We shall disouss., $Eellespontine allies' in., the text below in 
comparing tha'evidence -of. Iierodotos and Thuoydides. 
56. Only Kirohhoff, 9. in; faot, adhoresto all these points. 
57. Diodoros! oomment; (37.4)ýthat. the 'Ionians and islanders' were 
withathe-"Atbenians. at Seaton is based on his belief that the 
mainlanders; joined . the. 
League.. beforeýthe -start of the Samos 
oonferenoe,, andgrlike, it, (aee tezt, above with N39)9-in worthless. 
58. Cf. e. g., Kirobhoff 91 z, IÜgnett,, 2), 261N6. 
59. Hammond. 1) . 319. ä Sealey, 3 
), 236_. suggests. llerodoton, to following 
a. different: source to Thucydidee. 
60. It ispoasible that-the Athenian envoys at Thuoydides 75.2 are 
referring to , 
this occasion when the say,, 
1e vuý, ý l &pa f c$Iac, °..? V S.. tä:. v ')Lasýc& ; . Toi, -P Pýý, __ ý.. - 
but, I. prefer, to aaaooiate; it with 478/71 
', 
see chapter seven. 
61. Leigga 35N1, cf. , 459 " 
62. See e. g., Kirohho, ff 9;, ATL, 190. .: -,., .ý. 
63. Meiggs 35" w 
64. cf. N51 above. 
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65. iTammond-1)-319`postulates -the -re-formation"of the Ionian 
League; Ido not-believe it was, in fact, re=formed. 
66. Most reoently : by'=do- Ste. ' Croix -175-6, ' 378-9, -who tentatively 
suggests that Themistokles proposed something'like a 'King's 
Peaoe' (7Cen. He11. ' 5.1.31). ; -see also 
E. "Iteyer 4941, von 
Domaszews'di: 91 'IIigrºstt`l)'190; ýAmandry 2101 .. Forrest 2) 208; 
Cornelius, 503..... #F ä ;.. 
67. C. Bioknellýi) 112y(drewing`a'different oonolusion). Beloch 
146 says Themistokles-could-, not`sail east in 479 "da or in 
diesem- kritischen -, Augenblick`Athen nicht. so, - lange fernbleiben 
durfte"g`adding. also that`he"would'only have been able to win 
glory'seoondýto, that=of'»Salamis. ýý There-'is some truth in this 
secondýpointg'. too, ', 'for Themistokles probably would'not have 
inoreased°bia''influenoe'by further military'achievements. 
Rignett-2) 278"says that`Belooh-is "reduced-to" these arguments 
to ezplaintThemistokles"disappearance from Aerodotos' pages, 
tbough, he doesn't explain-wby'he: finds them eo'pitiful. ' 
Schaobermeyr: l)-96; 5)ý: 65-wonders'whether'Themistokles stayed 
in: order'not{torlose further contact with the. demon-, by-being- 
away so 'long 
68. Belooh's, over-oonfiient`attaok (149-54), is notoriou e. - von Fritz 
2) 274N61--described it as a; )üsterbeispiel-übergeocbeiter - 
moderner. Kritik':. a' IIammond -1) '312N4. said the . theory; "pae. en my 
comprehension". ", von Stern`aleo'attacked Thucydiden account, 
while E. Ueyer=454N19: 3)1 Busolt 3) and Gomme; 267-70 defended(, 
Thuoydides and: eet out some methodological principles. Fornara 
3) 17N21; bowover,, häe `recently }expressed agreement with some 
of"Beloch'a suspioiona. There are also eoholars'who accept the 
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story in essence but suspect some of its details. 
69. Boerama'45-6 has'attempted a more detailed reconstruction of 
the various stages of the rebuilding of`the wall. 
70. As emphasized by Bueolt 45N16and. de Ste. Croix 167-8. 
71. Plutarch (Th. 19.1) mentions in particular Polyarohos of Aigina. 
72. Belooh 151-2 made muoh of thing "and, Gommey269-granted"that there 
was some substance to the"argument that Sparta bad little to 
fear from'a walled Athena: 'Lotseý258=60'emphasize a that Sparta 
did not seem ae'engaged as-:. we 
'should 
expeot from 's state with 
"fimperialiatieohen' Zielsetzungen" (260) describing'herfletance,, 
not inaccurately, ae "nacbgi Oig"(261): -°Seä too'E. Walker 351 
French 2) 110`(an""inezplicably neglected-article). 
73. I would- take'thewords of the Korinthiana at Thuoydides 69.1 to 
refer'to the-Spartans having allowed the Athenians to strengthen 
the power of their "oity', throughout t the Aegean (Tý4_ W6, Iv jc. t2 
rather 
- than simply strengthen 
the-walls of 'the oity. ''Büt°the latter"iä possible-and would be 
evidence that-in 432 ýSparta'axalliee implied that they had 
wanted her in`479. to-do more°than"ahe, did-to"prevent the rebuild- 
ing of the=walla. That-would still not be`evidenoe that anyone 
in 479 exoept; 'the" Athenians' really-believed`Sparta would invade. 
74" Eolm (referenoe`at Busolt"45N1) thöught--Themistoklee' aotiona 
unnecessary, though he, `offer'edýdifferent ezplanatione. Busolt 
rejected" his opinion T_ 
P'V 
only` bäaause' öf'previous Spartan 
adventurism. 'For" an'nnalysie'of the other sources on the walls 
incident se® Bäuer A l06-=10* °' 
75" By"e. g: WilämöwitzFl)}138N27 cY. °124N4i 'E. Beyer 453N1,490N1; 
Bu olt 85N2; -Beloch"148-9;; "G omme µ3ö5; ý- `Bengtson 2) 91; Waist 
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1) 62142; White 145N21; Lotze 265. - 
76. Scholars who recognize the historicity of. the story's setting 
include pilamowitz 1) 138N27; 'Bueolt 85; Belooh 192 (see 
Gomme's comments 400 Ni); E. Walker 466; Uighby 89; Johnston 
1061' Wßst 1) 621White 145N211 Lotze 265; Ueiggs 491 
though not all date it to'479, the most obvious date against 
which there are no insuperable objections ( cf. Pause 3.7.9" 
Bayer-Heideking 106-7 give a selection of modern dates for the 
expedition). TThuoydides-(89.2) says the Peloponnesiane 
Jxq- (cä p 10-ev 17. X 'ý , -o 
K-00 
. This, of course, is 
true even though, they, broke their journey at Pegaeai. The 
unsuccessful adventure was not of sufficient moment or relevance 
to'allow Thuoydides to mention`itl see, too Lotze 265. It is 
also possible that the fleet returned., to Aigina before setting 
out again in the same (479) season, as E. Walker 33 states, 
though it was. late in the season. - The argument that the 
expedition must have immediately. preoeded the end of Leotychides' 
reign (which was in 469/8. -. see e. g. Clinton 261; E. Meyer 
2) 507; Belooh 190-92).. is not compelling. The absurd story 
of how Leotyohides was caught is almost certainly a fabrication 
(pace Parke 1) 106 and Ni) and as such could have been trumped 
up at any time after the event. Since Herodotoe believed in his 
guilt, be naturally. presumed tbe: trial took place immediately on 
his return to Sparta ( cf., E.. W'alker 466). 
Diodoros' erroneous date for the end of Leotyohides' reign 
is 476/5 (48.2). It is possible that Diodoros has simply con- 
fused the arohonship of Phaidon with that of the name of the 
archon be believed to have held office in 469/8, Phaion (63.1), 
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as suggested by Krüger 1) 151-, and more recently Andrewes (in 
white 145N21, followed by smart-136). A more satisfactory 
explanation, however, is that-Diodoros has recorded, not, as 
he thought, the end of Leotyohidea'_reign and his death, but 
the date of his flight to Tegea., (II. 6.72). This explanation is 
favoured by e. g. 'wilamowita-1) 147N42; -. Buaolt 83-4N1; Gomme 
4061 Perke, l) 1101, Johnston 111. 
, 
On the oomposition of the fleet, see below N84. {. 
77. The variant - tradition reoordedby Cicero 
(de Off. 2.49; Cf. 
Val. Max. 6.5. ext. 2) in which Themistoklea proposes burning 
the Lakedaimonian fleet anchored at Gytheion may represent a 
conflation of-, this and another, Thea2istoklean proposal (see below 
chapter. eleven) or maybe simply a slip. 
78. Eu Solt 85N1; Diodoros 41.2e; Siýö_ ctL.. _t-Lc. 
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Rhodes l)-41N2. tacitly recognizes that the process described 
by Diodoros over the Piraeus fortification is essentially the 
same as that over Themistokles' proposal to burn the fleet, 
though be refers not to Plutarch's account but to Cicero's. 
79. I think this is obvious81vough from a reading of the whole 
{ 
section 41.1 - 43.2 to require no discussion. 
80, The addition by Ephoroa of Xanthippoa to, Ariateidea, as found 
in Plutarch (Th. 20o2, -'Ar. - 2292), may be merely in conformity 
with-an Ephoran fabrication (Diode 27.3* cf,, chapter four and 
N6). intended to add verisimilitude= but see further text and 
1 N83 below.: Ä.. -- 
81. This was reoognized by Bauer 111N2. I am prepared to admit only 
a remote-possibility that Plutarch's story is a modification of 
Ephoros' or a version upon which Ephoros is dependent; not so 
much beoause, 'theýeecret proceedings in Plutarch are an integral 
part of the-story whereas in. Fphoros they are extraneous but 
because it Lis hard-to-imagine a later source inventing the 
obscure details of Plutarch's version. 
82. 'Bauer-111N2.1; On Stesimbrotos' anti-Themistoklean attitude, see 
now Feister -282. 
83. ýDioloross(42.5-6), an well, as Aristeides and Xanthippos (both 
strategoi in.; 479/89-H. 9.28, -114), has the Boule secretly judge 
a: set of proposals. , 
Proposals disoussed. by the Boule in secret 
session . are: well-attested$ aex e. g. de Lair 26 and N761 Rhodes 
1)-. 41°(who shares the general suspioion, of the historicity of 
Diodoros* aooount). ' 
84. But Amandry 215`-and-Lenardon, l). 33'seem to-take the story 
seriously. -"T(Amandry°loo. oit. does not give. the eouroes he is 
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drawing, on, but; sinoe: he, says, Themistokles. propoaed burning 
a Spartan fleet at-a Thessalian, port he in combining Plutarch 
(Hellenio: fleet,. in 
tPagaeai),. 
with Herodotosý(Lakedaimonien 
expedition to_-Thessaly)_and/or! Ciosro", (Lakedaimonien, fleet at- 
Gytheion). Herodotoa!,. foousing,. attention_on the, -Spartan element 
in; the. Hellenio, fleet; ie; no more; 
-signifioant 
than his omission 
of other, allies with, the, Athenians at Santos (, cf. IIighby 89). 
w, ,,, Kagan 58, although hefinds; Plutaroh! s story- "auspeot", thinks 
it nonetheless,; "possible'!. r; - _, ;. ý, r, - 
85. Though;, Ephoroe'_, seerat1 meeting, over. the, wall a is probably based 
only: on, Thuoydides'k,,, 
ÜýE17CCiý. 
_..,.. a(90"48~see Pfister 382); but 
it we are, -to, aocopt, Thuoydides'ýaccountýof, the walls incident, even 
in outline, we mustassume a degree: of-seoreoy over: Athenian 
intentions. * ,4'.:. Y... . 
86. See chapter.. nino; N10. 
87. This, inýat, least: the. - fairly, clear-, implication. of. the, lines;,. = cf. -,;. -- 
G. W.; Williama-3) 59ý: Sohaohermoyr. ~4) 821 eee'. too ohapter seven; -, 
N67--,.. 
_ , ýt :.. K_;. .. °, ': 
88. See ahaptery ninee; 4 
89. Though,. Rhodes 2), 148; suspeots; that, theYtwo,. men'were, aligned-°, yý, 
together.. throughout the: 470e. y t 
90. See- the; survey.: of;,, modern4 sobolarship by_Kluwe ., 3) and, indeed, 
his own comments, at2)9 especially, 65* ..., CP., i; usioleký especially, 
315 (Iram notksure; that,, I Pullt', understand-the". main, thesie,, of 
this paper,,, but, itäoontaina'a great deal, that. ahould: be, rojeoted). 
91. In,, keaping, with, our* general: oonolueioniare, the, impliontiona 
regarding; the, relationship between tho demon -, and: its'; leaders of 
the-fact that 
, even°during: thesperiodrof.,, evaouation the Boule and 
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Assembly were funotioning, normally, (H. 9.51.: see de Laix 26N73) 
end. of the fact. that, an office= of. :ý a7cFO-Zv ra5- aü zo v-paxtzp 
did not exist during the Persian war (see e. g. Dover 2) 72-31 
Burn 491 and 492x121`r°Fornara 3). 12.16; tBicknell 1)'111 and N6; 
Badian 5N11); a'nor-does the evidenoe: require us to postulate any 
eztraordinary, positionýfor. Athenian`generalsg as Hammond 
1) 378-82 doeel ct. -Hignett'1)-218. . `f 
92. We shall tentatively'suggest. sn'answer: to-the question of. how 
effective his ploy. was in', forming., Athenian opinion on the direction 
of Athenian foreign polioy inrohapter nine.: 
93" The notice is accepted by"most commentatorav Wade=ßery and, M$ritt 
187; ' Korrieon and°R: T: lWilliame'225; ''Frenohýl) 94; " Kagan 58; "ý 
Blackman 203°and''N73,213; ý: -: Meigae`262-3,, Rhodes 1)'115 
advises caution j -: r see , too -. Podleokl, 2) 111 ý" `. ' 
94" Cf. . Cawkwall 44; ', Podleokiý2),. 34. ' ..,.. r =. 
95" Thirty.. ships, (Thuo. '94.1; "? Diod. 44: 2). ý£For an attempt to reoonoile 
Thucydides'and Diodoroe' figures for-the non-Athenian=contingents 
seeýHammont 1) 323N1I--. seeitoo, ü. D. Meyer-425N41; :. Lotae-270N1. 
96. In Athens pylegorei''were eleoted2 . °cf. "Mtiet"2) °135. -r 
97. Bengtson' 2); :. -Flaoeliere , 19-28: - ATL". 1051'and ýN46, - 302N6 aooopted 
the story without knowledge`of the`-work^-ofBengteon or, Plaoeliere. 
98. Podleokil a=opinion =ia ourioualy ambiguous. " At' 2) ý 29b* says the 
" a0count "ie'not in, itself` implausible" and would, appear'-to: "aooept 
its"historicity, $at `>least in essence", while at"'4)''2N3, which was 
published in theeame year-(1975)`as 2) he dubs it'-"an altogether 
dubious episode"-, (which, "I-"'suppose,, needn't-refer to: its 
authentioity. but'-wouldýbe most-natural': to take. it so). Sealey 
2). 266N6 in suspioious. ý For 'a`-less' reliable =aooount of further', - 
303: 
diplomatic attackaýon Spartan pretensions, see Pseudo- 
Demosthenes (59.96_8), disoussed- (and° aooepted) by Wolski 1) 829 
919 2) 39.. 
99 0 See Lotze 264. as Ste. ' Croii-174N25 notes that spring 478 is 
preferable "beoause Themistooles' aotivities at Sparta over .. e 
the walls ... ALL in, the, Ninter°of ý 479/8 ý' are more easily under- 
standable if he had not'already'antagonised the Spartans". The 
complex 'of events eurrounding`the walls incident; however, began 
F_>19 X after the withdrawal of the Pereiane (Thuo. ' 89.3 
and no Themistokles°almost'oertainly went to Sparta before the 
ý'" Amphiktyonio Counoil,, anyway. -, Bengtson ý2)'92'and Flaoeliere 22 
consider both 479'and 478, possible. ATL 105N46 say "probably 478". 
302R6-4781- "perhaps 478'-'; NCawkwel1.46 favours cf. Poleki 1) 91. 
Argumenta'baaed on`-a°csusal conneotion. between the Amphiktyonio 
proposals and-Leotyohidee', -expedition'are quite inoonolusivot 
see Gomme 365; -mist'; 1) 64; ý ' Lotze 264=5. 
100. Themistoklea'-etanos, has been äbaraoteriaed an an'early expression 
of'an`Athenian, "Amphiktyönio=polioy"ýtraoeable down to beyond mid- 
centurys ý ise'ATL 302261'"Raubiteohek 11) 40; - Meiggs 174-5. 
Lotzel efargnmenta'262-3" ( Cf. `Keil' 70) are at their weakest 
over SpärtanVintentiona`at''the"Amphiktyonio äounoil. y Be admits 
(262N1). that'Themistokles'"action'wae"maohtpolitiaoh'. ' 
101. The hints of Themistokleä'Linterest"°inýthe west should-be seen 
in'terms of developing e"military as well as trading partnership; 
4 the evidence'is collected', and'Fdimöuesed'by e. g: Macen4451-2'and 
de Ste. Croix 378-9. `For*a cautious -interpretation eee Mattingly 
1)'202-4"' Despite GauthierY31=2='I'em"not°prepared'towbaea °`' 
anything on theýaneodote'in Plutarch'(Tb.. 25.1) in which Themiatoklee 
304" 
attacks Bieron at Olympia., Gauttler: argues that. Aelian (V. 1I. 9.5)ý 
who has Themistokles, motivated by. the,,. tyrant's. inadequate 
assistance during the: Persian. war, -may, correotlyfrepresent 
Theophrastos or an.. earlier source. 
102. üuxley 2). L. ").. ', " I, .. -.,. 
103. As Gomme-438 does, and as believed; byrLenardon 1)'127. 
104. Wilamowitz. 4): 152N1. even-olaimed-it, was. "gewiss urkundlich" and 
many scholars do not even mention the scholiast's version (e. g. 
BÜeolt -129 , and Hl , 
(with.. his cross. references); - as Ste. Croix 
379)" See also D. M. Lewis' comments 1) 416. 
105. Gomme 438, cf. 62; Podleoki 2) 40 also suspects Plutarch's 
version may be "mere guesswork". 
106. Lenardon 1) 127. I have been unable to read the article by 
L. Piccirilli "Temiatoole EWECT z1s dei Coroiresi". referred 
to by Lenardon 1) 234N200 as, apparently, one who shares the 
suspicion of Plutarch's explanation (Lenardon's N199 should refer 
to H. 7.168, not 8.168). Burn's suggestions 293-4 do not provide 
grounds for preferring Plutarch's version. 
For our purposes, of course, it is unimportant to decide what 
the real reason for the grant may have been. It is not unlikely 
that both events offered by antiquity as explanations were 
historical (which would mean Plutarch's would take chronological 
priority), and both could be, though neither need bei in fact, 
the grounds for the award. 
107. On the chronology, see Lazenby 238-9. Andrewes 2) 304N13 finds 
unnecessary problems in the programme for 478. Balser 1) 106 in 
wrong when he says the fleet in. 478 liberated "coastal cities 
from Persia"; his references to Thucydides and Diodoros in N5 do 
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not say this. Diodoros (44.1) is wrong, to judge by 
Pausanias' actions and by the 'Tendenz' of Ephoros, to say 
Pausanias was ordered by Sparta to free the Asiatic Greekss 
see Hammond 1);. 322. '. - 
108. cl. Lippold 324.;: Lang 1) 82, though, thinks that Pausanias 
1. (reflecting Spartan policy) brought accusations of Medism upon 
4 himself by his 
lack, of : enthusiasm for extending the war of 
liberation. z,..., 
109. See chapter. seven"on the circumstances of the transfer. 
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CHAPTER 3EYER NOTES' 
1. But see chapter' ten', for some'comments., 
2:. For difforent`explanations, see, Balser, 1)'111; Andrews a 2) 950 
3. See chapter four N16. t -. 
. MGr 
u( 4. Podleoki-4) 6., " 
5. Larsen 1)'181 and. Kagan 39 appreciate`-that'the Athenians were  
not, quick to aooept the offer. -Kisoble 269, "by contrast, thinks 
the-offer-was a; mere formality. " Polski 2) 41 says in the 
negotiations ýthe-Athe nians emphasized-their tribal'aff inities 
(with --the. Samians). " Phi e is: nowhere"attested.: Plutarch 
(Ar. 23.4) 
also suggests that the Athenians delayed before giving the°die- 
attested allies'=a positive°-response. 
6. Iolski-2) 47N62 is wrong when-he'says' Diodoros'calls'them Spartans. 
7. Larsen l)`181N4. notes'it, but'it"la widely ignored, ; 'even"by the, 
usually'exhaustive-Busolt*(67N4): '=Podleoki"4)`8`notea the version 
and- draws-- the. right'conolusion (see: text below) : "-''1=''; 
8. Herodotos'-evidence will be discussed further in the text below. 
9: - On the"date-see chapter six and N99" 
10. The Importance of Kimon's role"in`the; tranefer is emphasized by: 
Kieohle 278. and, ýBalcerl. l)'105; -ý. 
ý. ur 
11. At-the formation`of'the new,, Athenian'allianoe-the. ritualldumping 
of iron'. lumps into, the`: seaý(AP. 23.5),, almost{certainly=testifies 
to-the--permanence 6f the alliance (despite'. V: 'MartinJ52, Note and 
recently Jaoobson). wbich in turn should cause no aurprise since 
it represents a*reaffirmätion°'of-'tüe; assessment of: the military 
situatiönýin"mainland-Ionia°made'by-the#ßreeks: at $amos, in 479" 
Cf. 'Brunt 1511 . 'Kieohle 275N351"'1'eigge`463. -=:,: 
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12. The position of the disaffected allies and the Peloponnesians, 
and the possible Athenian response to the proposed new alliance, 
will be discussed later in the chapter. 
13. F. Meyer, 458V2,, believed that the story of Ouliadee of Samoa 
(a genuine Saurian name: see the reforenoes at Meigga 42N2) and 
of Antagoraa of Chios recorded by Plutarch (Ar. 23.5) may derive 
from local chronicles. He is followed by Wolski 2) 41 and N36. 
H. D. Beyer 429-30 N51 ( cf. 2) 499); Kagan 39;. Lippold 324 
accept the story for the wrong reasons. Larsen 1) 181N3 rejected 
it. I incline towards accepting the story, though not Aristeides' 
part; in it-(see Kiechle 268-9N15). Pausanias was leaving 
Byzantion ( 
_xpo 
EK. X)£o u o'av ) at the time of the incident, 
and-. the,. faot that he threatens punishment for the future- 
(-- ý> 1w Xe vcj ) Suggests be oould not postpone his 
L 
present, journey, which suggests the summons to Sparta. The story 
thus tits with Thuoydides' evidence. But there ciay. well have 
been a less dramatic and more widespread demonstration. as well 
as this incident. 
14. Cf. ATL; 192N31. 
15.. Kieohle, -280 is wrong to say that in 478 "daß sich ... in der 
hellenieohen Flotte Kriegsschiffe sowohl der Insel- wie der 
Festlandioner: befanden, überliefert Thukydides sogar auadrtLoklioh". 
In - N52 .: he ý: says Thuc . 95.1 includes mainlanders "offensichtlich". 
See Hammond, l) 323 and N2 whose interpretation keeps striotly 
within . 
theievidenoe. 
16. Dioioroe, 44.6 says. only that some Peloponnesians. returned home 
before Pa usanias, (i. e., deserted). Those who take him as 
indicating that: this was the point, at whioh they all, sailed home 
308" 
do not accept the information Iaa"reliables See Sealey 3) 253N7; 
Meigga 52N2. Thucydidea'(95.4) could be taken as"implying that 
unlike the disaffeoted`allies the Peloponnesiana returned-'home 
with Pausanias; it was probably rather late in the season 
anyway (pace ATL 192N29). The absolute chronology is not very 
important, but everything points to-late 478 for the date of 
Pausanias' recall; for some-differing opinions and discussion 
sees Belooh 182-39 186, "2) 61; Bueolt 65N1-(the point about 
Thracian trips in mid-winter'is"valid, if not that about letters 
to the King), 69N1; ' ATL 191-3; Woleki 1) 78; ' Baloer 1) 106, 
111; Lippold 324N16; ' Rammond 325N1; 'Fornara 2) 265-6; 
Lazenby 238-9; Bayer and Reideking 205-6*: -' 
17. The Athenian reaction to his''propoeals'is discussed at the end 
of this chapter. 
18. Kirohhoff 18, followed by Holzapfel 128-91- cf. Bu colt 4N3, 
89N4,96-7N11 Wilamowitz 1)`145 and N40; flighby 95-6. 
19. $ee`Belooh 187:. 8; E. Meyer 2) 63-59-' -c-f- Geschichte don 
Altertums 456H21" 'E9 Walker "4671 `flereward`47 (whose suggestion 
of'a third oapture is unneoessary - see'text below). 
20. ATL 206N55; Sealey 3) 251" 
21. Vloodhead 10-12. 
22 Sealey 3) 251-2. -'See too Lazenby 239N14. 
23: Meiggs 463. 
24. Steigaa 463. .; ý. ; 
25. Lazenby 236. If Gongylos was acting in his own interests he' 
will have done well`t6'make off with only some, not all, the - 
captives, for the sake ofinconapioüouaness paoe Holzapfel 128. 
26. See'Lazenby 239N14 for another possible explanation. 
309" 
It., I do not, incidentally,, accept Seeley'a suggestion 
(. 3); 252-3) that_the, Peloponnesians sailed home in disgust 
at Kimon's distribution., There is no, evidence of anything 
like this in the- sources*. Nor do I aocept, even that "a 
dispute about booty was, likely., to arise". ( 3) 252). -It; would 
not have been unduly. diffioult to, agree that it would-be fair 
to, divide the Byzantion, booty, among all present, since all had. 
contributed. tothe capture. To make this simpler, it maybe 
that those who; had. taken part. in, the Sestoa siege as well-, would 
be taken as. one,. unit. .. The ; Peloponnesiansýhad probably: reoeived'. 
their quota before Kimon's distribution. took place (E. , 
Yeyer$2)' 
65. off ers a aimilar". explanation). This,, probability is reinforced 
when we remember that Kimon's distribution was fit ty-fifty; - -- 
between Athens and_the: rest, whioh. cannot, be. a division among 
all the members of. the Hellenic League, but is eminently 
reasonable. among Athens and-. the non-Peloponnesian element., The 
impetus to 
; 
divide the spoils , was : probably, gthe recall 
*, f. ". 
of, Pausanias. Having received their share, the Peloponnesian 
contingent most: probably. sailed: home with Pausanias -' cf. 'N16, 
above. ., z . 
27. 34e1ggs 4607" 
28. Meiggs 
, 
463; Sealey'3) 252" ; .... . `ý t r. . 'a., 
29" Cf. references, at N18 above; Is Walker- 467 is, also categorical Tr-t4 
in , requiring a context, where Kimon is not merely., in r joint 
command with Aristeides. Cf. Hereward'a objections to Sealey's 
context (46).,,. woodhead 10 
-and 
11 played this dorm, and Lazenby 
239N=14, thinks, there are. "a variety of reasons" why_. Kimon, "may 
have got-the job".. 
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30. The fact that Kimon -returned `home four months 'after theRdis- 
tribution with gold; to"spare rules out,, the': second 'capture' of 
Byzantion; -from, Pausaniaa 
(Thuo. 131.1), 'ae'a possible, setting 
for the distribution; -' POxyýXIII, '' 1610 (Pr.,: 6), whioh'may-derive 
from'Ephoroa (doubts$ 060 Africa - 87)x` says. that : the "Athenians 
went from Byzantion to, Fion. = That ", Pausaniso'bad'already'been 
evioted when they-left ., for-Eionshould be assumed`in, the absenoe 
of: better. evidence -, to ý, tbe oontrary (;, cP. - e. g. w'olaki -1) _ 791 
Smart'138N51r. Blamire 300 N17V. =Lazenby_239; pace Fornara 
2)-2701 .. Lippold"`362;; 339-41V, _=°Rhodes 3), 3971-`= Maiges 468) which 
is not constituted lby Justin . 9.1.3 -(keep. reading). The, siege' of: -: 
Sion--almost oertainly'lasted more than four monthe; (eeo ohapter 
eight), -and to'. judge`by the, gift. of 12T. by Menon=of Pharealon 
(Den 23.199)=Kimonýnot. only. didýnot, have gold left over for 
the city but bad-run, out before=the end of theeiegep Bucolt 
102_3N1 noted'-thät? the booty.,, money muathave. run`out-but-failed 
to draw attention toýtheioontradiotion<this, oreatea with the Ion 
fragment.; "_°. _:,. 
"-ý-'A'4urprisingly impressive {list of reoent. eoholara have taken 
, '`ý up=and tried-'-to° extend the 'arguments of : an' earlier generation 
of scholars (see-referenoes at Busolt' 96N1; cf. Belooh 186-71 
`°. E. °Meyer 5486-7B2)'which conclude'-, that we should respect Justin's 
authority) (loo. ioit. ).. His', evidenoe, °, however, oan`oarry very , _.,;:,: 
little weight see-Wilamowita', l °, 145-6N40 Busoll. 6- Nl 
Highly, 97-8; ,,, Gomm 399-400; Lazenby 239r, , Andrewes . 2) 94, 
303N8)Besides, being. in°<confliot with, Thuoydides (131 -13 it 
in not natural tounderstand- the, Kai,,, conneotion andesignating 
a gap-of seven=or so4yeara:; v cf. -Busolt: 96Nl; IIighby 91; 
ýý ý- 
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Podlecki 5) 304), the fact that''Justin was half asleep when, 
he epitomized this section of*Trogue, Fcontrary to: the opinion 
of E. ' ]! eyer, 2) 60-61N3, ' really does minimize the value of the 
whole passage. "Thucydides 
(98.1) says the" first action of the 
"Athenian alliance was the besieging of Sion:..: To judge by the 
fact'that`Pausaniae had one ship (Thuo. `128.3,131.1), his e 
expulsion will not have been more than. an escort from the cityi 
: (the comparison with -the , siege'in , the sanctuary.. 
(Thuo. 134.2), 
occasioned by the use of, ' t KAO o(K 
Ew 
~ for both is 
useful - see , comme 433). It 
may, have been considered tar, too 
minor an event to be'listed by Thuoydides.; 'A further explanation 
may be that the escorting of Pausanias"occurred-before the 
ewearing `of oaths which marked : the'formal inception "of : the 
Athenian alliance; The revivalists, ' initially Fornara'2)-267-71 
and, Lippold 339-41, are now-supported by Lang 1) 79N6; smart 
137-8; Rhodes -3) '397;, ' Leiggs 446-8. ", Podleoki 5) 
`304 , seems . to 
be withdrawing his earlier -mild support (=2) '198N19). 
31. de Ste'. Croix 171N13 thinks Thuc. 75.2 ;. "ie very relevant". <to '. 
, the transfer, but doesn't analyse the implications. 
32. Lotze 267N2 -thinks the ýezpression . of`fears of corruption 
derives 
from later 'accusations. tk 
33. -The'preoise constitutional relationshipnbetween; the`Hellenio 
- "League and -. the`Athenian-allianoe. 
in -not important for. our=purposes. 
'34" iThe"verb"used in this 
. way needn'-t'always 
havean implication of 
deception discovered - see _Thuc. 4.81.2. : For! the, idea of ; `.. `, 
observation 'containeet'in the 'primary, meaning . 'of, Pero option sea 
Thuo. 8.1Q4.1. ß The wordfahould, beinterprated'inetbe light#of 
'the explioit'statements at 75.2 and; 95.6. -; , ;, 
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359 Scholars who are - prepared,. to modify, Thuoydides' statement on 
the Spartan attitude to`the, transfer inalüd®H. D.: Meyer 434-6; 
Ehrenberg 1), 189; Cawkwell 46; Balser-1)'111; {; Lotze 269; 
aeiggs 40-41; `, Lazenby, 243; '4ndrewes 2) 95. 
36. See e. g. Belooh 61-2; --"Larsen, 1)1841 E. Walker 391 Wolski 
1)x92; -Cawkwell` 46; t von- Fritz -1) 605_6; 1' Hammond 1)"-325N2. ` = 
37. von Fritz 1) 606. r tü .. - ý. "a 
38. Of: the`few scholars who_aooept Thuoydides'ýatatement without 
modifioation, V, Martiný151 believes-the Spartans were aware that 
they } were ` ill-equipped' to r lead - the war; 'cf. Brookmeyer 40N13. +. w 
Wolaki 2) 45 accepts, but finds the Spartan'ättitude strange, 'and 
goes on-to explain it in-terms of, Leotyohides' failure`in 
-Thessaly. and, 'problems'-in theýPeloponnose. Lippold 323N13 drew 
the'-right oonolusion, on Spartan'-interestin-the leadership of 
the war after ýPausaniasl"recall: 
39" See-e. g. H. D. '° E1eyer 4351 Kagan 39; Blamire 298; -Baloer' 1) Ill; 
Lotze, 267, -2691'>. Lazenby 241. (Kahretedt's view-(322.324) that 
other-Spartan commanders were sent"out`after Dorkis is untenable 
andhan, found no support 
40". Unless, ýot, oourse, we assume a) that the Spartan (and so 
presumably Peloponnesianl,, too)-foroes remained= atý, seahall, winter, 
whioh`in-highly, unlikely cf Eammond 1) 325111; VN16 and 26 
t, above;. " or b) that: Dorkis{was"sent out immediately on Pausanias' 
-recall; =Thuo. 'ý95.7'suggeststome' that; it'was"only. afterý-'ý 
Pausanias' trial that. another-commander-wae'eent out, and that 
Thucydides'ia emphaaizingýthat the'Spartana did not send 
fi Pausanias =-: although'he``left at`ýapproximately`the approix'imately`the, same', time' 
büt=Dorkis. But I wouldnottryto`ýpreeä'anyääent"ot the 
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absolute chronology. of 478/7; see Bayer and Heideking 105-6 
for a selection of modern opinion onýthe dates and the 
references above N16 on the date of-Pausanias' recall*-, *. (Lang 
1) 83 sees the dispatcb, of, Dorkis as'a cover-up, of -attempts to, 
secure a settlement with"Persia). 
41. The alternative reading found inýthe Codex Parisinus 1642 gives- 
vov v-rv --and since 'Rindort it `has been adopted by 
most editors. It reduoes the emphasis on active support but' 
does not alter the meaning ' fundamentally" "! '° 
42. On Hellenotamiai'-see Woodhead 2). 
43. The notice has been-neglected; lde Ste. Croix dismisses it as 
of'. "little value"; `=Rammond'1) 325N2`minimizes its-worth, but 
Kagan 377 reoognizes its value. '.. " ' 
44 " Sealey 3) 253N8= suggested' translating WP o9 a-a' 1 `" ; ', here-as' 
"occasion". But see Andrews a, 2)-302N3. 
45", That-the interpretation'of the transfer as a-clever Athenian ," 
ruse was not considered' incompatible in'the anoient'tradition 
withrthe fact , of Spartand support for it' is shown' by Plutarch's 
juxtaposition ofboth= at Ar. 18.1 and 6. , - 
46« Cf. last note. 
47" Gomme-2729, followed-byATL-192N30; ' Meiggs 40M2. `de Ste. -Croix 
171N13ý'thinks he`"may be-right". 
48., Dr. >Barron in-Ehrenberg l) 427N8. ` "- 
49" Hammond 1) 325N2. ý`. Others who"doubt Gomme'sýtranelation include 
R. D. 'I2eyer 435N61 and, ýrecently, 'Rhodes-2)148. 
50 " See Lotze 269. (On AP- 24"lF see =below N56)'#, -'-, 4-, 
51. The-point is made most"olearly'by Lotze 268 and, - as' Ste*` Croix 
' 171'. See too von Fritz, 1)' 606j'-2)`276N781--- Andrews e: 2) 94'', r°ý 
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52. As, far as I know, this point has -not. 
been used, asan argument 
Yor. redating the Hetoimaridas debate. ý. x 
53. The-debate's historicity, was generally', dismissed by. earlier 
scholars (e. g.. Busolt 71N2; E. Meyer 459N1p; 483N1; though not 
ezcluaivelys see Unger, 9O), but;, witbout; good reason,, (see,. de, Ste 
Croix 170); Veig; s 40-41 is still dubious.... Vist 1); 66-7 accepted 
it, in essence before its convincing defence, by Kagan= 378-9, c f. 
51-29 arnd, ae Ste. Croix 171, both of whom seized on the 'lame 
hegemony' image and related it to the quotation from Kimon preserved 
by. Ion fr. 14 (ep. ; Pl. K,,, 16., 8),, which for, me- is, the, decisive 
argument in favour, of historicity. I_ think it is fair,, to, say that 
today it is orthodox to accept the debate, _recogniaing 
that,,., - 
elements have been. dietorted (notably the unanimity of, opinion, 
before Hetoimaridae' apeeob(5O. 5)). SeeForreBt 3)y11 for an ., 
attempt. to, place the debate. in , 
the context, of, Spartan constitutional 
procedure,., and D. M. Lewis 1). 41445ýfor the suggestion that this 
and other elements in Diodoros mayäbe: baeed: on Charon*__ 
, 
54" Redating. the. debate. to 478/7-is very common. Soholara usually 
point out that=50.1 (475/4); could join onto, 47.3 (477/6 - 
Diodoros' date for the transfer -but see Comme 4-5ý 272), that 
they are separated by. western. events only,.. and, that, Diodoros, 
records nothing else under. 475/4(see e. g. recently Cawkwell .,, 
55N141,, de, Ste., Croix 171;,.,,, 1'eigga, 4O, 454; Letze. 268N21 . Andrewes 
2) 94), " , It mayr, be pointed out,. that', as 
for; positive reasons these 
Scholars can offer only- a priori-reasons (e. g., Andrewee loc ", oit. t 
"the moment for decision was when the allies rejected Dorkis"). 
Scholars who, retain, Diodoros'date. include Unger, 901 Wtia 66-7 
Kagan`. 51,52, -, 378-91,, }-and 
Lang, 1):, 83N16, recognizea, that there is 
3 15" 
nothing against aooopting, Diodoroat arrangement. ---,. ý'I 
55. Andrewes 2) 95i,. -similar : ineredulity among moderns:: ' see 
references at-'N35 above. See also chapter nine R21. 
56. AP 24. ls Aristeides 
__criv_ýýoü-ýF-U£ý/ývxJiýahtý3äYýr7ýu tvýs 
Cýx 
5ýýý_a t ,,, 
Hasa AP.: conflated Aristeides', attemptsto 
persuade the Athenians to accept the hegemony (not 'take-it' 
away' (from the Lakedaimonians) - see Rhodes 2) 148) in 478/7 
with what be believed . later developments to be: 
57 " cf: , 
Cawkwell 46. ;... . 
58. Plutarehý(Th. -, 20.4) dates; the beginning of-Spartan support to 
478 (aee chapter nix N99). --. It;, is _very: 
likely'that the first - son 
born to: Kimon after the award was Lakedaimonioa. ( cf. 'e. g. U. B. 
Wallace: 198) and-sinoe; the'. unfortunately-named. gentleman'served, 
as. hipparch probably in'-446 (Iß{12 400), he'oan hardly, have been 
born, after 476. °- , Evidenoo . for-Kimon' is, proxenys ' 
Pl. K.. 14.3! '" ý 
Theopompos fr. 88p , Aischines 2.172. 
59" The : fact that- 7PöaxºýFt, a- in Thuoydides always means "excuse" 
(see Chambers 31N51 Rawlings 1-4,8) means, of course, that it 
was also the 'stated purpose' of the alliance. 
60. See Jaokson. 
61. The oath sworn by the parties' involved - and here the spirit 
and not the letter is important - to have the same friends and 
enemies (AP 23.5) is evidence of a promise of protection to those 
who joined. That we should see the oath as more of a commitment 
on the part of Athens than the allies, is rightly emphasized by 
Kiechle 270. 
62. Compare further the interpretations of Sealey 3) especially 
-237-42 (similarly French 1) 89) and Baloer 2) 21-2. 
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63. On the depth of feelings of revenge see Bellen, especially- 
45-7-(For archaeological evidence of private reconstruction see 
Boersma A0,44) " -" . 
64. Cf. Kagan 40N38. 
65. Podleoki 4) *'is perhaps`a, little -too cautious when-be says 
"we cannot begin to guess what Themistocles would have said" 
about'-tbe propöaed-alliance. ' r :ýp 
66. Though, the theme was probably developed end exaggerated; see 
references at chapter eight N43. 
67. Tbat. Timokreon-(fr. 1) seems to have gloated-at Themistokies over 
the "formation of _ýthe alliance-(see Bowra 353-. 4) is not evidence 
that'Theaistoklee had'opposed it. Timokreon may: simplyýbe" 
delighting'in the event which had given an enemy of Themistokles 
his greatest renown. It is also possible that some of the allies 
had ezpreesed''between 4787and, theýpenning, of'TimokreonIeýverse, 
, an'aversion to having Themistokles as"oommandersiwviewof his 
reputation from 480. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT -` NOTES 
1. See e. g. V. Martin 154,156-91 Larsen 196-7; H. Schaefer 
15-16,126,132-3; ATL 141, "228N10;, - H. D. Meyer 437-8,2) 499-500; 
Hammond 328,338-9N3, " 339-45; Meiggs 47,462; Schuller 144; " 
Finley 107. 
2. Souroesi see Hill, EMeiggs and Andrews 397" On the reliability 
of the soholiast aee references at Milton 257N3. 
3. A. Schaefer 10-il; Pierson 63; Unger 91-2; Curtiu. s 806N62; 
P. olzapfel 85N1, '167. 
4" In which they followed a suggestion originally made by Bentley: 
see H. Schaefer 10-11; Unger 91;, Curtius 807N62; Holzapfel 85N1, 
166-7. Blass 283-4 had some wise words to, say on the propriety 
of all 'this. 
5s'', A. Schaefer 10;. Unger 92; Curtius 127. -Holzapfel 85N1 
was 
exceptional in denying that such a gap was problematical. 
6., Wilamowitz 1) 146N1. Krilger 45, '52, of course, bad postulated 
disconnecting the bones and judgement incidents almost'sixty, 
years before Wilamowitz; " he did so, however, in the belief that 
Plutarch had in-fact linked the two events and that he had-been 
mistaken cf. '41,44-5; Blass 283-4 supported him for different 
reasons). Hereward 45 has recently; adopted Kriger's position, 
though without justifying her opinion, and'Deane 129-951110 has 
just reasserted, unfortunately, the Skyros-judgement connection. 
Wilamowitz was accepted on this point by e. g. 'Busolt 103N1,106N2; 
Beloäh 183. (though, without referenoe to Wilamowitz); --E. 
Meyer 
" 463-4N1, '2) 62N2; Gomme. 6511;: Lenardon 37N70; Smart 138N4'(see 
below 1q11). 'Wilamowitz', point, of course, underlies the belief 
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of those who support. present 'orthodox' chronology based on 
the idea of a connection between Eurymedon and the judgement 
(see references at Uilton 269N65). 
7. See Milton 269-70 965. Beloch 183-49 characteristically, 
rejected the historicity of the judgement. It must stand since 
the one element which we can check proves correct (see Marm. 
Par. 56); _. cf. 
Krüger 41;, Unger 91; Holzapfel 167. 
8. Compare in particular Smart 137 with Curtius 127,807N62.. 
9. Smart 136-7 and Ni. r 
10. C£. chapter six N76 on the date of Leotyohides' reign in Diodoros. 
11. Smart accepts (138N4); as valid Wilamowitz' denial of the necessity 
of connecting Skyros and the judgement,, but adds that this doesn't 
mean that there was ins fact no connection. That in fair enough, 
but it cannot provide the basis for, the statement that "elsewhere 
with reference to-Skyros Plutarch mentions the arohonehip of 
Phaidon, here that,, of, Apeephion", (138). 
12. Smart 136. 
13. Smart 137_8. 
14. These considerations outweigh the, oasual, remark made at 63.1, 
summarizing the events recorded at. 60.1-62.3,, tbat 
xauo. Z. a_ , , Vý 9d3 ý/ ? rQ0. _K oýLoJ__2cýv... ýccw tov 
Our conclusions on"this date in Diodoros will be developed later 
in this chapter. 
15. That Smart'o_theory7would enable us, to retain Justin 9.1.3 and 
AP 26.1, carries, hardly any-weight in its favours see chapter 
seven N30, chapter four V169, - 
26. Even if we were to accept the incorrect connection between the 
ITh©seust, oraole, the Skyros, effair and, the judgement (see above 
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Nil), making Plutarch also guilty of confusing Phaidon and 
Apsephion would involve the. improbable`postulate "that Plutarch 
moved"-from one ` arohoný list`to'anotber, without noticing the 
divergence"; as''Sealey'2) 265N5 points out. - 
17. Blass. 
18. Further a priori grounds against accepting Smart's theory have 
been set out by Herewerd-45-6-(though some of her arguments are 
invalid). ' I"doýnöt consider valid the argument'that we would 
expect the-Athenian"allianoe to begin-operations soon'after its 
foundation, not eigbt, `years-after. "ýore lack sufficiently reliable 
evidence on attitudes and confliotsin£-theoe'years to be able to 
rule out suoh`a-delay. In our period the evidence, on'the'whole, 
is such'that chronological conclusions must be allowed to 
determine interpretation, and-notrthe. roveree. 
I know of. no scholar wbo. has accepted Smart's theory, Mbut his 
suggestion"deserves: more'attention than the usually peremptory 
rejection it=receives., (J. w. Cole 47-says Cmart's dating would 
suit, bis ' thesis well). 
19. For a^aelection'of modern opinion on the chronology of this 
period consult Bayer°and Aeideking 105-81 see too chapter seven 
Nx 16,309`40*'--`;, 3, a 
20. See chapter nine'-N20. 
21. Beloch 182, denie a' thirte s'' 
22. The stratagem attributed to Kimon by Paus. 8.8.9 is almost 
certainlyrunhiatoricals`.: see, Wilamowitz, l) 156N59; 'Busolt 
102-3N1; ` Horewardh47-8 (whose"reference to' Paus. 8.7.7. is a 
23. The engagement-ii'doubted`by.. e. g.. Bucolt lOlNl and accepted by 
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e. g. E. Meyer 463 " ýt : '_ W 
24. Nepos (Cim. 2.2) has. obviously, confused. this -defeat with 
Drabeskos -. , cf. , 
F:.,. Meyer-2) 62.,,, 1Filamowitz 1) 157N61 calls 
it a "schwere. niederlage" which may. be, oorrect. 
25. If A. Schaefer were followed in connecting Lykourgos with the 
family listed., under, number9251-in Davies (Davies, page 349 for 
reference to A. ýSchaefer)". then we-should either 
have to assume 
en. early. caae, of double representation from Oineis for 476/5 
or place Kimon's. generalahipAn_, the previous year. Davies 
(loo. cit. ) doea, not,, seem enthusiastic about the connection. 
26. Gomme, 391N1 (_cf.;, 281); describes. the, expedition, as a "sortie". 
Other students , usually. 
describe; it, as an attempt, to establish 
aý cleruohy: ,, e. g. 
Classon-Steup 2641- Busolt 102N1,1041 
E. Meyer, 463 . 2) , 
62;,..., E. WalkerY57p Clooh0 2Y52 (cautiously). 
Others 
"odo., 
not,, commit, thcroselves, (e. g. Bayer and foideking 108N321 
Kluwe 2) 46; .,, "- 
Eammond . end . Griffith " 
102). 
,,. , -_ 
27. See above N5. =; Podleaki;, 4), 
15, also-findeýa delay, uncomfortable 
in view of Thucydides. 
28. Bolooh 183 'would. ° :... f .. , w.. '_ 
29. Busolt:. 106N2 e. g. -aites4. $ZXti_'CA-- : _as a reason for not- setting 
Skyros immediately: after Eion. 
30. Cf. ATL: 159-60. e. g.,, ... . 
31. See; Deane'a comments 94N1O. 1,.; r=`;. 
32. Busolt. 106-7N2. thoughtKthis, noticevimplied Kimon, was still, in 
acceasiblex. Thracian waters, which is arguable, I suppose. Unlike 
Bucolt,, I, 
_would, suggest; "still at, 
Eion. - Podleoki 3), 142 and NlO 
finds the: whole: seation_suspioiou s. =; H_,, " 
33. See: ohapter; nine N20=and-, Meiggs_ 69. 
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34" Diode 60.2 is alone in talking of a'siege; cf. Dusolt 105_6N2. 
35. Krüger 42_3 and Onoken (aocording to IIolzapfel 167 who follows 
him and gives the: referenoe)'argued for, the need of a close 
connection , betweenä. tbe-oracle and: ita exeoution; cf. Blass 
482; reaently. Smart 137; Jeffery 45N20. Nonetheless Busolt 
106N2 ( cf.; 103N1): was, quite right'to. deny-thatj formally, the 
date of; the oraole: °represented'a. date for the action against 
Skyros, (he>meant., to refer. to: WWilamowitz 2): 299 not 2) 199); he 
is followed by±Podleoki ý-3) , 141-2; a :,, cf. rBayer ý and Ueideking 
109N35; Deane . 95N10:...... , =ýx ._ 
36. I think our. interpretation is more-An aooord with the eouroes 
than. Podlecki! a; 3), summarized as 4), 14-15.. He-would find a 
: >, lowering of the date; of'. Skyros oloser 
to 470 satisfying, and 
he hags hie,, own. reaeons:: Ale suggests that Kimon was having 
"trouble. taking;! Skyroa, and solioited-a aaaond-oraols" - i... that 
found An Pausaniae -'"to supplement-Abe earlier one of 476/5, 
one whioh: would meet. his-own specificationsýas to where the 
(bones' ,... were '. to. be found", (3)., 142). ý -" I 
37. C '" e. g. Krüger 451 - ieo1t 14O.. 41N6. 
(who supports the- 
implioations. ofswilamowitz'-dating, of`tbewbeginning of the 
Karystos war in:. the yearafter bis date for "the capture of wy 
Skyros (the correoureferenoe: ie; to t7ilamowitz: l) , 300, ' not~ 
.. ý, v :.. .. 2) : 13oo) p -- -contrast 'Deane 111112*, - 
38. An"ezample of.: a, different; interpretative_argument leading to the 
same : -result at Beloch, 185. M .ýý. ;;. 
39" Our chronological -result s'are fairly conventional,, but I -felt , 
it worth stating the arguments at this length beosuse reoently 
there . haa: been'a... tendency-to despair of confidenoe in the 
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chronology of the 470a ( cf. e. g. Baloer 2) 24N14). These 
results are not beyond doubt, but they are, in fact, fairly 
reliable, and, most importantly, they are sufficiently reliable, 
in my opinion, to build further upon. 
40. ATL 158N1, -160. - 
41. If we accept POxy, XIII, 1610 as Ephoran, then fr. 7, col. 1 
would provide evidence that between Skyros and the beginning 
of preparations for the eastern campaign Diodoros has made fairly 
substantial omissions since the fragment, mentioning Lykomedea, 
probably described the bones-of 'Theseus' incident. In Ephoros 
a gap of six years between Skyros and the eastern campaign may 
therefore have been more apparent than in Diodoros. 
42. See Milton, espeoially 267-9. 
As noted (Milton 275) Westlake's paper 3) (-c_" 4) 357) was not 
taken into consideration. -Westlake now believes Thucydides 
acquired his information on Pausanias and Tbemistokles from a 
written-source, a view based mainly on certain un-Thuoydidean 
expressions found-in the ezoursus. Yet these Ionioiams can be 
explained by the fact that-if, as seems probable (see Milton 
258-9 and further references) Tbucydides wrote the exoursus 
early in his career, `,. he-probably had not yet developed his later 
style, and that he himself may have deliberately adopted an 
Ionic manner, widely felt appropriate to historical writing 
(Westlake 3) 106). - The weight-of my arguments at 266-7 is not 
affected by Westlake's new position. 
43" Cf. e. g. H. Schaefer-30-31,302; -Gomme 285-6; Blackman 188B23- 
44- See in particular West, espeoially: 271-2; Gomme 285-6,336--7; 
ATL 244-52; Blackman 187-90; -: Veigga-90_91. 
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45" Cf.. e. g. Gomme 284; ATL 246 and N9,250N26; Blackman 189. 
46, Cf. e. g. ATL 249N20. I 
47. Cf. 
_, e. g. 
IN Sohaefer : 30. -:. 
48. C%_, ATL 250 and N26; -Blaokman, 189ýexpresses doubt as to 
whether this notioe derives'from a good souroe; cf. ATL 246N9. 
The rate of conversion to cash contribution does not affect our 
s°" argument. 0 
49- See Tilton. 
50. That we may place the Naxos revolt between the Eurymedon 
preparations in Lykia/Karia and the Eurymedon battle was shown 
by 'siege 73-9- 
51. See Milton 267-9. 
52. CF Milton 267-9. - Herodotos 
(7.106) says of attempts to dislodge 
M'askamea from Doriskos 7 O» C4V XUPjC+SV4jVj and, pace Gomm* 
291N1, who fails to paraphrase-Herodotos' further comment that 
no one was able to'dislodge Maskames, Herodotos does indeed imply 
that Maskames' descendents-were inýcontrol after 46/4 (accession 
of Artaxerxes). - This suggests that attempts on Doriskos were not 
necessarily made during:. the-470s. It is also possible to under- 
stand Herodotos as referring to attempts from within. A Pindar 
fragment (fr. 36 - ýP0xy -V, -841, Ir, 39-40,704-ý)has been taken as 
referring to actions at 'Abdera. ' If this is correct it could be 
interpreted, like the possibility of operations against Doriskos 
in the 460a,, as also linked with the operations surrounding the 
Enneahodoi campaign. 
Plutarch (14.1), -Ancidentallyýfdoes not state that his 
Chereonese fighting was after Eurymedon,: though it in placed 
after that victory in his narrative order. It is tempting to 
it 
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associate it with the urymedon preparations proper. But since 
there are no valid objections to Plutarch's implied context I 
suppose we should follow him ( cf. Milton 267N55); earlier 
scholars had rejected Plutaroh's oontext but for invalid reasons: 
100 N3. Eg Holzapfel A. Sohaefer 10; . Kirohhoff 
171 
53. Veigga 71- 
54- Whenever the period referred tog there is very likely to be 
exaggeration here. 
55- See Chambers - 27; , Rawlings 1-4, U. 
56. See chapter seven 2159 " 
57. The other aim,. given undue prominence by modern scholars, is 
not primary, and may be secondary, since Thuoydides describes 
it as an almost. incidental advantage of his narratives 
wý 6v`va ttom SV ow TmKc 
(97.2 ). 
58. Rion: 
, epigrams . 
(Pl. K.: 7 ". 4 --51. - cf. 
Aisoh. 3.183 -5) and 
H. 7.107; Skyros: P1. Thes. 36., 1-2; K. 8.3 -6 
(this tradition 
must be independent-of . 
Thuoydides); _of. Paus. 3.3.7; Karystoss 
2 H. 9.105; _ f , 
IG 
.l 
943 - 14L nr. 48,1.27 . 
(soe ML p. 128; 3Meiggs 
161); Naxoss. Aristoph. wasps 354-5" 
. 
59. On Kimon's modifications. see Gomme 287; Morrison and R. T. 
Williams 163;,, -Jameson 1) 397-8 
(further bibliography for Troizen 
Decree consult SFG, starting from volume 18,1962); Jordan 188-94; 
Meigga 76. 
60. II., $ohaefer 28Nl, also thinks the offensive against Persia came 
to a etandstill; inthe mid-470$ and was taken up again "um 470"; 
and Sohaohermeyr 1) 127 aaoepts the possibility of a substantial 
halt in-operations. 
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CHAPTER NINE NOTES 
1. See e. g. Prestel 5 and N11,191 Reverdin; Burn 260-65; Connor 
2) 5-8; de Ste. Croix 169-70;, Thomsen 120-22; Gruen 92. 
2. Cf : e. g. Prestel 14t 27; Connor 2) 22-4- 
3* The most complete, 'up-to-date liet'of ostracism candidates can 
be found in Thomsen 70-80. On the distortions in the literary 
evidence see further Connor l) 124-7.2) 67-8. 
4. Of the allies we should perhaps take the professed motives of 
the lytilenaians in joining the alliance as typical; they claimed 
they had joined for the sake of the freedom of the Greeks from 
Persia (Thun. 3.10.3). For whatever motives, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the allies of Athens in the 470a were ready and 
willing to join an aggressive war against the Persians' land. 
To explain the fact that during the 470a Eion was the only city 
controlled by the Persians to be attacked we must turn to Athens. 
5. The most recent discussions of the phrase are Andrewes 2) 304-5N11 
and Westlake 3) 100-102; ýsee'too Rhodes 3) 390123- 
60 Anticipating Kabrstedt 323 and Lang 1) 82-4. Thuoydides' 
insistence (128.3) that Pausanias went out privately suggests 
he-is contradicting a different interpretation. If the original 
accusation were Themistoklean, Timokreon (fr. I ape Pl. The 21.2) 
will certainly have ignored it and have still considered 
Pausanias praiseworthy in the mid-470e- 
79 The case of Nikias later in the century when a general is sent 
on an expedition, the wisdom of which he was known to doubt, 
was no doubt exceptional (Thuo. 6.8.4, cfe de ste. Croix 316) 
but provides a useful-corrective to those who would see e. g. Eion 
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as substantially the result of Kimon'n initiative. '`The most 
recent scholars`guilty'of this'approaoh are-Podlecki 4) 8' 
(who, rather surprisingly, ' describes the Eion campaign as° 
Kimonls riposte-to Themistokles''"ohoregic victory with Phrynichos' 
Phoinissai) and J. W. Cole: 45-6. - 
(I do not, feel=it necessary to 
speculate on the relationship between a decision of the Athenian 
Assembly and the opinion of the allied, synedrionyfor operations 
. 11 
,. of the allianoe.. will not 
have gone, ahead --against the wishes of 
the Athenian. -Assemblyl Cfo chapter eight Ni). .- 
Be See further chapter thirteen. - 
9. Lakedonianýkinga' oontrol over timber, ezporti clull: reSerenoee 
at M. B. Wallaos : 199-200: N13. ' J. W. Cole, has ýreoently argued for 
the existence of aepersonal conneation. between Alexander and 
Themistokles. - With-. the exoeptionof, the "Themietokles Letters" 
5 and 20 (J. w. Cole 48),: heýia unable-to cite any evidence whioh 
testifies to a direct relationship-between=the two men. ''Tbe 
notices-he cites are all-interpreted on-the basis of; the 
assumption which be has made'-of-a-conneotion 
(37). 
- See-further 
below chapter--thirteen=N56: -; -The most plausible'"element 
in his 
argument is' perhapa&that: the award. of. proxeny andieuergesia to 
Alexander by'the-Athenians--ahould,: be connected-with a postulated 
supply' of'timber for. Athena' - Persian-war fleet 
(J. w: - Cole 421 
so too Hammond -and"Griffith68-99 followingý, 
Edson). Yet auch 
supplies would-certainly., have been: considered-hostile to Persia, 
and the evidence suggest s. Alexander'-waa-trying to keep-on good 
terms=with Xerxes'throughout 483-0 (see Hammond and Griffith 64) 
and-after (hIammond: and°Griffith'99,; 101).; -Such an essential 
contribution to: the Greek'viotory'is very unlikely to have gone 
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unmentioned by Uerodotos. There is-evidence that Themistokles 
had some connections with western Greece (another source of 
timber) at this periodr(seeýohapter- six Nlol). Other occasions 
can be found when the awards could, have been made (see M. B. 
Wallace. loo. cit. ). -The suggestion tbat-Kimon was unfriendly 
towards Alexander 'is, in conflict with, good evidence (see chapter 
thirteen N56 i ). See-too next note. 
10. The political'situation in. Thessaly after-480 is not clear, and 
although we'oannot make a'-'full. analysis, of the evidence here, a 
few points mayrbe. noted. =" It was olearlywthe-Aleuadai who were 
responsible-forýthe'Vedism of Thessaly (see'westlake 1) 12-16)9 
and-in--their early determination-'to'side with the-King'they seem 
to , have'stood'alone'(see N. `'Robertson 103'and further references). 
Leotyohidee' expedition in 479-. may have had'some initial'suooess 
in°'deposing allooal'ruler"of Pherai'and Pagasai (P1. The 20.1 
with'--). 'or. 859d and Belooh' e references ( 2) 62-3N3) linking the 
name 'AriatoznedeewjthiPhersj); but be failed'to unseat: Aleuad 
power--(Paus. '3.7.9s ', Gf. Morrison 62) . and there is no good 
reason to assume'ý(as e. g. Westlake l)'17 does) that 'they lost 
their position-shortly after'Leotyohidea'. expedition. 
`--, Hillervon: Gaertringen. was-already. on"the right"traok when 
he doubted-: the. validity of-any single dynasty's claim to°be, ruler 
of all Thesaaly-(&. E. VIA Al, `ool.; 118; ýfollowed. by Brunt: °162) 
and-N. Robertson'has recently: analysed the evidence for the 
naturelof--Thessalianýpoliticsýat thiwperiod.: 
_He 
disoerns a 
plurality. of looal' dynastieS -,. "; of which the ' Aleuadai were 
only one, =albeit, -exceptional.. Be`tranelatee Thuoydidea' 
e£66Qh Y 4ý5' as="Thee alien king" -(102_6) whioh would pY 
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make things easier taunderstand; -'and-. whiähýI' acoept. - The 
available avid enoeadmite, 1 euggest,, of°an interpretation of 
thel. positionýof: "Theaealy" in: the Greek ; mäinland°Iinternational$ 
framework in which the Aleuadai, Themietokles (and his political 
heirs) and Argos were mutually friendly and were all hostile to 
another mutually friendly group, comprising the Thesealian 
''= enemies of the Aleuadai (for-example Menön -of Pharsaloe), ' Kimon 
and. hie friends; Sparta and Alexander. N. "Robertson argues that 
before 480 the Aleuadai and'Alexander'were traditional allies. 
But if'the 'Aleuadai had ' been' induced to Medize'by"Alexander, and 
if ' his mesaage` to the'- Greeks was `a"warning of °Aleuad' intentions 
(both suggested""by°R. Robertson 119)9'tben-relatione'between the 
Aleuadai: and 'Alexander may'well' have', eniffered*ae'ä "result. 
This sobeme"fite, 'of course, with the evidence for Atheno-- 
Thessalian-relation s'between 460 and '454* 'The 'alliance between 
. 
°= the: two-powerä, wae, "on "the Thessaliin sides motivatede by Aleuad " 
influenoe. By-the time of Tanagra enemies of the hleuadai had 
=r* made -a oompaöt? to"deaert. Týnagra does not mean cavalry loyal 
to the Aleuädai deserted. ` 'They may have been'thrown"into con- 
fualon - and have `fled 
(Thea®aliane at, Tanagrat , -"Thilo . , 107.7 ).. 
That' Thessalian: aotion: was not uniform at Tanagra in suggested 
by the-fact" that while "Menon`of Pharealoa was flubbed=a 'traitor 
by<the Athenians (see Vanderpool 1)11240-41), by 454-they 'were ^, 
seeking to reinstate Orestes eon of Eohekratidas by attaoking 
Pharaalos. - The latter gentleman was an Aleuad, as shown by 
Morrison (59-63 
_cf. 
"'Jeffery 52N49), ', whioh-makee it very-difficult 
to believe hiä-family'bad,. been implioated in', the deeertion'at 
Tanagra., ' We may also have -evidence of -Alenad loyalty -to ý the 
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Athenians in, the Thessalian dedication published by Daux which 
he used as evidence to argue for a, Thessalian presence. on the 
Athenian side at 0inophyta (Daut, -especially-332-3)" 
See too 
1113 below. 
11. See Bengtson 3)- 
.,,.: ,. , - 
12. Cf. Wilamowitz 157N61. 
13. Raubitschek. 4) associates this-tenon with blenon l enekleidou 
Gargettios. whose name appears, on., a numberof ostraka 
(see 
Thomsen 78N137, for references). I do not, accept that it is 
necessary to assume, )senon returned fromFion to Athena with 
Kimon 
(pace Raubitsohek_4) 287H6).,. -The, award. of. citizenahip 
guaranteed 
6. of 
PN! ." .r 
tenon a place of-refuge in time of need. This apparently arose 
at some. stage butt' we do not know exactly whon. The remarks 
in 
N10 above are relevant here. 
14. See e. g. Hignett 2)443-41 Hands 60-611 but also Lazenby, 2) 266-7. 
15. Schaohermeyr l)-126 draws some of the connections wo"have. made. 
16. Podlecki 4) 17-24"- 
17. I don't think it, is cafe , to; base, anything on, the garbled account 
in the scholion "to 
Aelius . 
Aristides 46.3 (Dindorf 446) where 
'Skyros' seems_to bean error_for ! Thasos'(though, Podlecki 3) 
143 takes it seriously). ý; . 
18. Cf. e. g. Meiggn; 69-70I , , 
WWolski 3) ; 14"r(who, . according 
to the 
French summary of his article, in Polish,. makea. a similar asseas- 
went . at 
19. See chapter two. 
20. Larsen 1) 19113, 
athough, 
thinks 4the -Karystoswar was considered 
le,; itimate., Pace Rawlingsr4-(. cr", Finley 105) I, do not think 
we can be. confident that Thucydides98.1x-4 means that-the 
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Athenians alone took Eion etc. He is ambiguous. For Karyetoe 
the only evidenoe we have to supplement Thuoydidea' ambiguity 
is the soholion to Aristophanes' Wasps 283 (Koster 52) where 
Iý - the Samian named Karystion may suggest Samians were present 
(and that at least one allied Greek thought the war nothing to 
be ashamed of); cf. M. B. Wallace 208 and N28. This is not 
decisive but it does tilt the balance slightly. ßerodoton 
(9.105) mentions only the Athenians but this is valueless in 
view of the comparison between his description of the Seaton 
siege (9.114, -116-17) and Thucydidea' 
(89.2). 
21. Diodoroa' statement (50.1) that the Spartann 
makes it clear that he intended -q-X£ýX_oOM/ t, 6F-tN q. 
jrOL 
. 
y_ ýý ccoýýgf -rlt&A) in the sense of "threatened 
them with appropriate punishment" and. he presumably reflects 
Ephoros correctly. But if Ephoroa'has inferred Spartan attitudes 
according to what seemed probable to him, it is possible that he 
has given the words of his source here an interpretation they 
needn't originally have bads they could have meant the Spartans 
"promised to bring them appropriate aesistanoe". Were there 
appeals from Aegean states-for Sparta to stem the tide of 
Athenian imperialism already around 474? In view of Thuoydidea 
101.1 ý2 this cannot be'dismiased as fancifulp note too the 
undated Uytilenaian appeal'for assistanoe to Sparta (Thuo. 3.13.1); 
cf. _, 
Larsen 1) 208. 
22. This is only an argument from silence, but the fact that Karystos 
is omitted by Plutarch in his 'Kimon' and by. Diodoros (60.2 . 3) 
in his catalogue of Kimonian exploits makes our assertion fairly 
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- .., safe* 
23. C. 
_, 7 
E. -Sohaefer 92; French 111-12; Brunt 2) 72; Brookmeyer 
411x7. ,,. 
24. Themiatoklea' measures to, enoourage the. immigration of metios 
and craftsmen to Athens. reoorded; by Diodoros (43.3)are usually 
accepted as historical, - 
(by-e. g.. Hammond; 
_4) 
264; French 96; 
Meigga 262-3; Boersma, 48), and should be seen not only as - 
providing skilled labour for the maint, e nanoe of Athena' fleet 
(see chapter six, with N93) but also- as. encouraging the settle- 
ment in Athena of a class of men who would fulfil the import 
needs of Athena. Thequotation. from Themiatokles (Ion fr. 13 
ap. Pl. K. 9.1; 
_cf. ý 
Th. ; 2.3) that - he, knew how to create 
abundance ( fi % oua'La v) for the city may point in the 
same direction.:; For, the evidence-of, a. po: aible--twestern policy' 
see the references at, chapter, six N101..:. 
(The picture of, Aristeidea at AP 24. L . 3, encouraging 
migration of. the population-, to, the city. for politioo-eoonomio 
reasons, is; anacbronistio and"is, probably later imagination 
rather than correct-report" (Rhodes 2). 148,: 151 (the, -later page 
reference applies. only, to the corrected version, a copy of which 
the; author wan kind enough, to send me); . cf.., von 
Fritz and Kapp 
169N67; Day and Chambers 34, *,, 124-5 8--"one, -of the least 
sound ohapters., in the. A. P. "). 
On the special place protection of vital imports had in policy, 
in contrast to other 'trading:; interesta', see. Itasebroek 1391 
E. Schaefer, 92; iUicbell 225-6;.; Frenoh"1)ý112; ý, de. Ste. Croix 
214-18; Frost 3) 66; =, Finley, 120-21; -contrast aiueiolek 305, 
316. (Fora oritioalanalysis,, of proffering, corn-supply as the 
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main explanation of Athenian imperialismrsee Bloedow; cf. 
Schuller 187-9) ". ..., 
25. C#: e. g. E. Meyer 478; Fornara 3) 118,41; G. M. E. Williams 106. 
26. Cf. Connor 2)'10; G. M. E. Williams "'106-7 e 
o- 27. On generositysäe'Connor 2) 18-220 
28. See Ervin 295. ' who translates "a 'present for, Themintoklealle 
Mattingly 2) 285renders it a märkYof Themistokleä' honour. 
29. See Connor 2) 30_32. 
30. See further Sealey'l) 65-6,7) 267-9 with-Connor's'oomments at 
2) 18-19: :.. 
31. On Peisistratos see e. g. '_Ändrewes 4)"113-14; " Ehrenberg 1) 8(1-83; 
on'Kleisthenes see D. M. Lewis 2); Kagan 2); Bicknell 1) 1-53. 
32: Cf. J. D. Lewis 135- 
33. Raubitsohek 1) 164, e: g. jafter studying the evidence on Leagros 
has'to- cönclude that iwe'äre unable to 
perceive his relationship 
to other politicians clearly. 
34" In-this section -I do not"propose'to diecuss'tho`evidence fully, 
and shall refer to only-a little of tho modern, workon family 
backgrounds-and relationships. `The"reider"should`consult Davies 
for furthor, referencess 
35" 'Pödleoki2)ýl'and-Badian-7Nl5 äaetiaspersione on the historicity 
of'Themistökles' claim. See Lenardon 1) 224N7 and Connor 7) for 
the possibility of Itttragenoa rivalry; c!. Frost 2) 25. 
36. Quoted at Bauer-Fröst° 129. " . ,. 
37" Cf u Frost 2) 25Nl8; R'Sealey`1) 65,73N42; or among Themistokles' 
relatives if we followed Schachermeyr 1) 310 N77. There seems 
to be'no evidence for °von Stauffenberg's'oontention' (123_5,138) 
that the"Lykonidai'were traditionally 'democratic': " 
333" 
38. Cf. Davies 213;: -Connor 7) 573N1; the name Neoklos, though, 
does not neoesaarilyadd; weight 'to this impression: see Connor 
8). 68; cf. Lenardon l) 224N11. 
39" Cf. 'Frost,; l)-113; -" evidence at Davies 213-14. It is fanciful 
to=say"her Thraoian-origins are confirmed-by the Ostia portrait 
as Bieber 282-3 e. g. did;. though see Paus. 1.18.3. 
40. See Davies 213N1;. -though Raubitsohek 5) 500-501 argued the 
`tradition-derives from, Theopompos=and used it to explain the 
VÖß05 tradition;, - Frost 2)'24-5 seems to believe, at least, 
in. hostility between'father and son. 
41. On the location-of; Phrearrioi-see now Vanderpool 3) especially 
50-53 " ,: -,. °' 
42. Cf" Frost 1) 113:... 
43. The. faot that-most=voters in the ostrakophoriai give Themiatokles' 
demotic'and omit'his patronymic may only reflect his father's 
obscurity; ", I do-not, ", therefore, think it cafe to assume that 
this"peouliarity'is the result of. a deliberate attempt by 
Themictokles to: cultivate the non-snobbish designation (an 
Vanderpool'l)"-222, does). 'That the fourteen men'who"insoribed 
the 190, -ostraka'published by Broneer'228-43 tended to give the 
patronymic As a. sign=of', their' social attitudes and was automatic, 
not calculating. '.. 
44" c: Usher'286; = Davies 213; Podlecki 2) 1-3; Lenardon 1) 18-20 
Sealey. 1) 65: ". 7- Earlier'modern"references, describing Themistokles 
as, a novus"homo at Frostl)°105N1. 
45. See Davies 217. ° , :. § b, :.. ;" 
46. This remains true-even if we deny Aricteides Lysimaohou was 
eponymous archon in`489/8'as-Badian 11-13 and Bicknell 5). cf. 
334" 
3), 22512 do, - since two,, men who were probably relatives of our 
Aristeides are recorded as ohoregoi-. in this century ( cf. Davies 
48,52-3)-. 'The stories of the destitution of Aristeides' 
descendents are unhistorical: see Davies 49-52" 
47. See the acceptable defence of this much factual basis behind Pl. 
Ar. 25.3 -6 by Davies 257; " " cf. , 
'Bicknell'. ý2) 435N62*., 
48. See Davies 257,259-61. 
49. The firmest is "Plutaroh's "statement, "(Ar. 2.1; cf.. -D 
: or. 790f, - 
79la, 
_805f. 
) that Aristeiden, was-a hetairos of Kleisthenes (which 
4y> needn't, of course, 'imply: a family relationship), but this. looks 
like the, tendency of later, writers-to. assooiate greatjnamea. 
Bicknell, 1).,, 66N29,,, c. f. 62, ". 71,. 93,2) 433-6 has argued for the. 
connection; ( cf. G-11-2- 'Williams 107-8), but Davies A8 -tenda to 
take the, assooiation? as, "a malicious invention of 4832". 
50. See Shefton-161-2, for° the. suggestion that.. the`Kallimaohos memorial 
2 (IG 1,609 ., 1L nr. 18). represents an unsuccessful attempt to 
,,. prevent the oirole: of, i'iltiades usurping. the lion's share of 
the glory of 1'arathon. 
51. See e. g. -Sohachermeyrrl)'"80-84 for-anýacoount,. of-, the-reoent 
background to, Kimon'simmediate, family; (omitted". by. Daviee 301). 
52. Davies 299-3001 ý:,. cf " Bicknell 1) 71N64. 
53- See Wade-Gery 164N3; w Sealey,, 37N781, - Bicknell 1) : 92NN35 _ and -361 
C=f. Davies: 300. 
54" Cf. G. Z.. E. Williams 106.7. , 
(At -any rate, Kimon seems " not -to 
have., 
been-. thought; of: asYatupid,:, but,, the, atrategem he, narrated to prove 
his cleverness"in fact, only"illustrated, the, lack of judgement of,. 
fierophytos. 
-the Samian, ,. though Ionobviously. did, not consider :... 
Kimon's"anecdote; failed, to illustrate-his " a', oýia ).. For 
335" 
possible attempts by ICimon to'-glorify'his father's achievements 
see Amandry 220-22,2); Weiwei"especially 303-4; Podlecki 
2) 37.3) 143,4)-16. 
55. See Davies 303. 
56. See Davies 262-3. 
57. Some other points, 'which, if anything, should encourage placing 
the marriage in the second half of the, decade 485-75 at Davies 258. 
58. Bicknell 1) 94N48, cf. 62,71. Davies 258 locates it 0.485 and 
G. M. E. Williams 107-8ýhas recently objected to Bicknell's date. 
59. See Bicknell 1) 64-71; see Davies 232 on the possible relation- 
ship that existed between Kimon and Thoulcydides Melesiou; cf. 
G. i". F. Williams 107 and Bicknell 1) 62 who thinks another sister 
" of Kimon married Thoukydides around 479 (further references at 
G. 14. F. Williams 107N15). ' 
60. On the identity of this 1"egakles'see Davies 376-7; cf. Beloch 
31; Bicknell 1) 89-91" 
61. Cf. Davies 304; pace Bicknell"1) 89 and N2. 
62. Ct e. g. E. reyer-2) 48-9; Schacbermeyr 1) 316N5,3) 17- 
63, - So'W'ade-Gary 2) 221N21 drawing support from the identity he 
proposed for Isodike'a grandfather (but see references above 1760) 
and dating the second marriäge. to°451. -tore recently Connor 
3) 71-3, ct. 2) 17,61 bas triedto-supplement-the caie for a-" 
late marriage by drawing support from'a, commentýby the-soholiast 
to Aelius Aristeides (Dindorf 515)'that Kimon's=cons Lakedaimonios, 
Eleios and Thessalos were'named`after'the proxeniai hold by their 
father; combining this with Kimon's'etatem®nt'in-462 (Pl. K. 14.3) 
that-he was not a proxenos of`ThessaliansýConnor claims that the 
child must have been born, and the proxeny awarded, after 462. 
336" 
Bicknell 1) 92-3 rightly, emphasized the weakness of the 
scholiast's information here, and followed Raubitsahek's 
alternative explanation for the, boy's name ( 4) 288N13)ß as 
does Davies 307; -11. B., Wallaoe 205 suspends judgement; see 
his comments at 195 on the scholiast, also. Schachermeyr 1) 122 
has Kimon and the Kleitorian woman split after few. years and 
Kimon marry Isodike (presumably shortly) after . 
479; cf.. ': " 
Connor 3) 71" 
64. Raubitsohek R. E. 18,,. l, 11. col. 2000; -: Davies 304; ; preferable to 
his suggestion at 2)1260 Nl3 -to -amend :J<AI TO PIAI - to 
AAITHP(AZ ýF 
65. Differently, - Bicknell -l) 90. 
66. CS Davies 305; de Ste. Croix 172 ant N18. 
67. Cr. Connor 3) 67-8; -.. Bicknell 1) 95; : ', Davies, 305 . 
68. Cf.. Bicknell 1) 93, !- cf.. 62,87;. ý Hignett 1) 396. It is not 
necessary to take the marriage '. back into the 480s as Belooh 
;, - 40-41 and G. M. E. Williams 107 andN16 would; Davies 305'acoepts 
a : late 480a date as -possible.: r ;,.. 
.. 
69. See e. g. Davies- 3 68-85. 
70. The curse was studied in detail by. G. W., Williams 1), - 2) and'3). 
71. The attempts (possibly by -, Themistokles -, see ; 2inserling; ý Forrest 
1) 237N4; Podlecki 8), - criticism, '. Pleket-2). -77-8; Cf. '. Ostwald 
131-6) to rob the Alkmeonidai of the glory of having expelled 
the tyrants by -emphasizing the role. of. , 
ITarmodios and `Aristogeiton 
prove that the Alkmeonidai enjoyed-that glory. 
72. See Bicknell 5) 171-2 for the possibility of carrying the 
connection between, Xanthippoa' genos and 'the : Alkmeonidai': back one 
generation. 
337" 
73. I accept the conclusions, though not' all the argument is, of 
Bicknell 1) 73-4, cf. 66; -81-2,87x2,2) 434-5x61 against 
Forrest 1)233. In particular, nthe. existence of an ostrakon 
describing Themistokles, as'aooursed (see Mattingly 2) 285,287 
and Nll; G. M. E. -Williams 
109N20)-, should warn against taking 
the ostrakon (Agora PA 16673) calling Xanthippoe accursed and 
indeed any others using this insult which are yet to emerge, as 
evidenoe of a oonneotion=with the Alkmeonidai. '- 
74. We shall examine this, aspeot of Kimon, further under "personality". 
On the exploitation of the Theseus legend on this oooaslon see 
Podleoki 1) 37,3) 142-39 4) 16; and Connor 6) 157,161-2, 
165-6 on the role of myth: in Greek politios generally. 
75" Cf. Davies 48. 
76. Defenoe of the tradition; by Bioknell'2) 433-6, though not all 
the arguments used are`aooeptable.., "..; ', '. 
77. But eee. Badian 11-13;. Bicknell 5). ' 
78- v TociTo cg zoos =K fo f-s at AP 22.7 may 
indicate more than: juat. a temporal"oonnection-between Ariateidea' 
ostracism and the decision on-the fleet. That Aristeides' 
opposition was not`Tto the fleet itself but to the proposed use 
it should be put tohas recently been-sensibly emphasized by 
Frost 1) 1181 Bicknell-2) 4391 G. M. E. Williams 112; Karavites 
2) 135. 
Stesimbrotos (fr. 2'ap. P1. Th. `4.3)-is supposed to have said 
£ -Caý3 2c-M iX Zc.. ä_ýey ýkPCt-Tyrs'AS 
4' Themistokles ET PC4 
&V &). ou-Co _ and`- the context makes. it clear that'. Ta. 
Ü7 C11 
refers to the . building`of the -fleet. ' .;. This is wrong. Miltiades 
was dead by 488. and, although Themiatokles might have made a start 
338" 
on the Piraeus fortifications (., 'cf. 
Thuo.: 93.3) he certainly 
did not finish them, nor did he haves fleet built at that 
time ( Cf. Lenardon 3) 409). Plutarch clearly thought Themistokles 
successfully carried out his plans ( £TPa- ) at a time 
when Miltiades was opposed to him. E. Meyer 296N1 accused 
Plutarch of misrepresenting his source because of having drawn on 
it at second hand. Gruen argues that Plutarch has conflated two 
traditions, one from Stesimbrotos, referring to conflict between 
Themistokles and Miltiades in the late 490a and the other, from 
Herodotos, referring to the deoision, over'the use of the silver 
in the late 480s (94-5)e This is possible, but Plutaroh, apart 
from the fact of an error' does not betray confusion of this sort, 
and I find it more convincing simply to change 'Miltiades' to 
Aristeides ( cf. Burn 258 and, Ni; Bicknell 2) 438; Podleoki 
2) 58# 203; Kinzl 2) 212N73). -Lenardon 3) 409 accepts the 
possibility of some form of opposition by Miltiades, but 'cf. 
411. Some scholars accept as historical the opposition of 
Miltiades, but fail to recognize the mistake which remains, namely, 
that Themistoklee e7('a fý ý; - 'Ca 
vta, before 488 
(3ohaobermeyr 3) 13; Schreiner 3)'23-5t 36-71 Cf. Meister 283). 
79", I doubt whether he believed the Spartana would invade, and 
suspect that be went along with Themistokles' game because to 
refuse to do so would have left him open to accusations of die- 
loyalty, as had happened in the 480s (see-Raubiteohek 6) 240-42). 
80. There is good reason-to reject as unhistorical the story in 
Plutarch (Ar. 22.1) about constitutional amendments proposed by 
Aristeides after Plataia; see e. g. Plilamowitz 1) 124N4; Busolt 
31-2N4; E. Meyer 453N1; Prestel 21;. E. Walker 474; Hinnett i) 
339" 
174; Knight 32N39. Contrast Hammond 4), 264;, Bicknell 
5) 164-5N5" r,.. _ 
81. Defence of the tradition: Lenardon 3) 409; doubter Bicknell 
2) 437-8 (not all the latter's arguments are valid). 
82. According to the usual interpretation of ostraka of Themistokles 
which originate from the same pot as those of Megakles; references 
to examples of the interpretation at G. M. E. Williams 103N2; 
doubts: D. LS. Lewis 3); Bicknell 4). (It should be mentioned, 
however, that the 'one pot, one"ostraakophoria' assumption in 
quite a large one. It requires us to believe that all the 
potsherds which were available in Athens were used up in a single 
ostrakophoria. Ervin 295 thinks it "unlikely, though not 
impossible" that sherds from the same pot should be used at 
,. 4 
>. 
_ 
i .iI- "+. . 
-"4 r' ß. r4 a "r 
t, s. ", 
different ostrakophoriai. It is said that when the Kerameikos 
ostraka are published we shall have complete vases restored, which 
" will help to test the extent of the truth of the assumption). 
"83. See Podleoki 2) 15 and N18. 
84" I find the Olympia-story at Pl. Tb. 17.2 perfectly credible; it 
should perhaps be set in 476 (. _cfo e. g. 
Podlecki 2) 36). 
85. The evidence is collected by Podleoki 2) 49-519 see too 6) and 
7) and Bowra 342- 
86. See references in last note. 
87. On Lenardon 1) 105-6, cf. 38 see chapter three N4- 
880 It is fatuous to speculate further on the contents of the plays 
see Podlecki 2) 47-8, cf. 36 and the references at 47N4, adding 
Freymuth 64-5; cf. Wilamowitz 1), 143-4N3 6 (whose strictures, 
though, do go a bit far - cf. Forrest 235-6N10; Davison 2) 103); 
Wardman 50-51. Other conjectures concerning Themistokles and the 
340" 
theatre building itself can be found at O'Neill; cf. Davison 
1) 34-51 Cf. Podleoki 1) 158N179'2)'25N25,174" 
89. Amandry 3) 276,279 has doubted the' historicity of the epithet 
'Aristoboule', on which, though, see Kahil 24- 
900 See Threpsiades and Vanderpool* Vanderpool was certain of the 
"'-'`. do not. 
association; ýý. Amandry's remarks (3))<repreaent serious 
enough objections to drop the association; at most they intro- 
duce 
Win: _ .. ny.. rr 
an element of doubt: see Wyoherley 287-9; Podlecki 2) 
175_6. sauer 140 and N96 seems to minimize the political 
significance of the temple. 
91. This is the opinion of Connor 7) 573 also. 
92. Ervin 295- 
93" Though his arrogance in attested already in 480 by Herodotos 
(8.125). There are, of course, many probably unhistorical 
anecdotes based on the fact of Themistokles' arrogance; see 
Lenardon 1) 220-22. ý 
94" See the ancient references collected by Meautis 299, and his 
comments; also, Fornara 4) 72. - 
95" As may have been theoase'with what we, euggested-were the 
accusations levelled at Themistokles at the time of the Karystian 
war, 475-4, ands followed Up by Timokreon's accusations. Diodoros 
(54" is-5) professes to know of a first trial of Themistokles at 
Athens, instigated by the Spartans, accusing him of complicity 
in the plots of Pau sanias, who had been convicted. Barrett has 
recently defended Diodoros''account. But he is wrong to try to 
claim that Plutarch supports they idea of a first trial. fle would 
Y fi 
associate the indictment of Leobotea (Krateros fr* 11; cf. 
Pl. The 23.1-2) with an unsuccessful first trial (, cf. Lenardon 
341. 
1). 119) and. take the. seoond, suooessfui, action, of . -the 
Lakedaimonians as referred to;, in: Pl. -, Th. 23"; 3-4" Barrett,,,, 
(292-3) draws, aupport forrthis from Plutarch's reference. (23.3)_.. 
to ,ý 7CPotýýcu5., ºc4, ýcýýoýiat5ý _-which. 
he correctly renders as 
"other, charges" on, page, 293. On the: next page,. however, be- 
apparently changes ; thiss. -, "Plutarch states, that 
his defense 
coneisted largely of; the_, same arguments heýhad used successfully 
against: Leobotes! , indictment". ý; SNo. he down! t;  
he only, says be 
used TÜ2 Tpozs ýüLS, ý. k az ý ýÖ r5 . i. e. earlier: 
accusations, not- defence.. Plutarch immediately, explains what 
tbey.. were_andýhow he,, was, ablepto use, them.,, Themistokles wrote_ 
that. if, as:,. his ; enemies, bad said Of: 
him, 
. 
he >. L. 
rcwS:. ___. _ .fº 
ý_. ý 
oµýVo. S_ f. w. 
(23.4), 
he would 
w 
be unlikely to submit himself --to the rule, of ,. 
the . 
Barbarians.., Podleoki. l)'54, also thinks thia, implies an earlier 
trial., 
- 
To ue±it,, obviously refers to (some of), the attacks made 
on,. Themistokles,, whioh contributed__to. zhis-ostracisme. Furthermore, 
Plutarah, (Mor.,, 855f., =not mentioned ;, 
by". Barrett) . seems to, reject 
y; ezisted only in Ephoros. Ephoroa! _veraionf-, ýthe account probabl 
-. -Isathere any_reason, though, 
to-, reject the Diodoran account? 
It, is consistent-( c f. Podleoki 2) 98), and, the chronology of 
Pausaniasl_, troubles, (oited by, Lenardon, l). ll6 as s difficulty)' r 
isperhaps not- decisive, (ý cf, references at ZSilton 263N37). It 
is easy to think, up reasons why,, Fpboro a. -, or, perhaps, someone, 91 so 
might-bave invented atrial (cfo e. g., Lenardon 1) 1171 Barrett 
has -a -full bibliography, on! earlier-, , attitudea). -I yam ; 
willing to, dismiss, Ephorost, tbough, -because for Fthe time; being ;_ 
342. 
I am prepared to. accept that some. of, the' new Kerameikos ostraka 
, 
belong to the 4709 (_ cf.. Mattingly 2), 284 and I99,285). None 
of the Themistokles' ostraka- mentions treachery or Ledism. ' Ephoros 
might have known of a trial and acquittal at Athens before 
Themistokles' ostracism, but I cannot believe Medism was even 
indirectly involved. Some trial concerning financial 
irregularities in 480, 'perhaps. stemming from our postulated' 
Karystian accusations, might, well- have involved the Spartans. 
Internally, too,, Diodoros'-. account""betrays. sign s of fabrication; 
the Spartans bribed: Themistokleal'onemies"(54.4); which, -would " 
hardlyylhave been necessary.. -.: The convoluted irony which pervades 
Diodoros' account has been, given, a. further, twist: than. is. found in 
the-perhaps historical account of Plutarch, =wbo-has. Themistokles 
use earlier accusations in'his own, unsuocessful"defenoei 6Diodoros 
has-the-enemies: use Themistokles': earlier successful. defence in 
sucoessfully=. oondemning: him.: Kagan 52-3 also accepts atfirat ". ' 
trial for Medism.... 
96. See Lenardon's ohapter: l)°; 214-22'subtitled: "A Hero's Wit" where 
the. aneodotesr(includingäsome not-in Plutarah). are'colleoted. ", - 
97" On°. the_predominence=of `demotic band rarity,. of patronymio<on' . 
Themistokles' ostraka. see above 
N43. ysä '$° °=p 
98. See. Gauer's comments 136: 
99. The passage-is discussed by lfeister' 2784i 11: -cf-, -the comment -of 
von . Fritz and Kapp on AP, 26.1 
(170-7lN76). 
.. ' .... "° -_-- 
100. Fora more-extensive, and`idealized"portrait of Kimon's charaoter 
see . Sahachermeyr 
101. '. A-possible ezception, to'-this could: be°seen'in the, - suppliant's 
ostrakon (aee-Raubitsohek-. 6) 240-42) whioh was perhaps the reaction 
343. 
of a man who felt Aristeides' Justice had not been tempered with 
>J mercy, and had himself suffered as a result* 
I can -think of no useful evidence to illustrate Ranthippos' 
character. 
102. Bicknell 1) 'Preface. ' 
103. Sealey 1) 66. 
104. Bicknell-1) 87, cf. 94-, See too Davies' comments 305; "° cf. 
R. Walker 48; - Rignett 1) 190; Meiggs 86-7. 
105"' 
_ 
'the comments of Day'andýChambers "132-3; -J.. Martin 41-2. 
106. I. take this date for Themistokles' oatracism'as: virtually certain. 
It is Diodoros' -date. ' for' Themistokles' . post-Aar career' (54.1 - 
58.5)" That-be: baa preserved the correct dateýoflsome_oentral 
eventin Themistokies' career has"been widely, "' and -not -unreasonably - 
assumed (by'e. g. Beloch: 192-3; '. `. Wilamowitz 1) 144; ýBusolt; 112N2; 
E: °v alker 62; Cary 1)'1621', - , Eighby 82-3; 
' E. Meyer 486N21,.., 
Lenardon 2) 24 and N6,25 and N12; Cawkwell 47; Fornara 2) 271; 
Tomlinson 104; Barrett 304). If it be accepted that the event 
can not have been Themistokles' flight from Hellas or his exile 
(see Milton)- there is a-prima facie case for accepting it as the 
ostracism date. And if it be further accepted that there is no 
good evidence to contradict this belief (see the references at 
Milton 271NN70 and 71) then it would be tendentious not to accept 
Diodoros' date as the correct date of Themistokles' ostracism. 
(There is sometimes a surprising confusion in modern accounts 
about the precise date within the archon year. It is not possible 
to cite Diodoros for Themistokles' ostracism being "in 471" (as 
Podlecki 1) 52 with 165N23; *_cf. 
Pierson 59). The evidence 
leaves no doubt that an ostracism took place in the second half 
344" 
an : archon years AP 43-5 says the decision on whether to 
hold an ostracism was made in the sixth prytaror. 
tl 
Philoohoros 
(fro-30) places it_before the eighth. Carcopino, 1 62 and N4, 
followed. by Rignett 165jargued that Philoohoros probably meant 
the final vote. °. So -the, preliminary vote took place, most 
probably, roughly, in January and the final vote towards spring. 
Antiostracism in 471/0. was'therefore in spring 470. Correctly', 
now, . Podleoki 4). 20.: ' 
107. Davies 305. ` The implications we have drawn from Themistokles' 
non-ostracism would be forcefully underlined if it could be con- 
fidently accepted that itegakles was ostracized a second time 
ri. soon after 479, . as D. li. Lewis 3) , 3-4 and Bicknell 4). 174-5- ry 4 
suggest. I'see no: reason ýto differentiate between the ability 
to-muster-support on the question. _of an ostracism and on questions 
Of, policy-facing the. Assembly in. the regular course of political 
345" 
CHAPTER TEN NOTES 
1. Pl., More. 859 o. _d gives a list. of tyrants expelled by the 
Spartans; only the last two, Aristodemos and Angelos, from 
Thessaly, are specified as being: at the, hands of Leotyohidea* 
Thus neither Aristogenea from l! iletos, nor Aulisfrom Phokis 
was expelled by Leotyohides. Burn. 557, thinks Aulis was expelled 
by Leotychides and dates the eventyahortly after 479- 
2. See, above all W. P. Wallace 2);: criticism and, further references 
at Roy 336" 
3. Androwes 1) 2. 
4. Huxley 2)9 apparently. accepted by 17olski 3) 14 in the text, but 
treated with sceptioism in 14N45. 
5. See Hahn for Spartan approaches to security. If the xenagoi, 
system were introduced in our period and, not, considerably earlier 
then. itwould, be as, likely, to, have originated immediately after 
the Persian war as after. Dipaia, _when Busolt 124 
(with the 
ancient references), would, piace its followed by. F.. I: eyer 484N21 
F.. Walker 67; and Ni. 
6. See, chapter six N76. .-.., 
7" Contrast, Forrest, 3) 11N3. 4?, 
8. C f. Rhodes 3) 391" 6 
9. See. chapter seven. 
M The objection of Barber, 90 that the motion must be exaggerated 
because "they had no navy" is, -pertinent,: 
though not conclusive. 
Had the motion. been carried_the proposals would have been put to 
0 the Peloponnesian League whioh. could have, put, up some kind of 
challenge at sea, though admittedly not an adequate one. 
'=º 'Furthermore, there, ma have been the possibility of revolt 
346. 
from some of Athens' allies (see chapter nine N21). And the : 
motion-was, after all, Jdefeated. 
11. E. '-i7eyer 483-4N1 thought that the evidenoe of the battles of 
: ', Tegea: and Dipaia, proved the debate unhistorical. 
12.1 , find-the eolution`to the problem proposed by Harnmond 2) 371-81, 
399-40 the, most, satiefaotory, and-I acoept his main oonclusions; 
c£. "Ccharf 2),, for similar conclusions. - None of the objections 
A raised by Reece 115-16 ; is ': conclusive. 'The modifications offered 
by', Sealey 5) are not preferable , (see Hammond's reply 3) cf. 
Reece-116-17). See also'Papantoniou and French 2) especially 
112-15. ' Lana-2) 270-71 appears to accept Fammond's'oonclusions 
on the early date=tor-the beginning of the revolt. As well as 
the modern- Workscited in-the above mentioned articles see also 
the earlier references at Busolt 260-61N3; and P. K. Walker 37-8; 
van -Rooyl Huxley 1), 33 and -N211 " Rusehenbusah 375N36i Mopeall 
=``x J. R.: Cole 374_61. Deane 16-32, '46-52.59-62; , Schreiner 1) 48-9, 
2) 271; cf. the bibliographical"reviewat Bayer and'Aeideking 
131-2. See too chapter fourteen. It is worth mentioning that 
Thuo. ý128.1,, narrating how, the Spartann believed'that the, 'Great 
Earthquakelwas. caused by the. tricking of suppliant helots at 
Tainaron, suggests that a revolt had'been going on before the 
earthquake: =zl. Their-seizure would mark a considerable step forward 
in-suppressing. the¢ revolt. `I-, assume, of course, that the 
sacrilege occurrei shortly before the Great Earthquake. Lazenby'a 
suggestion: (246) that', we should d-assooiate this! sacrilege with 
theframing of Pausanias at Tainaron-is attraotive. 
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13. E. g. Belooh 2)'190; 'Andrewea 1) 5; Forrest 1) 229-32 
:. (followed by Lazenby 246)x; Scharf 2) 1611: Bayer and Heideking 
117, and 117-18N22, oitina Callmer and Will for the same low 
datingg. 
14. On the date see, chapter thirteen. ;; : --. - <. "` r;. i 
15. See Andrewea 1) 4N12; i- 'cf " Beloch 189; . E. -. Walker - 66; - pace 
E. -Meyer 484N1 
(following'Busolt). 
16. See ohapter`"eiz N76. 
17" ý7t LV(, LýcL. S`n ßt6 aS_ they fought ,. ý., p 
k? KcZY 
isshis rhetorical, ' exaggerated way, of expressing 
the-faot; :. ' cf. '"Hammond-. 2) 380 and N3. 
18. Wade-Gery84"and N3, -followed by+'Andrewea 1), 4;.,,. cf., -Forrest 
1) 229; Lazenby 246N49. "" 5 fi 
19" Cf. Bammond, 2)"380; '.. -. Scharf .; 2). -161.,. Gomme. 409. wanted-to, divorce 
the Messeaiian war from Dipaia (and Tegea) because be felt they 
could notýhave been¢won-while, it was-at`ita height. 
20. Forrest 1)!, 230-32 uuggests, that'the 'Sons of, the= Slain' were in 
control=or, Argos at. this. timee I: cannot believe. that, they, would 
be-any the: less`lhostile to; Sparta than the; 'douloi';. cf. 
Sealey 2): 2548. I am doubtful whether the complete chronology 
or: Argos' expansion: in., the Argolid, or: of, her internal develop- 
ments are recoverable: on Forrest'see Podlecki 1) 168NN42,43, 
44; Cf. Kelly-83N7,!: 84N14; ý Lloyd-Jones i) 358-60; ' but see 
Kieohle 2)respeoially 197-200;: -Jeffery 54 and, N55; see also 
chapter thirteen. `. FUnfortunatelylthe excavations at IIalieis have 
not"produoed any usable chronological evidences see Jameson 
21. C£ Kolbe 260; Tomlinson 105; Forrest 1) 231; pace Belooh 
348. 
189-901 E. rialker 66. .., 
22. Andrewea 1) 3,51 Podleoki 1) 168N43. See Hammond 2) 380 and 
23. See above N12. -24. 
By F. Walker 66; Andrewee 1) 5. See further Forrest 1) 231-2; 
Bayer and Aeideking 117)22. =Kelly 83N9 wasn't impressed with 
this (or other) suggestion(s). '-, = 
25. Diodoros (65.3)`says the Argives attacked I! ykenai because they 
saw the Spartans had' beenAümbled (Týta tiýýý/cv t-k4v o u5 
I. believe this refers to, the reoent, Pausanias affair, for'Diodoros 
uses the same word earlier'-t6 desoribe'the effect it had on the 
Spartans (54.2: -ToX. F-(vw S 
). , -= Pausanias' death should not 
be dated earlier than'468: (see Milton. 263, though'note the- 
arguments used by soholars referred, to. at-263N36, adding Barrett 
304 and h29). 
26. See Forrest l) 231! for a different version. ' Sealey 2) 256 
objects that-the Arkadian revolt should be over before the 
beginning of - the ý7 oesenian`. war-lsince such a complication should 
have been reported in the sources.,, -The argument'is questionable, 
but, 'in any-case, the. complication probably was reflected in 
Ephoros'r acoount,, if our interpretation of -L L"S' 7Co kEt-A-ou5 
is'aorrect. 
27. Sealey 5) 369 (among others:. 'aee-referonoes at Cloohe 35-6, 
adding J. R. Cole-3811 Sohreiner l) 37)-doubted the historicity 
of the promise, -whiob, in my"view, -'is methodologically unacceptable 
(see the comments of = Homme : 1407; - Kagan 61N5 (with further 'i- 
references); - de Ste. Croix'l79). Sealey 2) 257''has recently 
reasserted his doubts.. -`_- 
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28. Andrewes 1) 4; Busolt 121N19 followed by Kagan 55N21; of. 
Highby 87 " 
29. See iilton, '""espeoially 263N36. I assume the western part of 
the flight must have taken at least three months. 
30. Busolt 121N1 (following Belooh). See, correotly, Forrest 1) 
229-30, 'Bengtson 1) 197 is inclined to date both battles in 
the 47081 (he is wrong to describe Hammond's view as 'similar' 
to those'-who date both battles in the 4600. 
31. Against Bergk see Busolt 121N1; cf. F. Meyer 483N1; Forrest 
1) 229-30A1; *Anlrewes 1) 1,4. Pau sanias (9.2.5) makes it 
unlikely that the Tegeans had a separate monumont at Plataia 
( cf. Edmonds 359N4)" Simonid©a' authorship, inoidentally, 
provides a terminus ante quem of 468/7 for the battle of Tegea 
(harm. Par. 57); ef. Forrest 1) 229-30N12. 
32. Busolt 121N1. 
33" Cr- Andrewes 1) 4; but note too Forrest 1) 229N8. 
34" On the date of his flight to Tegea, 476/5, see chapter six N76. 
35" See cross reference in last note. 
36. See R. T. Williams 16-18 for a different suggestion. 
37. The synoikism was probably accompanied by further constitutional 
rearrangements: see ancient references at E. Mayer 485N1 or 
Hill, Meiggs and Andrewes 358. The ten phylai had already boon 
instituted by summer 472 (Paus. 5.9.5; cf. Dusolt 118N5). 
There is no evidence to suggest the t'antineians synoikiaed 
(Strabo 8.3.2, p. 377) at this period, though scholars often 
locate it about now (e. g. Busolt`118; Andrewes 1) 21 Podleoki 
1) 55); correotlys E. Meyer 485x1;, Roy 338 and 1420; cr. 
Sealey 2) 255. äiantineia appears to have been pro-Zpartan (or 
.. 350. 
probably more accurately anti-Tegean) throughout the 4708-and 
460s, in view of her assistanoe: to Sparta in (probably the 
third) Messeniantwar (Xen. H9110,59293) and her absenoo, from 
the battles of Tegea and Dipaia.. _-The 
date°. of the eynoikism: of 
Tegea. (Strabo_8.3.2, P"377i`, - .. 
cf. Paus. 8.45.1)`is, also. unknown; 
of_ Huzley, 2) `30; . see'too_Forrest, 
l) 229N8. ß. - ;ý. 
38. See-R. T. Williams : 15-26; responses at Gomme;, -Andrewes and Dover 
485; Roy 335-6... 
',.. ea..... 39. '- Roy 341, Cf. -336. 
40. See, ° generally, W. P. Wallaoe 2); R. T. Williams* 
41. See Roy; cf.: Sealey 2)253_4. '`. 
42.. See. abovs, N20. _ ... .ý. . 
ý. 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CHAPTER-ELFYEN NOTES 
1. I consider Diodoros' statement (50.8) that the Athenians had 
been expecting a war with. the Spartans before the-outcome of 
the debate became known to be invalid because the implication 
that the hostility originated from the transfer of hegemony 
contradicts good evidence and is most probably, based on nothing 
more than a retrojection of the implication of the motion of 
the debates see chapter seven. 
2. " See chapter six. , 
3. Cf. 
Y, 
the suggestion in. chapter six that Themistokles had been 
allegingthat the Spartans,, tbrough Pausanias' agency, were 
arranging a deal with the Persians. The incorrect association 
(see Meiggs 509 for evidence-and further references, at chapter 
twelve ßa35) of Themistokles with the condemnation of Arthmios as 
&zt/A(>5 Kca. -ý . 
4o)c4t. t. to S for having brought Persian gold 
to the Peloponnese found in Aelius Aristeides 46.303 (Dindorf. 
II p"392), and Plutarch (Th. 6.3) may be'based on the knowledge 
that Themistokles had noted the danger to Athens of-Persian 
support for the Peloponnesians. 
4" `See Berthold for justification of this assertion.,., 
5"-". On the relationship of Themistokles'_-post-war, maritime strategy 
towards the Peloponnese with Perikles' see Brockmeyer. 37-41,, 61. 
6. Andrewes-1) 4, e. g. takes it'as an error - "at any rate, a 
reconstruction-which works the Athenians into Teisamenos' battle 
of Tegea will have to alter a good deal that we are otherwise 
agreed on". -Forrest's'appreciation, of the significance of the 
evidence (1) 235x8) is just and exceptional. 
, 
7" It is\noteworthy that, -if our interpretation is acceptedlit would 
.ý 
represent a further refutation ("cf. chapters five and thirteen) 
of the theory of socio-political alignments which identifies 
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Themistokles' supporters as mainly, of lower class background. 
The ardent volunteers at Tegea, must have been wealthy men. 
8. Kolbe 255-63-finally established the individual identity of 
a fifth century battle of Oinoe in the Argolid. See further 
Jefferyi Meiggs 96-7, , 469-72" 
9. See Thomsen- 328; lieiggs 2), 44, o"f. ! 'The Athenian Empire" 
471), followed by, Jeffery, 41, (but iteigga', argument concerning 
post-Ephialtio naming of. buildings. cannot be taken, an a formal 
terminus ante, quem, as Bicknell, 2) 429N19, seems to take it), 
L. S. Veritt 256-7; Boersma, 55.,,. 
10. See. Jeffery 42NlO;,.. Meiggs 471-2 and. tbe, referenoesthey cite. 
11. See chapter. thirteen. , 
12. Andrewes, 3) 10-12,15. 
iý3ya 
'4 !rk- 
13. C£. Schaohermeyr, 2) 36,,, 46,, 24li[25., 
rThe 
Athenians at both 
Tegea and Oinoe are unlikely to have, been. meroenariee. 
14. Cl. chapter nine N21. 
15. See the commentsof Frenob, l) 96.., YZt. 
is. egainat this, baokground 
that we, should understand, the. meagreness_oftemple rebuilding 
activity (see chapter five), as well asthe failure,. toroomplete 
the Piraeus walls, to the., height originally intended (Thuce 93.5)" 
The lack_of. manpower. in these years is testified to by 
Themiatoklea'measure to encourage... the,,, immigration, ofxmetios and 
craftsmen 
, 
(Diod., 43.3=.. modern, references at chapter nine N24). 
16. I think it is-fair to. interpret>Kimon! e words in thisaay, even 
though Stesimbrotoa. took, his, words as intending a comparison 
between., the Spartans, and1Athenians, unfavourable. to the latter. 
This may have been: merely Stesimbrotoa'"interpretation and. Kimon'a 
words. needn't be taken only, in thin, way., or do I. think it 
353" 
improper-to suggest Kimon's defence or, praise of the 
Lakedäimoniana in this form may have been as early as the 
late 470a, even though Plutarch mentions it in the prelude to 
his ostracism*" 
17. The references ere`collectsd'and'discussed by Podleoki 1) 15-25. 
(I do not aooept7'though, 11his interpretation (19-21) of 
Themistoklea'attitudesytowardefthe lonianse see ohapter 3). 
18. The danger Hellas 7might`be in from a eonaller land foroe is not 
treated so rationally (803-22)gbut the benefit of hindsight and 
depth of religious feeling'prevented this element spoiling the 
general effect of eeourityoreated bythe-`whole tenor of the 
play. The auperiority'ofathe Greek (or rather Athenian) naval 
arm is'presupposedi '728, '1037; - cf: Themistokless refleotiona 
on the°atrategic eituation after Plataie (Thun. 93.7). 
19. The'phrase was uaed'by Kimon' in 'the seoond half of 464 (Ion fr. 
14"ap. "Pl. "g. 16.8: '3 on'°the, date see JIammond 2) 374.7), but the 
oraole (see the referenoe`at"ohapter, thirteen N11) upon whioh it 
was based was being'used'in Sparta to support an analysis of 
the 'international' situationin47/4 (Diod. 50.4s''on the 
Hetoimaridae'debate-eeeYohapter`seven). 
20. See Podleoki l) 17=18. '`° 
21. Podleoki'1) 19-21 offers'a different"exp1anation, taking the 
devices as an"ezpreasion of a' putative'"Ionian polioy" (the 
phrase is used by Podleoki at 2) 29 and 4) 4.. 5), the existence 
of whioh'I cannot-aooept: 'eee-ohapter'three. 
22. Ift'ee Äe`'wöndered, `Themietokles had'been'pointing to the 
preeenoe of Paueaniae in'Kolonai an evidenoe of joint Spartan- 
Persian plane*'aimed at 'Athena; the'reoall and imprisonment of 
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Pausanias, perhaps °in. the, late 470s,, may have been seen as. a-,, 
gesture to alleviate Athenian, fears. sI 
23. Cf. French 1) 117. 
24. The-case against accepting the implicatione, of Peraai-890-95, 
as to the membership of, the Kyprian citiesýof the alliance at 
the time of the.. produotion-, of. the=Pereei (see ATL-207-9)9 
though aooepted by Podleaki 1) 159N28, is not good enough$ see 
Meiggs 57-8.: Kypros was a Persian=base by the time of Furymedon 
(Pl. K. 12.4*.. on-the; date see Milton, ! espeoially 267-8)" 
25. See Ehrenbers. 4) and-Wade-eery 265-6 on; Athenian polypragmoeyne. 
26. U. Diod. 54.5v' Aristodemos, 6.1 Cicero do Amio. 12.42. 
Raubiteohek, 7) 109"defends an oontemporary the attribution of 
Jealousy as a, oause of ostraoiam,, ref erring,. to, -Pindar 
(Pyth. 
7,, 1.. 19 (on: L'egakles))-and-. Sophokles (Ajax. 154-63, whioh, he takes 
as certainly referring,. to Themistokles). 
27. See chapter nine N95. fTho:, other--. two fragments, aooueing 
Themistokles-of; Mediem, are-, expreselylooated by Plutaroh 
(Th.; 21.4) as having,, been, oomposed.,, [, Lv-tL Tlv qUyºJV of 
Themistokles. -Ido not, believesallegations of Mediem played any 
part in the pre-ostracism slanders because of the silence of the 
ostraka on this points see chapter two and chapter nine P95, 
pace e. g. Forrest 1) 236-71 Gdlke 611 Knight 431 Barrett 303. 
For the possibility of Lykomid slanders see Connor 7) especially 
574" 
28. Caroopino 188 thinks the alienation caused by Themistokles' 
self-advertisement is sufficient in itself to explain his 
ostraoism. See chapter nine. 
29" Dioä. 54.5 lists as a motive for ostracism the desire 
355" 
30. Cf. chapter nine x95; cf. Aiod. 54.58 one group who worked 
for Themistokles' downfall were 
CWrou niy v 7-ý . _OA _V,;. 
31. Demosthenes (23.205): would', also appear to, support this assess- 
ment of the causes of. Themistokles' - ostracism. - 
32. Cf. the oomments. of. fignett°l) 339-on'the-purpose of ostracism; 
cf. J. R. Cole-377- 
33- 
.. 
None of Themiatokles!, philoi, -of, course,,.. will have been foolish 
enough to have attempted to-, carry on_the anti-Spartan cause; 
they will have had. noýreasonýto: hope, for=suooess. where Themiatoklea 
had failed. To`this-i extent Connor. 2)'74, cf. 63N55 is right to 
underline the importance of'the'personal leadership of a philia 
group, as testified by the institution of-ostraoism. 'But this 
does not imply that`similarity'of"'polioy aas not an important 
element in- philia'"groups. '° A new leader, ', Ephialtes, -, -did in fact 
arise to take, up`some of-Themistoklea'--"ideas, but-only when the 
Political-, situation had=ohanged. ý-, "I" suspeot- that '-some of 
Themistokles'; erstwhile philoi'ýsupported-Ephialtes, (see too' 
Connor"2) 75-6N68p. Karavites. l)X334 and chapter fourteen. - 
34. See ohapter-thirteen.. rt :., 
s ,ý 
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CHAPTER'TWELVE NOTES 
1. On the date of strategia. eleotions, seeB. D. Ueritt; on the 
date of- ostrakophoriai_ within the archon year and the 
471/0 date for Themistoklea'. ostracism see chapter nine N106. 
2. See chapter eight and, ]: ilton.. 267-9. It is unnecessary for our 
purposes to choose. between, the alternative reconstructions I 
proposed at the latter, reference. ", At 263N35 I objected to 
Ehrenberg's reliance on ,a 
priori,, arguments in the face of an 
analysis ofthe, ancient-evidence, but also claimed "that it 
would-be no difficult task to demonstrate that the Thasos revolt 
is, as 'likely' etraight. after Eurymedon as, four or five years 
after". Perhaps I_chould, substantiate this claim. Ehrenberg 
says "it is unlikely"., that tbe_Thasoe revolt "followed so 
closely the, victorywhioh_made any. Persian offensive impossible, 
and, in fact, opened the door to a more tyrannical rule by 
Athena". ( 3) 671). But the strength of the Thasian fleet, the 
duration. of, the siege, the events end situation on the mainland 
opposite Thasos -and,, the,, attitude of Sparta make it unnecessary 
for us to assume that Thaeos. would look to. a Persian offensive as 
the moment-to, revolt, If Thence, like Naxos, became dissatisfied 
with Athenian behaviourlduring, the: preparations for Eurymedon, 
believing in: the. probability,, of a: Greek victory, _ she may. 
have 
decided-to; wait until after. the. defeatýof the-Persians in order 
to avoid being dubbed a-Usdiaer (as Naxos probably was - cf. 
e. g. . H. Schaefer-1141 : Cawkwell 48), thereby, keeping the sympathy 
of the 
. 
other alliee,. end, more importantly, -of Sparta. But as 
eoon, as her , loyalty to. the Greek cause had been demonstrated at 
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Furymedon, and as soon asp arguably, the Athenians' excuse 
for their uncompromising treatment of their allies had been 
removed, "the, Thasians need postpone revolt no 
longer. 
, 
3e, C. 
- 
chapter eleven ; N33. _ ,, 
4. See further chapters,. thirteen. and fourteen. AP 25.3 -4 perhaps 
reflects a tradition; whioh reported a political association 
between Fphialtes and., Themistokles, which would, therefore, be 
located before Themistokles',, ostracism in 471/0, and not, -as 
the AP story requires,; in the.. late 460s. .I am, 
though, less 
confident.. than Lang2) 273! 
5. see Davies 455,457".: cý 
6.. The-figure of fortyiyeare-maybe a round ones cf. Wade-Gary 
2401. -, see too. Hignettj l) 2531, -, and 
it probably derives from 
Theopomposa; see, Connor 1); 167-8N8 cf. 4) 33) and reference 
ý, - 
to, WeizBäcker;,, , cf., E. 
ý. 
Walker 69 , and Nl;,. 
Raubitsohek 10)83, 
93-4". 
-tiýý. ý 
7. Podleoki. l) 29 .X3 ;' M1 .s-y 
8. Eurymedon was. early; in 465, (see,, Milton, especially 267-8), and 
Cawkwell. 47-8 has, shown that news of the preparations will have 
reached Athens, a good=two_years before, possibly more; of. 
von Domaszeweki; 10., .-=w 
9. I do not, find persuasive, tbe tentative suggestion of Davison 
2) 104-that the play, may reflect talk in the, early 460s of a 
reconciliation, with. Thebes, torv, balence Spart aI s land power. 
10. Correctly, - Forrest 1). 240. , 
11. The subtle, methods - manipulation of constitutional machinery 
by means of his, philoi: conneotionswithin the Areopagoa -will 
be discussed in the ne=t chapter..,, . 
:- 
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12. CW Zou .. e TI J rcvý 7paýwäwv- 
cf. Wilamowitz 1) 146N41; Uilton 270 N65. 
13. See Forrest 1) 238. 
14. Forrest 1) 2381 cf. Petre. 54; Zinserling 102N2 in lese eure. 
Cavaignao 1) 105 suspected -resentment, on Kimon'a part, but 
associated it with what; be, believed to. bathe recent production 
of Aisohylos' Suppliants with its. sympathy for Themistokles and 
Argos. (He correoted the date of-theýSuppliants in accordance 
with the new evidenoo; (aee chapter thirteen N21) at 2) 123). 
15. see Milton espeoielly 203 end N36. 
16. See Cawkwe11- 53i rotze 273-5; :ä Lazenby. 246-7,250. 
17. Contrast Podleoki: 2) 38,. 5) 307-8 who euggeata that-. the Spartan 
action against Pausanias. was motivated; primarily by the desire 
to do away with Themistoklese- 
18. Pace Barrett, especially 293; cf. Lenardon 1) 119,1 am 
confident that Leobotee' action is direotly related to the 
aoousation ol, oomplioity in Paueanias' D""edism, not, with some 
putative, unsuocessfuL earlier, actions' aee chapter nine P95 and 
Rhodes 1) 200_201. 
19. On his possible identity see Bioknell, l). 54-8.4. 
20. C#: Podlecki 1) 165-6N24i 
"ý! ýy......, hö k rJ _ suggest is ýa: speoific , aocusation' such as the 
Mediem charge, and not; -_for example, the. earlier informal 
accusations which culminated-in Themistoklest=ostraoism, as 
Curtiue 132-, ha4 itp,, Kieohle-294 appeare-to-. relate this to the 
ostracism eiandere, though; he, doesn't-speoify. -:, - 
21. Plutarch's confident assertion (Ar. 25.7)'of Aristeides' absence 
from identifiable-accusers-of. Themistoklea, mounds as though he 
has looked for his name, so I prefer to accept it in 
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preference to the opposite notice in Lucian (Calumn. 27). Hie 
absence is to be explained by the fact that he was either dead 
or moribund. Raubitschek 10) 93-4 takes the 469/8 date for 
the beginning of Perikles' ascendancy (. cf. above N6) as 
marking also the death - at least in the tradition based on 
Theopompos - of Aristeides. However, if Nepos' notice (Ar. 3.2) 
that be died four years after Themistokles "erst expuleus" is 
also based on Theopompos, 'it casts serious doubt on the correct- 
ness of the tradition, ` for it would mean an ostracism date for 
Themistokles, at the latest, of 472/1 (i. e. 'in the fourth year #) 
and so most probably (see chapter nine N106) a 471/0 flight date, 
which conflicts with better'evidence (see Milton 257-67)- 
22* Knight's disagreement"(43-41159) with Hignett's view ( 2) 37113) 
that "the fall of Themistokles may have been largely brought 
about by Kimon" on the basis of the tradition of Leobotes' role 
is unwarranteds the two-'are by no means inoompatiblet see e. g. 
Lazenby's comment (248N54). ' Kimon's involvement is also supported 
by his treatment'of'Epikrates (see text below). 
23. Diodoros (54.4) asserts"that the Spartans 
ýýýý£__Yoýý 
Qtý___. _ _ý 
_CoSýPp_ of Themistokles; but in the context of 
the apocryphal first M'edism trial (see chapter nine N95), with 
the implausible and damaging detail that Themistokles' enemies 
were-bribed to bring charges against himj the evidence is thus 
worthless. Modern scholars who have suspected collusion between 
Themistokles' enemies and"the Spartans include 17ilamowitz 
1) 144N377who seems aware that contact with Kimon is probable, 
but doesn't seem to. 'like`the`'idea; Podleoki 2) 38,5) 3111 
Smart (in Knight 43N58), yfollowed by ae Ste. Croix 178N40; 
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Lazenby 248N54.: 
24. By Tomlinson 104" 
25. Tbuoydides was probably, prevented from-expressing what may have 
been his inclination to, reject, the, idea of Theristokles& guilt 
by the reasons mentioned at Uilton 264. -5N46. 
26. Cawkwell, especially 48.: ü. -' 
27. Cawkwell 45, cf. 48,53" 
28. Thus it is neaessary. to - shift the emphasis of Cawkwell'a and 
others' explanation (see referenoes at ohapter three 1l9) of 
Athenian willingness-to, believe'the charges-in terms of 
Themiatokles' lack of zeal for the Persian war, in order to 
take account of the, sudden awareness, of the implioations of his 
earlier policies{' I feel. thia; suddennesa makes their reaction 
considerably more easy to understand. Cawkwell 47 was right to 
note that with the news of the: Persian build-up Themistokles 
was proved wrong, or so it appeared, about Persia" ( Ct. chapter 
eleven). as Ste., Croiz 175:: 6N29 objected that Themiatoklee (we 
should say his. friends:;; de'Ste. lCroiz (175N28) is applying the 
argument toýbefore Themistokles'-ostraoism)-"oould have turned 
any`suah news tothis own advantageq. by pointing-out that the 
Persians had. beenneedlesely provoked, against his advioel" 
The faot'that*lneither he (ostraoism) nor his friends (Themistokles' 
exile) were able. toaturn: the news to'advantage should, rather, 
suggest, 'as we-have maintained, '=that'Themietokles. did not, in. 
faotq advise the Athenians to refrain from provoking the King. 
de Ste. Croix 178 himself. draws attention to another, more 
rational aspect which helps explain Athenian reactions their 
desire to show their regard for the Spartans ( cf. Diod. 55.5). 
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This no doubt played a part, and it will have contributed to 
their anxiety, Spartan enmity being the last thing they needed 
in 467-6; but it does not. fully explain the vigour with which 
they hounded Themiatokles, which seems to have been motivated by 
genuine anger. 
29. Wilamowita 1) 144N37 is mistaken to turn Themistokles' family 
into his treasures. 
30. By e. g. 7tilamowitz 1) 147N43; Dusolt 110_11A5,130; Flaoeliere 
10 and N1; _Sohachermeyr 
3) 17; Podleoki 2) 41 (suggesting the 
official indictment document maybe the ultimate nouroe); Meister 
281. 
31. C. Forrest 1) 238, followed by H. B. Wallace 202N17. Wade- 
Gary' a, date in 450__( 2). 222N22; cf. ATL. 171N42) has very little 
to reooaºmend it e,., -. »: -. 
32. Cf. Milton, 261 and NN26 and, 27. 
33- Sohaohermeyr 3) l7- 
34- See the 
. 
evidence at Lteiggs 509-10.. 
35" See von Domaszewaki, 1ON1; '. Cary 2);. Forrest 1) 238-99 239N1; 
M. B. Wallace 200-202; --but alsoGomme, 327Nl; Wade-Gery 2) 
222N22; cf. ATL 171N42;,, H. Schaefer. 25-8; Sohaohermeyr 
1) 318N60 with further references.,. 
36. )!. B. Wallade 202., ---.; 
37" $ohaohermeyr 1) 124., Our, aketoh of, the, Kimonian era is deliberately 
one-sided. For-the. rosy view-, see e. g. ýSohaohermeyr 1) 120-38. 
.... _ ... "-z,. a-, 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN NOTE 
1. See Milton 268-9 for references. 
2. Hammond 5) 107 seems to, imply that the move should be connected 
with the election of Ephialtes and-Perikles to the strategia in 
this period. 
3. On the Thasos revolt, and its background, see in particular 
ATL 258-9; Pouilloux=107-101. _Pleket 
1); Kagan 47-81 Blackman 
2001 Moises 83-6, - 90. 
4. Kagan 47 (-. cf. Hammond and Griffith 103) believes Makedonia vas 
a target as early as this. 
The friction between. Kimon and the Korinthian Laahartoa 
(P1. K. 17.1) should-perhaps not be over-interpreted. It may 
represent nothing more than Korinthian indignation at Athenian 
lack of propriety and Kimon's impatience (though Raubitsohek's 
claim (12) 269) that "there was no, change" in the Korinthians' 
friendly attitude to Athena on this occasion requires more comment 
than his reference (269N4). to de Ste. Croix 78N34 (which is 
irrelevante de"Ste. Croix ref arepus to Jaooby'sasuggestion that 
the story derives from-Ion) and to J. R., Cole 374-8 who does not 
(seek to) elucidate Atheno-Korinthian relations). It is not 
impossible, though, that Korinthian: suspioion was aroused by 
Athenian ambitions at Enneabodoi and: the, area,. posing a potential 
threat to the well-established Korinthian interests. in the area 
(Podeidaia). This needn't imply the: existenoe of the more 
ambitious goal of annexing part of Makedonia. Korinthian 
hostility might also. be explained by-. the natural-fear of-too, 
close a co-operation developing-between: Athena and-Sparta ( cf. 
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H. 5.75,92). Huxley 1) 31-3 and N21 has rendered convincing 
Jacoby's suggestion, ( 2), 7-9)'that Ion was with Kimon on this 
expedition and so is probably°Plutarch's source. See also 
Sealey's remarks ( 2) 263-4). '- 
5. E. C. Jacoby 1) 51; Hignett 1)'193; ` Forrest 1) 240,2) 213; 
Meiggs 88; " cf. J. R. Cole' 377 
6. Cf. Gomme 296; Papantoniou 181. 
7. See Hammond 2) especially 376-8. 
8. This is brought out most graphically-by French 2) 112-15 and 
Deane 19-20. 
9. Even with the revolt-of Thasos suoh'e Peloponnesian war would 
still have been °praatiaable. Pace E. Walker 71, the Athenians 
were probably not bound by the alliance against the Persians to 
render Sparta supports-'see comme 300. 
10. E. g. "antagonistic' 
(de-Ste. 'Croix 182); "a dangerous rival" 
(Hignett 1) 196); - "Gegner": (Sohaohermeyr 2) 32); "natural 
enemy" (Veigga 89). µbR 
11. Parke and'Wormell 50, nr. 112; '-'--' 
12. See Milton 257-8 "and N5, '267-9. (Ae far an I know Sohreiner 
2) '27 is alone in. keeping to'the'"soholiente 453/2 'date for 
Drabeekoe). 
-Because of the nature of, the: arguments'used, discussion of 
the chronology of'the"post.: 465/4"period will be integrated into 
the main narrative and-not contained in a separate chapter as 
was preferable =for the period'478/7-465/4" 
13. Cf. e. g. Kammond'2 -397-9ýa = 
14" It is-this faot,: mainly, which vitiates-the explanation of the 
Spartan dismissal-of the Athenian contingent proposed by Lane 
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2) 268-9 (that the fall of Thasos rendered the presenoe of 
the Athenians in the Peloponnese unnecessary, since they had 
been requested primarily to dietraot the Athenians from Thaaoa) 
and by Deane 189 21 (that news of the fall of Thaaoe brought 
with it Athenian knowledge of the prior Spartan promise to 
invade Attika); cf. French 2) 116. Second Spartan appeal, 
see chapter ten N12. 
15. The most important, in my view, is the following. The reforms 
of Ephialtea are datel to 462/1 (AP 25.2). Plutarch (K. 15.1), 
immediately after his account of Kimon's return from the success- 
ful siege of Thasos and consequent trial (14.2 -4), says that 
the reforms were parried out while Kimon was away on a oampaignt 
and that Kimon went by sea (£1 
.1 Fn keud-- ). Scholars have 
not liked the idea that Kimon should proceed to Lakonia by sea 
("eine seltsame Vorstellung" wrote von Domaszewski 11N3, sniffily, 
of Busolt'e suggestion (258, ,,. Cf. 
Judeioh 14NlD. - Some take 
F-' 710"S0ers as a slip by Plutarch (e. g. E. Meyer 2) 52; 
1eiggs 89N3). E. Walker's argument (468) -that the tradition 
of Kimon's absence on the oooasion of'the reforms was an 
inference of Theopompoe is arbitrary, and stimulated by what I 
believe to be his mistaken oonoeption of the circumstances 
surrounding the reforms. Beloch 198 related Kimon'a setting 
sail to the expedition against Thasos, and, going against 
Plutaroh's plain meaning, refers the attack on the Areopagos 
(Pl. K. 15.1 -2) not'to the final reform but to a long process 
of agitation. Jacoby 2) 2N6 ('cf. 1) 519 3) 369N17) would like 
to have the trial of Kimon (Pl. K. 14.2. -4)-after Drabeskos, 
and not, as Plutarch clearly implies, after-the capitulation 
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of Thasos, and have Kimon return after the trial, to Thasos, 
relating this putative embarkation to vxX£ua- S Barns 
167,170 has tried to relate it to a putative separate 
Kimonian expedition to Kypros in 462, whioh has little to 
recommend it ( er. E. Meyer 2) 52; Soharf 1) 311N2). To avoid 
ohronologioal difficulties in the mid 450a he has to include 
this alleged expedition in the six years of the Egyptian 
expedition, even though he believes the supposed Kypros expedition 
was in progress before the start of'the Egyptian oampaign 
(Barns 1751 Thuo. 110.1); Thuoydidee, though, is clearly referring 
to involvement in Egypt as lasting'six years. (sealer 5) 370, 
cf... 1) 68,74N65, has accepted his conclusions, qualified by 
"perhaps" at 2) 258). Others relate it to the Kypros-Egyptian 
expedition (von Domaezewski 11; Scharf 1) 315; Raubitsohek 
11) 38). See also chapter fourteen and ? 17 and Hignett's 
discussion ( 1) 337-41). ''Hammond 2)-400 has provided a perfectly 
adequate explanation of. why Kimon>ahould have gone to Lakonia this 
second time by sea. In , foot, `. its is now widely sooepted, that Kimon 
went with aid to Lakonia in the same arohon year as the reforms 
were effeoted: "it may=be'taken-aa'aaoepted" says J. R. Cole 
373, cf. 374-8; cf. 'Fornara 3)-44i. see too-Hammond 2) 378. 
While the first half of: 461 would not be impossible for the 
request for assistance (so,. eego, Busolt 258N1), the second-half 
of 462 is far preferable. 
16.1 do not believe, as Hammond=2)=401W1 does, that the Athenians 
fought the Aiginetans in}this period. Thuoydides (105.2) would 
seem not to refer toa oonfliot with'one of Athena' allieet pane 
MaoDowell (see Reeoeý118N32. '(ii), =((i)'is not valid) Deane 
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109N1). 
17. Though some soholars took the, assumption ., too far: see Gomme's 
discussion (307) of: Belooh; 205,2) 151-2 and. othere, adding 
Pierson 69; von Domaszewski ll;;,, -,, 
Taeger, l7-18. Sohaohermeyr 
2) 34 fails to, distinguish . between Kimon' a attitude to a Persian 
offensive immediately afterEurymedon and one after the 
capitulationof - Thazos, 1and is mistaken in lumping the question 
of a Persian offensive4together with a, war against L'akedonia; 
thus he arrivesat the -notionthat--there was 
dissatisfaction 
with Kimon's "zurückhaltende, Politik"9-an expression which 
Schachermeyr appears to apply; to Kimon'a attitude to the prospect 
of a renewed _offensive; against ; 
the "Persiansg, also. 
18. Cf. E. Meyer 2) 
. 
3N2... 
....; ý. 
19. Though it is true -; that. the order, Perikles - Ephialtea, may be 
simply rhetorical and not; neoeesarily-ohronologioal-(eee wads- 
Gory-203N2); Y: yet-, Perikles' expedition would be pointless after 
the beginning ofgthe Kypros-Egyptian expedition, in 460 (see 
chapter fourteen), and there: ie no-reason,. to. believe.. that the 
Periklean expedition waa:; connected; with reintoroementefor the 
Egyptian oampeign as von Domaezeweki 13 suggested (his reasons 
for. postulating, this (13N3) are invalid). . Perikles' expedition 
cannot beaaesooiated,,. with that-. in Thucydidea 116.3.; (pace Wade- 
Gary-loco cite and Fornara=3), =46N24; ä, eeepcorreotly. Meigge 79N1). 
Most scholars date both Ephialtes' and Perikles' expedition in 
the late 460a (e. g. -. Judeich. l2-l3N2; ,; Comme 295; -Burn 2Y551 
Sobeohermeyr 2), 34; =. R. W. Wallace 263 andrNl7_; (who puts both in 
the same, aampaignseason);, Hammond 5) 107)- 
20a C. e. g.., Jaooby : l) # 51; , ; Kagan , 
83; , Sohachermeyr_ 2) 341 Sealey 
1) 68. 
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21. I am not convinced that Aiachyloa' Suppliants is evidence 
for a debate on the possibility of involvement in Egypt at 
Athena in 4641 (the production of the play was in 464/3, about 
which there should no longer be any doubts POxy XX, 2256, fr. 
3; see the bibliography by Lloyd-Jones 2) 595, and, in 
particular, Leaky, especially 1-7; Lloyd-Jones himself 2) 596; 
Forrest 1) 236N3 (the reference to POxy 2265 on page 239 is a 
slip); Podleoki 1) 163-4N2); GGlke dates the composition of 
the play to a time when the Egyptian expedition "schon 
eingeleitet ist" and the Argive alliance "gerade geschlossen 
ist oder zumindest ... unmittelbar bevorsteht" 
(60, cf. 65) 
and she believes Aischylos is supporting those who were urging 
alliance with Argos (70-73). Lerkelbach 101 thinks the Athenians 
may even have been supporting'the Egyptian revolt from its 
inception. The Egypt motif was,, after all, required by the myth, 
despite Podleoki 1)174N48; (his remark presupposes that the 
main motivation-in-writing the Danaid trilogy was to comment on 
contemporary political-iesuee; - this, especially if we bear in 
mind, as far as we can, the whole trilogy, is not likely to have 
been the case). 
22. Originally-A. Boeokh'and K. O. Muller (see Podlecki 1) 167N39 
and the references at Lloyd-Jones 1) 357N2 (who does not deny 
"that the ode" (1.625f. ) 'may be intended to allude to the 
alliance")f Forrest 1)'240; '' Podleoki 1) 60_629 
23, kodern references on'-the AUK-, theme at Winnington-Ingram 
144N16; see-too H. G. Roberteon, `espeoially 107. 
24. See Podleoki 1),, 45-8., 51-2. 
25. See Winnington-Ingram, eep"oially 142, `145-6, against whose 
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reconstruction of the Aigyptioi and: DanaideaPodleoki 1) 
165N13 has no objections-to, -register.. 
26. See the discussion of, and evidence for, Athenian suspicions 
at Quinoey 198. (See Kelly 84-6 for some possible reasons why 
the Atheno-Argive-allianoe in-fact proved less productive than 
we might have expected).,;, 
27. Cavaignac 1); Forrest. l) 239-40; F,., Podleoki 1) 52-62p (ulke 
73N1. 
28. Respectively, Podleoki_1), 62; Forrest 1) 240. 
29. See further text below on the Themistokles parallel. 
30. By e. g. Diamantopoulos 224; Podlecki 1) 50,56,58- 
31- See Debrunner on the peculiarity of the word, and the references 
at Kinal 3) 321N25. 
32. See especially Ehrenberg s detailed - analysis 2) 518-24 
(with 
1) 432-3N44). Sealey 8) has recently argued that "decision by 
a majority vote in a. primary assembly does not, distinguish city 
constitutions called demokratia from city constitutions called 
oligarahia" (272).: But the awareness , 
of; this right as something 
to be defended against the incursions of magistrates is a feature 
of a developing oonsoiousness of=democracy which this play, seen 
in its Athenian historical context (see text below) may be taken 
as testifying to. 
33. C£. Lloyd-Jones 1) 358-60. 
34. Forrest 1) 222N4 seems ; to recognize this. 
35" Forrest 1) 221-32,240; Podleoki 1) 50,57-8,61-2; cf. 
GUlke 63; K. O. Moller; (aee Lloyd-Jones 357,360) " 
36. "The praise of democratic Argos" , 
is 
,, 
'"completely relevant, in the 
sixties ... The note. ie one of assurance; _ 
Argos ... had the right 
I 
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constitution"-(Forrest 1) 240)1 ='! Podlecki 1) 62 believes 
F. phialtes may have spoken of "a turning away from Cimon and 
his Spartan friends ... to our, real, friends, the Argives, 
"democratic like ourselves""; ý cf. Gtilke 69-70. 
37. Cl. , Gomme 318; ATL 151; ' for two, recent assessments of the 
date of the composition of Ps. Xenophon's pamphlet, see 
Bowersock 33-5 and de Ste. Croi=; 
307.. 10... (Sparta used the same 
guiding principle-in forming; her- attitude to foreign con- 
stitutional forms; , ,, cfe e. g..: 
J. R. ;. Cole , 
380; J. Martin 37)o 
38. See chapter ten. h20. , ". ; .... 
39" Ehrenberg 2) 517. See too Lloyd-Jones 359-, (and-Diamantopoulos 
224-5)- 
40. Podlecki 1) 58. 
41. On the background''to Aischylos! -anti-Spartan, feelings see 
Quinoey 205-6. 
42. Cr. Gomme 302; Forrest_. l)%240-N3; 
, 
Reeoe, 119; de Ste. Croix 
181. 
43" See-further ohapter ten, N12. ; One wonders whether the murder of 
Pausanias, later, at; least, considered a. sacrilege (Thuo.: 134.4), 
was already suspected of., being"suoh. _ 
44. See French 2) 115-17" 
45" See Diamantopoulos 221; * Podlecki-1). -60; 
GtI lke 69 denies this 
(see further text below). ', Aischylos elaborated,, Argive claims 
in the Oresteias see Quincey 201-2; . Dover 
1)236; 
. 
as Ste. - 
Croix 184.. 
46. GlIlke 69. Podleoki 168N46 explains-the claim. away by saying 
Aischylos "puts forward, in, the grand manner, ýclaima to Argive 
hegemony over "all Greece"". Diamantopoulos 221 uses this 
370. 
i 
feature to oast doubt on the belief that the play was written 
shortly before its produotion in 464/i. 
47. Hammond and Griffith 103 postulate & "visit to Argon by Alexander, 
for which there is no evidence. 
48. So, Hammond and Griffith 103'1 J. B. Cole 479 e. g. 
49. Forrest 1) 230-31. 
50. This, at any rate, aeems"to me to be in part what Aisobylos was 
celebrating in the Eumenides: see further Quincey 203_5 (critical, 
Podlecki 1) 174N50), ' thought admittedly, the strategic situation 
was radically different in 458 to that in 464- 
51. Cf. chapter nine N10, and see also 'Jeffery 52N49. 
52. Sealey 2) 261 argues that "since prosecutors were elected by the 
public assembly" (P1. Per. 10.5) "the trial was of the type 
called eisangelia". 'Unless this is nothing more than an assumption 
by Plutarch (helped by hie`demooratio interpretation of Perikles' 
early career), Seeley may be right, -and, he goes on, his accusers 
"must have thought=that Cimon ought to have been condemned in the 
previous procedure of euthynaiV`(loo. cit., cf. 1) 51,54)j 
either way it was most probably the Areopagoa which judged the 
trials on 'euthynai' see Sealey 1) 52-4 (accepted by Rhodes 1) 
201) and Monett 1) 203-5 (further references at 1) 195N3)1 on 
'eiaangelia' see now Rhodes 200-201 (pace Busolt 125-6N4; cf. 
Hignett 1) 200; Sealey 1) 51); 5; cf. R. 17. Wallace 261-3; 
Barrett 295 and N12; J. ! artin 331 see further Busolt 245R3" 
It is not impossible that ICimon Aas suspended from office by 
(the forerunner of Y) the process described at AP 61.2, cf. 
43.4, comparable to Perikles' fate in 430 (Thuc. '8. ' 54.3; Cf. 
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Busolt 245N3; Wilamowitz--2) - 249N56) but I'doubt it. It is 
probably no longer possible ý'to. reoonstruot the exact nature 
of the action(, ) against Kimono, 'In what follows Ireter to 
it/them as gü euva.. c_ ,''° recognizing=that 
in so doing the term 
may have to cover more than is usually understood by'itq *and to 
that extent may be inaccurate. '(For'the possible procedure at 
normal pre-Ephialtio 'euthynai', see HiQnett'1)'203-5). None of 
these uncertainties=affeotsthe'', date'very muchl the trial-was 
after the collapse of=Thasos. '(it is'tendentious to deny this 
as Jacoby (see above-N15) and'ýBarne 1723do), which was in 462, 
and most probably began at"the'end'=of'Kimon'a strategic term 
of office, most ', likely'the end ', of V the" 463/2 office. The 'trial 
will, therefore, have, been'around mid to-'late summer 
(pace 
E. Walker 68 andSealey 5)=370, who"plaoe it in winter). 
53" In discussing'the trialI shall assume that' Stesimbrotoa is the 
source for Plutarch 'e=whole`account, 'and -not 'onlyýthe-Elpinike 
episode. While there, - is some doubt"'there is no-good reason, to 
dismiss the-account of Kimon's'defenoe as "spate Rhetorenerfindung" 
(E. i; eyer 2) 49N1); ;, Schreiner-2) 26-7`has`reoently-argued that 
Kallisthenes was Plutarch's source; . Jacoby 2) 2N6 and Jeffery 
52N49 are cautious. ý` _ 
54. See below N77. '` 
55. Recent scholars have aooepted the usually-ignored notice in 
Pa. Demosth. `12.21'that=Aleiander was the'tirat'to control-the 
region of later'Amphipolia - N. `Robertson! 118; Harnmond and- 
Griffith 102, the"latterTeoholar$ dating Alexander's aotivity to 
between 478 and 476/5'(the referenoe, to"Herodotoa in N1ýebould 
be to book eight): --l distrust the'noticej-2`for more reliable 
372. 
evidenoe of Alexander's expansion see It. 5.17; Thuo. 2.99. 
56. Pace v. Walker 58 and Cloche 2) 53-4 who argue the proposed 
:.. expedition was punitive, believing Alexander was in Pact 
implioated in pausing the Drabeskos disaster, of whioh there 
-- is no hint in the sources. Dusolt 245 and N3 believes, and 
r- Meigge 
88 wonders whether Alexander wae""suspected or active 
sympathy with Thasos". J. W. Cole 49N26 suggesta that the reason 
for Athenian hostility was that it, "had to do with the flight 
of Themistokles", who, be argues (47-9)1 was received by Alexander. 
Despite a judicious assessment of. Thuoydides' evidence ("no 
hint here of any collaboration") and an awareness of the value 
of the 'Themistokles Letters' (481 cf. his reference (48N24) 
to Podleoki 2) 129-32), J. W. Cole is prepared to rely on the 
ooinoidenae of name-between the Makedonian Aigai and the Aiolian 
town allegedly visited by Themistokles in the non-Thuoydidean 
version of Themistokles' flight- itinerary given by Plutarch (see 
references at Milton 270 N66) and on probability, dependent, note, 
on a reoonstruotion. for which there is hardly any evidence (see 
chapter nine N9), to'suggest -that Themistokles in faut visited 
Alexander on his 'flight (, ', Cf. Hammond and Griffith 102 - without 
discussion). The sources, however, give the impression that 
after leaving Admetos' kingdom Themistokles did not let up until 
he was at Ephesos, ( _cf. 
Diod. ý56.3 -4i ' ani see Milton 260). 
Had Themistokles and, Alexander been friends-"seeking to create 
a-third. force in the Greek world" it would be incredible that 
Kimon should refuse, to attack Alexander's kingdomp (see further 
chapter nine NN9 and 10).. The idea that the Athenians should 
wish to invade Makedonia (and not also Argos, Kerkyra and Admetoe, 
373" 
kingdom) because of, Alexander's reception of Themistokles iss 
in any aase, highly implausible.;., ,t 
57. For the evidence of Kimon'a pro-Spartan. policy generally, see 
Hill, L'eigge and Andrewea 348", 
58. See, correotly, Rhodes-2) 149. ,ý 
59". So, Seeley 1) 53. It is possible that the 'euthynai' in question 
were of ex-archons about to, join the Areopagos, as Wade-aery 177, 
followed by Rhodes 1) - 2002, suzgeeted. - Sjee, too Burn 2) 52-31 
Day and Chambers 1851 Kagan 71; J. Martin 35. (Does AP 25.3 "4 
refleot some action taken. by_Ephialtes against Areopagitea who 
had been involved in, the ! eieangelia' of Tbemistoklea? ). 
60. A unilateral withdrawal from Paros may have been part of the 
charge against Kimon' e father; but, see further Kinel 1). 
61. Failure to carry out orders wasleeeeerioua than corruptions 
see Kinzl 1) 288. `- .. -. 
62.. Most probably Aleuadai:,; see chapter nine, MlO. 
63" Kimon was obviously, unaware. of the, atrength: and extent of Spartan 
feeling against- Athens'. tightening of control. over. the northern 
Aegean and the settlement at Drabeskos, (Thuo. 101.1 -2), but he 
may have been informed during the first relief expedition in 464 
that the Spartans would be unhappy, to aee, Athenian influenoe 
expand beyond Thrace.. I doubt, anyway, whether Kimon had envisaged 
expansion into, uakedonia (, cf. text above),, and I suspect Alexander 
and he were friends (_cfe chapter nine NN9 and 10; von Domaszewski 
121 Meiggs 88)., 
64" Kagan 63 notes the importanoe of family feuds as a possible con- 
tributing factor (as do Adoook and hoaley 31). but at 67-8 he is 
mistaken to deny that-, we have good reason, to believe Perikles 
374" 
opposed Kimon's foreign policy, drawing attention only to 
the lack of evidence directly associating Perikles with the 
anti-Spartan movement in the late 460s, and failing to use the 
important evidence provided by the trial. 
65. Sealey 1) 62_4ß cf. 70, ' 2) 258. 
66. Seeley 1) 62-3 - 
67. See Moister 276-8 for the evidence and for references to modern 
work; Sohaohermeyr 3) 10 e. g. would date the publioation to 
around 420. 
68. For a study of the ancient 'tradition 'of Perikles' oratory see 
Connor 4) with further references.., 
69. Cf. E. Walker 68 1 Kagan 67* 
70. Seeley 2) 258 has recently agreed that Perikles' age may be an 
explanation of the minor role he played in the trial but be 
clearly still prefers his earlier 'collusion' theory. 
71. Seeley 1) 65 castigates this element on different grounds. 
72. I have given Stesimbrotos the benefit of the doubt in arguing 
that his misinterpretation was based. on his well-attested lack 
of historical sense; it is possible that he has deliberately 
misrepresented Perikles' role, in order to enable him to invent 
a (pornographic - c, f. Athenaio s 13.589 d ! -. e? 
), story. 
Others who believe Perikles was in fact unduly. unenthusiastic 
at the trial include Burný, 2) 55-6l'-Day and Chambers 144N251 
J. W. Cole 49N26. 
73. Cf e. g. Burn 2) 55; soheohermeyr 2) 329,471 sealey 1) 53-4" 
74" See above N52. 
75. See above 1159- 
, 
76. Winnington-Ingram 148. in his attempt to reoonstruot the trilogy 
375" 
writes, "Did Danaus" 
(now King of Argos - see Winnington Ingram 
145-6) "refer the case of'$ypermestra`to the sovereign people? 
Or did be seek to act under his own powers, and did the people 
intervene? " The latter suggestion, would support our inter- 
pretation, but, as winnington-Ingram 148 says, ' the question is 
"perhaps unanswerable". --Petra 54 sees evidence of 'democratic 
propaganda' regarding the responsibility of magistrates in the 
Suppliants. 
77. Raubitachek 7) 91N7=`has applied to our trial'a notioe in 
Demosthenes (23.205) to the effect that Kimon once escaped the 
death penalty byýonly three votes and was fined`fifty talents, 
and so must. have=been found guilty. It is true-. that this 
information could be-combined without formal'oonflict with' 
Plutarch (K. 15.1) if-wO interpret. the: latter* a remark that 
Kimon cFI'K'lv: = -`as'referring only to the 
death penalty whioh he mentions`in'a differentcontext (Per. 10.5). 
As a supplementary argument{Raubitsohek says that Perikles could 
not have distinguished himself at the trial"had Kimon been oom- 
pletely acquitted. The`last point has no validity; as a junior 
speaker he would not have been, held-primarily responsible for 
the failure of the prosecution inlinormal'äiroumstanoea. ° In fact, 
though, if our interpretation of'the. trial is aooepted'Kimon's 
acquittal will have reflected the, partiality of the Areopagos, 
not-the incompetence of the prosecution. " Furthermore it is very 
doubtful, whether Demoethenee' remarks ahould be applied to'the, 
trial of Kimon in 462. ' He ' eaya 'the charge was' töt L- T-1 
As a desoription of Kimon's =trial in `462 this is wrong. The 
376*'-' 
simplest explanation might-be to take Kimon as a slip for 
Miltiades son of Kimon and refer it to the trial shortly 
after Miltiades' Parian expedition in 489 (so Busolt 255N1). 
But even so, Miltiades did not change the constitution at 
Paros (see Kinzl 1) for an analysis of the ancient tradition). 
Did Kimon in reality become involved, in; Parian politics during 
preparations for F. urymedon, perhaps, -in connection with the Naxos 
revolt, with or-without criticism. at: Athens, rand; has Demosthenes 
imported this memory into an equallyývague recollection of Kimonos 
trial in, 462? -If=-r"_---Itbese . questions . 
be answered positively - 
and some explanation_is"required_-IDemosthenes is as. likely to 
have confused the fine, of, Miltiades. withthe acquittal of Kimon. 
Demosthenes' evidence,, _. 
thong , 
ie-, highly, suepioious, while Plutarch 
clearly implies that Kimon waa. completely, acquitted . (The 
parallel to-)&iltiadee. which auch"afineyof Kimon"would_have X 
provided_would. have been-, so striking as to make it surprising 
that we hear nothing else of it). 
I do not believe it. is. safe; to; follow&the,,. 'oorreated' 12S3 
which give ýätptov in. plaoeý. of.. nap 
LWvF 
(as does mohol. 
Ael. Arist. (Dindorf 5l5))ý. though, mo®t,. editore, do. (though not 
Dindorf. or Fuhr-Sykutrie). 'But: if., weroould aooept. it: paleo- 
graphioally"and, historioally, -; and apply. it to 46; it would-be 
highly interesting,. and would confirm,: our., interpretation of, ths 
oonatitutional-baokground. to'-tbe, trial,, aa well. -as require-come, 
modifications , 
in the details. Be Meyer,. 2).: 25! 2 seemed to' aooept 
it*only beoause ofäthe diffioulties involved in reading 'Paros'. 
Reubitsohek! a, point. has., reoeived little, attentions . Connor 
1) 154N6,5)_, 109; is, aonvinced; rKieoble 293N95-is. non-committal. 
377" 
78. See Hignett 1) 204-5; Seeley 1) 52-3"' 
79" See above N52. 
80. R, W. Wallace 263. 
81. See above N59" 
82. See above N52. 
83. Cf. Hignett 1) 195 and the references at 295N7- 
84- See too Seeley 1) 54" I am, not-prepared, however, to try to 
support any of this with AP's idea (25.1. Cf. 41.2) of a 
7C0XLt Xa ... TWV oha iZcav 
between 480/79 and 463/2, which 
has no independent weight as evidences see Busoll 27N2; 
E. Walker 472-4; Hignett 1) 147-8; Day and Chambers 9-10,239 
120-24,126-8, '135- Contrast Giffler 225; Kiechle 281-93 
(especially 292-3); Schuller 178; and see LLJ. Martin 28-9. 
R. W. Wallace 260 and Kinzl 2) 220 and N13, while recognizing the 
valuelessness of the evidence, nonetheless use it implicitly as 
support for'tbeir reconstruotions. 
85. Generally see Connor 2)., 
86. If we could accept Stesimbrotos' evidenoe that Perikles held' 
back in the trial (see text above and N65) then a better 
explanation than either his'affeotion for Elpinike'or'for Kimon 
would be that he and his more senior-friends in fact wanted the 
acquittal because of the disgrace it would bring on the Areopagos. 
87. Among recent scholars see Hignett 1) 203-5; Seeley 1) 53,2) 261 
Forrest 2) 2091 -Rhodes"1) 200-201,204-5,209-10; -'Rusohenbusah 
373-4 and )7341- R. W. -Wallaoe; - J. Mertin'32-3" Day and Chambers 
185 are less confident than most. 
88. The most comprehensive review is to be found'in-Hignett's chapter 
on 'The Revolution"of'462t `1) 193-213*' , 'I'do not, 'in faot; believe 
378" 
the reforms included more than those elements I shall 
be 
referring to. 
89. The same purpose would be served by transferring now the 
responsibility of conducting oertain dokimasiai which the 
Areopagos probably bad (though perhaps only of arohons) to 
the Boule and dikasterion (see Rhodes 1) 176-8,205,2101 
Ruschenbusoh 373-4x34; 
. 
R"7. Wallace 261,266. But see also 
Hignett 1) 205-8). 
90. Rhoden 1) 199-201,205. 
91. The point has been argued by Sealey'l) 46-52 against both Wade- 
Gery and Hignett. Rhodes 1) 204 accepts this and has added some 
points ( 1) 204N1). See too, Forreat 2) 217-18. _Sealey 
8) 266-7 
has interpreted the predicamentfacing Pelaegos in Aisohylos' 
Suppliants, and his solution, in terma of the decisions facing 
arohons. 
92. R. W. Wallace 2681 Rhodes 204N1 thinks there may have been "a 
law at some-point, possibly enforcing a change but more probably 
confirming. an evolution that had already taken place"; C. f. Day 
and Chambers 181-5. 
93" See, conveniently, the collection of quotations of this view at 
Flusohenbusch 369-70, -'adding Schachermeyr 2) 26_33" 
94" Sealey 1) 53-49 cf. 2) 261. 
95". Rhodea 1) 200.2011 Sealey, at 2) 258,261,267N7. 
96. Thus Sealey's interpretation leads to the paradox that although 
ICimon's prior. acquittal at the hands of-the Areopagos in his 
'euthynai' was considered unjust,, 'he was nonetheless acquitted 
again by the popular court judging the 'eisangelia', yet at.,. _, 
(nearly) the same time Ephialtes was able to muster sufficient 
379" 
popular support against the "particular abuse" which was being 
perpetrated in the unjust Areopagos, ' euthynsi' hearings. 
97" J. Martin 37-9- 
98* Ruschenbusch 375- 
990 R. W. Wallace 264.. 
100. R. W. Wallace 263. ,r. 
101. R. W. Wallace 264" 
102. See too J. Itartin' e comments 34 ("3")-- 
103. R. W. Wallace 264.. 
104. R. W. Wallace 264, cf. 263. 
105. Rog. Wallace 262, cf. 264. 
106. See Frost I);. - Kluwe 2) 54-5,57 goes further. 
107. Many members of the Areopajos, no doubt, supported Kimon's pro_ 
Spartan policies with conviction as well as out of. personal 
regard for Kimon. 
108. I believe this was considered a more strict control over 
magistrates, pace J. Martin 35, who thinks-this not the case 
because the popular_jury's, were more susceptible to demagogy than 
the Areopagos. Nonetheless, -the, reduction of, tbe possibility of 
partiality based-on personal connections will have been considered 
a more strict supervision of magistrates'_,; activities. 
109. On Sealey's interpretation of the relationship between democracy 
and sovereignty of an assembly, see above N32.,, Further references 
on the early history of the word 'demokratia'. are'listed in 
Seeley' a article.. See too Kinzl 3). For the correct inter- 
pretation of the (possible)=Spartan reaction to the reforms see 
J. Ldartin 37, and on Thuoydides'. description of ., 
the Spartan view 
of the Athenians -in 7.462 as (102.3) see 
380. 
J. R. Cole 379- 
110. It is probable that when the vote on aid to Sparta was taken 
the full significance of Kimon's behaviour and acquittal and 
probably the neoeasity for reform had already been reoognized, 
The possibility-that Kimon had`bad no good reason not to 
invade must have been oonsidered'ae soon'as news arrived that the 
forces were returning to' Athens, and so the Athenians had had 
several months toponder the issues of sovereignty involved. 
Also, attention mayxhave'been focused on Kimon's 'eutbynai' because 
Ephialtes' attaoke'on`Areopagites bad perhaps illustrated the 
partiality of the Areopagos. 'When Kimon was sent to Sparta 
reform was probably in the air beoaaetojudge by Thuoydidea' 
account (102.3) Kimon'and his men did not-remain long in Lakonia, 
i'- and by the time theyureturned`the reforms had been passed (P1. K. 
15.1 does refer to Kimoriie'absence'at`Ithome - see above N15; 
Pl. K. 15.2 says Kimon tried to ý repeal "the laws - and this notioe 
therefore prohibits the, idea -(based`, only" on modern oonceptione) 
that Kimon had been' ostracized before the reforms were effeoted, 
see J. R. -Cole 374-=8 , (though not -all` his arguments are valid); 
of the finer, ohronologioal'point of whether the dismissal or 
reform came first I agree with Deane-20-that'"we simply do not 
know"). ý, .. _ 
111. See J. ! artin`34 ("2")3` Forrest'2)21-8; 216. ' 
112. Scholars who give credence to the theory include Cloche 34N1; 
Kagan 733 Rignett1)193,196-7`341; ` J. R. "Cole 378; - J. D. 
Lewis 138-9. we'do notknow the oompoeition`of-the force sent, 
by sea, on this seoond'relief expedition, for Aristophanes' four 
thousand`hopliteä`(Lys. ''1143-4)'belong to the first expeditions 
381. 
there were, however, presumably' many. hoplites'among this 
not inconsiderable", (Thuo0" 4102.1) force. 
113. Plutarch (K. 15.2, _3) creates the' impression that Kimon's 
ostracism followici swiftly upon 'the diemiaBal from Lakonia 
(in 462) and his'attempts-to repeal" the reforms (of 462/1), and 
so we should date hisoätracismµtö462/l. I am not prepared, 
incidentally, to'base`any ohronologicäl deductions on Theopompoe 
fr. 88, as is commonly dons: e. g. byxWilamowitz 2) 293-41 
Deloch 1971 ATLý172; 'Raubitechek'3)ý379; see Connor 1) 27-30, 
103_61 Cf. Schaohermeyr 2)'241x32; ct. below N 116. 
(Deane's analysis of`Plutarch's°evidenoe for the date of Kimon'e 
ostracism (57-8Hs unsätisfaotory'and unconvinoing (the 
referenoe to'Pl. K. 9 4. 'on`paae 58 is'a slipýforIPer* 9-4))- 
114, Between his return from Lakonia and ostraoism day Kimon probably 
'hadxsomething approaching six months in which to demonstrate his 
obstinacy, whiohg-paoe Deane-'57, was longyenough. ' 
The word t, tfoýqto5 -is not attested until later in the 
fifth oenturyy(eee Connor 2)i1C1-2) though Plutarch's perhaps 
anachronistic terminology does not mean that the attacks on 
Kimon's negative attitude to the demos which Plutarch describes 
are unhistorical. T OX 
S nýu05 is attested as a name in the 
first half of the fifth century (see Connor 2) 101N20). 
115. See also Barns 172-31 Day and Chambers 134,144N25; J. R. Cole 
377" 
116. See the analyses of Belooh 210-111 E. Walker 468-91 contrast 
Kagan 91-41 Meigga 111,422-3; 
_ further references at Bayer 
and Aeideking 137; 
cf.. 
N113 above. 
117. Though see the refleotione of Jaooby 2) 13-14 and 1; 9. 
382. 
118. See Beloch 2) 153 followed by e. g. Kagan 74 and N58; cf. 
Vanderpool 2), 1) 238; cf. Bicknell 4) 175- 
119* See chapter eleven V9. On the 'Kimonian' character of at least 
four of the paintings see Jeffery 42-6; Bicknell 2) 429. On 
the relationship of Peisianax to Kimon see Davies 376-8- 
120o On the question of aristocratic patriotism, though, see the 
analyses of the evidence by Pusey; Chrou st. 
121. The divorce In 
's 
deduction of E. Meyer's ( 2) 27), based on 
Plutarch Kimon 4.2 and interpreted as the result of political 
conflict between Kallias and Kimono Davies 259 accepts, though 
Belooh 45 rejected the deduction. 
122. Despite Bicknell's acceptance ( 1) 77 and Nl), of Plutarch's 
statement (Per. 24.5) that this woman was married first to 
Hipponikos and then to Perikles, I still find the traditional 
correction of Plutarch, on the evidence of the woman's children, 
more persuasive;, see Belooh 35; Davies 262-3., Seeley 1) 37N789 
64, emphasiaes the good relations between Kallias and Perikles 
but draws a different conclusion. 
3 83" 
CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
-r 
VOTES 
1. I exclude from this statement two recent articles by Schreiner 
(1) and 2)). He has proposed, a complete revision of several 
aspects of the obronology,. of, the Pentekonteetia. But his re- 
construction is,. in-my, -view, -completely, vitiated not so much 
because it is based on a, willingness, to reject Thuoydides' 
evidence, nor even-because, he, makes tbe_anoient-historian out 
to be a monster of, deoeption, w; but bsoause it requires us to 
2. 
3" 
4" 
5" 
believe Thuoydidee4wae prepared to: make, a fool of himself by 
publishing the historical, collage which Sohreiner'e reconstruction 
would make Thuoydidea' ezcuraus on tbe? Pentekontaetia. Because 
our basic prinoiples", of"souroe criticism are so divergent, it is 
perhaps permissible to. forgo discussing individual differences 
between our views. : (Though--for a discussion of Schreiner's 
approach to the date, of: tbe Naxoa. revolt see Milton 272-3)- 
See e. g.. Busolt 422N1; Beloch -213-14. t ,., 
Though Deane 68-71-has argued thatrthe invasion should be in 
winter 446/5. r-eigge 181 dates the invasion to May, primarily 
to enable the, Spartans"to, destroy the corn most-eff eotively, but 
the Truce may have": held -them _back, 
tillýlater_ in -the year. 
Paoe comme 413 "- ý'. ä- ,, - . 
I do not find attractive Gomme! a: suggestion (325,328)-that this 
notice has been misplaced, -in-Thuoydides'7text, and 
that it 
should come after, --not-, before, the notice of the Truce. Gomme 
did-not press it, -, and, I, thinkrBengtson; l); 212 and N2"is alone 
in having-taken it up..; _, Belooh. 202 miscalculated. See Nesselkauf 
(at Cloche 29N5)-on. Taeger.; « On Raubitsohek's interpretation of 
384. 
ý" at-o-%txövrwv &-riov Tpccjv_ . see, Connor 1) 150 N17 
(2). I 
do not know of any scholar who has accepted bis conclusions on 
the date of the Five Years' Truce 
_(though 
Schaohermeyr 2) 141N32 
thinks his conclusions are, 'possible')., will (see Bayer and 
Heideking 138 and N55)-relies on Diodoros (86.1) to date the 
Truce in 454/3,. as does Schreiner: l) 28,56N17. I am not 
prepared- as Meigga 125 -is, ", to date the treaty early in 451 
because of the tradition linking the recalled Kimon with it. 
Even if Kioon was recalled (and Andokides'- Ka. Ta 
JE CL 
-V 
(3.3) does not say, and needn!. t' imply'. that he was recalled, pace 
ý". Connor. 1) 104-51- Ilsigga 423; : Schreiner 1) 28) shortly before 
his period of- ostracism, expired. itýwould not. be: safe to assume 
that the Truce was, -therefore, concluded in 452/L. 
6. ATL 173; cf.. Belocb 202-3; Bayer and Aeideking 135N48- 
7*- Contrast. Gomme "325-6,409-13, --' '- 
8. ATL 173, -178-(sorto. Schreiner-l) 36-7);., Cloche 29 (so too 
Ueiggs 110-ll and N1; v: , cf.. 
Kagan" 97N57). :. F.. . 
90 W. P. Wallace, 258. dates: the: Thessalian, expedition and, Perikles' 
operations oorrectly,. but, ieprepared to aooept that, Tbucydides 
placed the end of: the Egyptianoampaignrbefore; theee, two, enter- 
priced only for effeot,, lerittrretracted, hie advocacy of a 453/2 
date for the-end. of the Egyptian campaign at., ATL, 169p_ Cf. 
Gomme 412N2. --References to, earlier. work: on-. the-ohronology of 
the Egyptian. expedition atýBusolt 304_5N1.,. - 
10. ATL's attack on this-date (165-70) has been almost universally 
rejected. Deane 
, 
55 accepted it f ,- 
in my view the , scholiast' e 
evidence is the-conolusive'objection-to his. proposed 454 date 
for Tanagra (46-62).:. On, Raubitachek see below 
385" 
11. Nesselhauf, followed by Cloche 29, insisted that the 'decisive 
event' of the final Egyptian narrative must be subsequent to 
Tolmides' expedition ( cf. Gomme 320; Meiggs lllNl). But since 
109. l,, -2 is clearly recapping, we are not on firm ground when 
we argue that any particular point before the end of the 
expedition must be in its proper chronological position in the 
narrative order, and not also recapping. (In fact I agree with 
their conclusions though I prefer to arrive by another route); 
see, more carefully, Bayer and Aeideking 133. Contrast 11cNeal's 
suggestion (315) on the location of chapter 109, (but with 318-19). 
12. See e. g. Busolt 328N3; Kolbe 266. 
13. Comme 410 adds the return of the survivors and surrender of 
Inaros as possible ends for the expedition, which I doubt was 
in fact the case. 
14. See Belooh 204; von Domaszewski 102 (though in the text he 
implies Tolmidea' periplous was after knowledge of the defeat 
in Egypt, whioh is impossible); Barns 175 (presumably followed on 
this point by Scharf 1) 316); Raubitschek's date for the end of 
the expedition ignores the terminus post quem provided by the 
periplous of Tolmides (11) 38); Judeich 14 dates the end in 
455, which (with his "Anfang 461" alternative for the beginning 
(5N1)) is possible. I have seen no convincing argument, 
independent of other'chronological ooncluaiona, in favour of 
dating the periplou s to one or other half of 456/5- 
150 Cr `-^ "C If . .4 
2E_-_b0L_. s- £_zvý.... 
-. oilEfe 
"ÖLt)/. 
-CR, this 
must mean six (roughly) full years, pace, e. g., Kolbe 266, and 
most commentators take it so. - W. P. Wallace 258N16 thinks it more 
386o 
likely- to mean ' in . 
the seventh year! I-,,, if ; so,, 
I think only 
just. Caspari miscalculated.: Barns 175,,, would, start these six 
years with, his putative Kyprian campaign,; in: 463/2, believing 
(170-71) the involvement-. inEgypt to, have.: begun, only in"461. 
This in an unacceptable interpretation of Thuoydides, not. 
because be would be giving a duration at,, theend of operations 
whose beginning he has omitted (which-. is what be did-for the 
Yessenian war), -but because, 
it is unlikely_ that he, should. lump 
operations in Kypros-, together with. ones in Egypt an a "Levantine 
war". _ý i`. 
16. Barns 171 is certainly right to: insist; on the, natural meaning of 
4ývo L__ 
(Thun. 104.2),,; i. e.. they were. --! on their way' or 'about to go'; 
cf. Raubitsobek 11) 38.. Contrast e. g. ATL 260 N79. 
17. One of the main reasons, why scholars have been attracted to this 
--, possible but improbable early,; date for. the Egyptian expedition 
is to enable them to associate-_it, withvPlutaroh's notioe (K. 15.1) 
that the reforms, of-;, Fphialtes, (effeoted;; in 462/11 AP 25.2) were 
carried out after Kimon. had-,:,,, E £7ýi-t' - but-this is not 
a. neoeeeary aeeooiation.: (' cf.;. ohapter.. thirteen , 
N15); . see von 
Domaazeweki 11; Barns-167,. 1709,, 172, who'is-well aware of the 
danger to=his thesis: presented; by, -the neoeesity. of fitting the 
end of the Thasos revolt,, trialq_aid}to,, Sparta and an expedition 
to Kyproa into the_period, requiredq; reaorts.. to dating the trial 
of Kimon before the end of_the Thasos revolt (deted, by, Barns to 
46.1/2) which. oonfliota, with, Plutarch. (. ^cf.; 
ohapter-thirteen N15). 
Scharf 1) 313-15 has. no problem, beoause he ia-working in . 
the 
, ., 
untenable belief .. that, the capitulation of Thasos, as well-as 
387" 
Kimon'a trial, were oompleted'before the end of 464/3. Judeioh 
4-5N1,13-14,13-14N1 argues'°the possibility that the Kypros-. 
Egyptian expedition began'in'462, 
(see referenoe at N14 above, 
however), though not with', Kimon, whom`he oorreotly'hae sailing 
off to Lakonia in 462. -Raubiteohek 11) 38 does not explain how 
Kimon should lead, therKyprosEyptian 'campaign'"during the summer 
of 462 B. C. at the same time as the Athenian second auxiliary 
expedition to kessene". :. Belooh'205,2) 151-2; 
( cf. Taeger 18) 
did not believe 
J ?)0 s9 'referred'to the Kypros-Egyptian 
expedition, but nonetheless believed, it' left in 462-and that Kimon 
would have led it-had'it not been for the Spartan appeal. His 
main reason for dating it: early, was tbat'it seemed to fit Kimon'  
Policies so-gell (eee"Gomme-307). 3 
18. E. g. Busost 3471 E. Meyer 2) 75"` - 
19. E. Walker 470, cP. -75-69:. # 
20. Though his argumentxfor, placing=the'Argive embassy after the 
allianoe -with- Athenawas miaplaoede=-"Argos was 
in danger of being 
attacked" and ! Walker thinks this situation obtained after her 
alliance with `Athens. But she was 7co> i_L. ot5 to Sparta 
before'her allianoe'witb Athene, 'and'eo`already in danger of being 
attacked (Thuo., -102.4). 'The reason'why the Argive embaeey should 
be dated after the alliance with Athene'is-becau`ee it was 
obviously"a joint embassy. A moment 'a'rellection on°the nature 
of approaohing great kings will oonfirm that it is inconceivable 
thatýthe Athenian envoys should be loitering around; able'to 
overhear offioial-embassies. This means theýAthenians were also 
enquiring about,. tXI ºý ' -whioh -is no 'doubt why ITerodotos' source 
sought to separate the 'two embassies. , :-" 
388. 
21. Hignett 1) 194N4; Sealey 1). 99N7,4)-332 and N1 and Barns 
173N2 follow E. Walker. explioitly, "and Meiggs 92-39 145 and 
Schreiner 2) 35 come to the eamsoonolusion as: E. "Walker. 
Ehrenberg 1) 431N29,437N74 places the embassy at some time 
after the Thasos revolt., Wade-Gory 228-9 (a weak argument against 
E. walker's view at 229N2); ,,, Cf. ATL 304 and CrUlke 63 keep to the 
traditional-view. 
22. I am not prepared: to support this date with Kolbe'a argument 
(265; cf. E. Meyer -568N1). conoerningapossible connection 
between the beginning of"the;! Tribute, Lista'q removal of the 
alliance's treasury from Delos to Athens, and the collapse of 
the Egyptian campaign. -. Cfe e. g. Cloche 28; Gomme 410; Wilke 
65N2 (apparently) 1. AML, p. 75; - ., there; are_ too many-insecure inferences 
for it to be of-muoh values ;; see Scharf 1) 312-131 _. Cf. Barns 
176; Pritchett 2); especially, l9'(oritioism"at. Leiggs 421)1 and 
the reference to will at Bayer, and Heideking, 134 and 1444" 
23. Be* the referencea. at ohapter. ten"N12, and on, method especially 
l'oReal. 
., y 
24. See chapter ten N12. 
r. 
25" See the referenoea at McNeal,, 308N5, adding E. Meyer 502-3N1 and 
Deane 19-30,48-50 (the. latter dating the capture, of Naupektoa 
after Oinopbyta, (30)ywhioh. he dates in 454 (47-62))" 
26.1 note, in passing, though, that the argument that we should 
believe-in a_ siege,, of_Ithome, continuing into the 450e in order 
tosender Spartan, inaotivity,, in-tho_First Peloponnesian War 
"reasonable" (eo_recently : Reece 118-19;, -Deane 38-42) is not 
valid. The: supposed_end of;, the siege in the mid-450a effected 
no change in Spartan behaviour. (Even if it were possible to 
389. 
date Tanagra after the end, of the revolt, as Deane does, the 
operation was hardly the-action of. men°itohing to get at the 
Athenians). Furthermore ,. we. hardly need4to-, seek an external 
reason for Spartan 
rjcru ýC'a- =" cf., e. g. Thuo. 68.1 - 71.7). 
If Spartan behaviour, concerning the second request for assistance 
and the dismissal of-the Athenians is anything to go by, we might 
well be misguided in- trying. to. find- reasons which render Spartan 
actions "reasonable"! 
27. See e. g. Belooh 2) 165N2; Scharf 2) 155-6 and 156N1,159-60. 
28. Cf. e. g. ATL 167; 1 Gomme -, 4051 - .! ° pace- Hammond' 2) , 402-3 . 
29. Reece 117. .. r..,. 
30. See chapter thirteen` A4. 
31. The Korinthians will, ofrcourse,. 'have regarded-the alliance as 
an unfortunate realignment;, -for Korinth did not enjoy good 
relations with Argos in this periods see Strabo 8.6.19 (P"377) 
and Plutarch Kimon°. 17.1. --There is no reason, however, to believe 
that Argos. and Korinth were enemies in the strict sense of the 
word, as Argos: and. Sparta. probably were,; forýthe inscription on 
a helmet concerning., an., Argive. victory. over: Korinth (Hill, Meiggs 
and Andrewes B110. (p. 322))_, seems: to come. from a later. period, 
"about the middle of_the", fifth century". epigraphioally, according 
to Hicks and-Bill 4614 see too Jeffery, -53N50.32. 
Cr__ Kagan. 79. r.... - r_,... 
33" See further ae'3te. Croix 214-18. -'_. 
34" The Megarians were at: war-with, -the Korinthiansi°" Thuo. 103.41 
see the references' below N51 for those who recognize the fact 
ti that the alliance -with Vegara, meant:. war. - i'ý.. 
35" Rammond -2) 403 and 
390" 
3 6. Hammond 2) 463N1; Reece 119-20 ,... . 
37. If accepted, this argument also precludes dating the capture 
of Naupaktos before-tbe Spartan'- insult, - which would otherwise 
not be impossible, and`in view of, the, public, debate of*464-2 
would not have been intrinsically improbable. - 
38. Hammond 2) 379-81, ' 400. -- ` .ý:.. 
39. For two possible reasons why the>expedition- to Kypros seems to 
have been later than. we=should,, expect"in*- getting started, see 
below N47. 
Q0. Thuoydides (102.4) makes it. fairlyralear, that the Athenians felt 
the Spartan suspicions of: sympatby-with the helots were unjustified, 
and I think we should believe them; E., Walker 71; , Burn 2) 56-7 
and Schaohermeyr 2)133`eig. do: not;. Lang 2). 269. isn't impressed 
with the-evidenoe-for feelings at Ithome; see too Scott. 
41. See N50 below. 
42. See too chapter thirteen N50- 
:> 43- Cf. Cloche 2)54. 
44" This may be the same man: who., as'Spartan, prozenos (Xen. Hell. 6.3.4) 
played a part in the negotiations with-Sparta over the Thirty 
Years' Peace in 446/5 (Diod. 12.7); this is Davies' opinion (258), 
while Belooh 44-5 thought the ambassador to Sparta, was. the nephew 
of the one who. went to Sousa. "-. If. the two'are the same man it 
suggests Kallias did not-express the -wisdom of negotiating with 
Artaxerxes in terms which were'ezplioitly'anti-Spartan. 
45" Demosthenes 19.273'might-reflect anger at Kallias for having 
proposed the embassy. 
46. Cf. the attractive suggestion at ML'p. 76-that'the use of the 
singular £v 'CO(- 'ýoýý tä at' Iß 12 928 - ML nr. 33. refleots 
391" 
the idea that the war: in Hellas was the same as that against 
the Persians. 
47. On Hammond's chronology ( 2) 379-819 400) the end of the )esaenian 
war was not until 460/59, -and so the dispatch of aid to Inaros, 
in summer 460, as we saw, since it comes after the end of the 
1Sessenian war in Thuoydides' narrative (Thun. 103.1,104.1) must 
also have been in the second half of 460; as the Kyprian 
expedition bad only just begun, or was about to begin (see ! 16 
above), at that time, it seems to have, got off to a later than 
usual start. Perhaps. preparations, mustering and training occupied 
the earlier part of the sailing season; and/or perhaps the 
Athenians were. anxious not to leave before their crops' most 
vulnerable months had passed without-any invasion by their enemies. 
48. As Cloobe 214-16 seems.: to. 
49" See de - Ste. Croiz. 186-7 for a recent appraisal of, the strategio 
usefulness. 
50* As de Ste. -Croix 181-2 has argued. 
51. See e. g. Burn 2) 74; Jeffery 52; Kagan80-811 =, Usher 404; ae 
Ste. Croix 182,187-8;.. Meiggs 92; Soaley 1) 6132) 261-2; Deane 
32; J. B. Cole 371.,. -(Almost all: contrast, Salmon 128-9). 
52.1-do not believe (as. e. g. Caspari 199; W. P. Wallace 256; Kolbe 
266-7; ATL 174, and N53; , 
ML p.? 5; lieigge 101; Bayer and 
Heideking 124N4, do) that IG 12 928 " ML nr. 33 can only, or is 
very-likely to, -belong to the , 
first. year of the Fgyptian campaign; 
see Gomme 311,412N2; Barns 167; -Soharf, l) 317,2) 157 and Ni; 
Westlake 2) 65; McNeal 320; , Fornara, 3) 45-6;, =Deans 35-8, 
109N14; - gypros had, to-a large extent been lostto the, Persians 
before Furymedon, and; ao far, it_had not been. dilly recovered. 
Since the Athenians and their allies must have been using some 
39? " 
part of the island seaway station''(thia'ie intimated by 
Thuoydides' a'. XO IXövr£S T, 
ýý` "' KüýCPo" (104.2; 
differentlys'Wade-Gory in, Barns: 171)) they will have encountered 
attacks; this in -also an adequate-explanation of the casualties 
in Phoenicia, probably' Boros: -see'' ATL' 9-llß 260-61; cf. 
Sohaohermeyr 2)35; ' see' too Libourel"'606. ' -`On the other band, 
I'would not rule out as impossible the-idea`tbat the Egyptian 
campaign was begun'in-the same'campaign'season in which the 
fighting at Italieie, ' Kekryphaleiaý9'Aigina" and Megara (IG I2 928 
ML nr. 33; Thuo. 104.2-106.2) 'took plaoe'('cfo e. g. F. Walker 
76; Cloche 30, ' 216,222). '' It -is unsafe'-to believe that the 
casualty lists-cover only`one'archon year, as Fornara; 3) 44 
unconvincingly argues, `in contraetto' the now orthodox view. 
There is, of-course; every reason to`follow Thuoydidea' 
narrative = order-'(103.4 - 104.1) in taking the Megarian alliance 
as prior to the requeatiby Inarost'see e. g. Cloohe 29-30. 
53. The traditional' unwillingness to' accept'Thuoydident'implioations 
concerning the'numbere committed to Egypt throughout'the six'' 
years has been expressed with variations, some drawing support 
from that inaccurate'scribbler (see'anoient"castigation at N. P. 
Wallace 254N3 `and' the' asaessmenta of'Meiggs'107, '475 and Bigwood), 
Ktesias (in particular Caspari; W. P. Wallace; Adcook; Cloche 
219-20; Scharf 1) 321N3; '; ýSchreiner 1) 35-6; see also Westlake 
2) 63-5 and the'referenoes°at 63Nl9f'"Barns`170, `l75N3,176; 
and most 'fully, '" Salmon-90=192). "The'most common view'is that' 
after the initial'viotory'the'bulk`-of the', fleet: returned'home, 
and this is held-to''explain events in Wellas (see Caspari 200; 
W. P. Waüaos'ý259-60; '° Adcook'4-5; 'comme'321-2; ' 'Westlake 2) 60, 
393" 
1"e ATL 177N61; Deane 35-7; 
. 
cß. Schart 1) 324). Recently, 
however, scholars have not"only been more willing to aocept 
Thuoydides' implications (see 1Seiggs 106-8, '472-6; " C!. Sealey 
2) 272,295N2) but'it has also=bean shown by'Liboure1 607-9 that 
the Peloponnesians could hardly have , dared-faoe the Athenians in 
the Saronio Gulf unless many, more - than f ifty, or so ships were 
away in Egypt-(the-fact that Libourel 609 mistakenly believes 
the Spartans were stillýengaged'at Ithome does not muoh alter 
the weight of his argument)- On, the -rP' 
ý PCL5. SLI; J0/OL 
see now Liboure1612-13. 'The diff erenoe'in Athenian manpower 
between the occasion when Jcyronides led the oldest and the 
youngest (Thus. 105.4) 'and- the -XovEjf. 4Cforces of Tanagra 
(Thuc. 107.5) will, then, --have been the result e-of=anew, stage in 
the siege of Aigina,. as, E. _Walker 
81 andýGomme'315 suggested. 
54" Beloch 205; , Burn-, 2)- 73. 
55 " at. Gomme 306-7}and. Nl; "virtually total"s Kteaiae 
(fr. 14) 
says the otherwise-unknown Chari(e)timides=wee one of the Athenian 
generals, and so, --presumably not oppoaed"to tbe, expedition. See 
Busolt 306N2. 
56. Beloah 205,2) 151-2. ý(I, have'referred. to the"modified proposals 
of von Domaeaewski, %Taeger, Barns;, Soharf and Raubitsobek above 
. ''r''-" in discussing', the chronology) 
57. C1oohe 2171- Dienelt, referredvto byýKagan 82 and N15; -" cf. 
E. Meyer 549, who'. portrays the offeneive'against the Persians as 
not motivated originally by the "radikale Partei"; Burn 1) 52 
considers but. rejeots the-idea-of a oompriae; see-further 
references at Salmon 125N7. 
58. Thereibaa, 'in-my: -view, 'been a, tendenoy toover-interpret hiaýdeath. 
394" 
59" See Sealey 1) 62,68-9E 
, 
Kagan 83.. . 
60. He may have been general at Tanagra,, but Plutarch_(Per4,10.1 . -2) 
cannot be trusted. Thucydides chose tovmention five, general ships 
of the First Peloponnesian War, {two, of Myronides 
(105.4,108.2 
-3), 
one of Tolmides (108.5), one_of, Leokrates (105.2); and one of 
Perikles (111.2).,, This may, rroughly, refloot the relative, importance 
and activeness of. these, four leadera, during the war. 
30zo- 
61. See Sealey 1) 68, E The. fact that Perikles . 
"seems to_have had 
friendly relations with some, leading. men at Sparta" (Sealey be. 
cit. ), of course, provides no reason againatrbelieving he was 
anti-Spartan at this or a, later stage. 
The anecdote at Plutarch Pere i8.2 -3, of, Perikles' cautionary 
remarks to Tolmides, before marching, to; Koroneia looks like 
rhetorical invention. If _itthas, any. 
basis: in fact it merely 
reflects a difference in tactics, not in wider, strategic aims. 
see de Ste., Croix 316. 
62. Kagan 79 thinks !! rikles had to go_along; with,,, the; war out of, 
respect for Ephialtee' memory, _with an. eye to 
hie erstwhile,, 
supporters,, but, that he was in fact unenthusiastic cf. 67, 
68N40,93,95-6; see further,, below N65);,, similarly, Soheohermeyr 
2) 33,46,51-2., de Ste* Croix 315-17 doubts Perikles' enthusiasm 
for Athenian attempts to,, establiah a land. empire, in central 
Greece, though be is less, confident, (316) about, PerikleaI, attitude 
to the Wegara alliance; cf., Veigge 3.8 
63o See above N60. 
64" Frankly recognized by only-, a, -few,., 
including: Gornme. 306 and, Weatlake 
2) 73N42" 
65. See e. g. Cloobe ; 216-25; :, E. Walker 74,779, 
', cf -, 79; . , 
fin 521 
. ,.. 
f 
395" 
Barns 170,173-4; 'Ehrenberg 1)208; "'Usher 4051 Salmon-126-9 
(with many further? references); `RKnightý 2-39 Kagan has a 
different approach, which lead s, 
b 'however, `to the same result. 
He believes "Pericles played a'leadin "'role decision" 
(84820) to assist'Inarose "119'-tries to mödify the implied stupidity 
of Perikles by-postulating that he'"may not have'approved of a 
policy of war withýSparta but'it'had-been the policy of the 
martyred Ephialtee, -andýPericles had'no 
choice but to pursue it" 
because he needed"Ito win the oonfidence'of the party he led" 
(79). In other words Perikles did not make"s large error of mia- 
judgement but knowingly advocated a`"foolishly optimietio'" ooureeg 
"reokleae and ill-oonoeived". ' Kagan's final'oonolueion, though, 
is that Perikles was "perhaps intoxioated with a'bright new 
ideology whose glitter bad not'yet'been tarnished by war and 
corruption" (83)- 
6 6. Of. above N60; ; '`cf. also Plut: `Per. 16.2 _3. Thoukydidee 
Lilesiou was probably' not' yet"influential. 0 'see Raubiteohek 10) 87. 
67. See, correctly, 'Sohaohermeyr 2146. '°It'ia-very unlikely that 
Perikles enjoyed a partioularlyýprominent`position'in'460. U. 
was only in bis early thirties, 'and had come to serious public 
attention, albeit`creditably a'mere two years earlier. So far 
as we know, he had'one uneventful'etrategia, to, this name. His 
family background-was' an-"aeeet, "sopecially- eince"he-'hed'kept his 
distance from the "grand coalition", itboigh our analysis-of the 
470a should warn n egainst over-emphasizing this source of'' 
influence. Like manys aoholare'''I do 'not `believe the tradition 
attributing-an, "active-role to-Perikles in'the reform of" 
Ephialte8 (Aristotle Pol: 1274'a 71AP 27: 1) de®erveä credenoef 
396"` 
see e. g. Rignett l) 197; Sealey 1) 69-70; Day and Chambers 
143 N19; Sobeohermeyr 2) 47; -Connor 
1) 183N21; Rholes 
1) 202N3,2) 151; it may reflect the recognizable political 
association between tbe, two men in the 460a, or is perhaps a 
retrojeotion based, on Perikles' later introduction of jury pay 
(Aristotle Pol.,. -1274 8,7-91 AP 27.3., -41.,. Pluto. Pere 9.2,, -31 
Plato Georgias 515 e); but see further Comme 327,329'; Wads- 
Gery 235-81 üignett 1) 342-3; Connor 1) 32-6,, 43-41 Day and 
Chambers 35N459 143 
, and 
N21; Podlecki. 1) 97-8, , 175NN 54-6. 
The necessity of payment for jurors is more likely to have become 
apparent only with. ezperienoe; , 
cf. Seeley 1) 701 pace leigge 
, 
94N4" Scholars who emphasize Perikles' junior status in this 
period inolude E. Walker 69; Hignett 1) 254;. Burn 2) 471 
301; 
Sahaohermeyr 2) 479 242N34; Sealey 1) 61, X Will (see Bayer and 
Heideking 128); 
 
Kagan 68.799,96". Kagan, believes, nonethelesa, 
that on Ephialtes!, death Perikles "assumed the leadership of 
the democratic faction. and of the, state" (78); esimilarly,, 
Hammond 5) 106-71., Usher 404-5; Knight, l-3,6 portrays Perikles 
in what appears to be single combat, against the Peloponnesian 
League, and the_Persians in Egypt., 
Another possible. friend, of Ephialtes who may have been aotive 
now, ia the Arohestratoe mentioned at AP 35.2-( cf. e. g. Eignett 
1) 1961. Sohaohermeyr. 2) 33; J. D. Lewis 138; and, lese 
confidently, Connor. 1) 125-6;: . the: 
historioity. of Arohestratoe 
as a prominent; politioal. friend of Ephialtes needn't be doubted 
even if the historioity, ofv the events described by, AP 35.2 , 
in 
questioned, ae_Day'and Chambers 129N108_and, Rueohenbusoh 372 
have done). 
rWeknow nothing about him,, though*. n(Since "the 
397. 
positive case" for identifying. him-with-Archestratos Lykomidous 
(see Wilamowitz 1)'-68N401- Busolt'270N1)-"is, substantially 
political" (Davies 346-7) it'would be circular to base any 
conclusions on's possible connection with" Themistokles) 
68. See text below on the*-analysis' of the events of the-year for 
an explanation of how this feature"could'have manifsated itself 
in practice. 
69. See Kolbe's comments (269) on the effect opposition to the 
Egyptian campaign would have had on Perikles' political standing. 
70. Ehrenberg 1) 208. 
71. Cloche 218; Thuoydidea 104-1- 
72* See J. D. Lewis. 
73" See Rhodes 1) 53 and the references at 53N2,57-60 and 58N1. 
fluwe 1) 302,2) 65,73,80 stresses that a high degree of 
education was necessary in making the decisions facing the 
Athenians in the decades after 480. He deduces that the bulk of 
the demoat therefore, can have made no serious contribution to 
the formation of policy. 460 was an example of the need for a 
complex assessment of the situation- facing the Athenians. The 
results indicate, I think, that the decisions were not taken by 
a small group of highly knowledgeable, men to be rubber-stamped 
by an Assembly of citizens who were, in Kluwe's view ( 2) 65) 
"dumm, leicht lenk- und ausnutzbar". 
74" I believe the primary motive in the Egyptian campaign was to 
damage the king's interests, and would rank as secondary the 
commonly emphasized economic benefits (see Salmon 129-33 with 
further references). Kolbe 269,,,, ' and Cloche 225 think that the 
Athenians may have had their eyes on the possibility of dis- 
398. 
content among their allies, which sounds plausible. 
75. The importance of a new generation is noted by Schaohermeyr 
2) 26, although he interprets the effects differently. 
76. The reader would gain a false impression if he or she were to 
take my recognition of the apparent mistakes of 461-0 as a 
general comment on the viability of Athenian democracy. 
399" 
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